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Multiple forces of the people's liberation army conduct joint drills around taiwan region.
Chinese foreign minister says china will continue to make efforts to rebuild peace between thailand and cambodia and in the second half we'll dive into our year-end special on china us relations.
Welcome to Road Today, a news program with a different perspective.
I'm Gaena in Beijing.
To listen to this episode again or to catch up on previous episodes, you can download our podcast by searching Road Today.
Our top story.
The Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army has begun conducting drills around Taiwan.
The military says the drills are a stern warning for separatist forces on the island and against external interference.
The new round of military exercises that began on Monday are codenamed Justice Mission 2025.
The ongoing drills follow Washington's announcement of an US11 billion arms sales to the Taiwan region.
The package includes more offensive systems than defensive weapons, such as HIMARS, rocket launchers, missiles and attack drones.
Beijing has condemned the move, saying China's reunification is unstoppable, no matter how many advanced weapons are sold to Taiwan.
To delve into this, let's bring in Zhou Bo, Senior Fellow of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.
Thank you so much for taking your time with us.
Thank you.
First of all, what do you make of the timing of this drill?
Why now?
And what strategic signals do you think is ascending?
Well, I think it is natural that we're going to do such a, we're doing this kind of a large-scale drill, because this is just a follow-up to Americans' large-scale arms sales to Taiwan.
I think this is our response to that.
The exercise is called Justice Mission 2025.
How do you see that justice playing out from both international and domestic law perspectives?
And how would you respond to some Western media claims that is raising regional tensions?
Well, you see, Taiwan is part of China.
This is recognized by 183 countries who have a diplomatic relationship with China, including the United States.
But for decades the United States has been violating this kind of commitment and has been selling Taiwanese arms of all sorts.
And right now we're seeing, actually they are upgrading the sales in terms of the content, in terms of the volume.
And their effort is what they called to turn Taiwan into a porcupine.
This is why we would describe this excise as a kind of justice excise, because there is no argument whatsoever regarding the nature of Taiwan, which is part of China.
So that is why we are doing this kind of excise in the name of it.
If you talk about how this kind of excise would raise some tension in the region, and Well probably, I would say yes.
But the problem is, who has caused such a tension?
It's the Americans, and it's also the Taiwanese authorities.
Because this Taiwanese authority, led by Lai Chin De, is different from his predecessor, who is also from the DPP, in that he actually has described himself as a pragmatic.
Taiwan is an independent worker.
Before election and after election, he has actually described the Chinese mainland as a hostile foreign force, and he has actually savored even the academic changes across the state.
So we won't tolerate this and we'll demonstrate our resolve.
Yeah, that he just simply cannot go down the road like this.
Well, you see, we are still having patience and I believe officially, the Chinese government is still talking about peaceful reunification or peaceful development.
But sometimes the ball is not entirely in our court.
As was pointed out by a spokesman from the Ministry of National Defense a few days ago, each provocation would definitely invite more pressure from the Chinese mainland.
So we'll wait and see.
As you earlier mentioned, the US has approved a record 11 billion arms sales to Taiwan, including offensive weapons and closer integration with US forces.
Could you please help us understand this more thoroughly?
What does that mean strategically and what risks? does it create for Taiwan itself?
Well, no matter how much they would try to sell to Taiwanese, it actually would not work that much, because for two things,
One is Taiwan would not move away.
Second, Taiwan is on the side of the Chinese mainland.
But this is a very negative gesture coming from the United States.
So over years, the United States have been exercising this kind of strategic ambiguity, yeah?
But I believe that, with the strength of the PLA getting ever stronger well, this kind of strategic ambiguity can be good.
It actually has changed its substance, yeah?
In the past, it is supported by American military strength.
But nowadays, against the background of PLA getting ever stronger, I would say this kind of ambiguity looks more like a fig leaf covering the worsening weakness or decline of American military strength.
So the United States has been howling out this kind of...
You know, one China policy.
They still talk about one China.
But this looks like a basket that could be, you know, thrown in with anything.
Yeah.
So we do not really trust the Americans, the one China policy.
I think it's just an alibi.
And this kind of arms sales tells me that this is indeed an alibi.
Mm hmm.
But at the same time, US reports indicate that air-to-ground missiles approved as early as 2017 will not be delivered until after 2027.
