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China tells the United States to stop immediately arming Taiwan after Washington approved arms package.
European leaders condemn US visa ban as route over censorship escalates.
Zelensky reveals U.S.-Ukraine peace plan to end Russian war, but key questions remain.
And reports showing that China's Gen Z are seeking to pursue a free, sincere and interesting life in their own unique way.
To listen to this episode again or to catch up on our previous episodes.
You can download our podcast by searching World Today.
First up.
China has urged the United States to immediately stop arming Taiwan.
A spokesperson from the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office on Wednesday called on Washington to honor its commitment towards the one-China principle and handle the Taiwan-related issues with the utmost caution.
The statement came after Washington approved the sale of US$11 billion of weapons to Taiwan.
The spokesperson has accused the US weapons package of interfering in China's internal affairs, undermining China's sovereignty and security interests and sending a wrong signal to Taiwan independence forces.
He has also warned Taiwan's DPP authorities that depending on foreign support does not change the island's status as part of China.
So for more.
Joining us now on the line is Dr Shao Yuchun, Director of the Institute for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau Studies.
Shanghai Institute of International Studies.
So thank you very much for joining us today, Dr. Xiao Yuchun.
First of all, here we are talking about one of Washington's largest weapons package for Taipei.
It includes the HIMARS rocket systems, hobbiters, anti-tank missiles, drones, and other equipment.
First of all, what is your main takeaway from this U.S. weapons package?
First of all, thank you very much for having me.
I think it shows Washington's kind of nervous here.
Of course, sending Taiwan weapons is a very severe interference into Taiwan, into China's domestic politics, China's domestic affairs.
And if you would look at the package, I think basically two things.
First of all, Washington has been very nervous about the declining of the so-called deterrence capability.
So it will continue.
Actually started from Trump the first term, and then by the administration, and then now Trump 20.
They will continue to send a large weapons package to Taiwan.
And secondly, if you look at the details, all those weapons, it shows that a lot of influence from MAGA people that first of all Taiwan should defend itself and then the United States will come to help.
So most of the weapons are asymmetric power weapons.
So according to my knowledge that Taiwan and the United States they have been negotiating on what kind of weapons that Taiwan need to buy for a period of time.
On the Taiwan side.
They want to buy large-scale weapons and military things.
But Washington definitely has different ideas.
So from Washington's thinking that Taiwan should come up to defend itself if something really happens in Taiwan Strait, and then the United States would think about whether it should defend Taiwan or not.
So officially, we understand Washington claims that it does not support Taiwan independence.
But do you think its arms sales will, in effect, end up supporting Taiwan independence?
Of course.
As the Chinese government always says, that the US military sales to Taiwan has sent very raw signal to the DPP authorities in Taiwan, because we know that DPP authorities have done a lot of propaganda in Taiwan, telling the Taiwanese people that The US would like to send arms to Taiwan because they want to defend us.
And it's a support of DPP's governance in Taiwan.
But actually, we know that DPP's policy right now is promoting Taiwan independence on the island.
So I think it's a kind of a support to the Taiwan independence policy that launched and and done by the dpp authorities.
So, by the way, what do you think we know so far about president donald trump's own calculation regarding the taiwan question?
Because, for example, in a november phone call was chinese president xi jinping.
Trump said that the United States understands the importance of the Taiwan question to China.
And in the meantime, I think some people are quite skeptical about his genuine willingness to provide Taiwan with the so-called defense protection or military protection.
What is your thoughts?
Personally, I think President Trump understands the Taiwan question is important for the Chinese government and the Chinese mainland people.
Because, before his first term, he had a phone call with Tsai Ing-wen, the leader in the Taiwan region.
But then Beijing has sent very strong signal to him and then he understood, and he understands now the importance of Taiwan question.
So he has been quite cautious about the Taiwan question when he publicly talk about it.
I think his priority is he does not want to see conflict, military conflict or war in the Taiwan Strait, because his own image he tried to build his image as a peace president.
At the same time, he has been adopting the strategic ambiguity, the traditional US policy.
And when he was asked by media reporters whether you were going to defend Taiwan or not, he always said no no, no.
I don't want to answer this question.
So it's his own view.
But the thing is that in Washington the so-called consensus among the different parties the Democratic Party and the Republican Party
The consensus is that the US needs to strengthen its military deterrence capability in the Taiwan Strait.