As of October 2025, US weapons approved but not yet delivered to Taiwan total 215 billion US dollars, nearly 70 of the island's projected 2026 defense budget.
Does this reflect deeper US strategic calculations or are constraints within the US defense industry base increasingly shaping outcomes today?
Well, I don't think so.
I think for two reasons.
One is that President Trump is transactional, right?
And he always wants to make money somewhere and anytime.
And besides, the American military industrial complex of course, want to make money.
Actually, in some American think tanks there have been kind of a discussion going on as to whether the large, you know, combat platforms such as fighter aircraft or tanks would really work because of the changes in modern warfare.
So that is why there are voices, you know, promoting this kind of turning Taiwan into porcupine by providing them more mines or missiles drones, so on and so forth.
So this is an ongoing debate.
But sometimes I do have some questions regarding this, because certainly big commodity platforms wouldn't make more money, right?
So probably they are going to do both.
We've witnessed that China has already hit back with countermeasures against the US companies and officials involved.
To what extent does combining military drills with these diplomatic moves deter Taiwan independence forces and outside interference?
Well, in terms of Chinese sanctions on American industrial complexes, I don't believe that would really play a very big role, in that we actually do not have a lot of interaction with these companies.
But this is a symbolic gesture.
And even symbolism still matters, because these companies would have a lot of interactions with other companies elsewhere with whom we might have some interactions.
So you never know that.
But I read the list.
I found, well, the list has been so long.
It shows our determination, and I would not say that it would not really work.
It shows we are very, very serious.
At least compared with efforts we have taken in the past, this long list looks unprecedented.
So coupled with the ongoing exercise, yeah, I think the message is quite clear.
Because the point is yeah, As I mentioned earlier what our source said yeah, they could still provoke us, you know, sometimes and somewhere,
But time is not on their side.
And so long as they continue to do this, they will just feel the pressure.
Yeah, more and more pressure are coming.
Yeah.
So, because what is the difference between this exercise and the one in the wake of Nancy Palouse's visit?
Well, I believe that just as a rule of thumb.
We did that before, so this time we'll definitely do something new.
We'll just exercise on where we are still having short points.
So, as a result, this kind of exercise will be more and more mature, and I believe that in the real worst scenarios,
Yeah, so I think they will work.
Building on that, what does this drill show about PLA's joint operational capabilities?
And simply put if the mainland had to use military force to reunify Taiwan, what would that look like?
Well, that would just make PLA better prepared.
Actually there has been a concern, For example coming from Indo-Pacific commander Admiral Paparo, who once said well, maybe one day PLA could just make use of such a exercise to launch a real attack.
So I would not comment on that.
But I believe that right now, there is no so-called status quo in the street.
Because in the past, people always talk about how status quo should be maintained.
And I always argue that no status quo is static because it is ever-changing.
After Nancy Pelosi's visit, for example, there's no median line anymore, right?
After that, so we see PLA aircraft, you know, flying to the other side as often as we wish.
So this kind of a provocation would actually backfire.
Yeah, it's always.
I don't believe they can actually stay much out of this kind of arms sales.
One last question.
Some voices have long said the mainland won't strike or the U.S. will step in.
Based on your analysis, do you think the U.S. could actually intervene?
Well, we won't know whether the United States or American allies would intervene or not.
Yeah, we won't know until the last minute.
But I think it is very true for me to say that the stronger we become, the less possible it will be for American or the allies to intervene.
So, for example, Takashi's comments are really stupid in that this actually is a chain reaction.
Chinese, Americans, and American allies all have their own strategic ambiguities.
Because China still wants peaceful reunification.
That is why we don't talk about the timeline of military attack.
And short of that, Americans cannot say whether they were going to intervene militarily or not.
And unless the United States become involved militarily, the allies cannot say whether they would become involved or not, although definitely they do not want to become involved.
We won't know how they are going to respond.
But first of all, I think it is important for us to show that we must have this kind of separate moves checked.
Thanks for your insightful analysis.
That was Zhou Bo, Senior Fellow of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.
The China-Cambodia-Thailand foreign ministers' meeting has convened in southwest China's Yunnan province, a key gateway to Southeast Asia.