So, whatever President Trump himself thinks about this issue, the Trump administration will continue to send US, to send Taiwan the the weapons, and also will help to train the Taiwan military people, because it's a and also the US Congress here also plays a role.
So for Trump, I guess he will not oppose, of course.
Of course, he said that he understood the importance of the Taiwan question.
But he is also a man favoring business interests.
So sending So all those arms package to Taiwan would help US earn a lot of money.
So from his own perspective, I think he's going to deal with this issue.
And it's a very negative implication for his next visit to China and also China-US relations.
I take your point.
In the meantime, why do you think?
According to some media reports, opposition parties in Taiwan have launched impeachment actions against Taiwan leader Lai Ching-teh, with online petitions said to have drawn more than 8 million participants so far.
Right.
The number is huge.
I think it shows that the a lot of people are not satisfied with Lai Qingde's governance so far.
I think basically three things.
First of all, Lai Qingde and DPP authorities want to use the mass recall to change the results of the election.
And secondly, Lai Qingde and DPP want to use the judicial system to oppose the opposition party political figures like Ko Wen-jeou, and also those political figures within DPP, which is not in the same faction within the DPP of Lai Ching-de.
And certainly, of course, the number right now of Taiwan's economy is quite good.
But if we look at the structure of Taiwan's economy, the semiconductor has been developing very fast and has become a very important part of Taiwan's economy.
So we have seen very imbalanced structure here.
For ordinary people.
A lot of people are complaining about their living costs.
They are losing opportunity in the job market.
So basically, I think these three reasons have shown a lot of people's unsatisfaction about Lai Qingde and his governance.
Now, in terms of the military issue, we understand Taiwan's DPP authority under Lai Qingde have vowed to ramp up military spending to more than 3 of Taiwan's GDP next year and 5 by the year 2030.
How would you look at this move by the DPP authorities from the perspective of the Chinese mainland?
First of all, it's really bad for Taiwan people because the DPP authorities would use so much money on the military part and not for the ordinary people's daily lives.
It's very negative news for most of the Taiwan people.
And then why DPP would do that?
Because it has faced a lot of pressure from Washington.
Because Trump administration's logic, policy logic is that first you should defend yourself.
So you should spend enough money and then have enough people and buy enough weapons is their logic.
So it has put a lot of pressure on DPP and Lai Qingde.
And then so recently, like two weeks ago, three weeks ago, we have seen that Lai Qingde had sent an article to Washington Post to say that okay, we are going to spend enough money on the military budget.
It just wants to show that it wants to get support from Washington.
And it's a big burden, it's a heavy burden for Taiwan's economy.
So, from the mainland's perspective, it shows that the DPP authorities have been determined to depend on the United States for Taiwan security, which is very short-sighted strategically and which is very negative for cross-strait relations.
By the way, does that make any difference in terms of say, the balance of power between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits?
Of course not.
If we talk about the weapons sales, the package, we know that for the past several years Washington has been unable to deliver all those weapons to Taiwan in a timely manner.
Right.
It has been a big issue now in Washington because the industry manufacturing capability of the United States is declining rapidly.
So this is the first thing.
The second is that, as I said before, the Taiwan and Washington.
They have different understanding of what kind of weapons Taiwan need to buy.
So, and we know that basically, if we look at the history, Taiwan has always got the weapons, which is outdated and then very cost according to the market price.
So I don't think it has any meaning for the so-called balance of power in the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan's security always depends on the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and on people-to-people exchanges between the two sides.
And finally, the peaceful unification of the two sides.
Peaceful unification will ultimately come.
I think that's for sure.
Dr Xiao Yichun, Director of the Institute for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau Studies.
Shanghai Institute of International Studies.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Coming up, European leaders condemn U.S. visa bans as row over censorship escalates.
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My name is Alessandro Golombievski Teixeira.
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European leaders have accused Washington of coercion and intimidation after the United States imposed a visa ban on five European individuals.
The five figures, including former European Union Commissioner Thierry Breton, have been at the heart of a campaign to introduce laws to regulate American tech companies.
U.S.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has accused the targeted people of leading organized efforts to coerce American platforms into punishing American viewpoints they oppose.
The European Union has signaled that it would respond swiftly and decisively to the American measures.
So joining us now on the line is Dr Kamal Makili-Aliyev, Associate Professor from the School of Global Studies University of Gothenburg, in Sweden.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Thank you for having me again.
So first of all, let's talk about this landmark Digital Services Act of the European Union.
This law is seen by Washington, or by the Trump administration, as a form of censorship while, On the other hand, European leaders say that those regulations are very much necessary in terms of controlling hate speech, for example.
So what do you think this tells us about the existing cultural or even political clash between Washington and Europe?
Well, I think this dispute highlights deeper transatlantic cleavages over free speech norms, regulatory sovereignty and digital governance.
United States and Trump administration is framing Europe's Digital Services Act, which mandates platform moderation of illegal content, hate speech and disinformation, for example, as censorship targeting specifically American viewpoints and American tech companies.
And Washington's visa ban on figures like former EU Commissioner Thierry Breton.
It reflects this interpretive gap that the US sees Europe's rules as extraterritorial repression, while EU leaders see them as necessary consumer protection rooted in the democratic processes.
So Europe's response here is calling the move coercive and a threat to its sovereign regulatory space.
It actually very much underscores a widening normative rift over how digital spaces should be governed in the transatlantic space between the United States and Europe.
So I guess the latest development is probably a sign that, Like you said, artificial intelligence or digital technologies are increasingly becoming a major theater of confrontation between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean.
Now.
So basically, what we are seeing right here right now is that the Trump administration, by imposing those visa bans, is in effect sanctioning some former officials of Washington's European allies.
So do you see possibilities regarding the EU retaliating by sanctioning some Trump and administration officials?
Yes, I think there is a political appetite in Europe for symmetrical measures.
You can see it quite clearly that EU leaders have warned that they could respond swiftly and decisively, quote unquote, to what they see as unjustified United States actions.
So however, a direct sanctions deed for that targeting US officials, I think are unlikely in the immediate term.
Right.
So very quickly, probably not plausible.
And that's because of the broader strategic dependencies, including security cooperation and economic ties.
And of course, because visa policy falls under US immigration discretion, not typical sanctions too.
But yes, you would see this kind of appetite for retaliating even in kind.
I think a more realistic European response is going to be in terms of probably, countermeasures against United States tech interests and platforms in the EU market.
So they're going to actually impose more restrictions, tighter regulatory scrutiny on US companies under the DSA yes, Digital Security Act.
And I think diplomatic protest and legal challenges are also going to be on the table.
That opposed to direct personal sanctions against US officials, for example, which could dangerously escalate the confrontation with the United States because The United States wanted it to hurt in this sense, right.
Personal sanctions.
But the same retaliation might actually make more damage for Europe than good.
So I think they're going to avoid that.
So, in other words, in your observation, those American tech giants are going to have a harder days ahead when we talk about their European business.
Yes, they're going to suffer more than that.
I think what the United States did is very counterproductive because Europe has its own toolbox for making it harder for the US companies.
So, going back to our discussion regarding this Digital Services Act of the European Union, we know it was passed back in the year 2022.
It requires large digital platforms to show that they are taking steps to address those online risks, including security, the spread of illegal content, hate speech and, for example, the use of disinformation and misinformation to manipulate election results.
Now putting away this ideological or political clash between Washington and the Brussels?
Do you think this law is going to safeguard free speech environment in Europe or, quite the opposite, destroy free speech environment on the European soil?
Well, the essay is fundamentally about balancing digital free speech with safety, transparency and accountability.
It requires large platforms to basically explain content moderation decisions, tackle illegal content like hate speech or disinformation, and provide transparency around algorithmic practices.
It's all designed to protect users and democratic discourse, basically.
While critics, especially in the United States, they portray these rules as censorship.
I think European proponents' arguments are around that this kind of legislative action preserves free and fair speech by curtailing harmful content without arbitrary suppression.
So in practice, the law enhances democratic control and safeguards users.
Though how it's applied matters, of course, because rigorous enforcement and judicial oversight are key to ensuring it doesn't become overly restrictive.
And here the European courts have been quite balanced in their approach.
So, looking at the bigger picture, Dr Kamal Markili-Aliyev, how would you evaluate the impact of this latest episode of clash between the two sides of the Atlantic on the overall alliance relationship between the two sides?