A communique released after the trilateral talks outlines five key commitments from Cambodia and Thailand.
The communique says the two countries will work to restore mutual exchanges, rebuild political trust, achieve a turnaround in relations and maintain regional peace.
So for more on this, Xu Yaowen spoke with Professor Song Qingren from the School of Asian Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University.
The recent trilateral meeting between China, Cambodia and Thailand yielded important consensus, and the joint communique released by the meeting outlined five key areas for consolidating the ceasefire and restoring peace.
So, in your view, how significant is the meeting and how committed do you think both sides are this time to keeping their promises?
The trilateral meeting at Fuxian Lake represents a pivotal multilateral upgrade in managing the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute.
I think its significance is at least threefold.
Firstly, it institutionalizes the ceasefire brokered recently.
This meeting transformed our Cambodia-Thailand bilateral military understanding into a politically endorsed roadmap with five clear, sequential pillars, which are from consolidating the ceasefire to long-term relationship normalization.
This provides structured process beyond a simple cessation of hostilities.
Secondly, it formalizes China's role as a guarantor and facilitator.
This communique details China's corporate commitments providing support for humanitarian demining, assisting the RCI observation mechanism, facilitating military dialogue and offering platforms for future talks.
This is a sustained third-party constructive agreement that is implementation and accountability.
Thirdly, it explicitly links bilateral peace and regional stability, notably by having both sides commit to creating a conducive atmosphere for both to postpone the fifth Latin American cooperation leaders' meeting.
Assessing the commitment of both sides requires cautious optimism.
The current commitment appears stronger than in the past episodes due to the high cost of renewed conflict and the structured framework established.
The detailed first nature of the communique suggests both Cambodia and Thailand.
The two parties have invested considerable diplomatic capital and have specific expectations.
Crucially, the inclusion of military representatives in talks indicates buy-in from the institutions directly responsible for ceasefire implementation on the ground.
However, historical skepticism is warranted.
The deepest obstacle of final border demarcation remains unresolved.
Domestic political pressures, especially with the elections looming in both countries next year, could still derail progress if nationalist sentiments are stirred.
Therefore, while the current promises are made within a more robust and supportive framework, their ultimate endurance will be tested in the arduous technical work of border management and the political will to compromise on sensitive Professor.
Thailand and Cambodia signed a ceasefire agreement on Saturday to end border conflict, agreeing to allow displaced civilians to return home.
In light of this, what specific measures do you think both sides need to take during the critical first 72 hours of the ceasefire to ensure its smooth implementation?
I think the initial 72-hour period is critical for establishing predictability and preventing a rapid backslide into conflict.
Specifically simultaneous measures must be taken in three domains, which are military, humanitarian and communication.
Mentally.
Both sides must immediately establish a direct real-time communication hotline between frontline battalion commanders and also higher commanders.
This is essential to manage accidental confrontations or misunderstandings instantly.
They should commence a verified reciprocal pullback of heavy weapons and special forces units from immediate confrontation lines to create a tangible buffer zone.
And joint patrols with licensed officers from both armies, potentially under the preliminary oversight of the agreed ICR observation team, can verify compliance and build on the ground working relationships.
Uh women, entirely.
Their action must be serviced to build public confidence.
The priority is to conduct a joint technical survey to identify and mark minefields and exploded ordinance along key rules used by displaced civilians the civilians.
Simultaneously, both governments would establish coordinated transit centers at great border checkpoints, providing clear information, safe passage and initial aid, for example for the medical checks for returning families.
A visible cooperation on civilian welfare is a powerful peace dividend.
Well professor, given the historical territorial disputes and the failed record of past ceasefire, what do you believe is the biggest obstacle so far to rebuilding trust between the two countries?
The single greatest obstacle to rebuilding a sustainable political trust is the intertwined challenge of the unresolved border demarcation and potent domestic nationalism.
While historical disputes over the poorer weir temple area are the core symptom, the deeper issue is the legacy of the colonial area maps and incomplete joint service, leaving segments of the border open to competing interpretations.
This technical ambiguity provides a perpetual flashpoint.
Any minor military incident or civilian activity in a contested zone can be framed domestically as a violation of sovereignty and triggering a cycle of escalation.
Positive ceasefire failures have created a deep-seated deficit of trust in each other's long-term intentions.