I think it is a negative episode, right?
This episode introduces a new layer of friction in the transatlantic relationship.
Um, its moves beyond traditional security and trade disputes and into digital governments and ideological competition, which we haven't seen that much before.
And while both sides remain quite strong allies on defense nato, with all the critique you know, and many global issues, this spat could have quite some consequences.
Um, it is going to erode trust even more, especially in regulatory cooperation.
It's going to increase digital policy fragmentation between the United States and EU markets, which is a negative because, you know, unified markets better results.
Then it's going to pressure multilateral institutions to mediate technology government's norms right.
It's also going to be questions of cooperation between the US and Europe.
Domestic politicization of transatlantic alliances is never a good thing.
But I also think that this kind of clash is currently more symbolic rather than structural.
We haven't seen it go deep into the structural fabric of a transatlantic relationship.
And I think both sides still share many strategic interests and there is room for diplomatic repair if mechanisms for digital cooperation are established, for example.
Nonetheless, it signals that digital and AI governance you know it will be central arenas of US-EU competition in the coming years, which is also a negative for the transatlantic cooperation as a whole.
Your point is well taken.
And thank you very much for joining us.
Dr Kamal Makili-Aliyev, Associate Professor, joining us from the School of Global Studies University of Gothenburg in Sweden.
More to come.
Zelenskyy reveals Ukraine-US peace plan to end Russian war, but key questions remain.
Reports showing that China's Gen Z are seeking to pursue a free, sincere and interesting life in their own unique way.
You're listening to World Today.
To listen to this episode again or to catch up on our previous episodes.
You can download our podcast by searching World Today.
I'm Dinghan in Beijing.
We'll be back after a short break.
You're back with World Today, I'm Ding Hen in Beijing.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has unveiled the key points of a draft 20-point peace proposal aimed at resolving the Russian-Ukraine conflict.
Zelensky said that the US-backed framework could serve as the foundation for future peace agreements.
He also said significant progress has been made after weeks of discussion.
However, two critical issues remain unresolved the future control of the Donetsk region in the eastern part of Ukraine, as well as the operation of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant.
The proposal also does not address Ukraine's NATO membership ambitions.
The proposal will be presented to Moscow by American officials in the coming days.
So for more.
My colleague Xu Yaowen spoke with Dr Joseph Siracusa, professor of global futures with Carding University.
Professor Siracusa, let's look into the two major unresolved issues in the peace plan.
Who's going to control the Donetsk region and the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant?
Regarding the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, President Zelensky mentioned that Ukraine has not yet reached an agreement with the US on who should control and operate this Europe's largest nuclear plant.
The plant is located near the front lines but is currently under Russian control, and President Zelensky said The initial US proposal envisioned a joint operation between Ukraine Russia, the US, but Kyiv wants shared control only between Ukraine and Washington.
In your opinion, is this possible for Ukraine, the US and Russia to reach an agreement on who will control this nuclear power plant?
Yes, I think there will be an agreement.
I mean, the Russians are in physical control of it.
Ukraine, of course, lays claim to it.
It's theirs initially.
And the United States has to do its part to be seen to be part of this ceasefire stroke peace plan.
And so the United States is committed to doing what it can.
So, look, I don't see a problem in trilateral control of this kind of thing.
You know many, many years ago, when I studied comparative communist systems as a young student in Vienna, I looked at the – my master's thesis was on the – the occupation, the allied occupation of Austria.
And in those days, Russia, France, Britain, and the United States control many things together.
I mean the idea of a number of countries controlling certain aspects of a certain country is not beyond the realm of possibility.
And if it becomes a sticking point, then it'll be up to the United States to resolve it.
But this idea that Ukraine is going to be able to have its own way, that is, to deal exclusively with Washington, at the exclusion of Moscow, is not part of the conversation.
So you know, they could wish all they want, but at the end of it, the hardest fact of all is that Russian troops are in control of that plant.
Then how likely is that Russia will be willing to share control of the power plant's operation with Ukraine and the US?
I think it would cut a deal with the United States, because Putin is going to great lengths to to deal with Donald Trump and Donald Trump will go to great lengths to bring a ceasefire to the area for his own reasons, whatever they are.
And so, yeah, I think Russia would agree to this.