Each side feels that concessions or restraint will be perceived as weakness and exploited later.
Professor, during the mediation we have noticed that both the Cambodian and Thai foreign ministers expressed appreciation for China's constructive and positive role in mediating the conflict and the Thai side particularly noting their appreciation for China's role and understanding in supporting peace between Thailand and Cambodia through Asian way.
How do you understand this Asian way in resolving the two countries' border dispute?
The issue we referenced in this context encapsulates Sui's distinct diplomatic philosophy that prioritizes sovereignty, consensus and gradual pragmatism over legalistic confrontation or coercive pressure.
China's mediation exemplifies this approach through several principles.
First and foremost is absolute respect for sovereignty and non-interference.
China has consistently treated Cambodia and Thailand as equal partners, refusing to unilaterally arbitrate or impose a solution.
Unlike models where a powerful mediator dictates terms, the Asian Wing positions China as a facilitator of dialogue, not a judge.
This is evident in China, providing neutral venues Shanghai, for example and also offering platforms, while insisting, the substance of the agreement must be forged by the two parties directly.
Secondly, it emphasized comfort level and consistency of building.
The process was patient and incremental, involving quiet, behind-the-scenes shuttle diplomacy by special envoy Dong Xijun before public meetings.
This allowed parties to express concerns, frankly, without public post-turing.
The Fuxian Lake communique itself reflects this, outlining a step-by-step process from ceasefire to political normalization, rather than demanding an immediate or encompassing settlement of the complicated border issue itself.
Thirdly, it synergizes with rather than supplements regional architecture.
China explicitly supported ASEAN's central role and worked to complement its efforts, creating an ASEAN-led, China-supported model.
This respects the regional ecosystem and avoids the perception of external imposition.
That was Professor Song Qingran from the School of Asian Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University, speaking with my colleague Xu Yawen.
More to come in the second half.
We'll dive into our year-end special on China-U.S. relations.
You're listening to Road Today.
To listen to this episode again or to catch up on previous episodes, you can download our podcast by searching Road Today.
We'll be back after a short break.
Welcome back.
You're listening to World Today's year-end special with me, Ge'enna, in Beijing.
From Monday through Wednesday, we take a closer look at China's major diplomatic agenda for 2025.
From high-level home-ground diplomacy to the latest developments in China-US relations, to understand how China is shaping its role in the changing world.
Today, let's begin with evolving and complex China-U.S. relations.
In 2025, few relationships mattered more to the world than that between China and the United States.
I'm very happy to meet with President Trump.
Since your re-election, we've spoken on the phone three times and exchanged messages many times.
Under our guidance, China-US relations have largely remained stable.
China and the US have different national conditions, so it's common to have some differences.
As the world's two largest economies, it's normal to have some frictions from time to time.
In the face of challenges, I and Mr President standing at the helm, should lead the direction and steer the overall situation for the Chinese ship of China-EU relations to sail steadily.
Stability was emphasized at the AIPAC leaders' meeting in October, even as competition, trade tensions and geopolitical risks continued to test the relationship.
So we've already agreed to a lot of things, and we'll agree to some more right now.
But President Xi is a great leader, a great country, and I think we're going to have a fantastic relationship for long period of time cooperation or confrontation management of differences or strategic competition as 2025 comes to an end how should we read the signals from beijing and washington where are china u.s relations really heading this is where today our year-end special To explore these questions in depth, we are joined by Dr. Joseph Mahoney, professor of politics and international relations at East China Normal University, Dr. Qu Qiang, professor at Mingzhu University of China.
Gentlemen, if you were to define China-US relations in 2025 using one or two keywords, what would they be?
Professor Chu, would you like to start?
Which specific event best capture the overall tone of the China-U.S. relations for you?
Well, I think if I want to choose the words, probably it will be fighting, but also rebuilding.
I think the reason why we're doing that is that well uh, when uh trump actually been taking the position as a president i don't think china and america has been, you know, cooled down or actually facing a better relations uh, we've been seeing the terror of conflict, we've been seeing the geopolitical conflict and also the selling of the weapons towards the taiwan province, And all that's still been going on.
But meanwhile we've been seeing some progress are still be making in the making, despite of all this kind of zigzagging.