Of course, you got to keep in mind here too, that there hasn't been an election in Ukraine since 2019.
And so whatever Zelensky's doing, he's doing it on a promissory note.
That is, he's assuming that there will be a referendum, after all these maneuvers, to approve what he's doing.
That may not be the case at all.
I mean, it could be that he's using up all of his goodwill with the voters in Ukraine.
You know, when he was elected, he was elected with 73% of the vote.
That's been downhill ever since, though he does understand And that Ukraine wants peace.
He wants a ceasefire before there's another election.
Of course the Putin and the Russians are making a case.
There should be probably an election before there is a ceasefire agreement.
So it's a circular kind of an argument.
But whatever Zelensky is doing, he's taking a bit of a gamble on it.
Okay.
He's assuming that he's going to get approval from the Ukrainian people for what he's agreeing to right now.
And, of course, if it stops the loss of life and the destruction of Ukraine any further, I think most people would settle for a compromise.
Professor, let's talk about the territorial dispute of Donetsk region.
President Zelensky has said that the territorial dispute is still unresolved in the 20-point peace plan.
Moscow wants Kiev to withdraw all troops from the region, including areas currently controlled by Ukraine, while Ukraine wants to freeze the fighting along the current front lines.
The US has suggested creating a demilitarized zone and a free economic zone in parts of Donetsk still controlled by Ukraine.
Do you think there's still room for negotiation on how to handle territorial dispute, and what would the possible solution look like?
I think there is.
And look, we have an awful lot of experience with demilitarized zones.
I mean, you know whether it was Vietnam or Korea or other things in Afghanistan Iraq,
The United States understands how these things work.
So, you know, that's a possibility.
But look, the Russians regard the Donbass, consisting of Luhansk and Donetsk, as a Russian control Russian territory because there are millions of Russians who settled in the area as a result of their long Cold War experience.
Keep in mind that Ukraine was part of the Soviet Empire for many, many years, and the great leader, Leonid Brezhnev, was Ukrainian himself.
The Russians regard this area as sort of Russian, the way the Americans regard it.
Texas as American in the 1840s.
So it's not negotiable.
What is negotiable is there is a large section of the Donetsk that has not been conquered by Russian troops yet.
And so Putin is asking the Ukrainians to consider leaving this territory as part of the ceasefire.
Now the Americans have counterproposed as we're getting around this counter-proposed that this be a demilitarized zone and a free economic area.
So Zelensky in the last 24 hours comes back and says look, we might be open to this idea of a free economic area.
There'd have to be a referendum on this.
It would have to take 60 days.
There'd have to be a ceasefire for at least 60 days to prepare for a referendum.
And of course, the key to all of this is that Zelensky is desperate for a ceasefire.
That is, he wants to stop the The hemorrhaging of blood and treasure in Ukraine.
That's the whole idea is to stop the war.
And so he's agreeing to it in the first principle, but he's saying that the people in this area can't vote.
In fact, he wants Ukrainian police to be in the area until further notice.
And they can't vote because they're not Ukrainian.
You know, the Ukrainian people have to vote.
So he's sort of playing a game here with how the vote would take place.
But look, the idea of a free economic zone is sort of novel.
The idea of demilitarized zone, of course, is as old as war mankind itself.
I mean there's always been demilitarized areas or buffer states or buffer areas and that kind of thing.
What we are looking at in this 20-point peace program is, is a ceasefire.
What Zelensky wants is a ceasefire.
And Vladimir Putin wants is he wants a peace plan.
So, you know, they're kind of working on two different angles here.
But I think Zelensky is desperate for this war to come to a close.
Professor, President Zelensky said this week that Ukraine would not agree to the new peace plan's demand to give up its goal to join NATO.
Meanwhile, Russia has repeatedly emphasized that preventing Ukraine from joining NATO is one of its core security demands.
How do you think Zelensky's stance on NATO will affect the peace talks between Ukraine and Russia?
Well, I think the idea of Ukraine joining NATO is now a dream.
I mean, it's kind of gone.
It's not going to happen.
In fact, if President Biden had agreed with this four years ago, there wouldn't have been a war in Ukraine.
That is what Vladimir Putin was holding down for.
Now the Constitution of Ukraine says that you know they could join the EU and they could join NATO and all the rest of it.
It's very clear that the precondition for peace in this area, at least for Vladimir Putin, is that Ukraine remain neutral.
That is, it not be allowed to join NATO and there'd be no NATO forces coming into Ukraine.
That's the whole idea.
And nothing's going to change that.
So you know, President Zelensky can say all he wants that they are not going to give up the right to join NATO.
The fact is, right now, NATO wouldn't touch Ukraine.
Wouldn't touch Ukraine because President Trump has made it very clear that he would veto it.
So, you know, keep in mind that NATO is completely dependent on the United States for its future.
And Zelensky thinks that if he can get into NATO without the United States it's not possible as a matter of fact, because President Trump's not going that way.
So look, the NATO option is simply off the table.
Whether he can actually get these words out of his throat.
And keep in mind that the 27 nations that make up the European Union are also the heart of NATO, so they're one in the same body.
And they've just guaranteed a very large, long-term billion-dollar loan to Ukraine.
So maybe Zelensky is forced to pay lip service to the European Union in these hopes of NATO.
But there are NATO forces, for example, like Hungary, that don't want Ukraine in the EU.
And of course, the United States won't back it up anyway.
So I don't think that's going to happen.
Joseph Syracuse, a professor of global futures with Curtin University in Australia, talking with my colleague Xu Yawen.
You're listening to World Today.
I'm Ding Han in Beijing.
Former Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Grzegorz Klaudyko, says the Belt and Road Initiative has created tens of millions of jobs, particularly in global south countries.
As the world is faced with mounting challenges, the question of how nations can collaborate across geopolitical divides is becoming ever more pressing.
How can we turn confrontation into cooperation that delivers sustainable and shared benefits for all?
Let's listen to a conversation between my colleague Huang Jiyuan and Mr Claudico, who is now a distinguished professor with Beijing Normal University.
So next year, China will unveil its 15th five-year plan.
Since your work here in China and both on the international stage.
What do you look for in this 15 to 5-year plan?
The most?
What priorities or key structural transformations do you expect?
Domestically.
I think it is critical to shift the driving force for economic growth from investment and export to consumption.
It's still very interesting why China's society is not prone to spend more on consumption.
And the more your policy will be during the 15 years five years planned 2026, 2030 favorable toward this restructuring from investment to consumption, the better for sustaining economic growth.
I think it is still feasible to stay the course of plus minus 5 rate of growth annually on the average during the last next five years in terms of GDP, which is absolutely necessary to keep also social stability etc.
On the international scale, I think it is balancing the current account, the trade balance.
And here is a very interesting point, which I would like to link to what we have said before.
Yes, because of the American attitude which is xenophobic to China.
The export from China to US this year under Trump 20, under Trump's second administration, what I'm discussing in my new book, It's going down.
But, at the same time, at the same time, export of China elsewhere, including European Union, upon which you were asking, including the rest of Asia, Middle East Africa, is growing.
So, contrary to President of the United States' intention, China is not weakening, it's not being weakened.
China is stronger, but the structure of the Chinese economic power in the world is changing.
China is less significant as an economic partner for the United States but at the same time, contrary to the American intentions, is more important as an economic power the European Union.
And I think that this direction of restructuring the world economy, where China will be not weaker, China will be stronger, but in a different way,
And I think it's a factor which is contributing to the peaceful development of the world, which is not seen always in this same way by some policymakers in the West.
Since you work in the Belt and Road School at the Beijing Normal University, I want to ask you where do you see as the most significant or the most underappreciated factor of the BRI that could shape globalization in the future?
I'm positive about Belt and Road Initiative.
You know, after all, during this 12, 13 years of Belt and Road Initiative, which was launched about 2012, China has invested directly in the remaining part of the world something in an order of 13 billion billion dollars.
Very few in Europe, a little bit in old EU members like Italy and Greece, maybe a little more in some East European countries, more in Hungary, which is more sympathetic towards China than say, in my country of Poland, which is regrettable.
But basically, these are the investments all over the world.
I was a couple of years, for instance, in Djibouti and Ethiopia.
I was traveling by hitchhiking, by trucks and by buses.
Now there is the railroad from Addis Ababa to Djibouti, from Central Africa to the coast.
There are the trains, hundreds of them, going from different cities in China to Europe via Russia, or Kazakhstan Russia Belarus, Poland to Western Europe.