For example, in 2025, President Xi Jinping and President Trump actually has been, you know, get through on their hotlines with each other.
And also both leaders have been meeting on the occasion in the APAC meetings.
And meanwhile I think both sides have setting up a rather solid framework for dialogue through the tariff negotiation.
But meanwhile, you know, we just resumed our high level dialogue systems and a lot of, you know conflicts, even though we're still having it, but still uh, we're making a channel to discuss them in an orderly and also reasonable way.
So, even though we're fighting against each other, for sure, but meanwhile we're trying to rebuild our relations in a very controllable framework.
So i think um Yes, both sides are zigzagging forward.
We have problems, but we'll try to solve it.
Professor Mahoney, what are your words?
Was, this year marked by a return to dialogue, under the banner of seeking common ground while shelving differences, or by intensifying competition beneath the surface?
Well, I'm a little less optimistic than Professor Chu if I had to choose two bullet points as opposed to single words.
I would say that China held the line.
We reached a temporary trade war ceasefire, given the US aggression, trade war aggression directed against the world, but especially China.
But just in the wake of that, we've seen the US now pressing new aggressions, provocations related to Taiwan and likely Japan, as well as threatening Venezuela and Chinese interests in Venezuela.
So China was able to fight the US to a standstill and achieve a ceasefire in the trade war.
But now we see the US advancing other strategic objectives.
Professor Buting, on your point looking back at 2025, the two sides did return to the negotiating table and made notable progress under the guidance of two state leaders.
So, in your view, what was the single most important factor behind this period of relative stabilization?
I don't know that I would use the word stabilization, but I would say that China's absolute firm resistance to the trade war, refusing to buckle and ultimately China's willingness to resort to export controls related to strategic minerals.
This exposed US vulnerabilities and compelled US to negotiate at least a ceasefire or withdrawal for a year.
But I think that that has purchased in turn the new aggressions that we're seeing, related to the threats over Taiwan with proposed 11 billion weapons, But also the apparent not yet confirmed, but increasingly we're suspicious that Japan is being weaponized as a proxy to reinfigurate what the US national security document has once again hailed as the island chain strategy.
Professor Xu, do you share the same stance?
What does 2025 review about the resilience or limits of China-U.S. relations?
Oh, yes.
I do think that both sides still realize that.
You know, the hardcore decoupling is not the solution towards either of the country's problem.
Basically, American and, you know, China need each other.
We're still in a very complementary situation. you know, relations with each other.
For example Trump, especially in his current administration and policies.
They really need to stabilize the agriculture industry And also supply chain and the manufacturing in America.
You know a homeland.
So I think they need you know Chinese market as well as for the Chinese supply chain, to help him to finish this kind of mission and task.
And also for China, while Beijing also want to achieve their ultimate and also very important goal, the revitalization of the nation, as well, as you know, to have a rather successful opening of the 15th five-year program and wrap up a 14th five-year program successfully.
And so, in order to do so, in order to achieve, you know, the chinese style modernization and also have this high quality development with new productive forces i think china wants to, you know, cooperate with an America in high technology, at least remove the sanctions on it.
And meanwhile, I think the both market really need each other.
And meanwhile I think China and America still have a wide consensus and also common ground in a mutual interest in many other international issues.
For example, like the Ukraine crisis and also in lots of the local geopolitical conflicts.
I think Both China and America want the whole world to get more peaceful so that the whole world supply chain can be stabilized.
And meanwhile, the order of the whole world can be restored to some extent.
So I think that's the reason why both nations stand out and try to shake hands with each other, despite of all these differences they have.
But they need to work with each other.
This is not a choice.
This is a must.
Professor Qu.
Building on that, we heard.
Mutual respect and equality are often described as the foundation for managing differences.
This also emphasized by both Washington and Beijing.
Do you believe such a foundation genuinely exists?
Because some analysts argue that clearer guardrails have emerged this year on core issues such as trade and technology, while others contend that tensions have merely been deferred, especially given Washington's approval of a record high 111 billion US dollar in arms sales to Taiwan authority, reinforcing the perception that US efforts to constrain China's development remained unchanged.
How do you assess this?
Well, I don't think the situation is as bad as the observer has been saying.
I think both sides are from China and America.
We still try to find out a very clear red line between each other, even though this red line has been in their revising.
So everybody's trying to, you know.
Cross the river by feeling stone, try to feel which where the red line it is.
But still, I think this kind of a temptation is based on the mutual trust and equality, even though Washington has been endorsed, like you mentioned, all this kind of arm selling to taiwan province and also a lot of the weapon testing uh in near the south china sea.
But i don't think america is trying to cross uh the bottom line that agreed by both sides and also i think china is still is also doing the same thing.
So i think we are trying to feel okay, how far Can I push?
And as long as I pushed until I feel there is a hard line in there, I will stop.
I think this is a strategy of our America and China also.
I don't think China would be the one who aggressively, will change the status quo with its own order or with its own reason.
China won't do so unless someone tried to change the status quo of the Taiwan Strait of the South China Sea in a very violent way and aggressive way.
Otherwise, China is still the guardian of the peace in the whole region.
So I think that these kind of the consensus, or muted consensus between the two sides actually are still one of the most important factors that make sure that the whole world remain in peace.
And I think both sides will still guard it and respect that bottom line.
Professor Mahoney, what's your assessment, given Washington's record high 111 billion US dollar arms sales to Taiwan?
How do you think China and the United States view their relationship respectively at this point?
Do you see any gaps or misunderstandings in how each side perceives the other?
Some people use the term guardrails.
I don't like that term.
I don't think that they're being built or utilized.
I think previously we saw that Biden was unwilling to negotiate, that he pushed his tactics to the breaking point, a breaking point that was reached earlier in 2023.
Trump does appear more willing to negotiate, but we also see him shifting tactics and targets.
And at the same time, there are troubling strategic continuities from one president to the next.
And certainly one could argue that there are only relatively superficial differences in style between the two sides.
If we go back to the first days of the Biden administration, we were optimistic that he would relax some of the incredible tension that Trump had created with China during Trump's first term.
And then we were shocked, of course, to see that Biden was going to take it in a much more vitriolic direction.
And in Trump's case we've seen again a new form of aggression, not only in trade, but also in technology and on the Taiwan issue.
Now here I would strongly disagree with Professor Chu's assessment and to point to this in a way that I think sort of deconstructs his rather rosy depiction.
I think we can look at the PLA exercises the north, the south, the east and the west of Taiwan today, demonstrating China's capacity to shut down the island, to shut down its ports, its airspace and to take the island by force if necessary.
Demonstrating this capacity.
And I think we have to remember that throughout this year we saw Trump's rebranded Department of War.
We saw leaders from that department going to Congress and telling congressional members who were reviewing budgets that China is preparing to be capable for invading Taiwan in 2027, and thus therefore laying the narrative, the groundwork of congressional approval for this record-setting sale of advanced weapons to Taiwan.
And let's recall, going back to 1982, the United States had committed to, through time, reducing both the quantity and quality of weapons to Taiwan.
Now, of course, that was based on an old rubric, when the United States was still locked in a Cold War with the Soviet Union.
And when, of course, the United States believed sort of a proto end of history thesis that eventually its way would triumph.
And of course, history has shown that that that hasn't happened.
We see now the U.S. taking a much more aggressive position, one that really starts with Obama.
But we've seen these continuities from Obama to Trump 1 to Biden, now to Trump 2.
And of course, we see what's happening in the water and the air around Taiwan today.
And I think that's something that should give us tremendous pause about where this relationship really is.
Professor Mahoney, given what you've just mentioned Trump's deeper strategy and also the various pressures and oppressions China faced from the United States in 2025 how would you assess China's strategy toward Washington this year?
And what might his approach be in 2026?
Well, I think what we've seen is China has been very, very self-disciplined.
We know, for example, that the United States was able to bait Russia into a conflict in Ukraine.
And although Russia was able, for the most part, to secure its baseline strategic objectives, we suspect that the US has increasingly tried to bait China into various forms of conflict or self-harm vis-a-vis China, its maritime neighbors, or simply US strategic aggression in the South China Sea or around Taiwan.
Biden repeatedly, I would argue, touched China's red line.
I think selling weapons of mass destruction like nuclear submarines to australia as part of the island train containment strategy and basing atomic weapon bombers in northern australia, again directed towards china, these are highly provocative, as was the return of us nuclear submarine port of calls to south korea.
We have seen recently, more recently, the united states aggressing against Taiwan and Korea in this mercantilist, rent-seeking economic policy that has unfortunately extracted serious concessions from both Korea and Japan.
And, at the same time, we have seen the Japanese leadership struggling to find a way forward and ultimately falling back under the boot hill of the United States.
And there are, I think, reasonable concerns that the US is now directing Japan as a proxy in this reinvigorated island chain strategy.
And indeed we see this in the national security document, where the US says that it will reinvigorate both the first and second island chain strategies, of which Japan is an integral part.
And, of course, we see Japan now extending this and reinforcing this link by its suggestions that it would create a security line with Taiwanese separatists, but also the more recent reports that Japan now believes it needs nuclear weapons and is returning to some of the old militarist discourse that unfortunately prefaced its aggression against China more than a century ago.
So these are all the broader contexts that I think we have to sort of face in a very, very sober way.
Professor Chu, it seems that you're taking a more optimistic view of China-U.S. relations.
How would you evaluate China's approach to Washington this year?
And what do you see coming in 2026?
Well, first of all, like I just mentioned, China and America are still having something in between.
I think it's a red line.
It's a bottom line, but meanwhile it's more like a guardrail to try to prevent things getting worse.
And I think both sides really agreed on that, but also try to solidify this guardrail.
On one hand yes, a both-side situation can be more stabilized and also we have a more foreseeable framework for both sides' relations.
But meanwhile, with this kind of guardrail or the fencing, I think both sides will have very limited contact with each other in a foreseeable future.
For example, right now, America are still having their sanctions on Chinese technologies, like on the chips assigned by conductors, and Beijing are also – kept their options on the rare earths, you know, export.
So both weaponized this kind of the high technology products over through rare earths products.
So I think these on one hand really can, you know, help each other stay on its own turf.
But meanwhile I think, like I just mentioned, the connections and dialogue spaces can be very much limited.
And I do think with this kind of the base tone back in 2025, if we look into the 2026, we'll find out in the future probably we're going to see a sandwich kind of the structure we call a selective recoupling.
So it's kind of a decoupling happening.
But meanwhile, recoupling are also happening in a selective way.
For example, I think at the top level, this kind of the red line or this kind of fencing against each other, still we well exist, for example, like the national security will still be the problem and high technology and our rare earths exported will still be a problem.
So uh, we wouldn't have, you know, like go back to the old golden days like before.
But in the middle turn, I think, for example, like the EV, like the renewable energy, pharmaceutical industry, airspace and aviation, in those so-called controllable sectors, I think the joint venture, cooperation or at least the dialogue can be resumed, because both sides understand we still need each other.
And also as far as for what we call the buttons in the sandwich, which is daily consumptions, market oriented product like the agriculture, like the daily groceries, like the brand, you know, designers products, and also the tourism, education and all that.
I think we are going to resume and even expand our connections with each other.
We're probably going to see more of the american products entering china and also chinese tourists to go to america and also because of this kind of the sandwich structure and the recoupling.
So we're going to have some very complicated you know negotiation, a result on the tariff and on many other economic related issues.
So we're going to see that politically we're not going to make so far with each other.
But economically I think we're going to regain some of the progress we have already made in the past.
So I think that's probably going to be the transcript that is going to happen in 2026.
Professor Xu about the trade and technology.
Many observers expect China-US technology competition to persist or even intensify.
One notable trend is that both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but along different paths.
US efforts, emphasizing fundamental innovation and capital investment, while China focuses on applications and industrial ecosystems.
What does this form of parallel competition mean for the two countries and for the global market technological landscape?
Well, for me i would like to say that china and america is actually the only two competitors in many cutting-edge technologies like ai.
Um, actually we have this kind of the g2 in the formation america are still trying to use as a high-end gpu, plus some you know closed source large language model, you know, to compete with china.
But china are using its localized and local produced semiconductors or with very much enriched zillions of the all kinds of the scenarios for the applications and also the open source of AI to compete with each other.
So I think in the future we're going to see these two.
Basically, this two kind of development route is going to go parallel with each other and also divide the whole world in the relevant area.
For example, in the whole world the AI is probably going to follow either America way or follow Chinese way.
Or there is another possibility that this both way can merge with each other and form some other derivatives.
And this time, I think, a lot of the third party market like the Middle East, Latin America, Africa.
They're going to have to choose which way they're going to do or which kind of the business model is that are going to follow.
And that's going to set a basic tone for the next three or five years for the high end technologies to develop.
See, let's see, all like ai, how they're going to evolve, who's going to be the dominant way, like chinese way or american way?
And that's going to set up the fundamental logic for the whole industry to develop in the next not only five years, but maybe in the longer time, like 10 years or 20 years.
But anyway, i think the point is china and america, no matter how brutal and how you know uh, competitive.
We're going with each other in this sector, but both countries will be the winner.
We have a saying in china when coca-cola are fighting against the pepsi, you know, one of the local brand or the third brand will lose.
This is always the case.
When the both, when the largest two giants are fighting against each other, always the number three and number four is going to die.
So I think the time left for you know the third party countries, like global South nations or even European unions, are very much tick-tocking and limited.
So I think this is something we really need to pay attention to.
Professor Mahoney, how do you view this?
Is bilateral trade heading toward deeper decoupling or could we see a form of selective recoupling?
Well, I think there are two points here, sort of two different points.
The first is I'm not optimistic about the United States sort of embracing Chinese green technology or EVs.
I think we have to point very directly to Trump's abandoning the Paris Agreement.
But more than this his speech at the United Nations, where he declared that climate change and global warming are a hoax.
And part of the broader right-wing narrative in the United States that has specifically described this as a Chinese communist hoax that aims to dispossess the United States of its power related to oil.
We saw, for example, Biden expanding oil production in Alaska, something that no other leader had the courage to do.
And in the new Trump national security document we see the Trump administration saying that they aim to make the United States the energy superpower of the world.
And the U.S. really can only do this through oil.
And US, of course, has a compelling interest to do this, in so much as its economy is still largely dependent on the dollar as the global reserve currency.
And of course, the dollar has an unhealthy relationship with oil.
So that's the first point.
And part of that first point is to look very directly at the conflict that Trump is bringing to Venezuela now, where China has invested billions of dollars.
Venezuela, the country with the world's largest proven oil reserves, and Venezuela, which is also home to very rich resources in rare earths and strategic minerals that Trump is desperate to find a source for.
So there are sort of many different facets being played out right now that we'll have to see where they go, but there are causes for concern.
With respect to the broader question of technology, I think in my analysis I have discussed repeatedly in different venues that one of the things that left China open to Western aggression in the 1800s was the profound technology gap that had opened between it and the more developed countries of the world.
And we have seen since liberation this close awareness from the CPC leadership to close that technology gap and to use different tactics and strategies through time in order to achieve that.
And indeed, this gap has been substantially closed.
In some respects, China leads the United States.
In other respects, it's still trailing.
In others, there's parity or close parity.
And so what we see then, of course, is the US now trying to create and widen that technology gap again.
And, of course, this has direct political support from people like Peter Thiel, from the Silicon Valley oligarchs, as well as the older traditional manufacturing base like Detroit, who don't want to compete head to head with China and have supported policies and policymaking to that end.
The fact is China is now moving towards self-reliance.
I think that this is an unstoppable movement because China doesn't want to be vulnerable to this type of aggression from the United States going forward.
China realizes that we're on the cusp of the fourth industrial revolution, that we are not only in the middle of this paradigm shifting technology associated with AI, but we have quantum computing right around the corner, which will maybe even be more disruptive than AI is.
That said, I think China has already established itself as the world's leading advanced technological society in terms of how it is able to lead the nation and the people and the industry in ways that solve big problems, whether we understand these problems, like responding to pandemics or building infrastructure or creating common prosperity.
All of these things that the US has demonstrated that it cannot do and that it has, that it lacks the capacity for doing, precisely as its monopolist seeking firms like Google or Microsoft or others try to sustain their position over the US people and even keeping other countries as data colonies of the US.
Thanks, gentlemen, for those valuable insights.
Dr Joseph Mahoney, professor of politics and international relations at East China Normal University.
Dr. Qu Qiang, professor at Mingzhu University of China.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today with me, Anna.
Thank you so much for listening.
Bye for now.