There is the big new harbor Chakai, at the eastern side of Latin America, north of Lima, capital of Peru year ago, with the participation of President Xi Jinping, of his way for the G20 summit last year in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil.
All this is a result of Belt and Road Initiative.
And now there is another interesting question which is not being raised that often.
How many million people, especially Africa, much less in my part of the world.
How many million people had got a job opportunity engagement because of investment executed within the framework of Belt and Road Initiative?
The answer is several dozen of millions of people are not unemployed.
They got a job because of the Belt and Road Initiative.
And there is another question which nobody is asking.
Because of this reason, how many less, how many millions less of people emigrated from South Asia, Middle East and Africa to Europe, or from Latin America to North America.
Again, this is going into millions.
So actually the most developed part of the world Europe, North America should appreciate the Belt and Road Initiative of China, because it is another factor contributing to diminishing the immigration pressure, which is a very big challenge in my part of the world and we are not able to address this challenge in the proper way.
So for that reason, I'm in a positive appraisal of Belt and Road Initiative.
And there is still one aspect which is supposed to be discussed even more.
China came first with this bold infrastructure investment and economic assistance project towards Global South or developing countries.
There was the response of the United States with their program, and there was the response of the European Union with our program, European Gateway, which is much smaller than the Belt and Road Initiative.
So we see also a kind of competition between China, European Union and the United States vis-à-vis investing coming, engaging with economic cooperation, infrastructure investment with the countries of Global South, which is a positive factor for development of this very positive South.
The more that type of rivalry, that type of competition is, the better.
That is the good recipe for the future, not, you know, the military competition.
Greg Ward Claudico, former Deputy Prime Minister of Poland, speaking with my colleague Huang Jiyuan.
Coming up a new report showing China's Gen Z are seeking to pursue a free, sincere and interesting life in their own way.
This is World Today.
Stay tuned.
You're listening to World Today, I'm Ding Han in Beijing.
A new report shows China's Gen Zs are pursuing a free, sincere and interesting life in their own way.
The report says the younger generation in China is more results-oriented and pays more attention to effective hard work.
Chinese Gen Zs are also said to be very good at preserving the most valuable parts of their emotions for their closest or core relationships.
In the meantime, the report says Gen Zs tend to refrain from manufacturing a perfect image of their life in social media posts.
Instead, they tend to feel very much free to showcase their awkward moments.
The report is compiled by Chinese social platform Seoul App in collaboration with two research teams with Fudan University in Shanghai.
It is based on a survey of more than 9,800 individuals.
So for more.
Joining us.
Now on the line is Han Hua, co-founder and secretary general of Beijing Club for International Dialogue.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Thanks for having me, Ding Heng.
So, first of all, why do you think China's Gen Zs, or the younger generation in general, pay more attention to the effectiveness of their hard work?
Do you think this is a useful mentality for China's future development?
The short answer is yes, but we definitely need to elaborate a little bit on that.
I think China's Generation Z tends to emphasize the effectiveness of hard work, largely because they grew up during a period of rapid economic growth for China.
With family disposable incomes rising quickly and most being only children, their material needs are relatively easy to satisfy.
However, the intense competition for social and professional success, combined with rapid societal change and the transparency of information so they present a more challenging and complex environment that shapes the young generation's results-oriented mindset.
So this generation?
They have seen clearly that efforts alone does not necessarily guarantee their upward mobility.
Instead family support.
Ratio between outcomes and efficiency and the strategic choices matter much more.
Plus digital platforms, data-driven thinking and the exposure to diverse career paths have also made them more pragmatic, encouraging smart efforts over this sheer endurance.
So the rising educational levels and cost pressures in housing, employment and family life further reinforce this results-oriented mindset.
So I think this mentality can be useful for China's future development, because it encourages critical thinking, productivity and the better allocation of human capital and their own competitiveness, their personal resources per se.
These are essential as China shifts from high-speed growth to high-quality growth.
However, it also requires balance, in my opinion.
If effectiveness becomes narrowly defined by short-term returns, it may discourage long-term research, long-term public service or some foundational work.
So, when paired with institutional support and a fair evaluation system, I think this generation's focus on effective hard work can become a strong driver of their sustainable development, for their own and for the society.
We know, China's younger generation grew up taking a lot of examinations throughout various stages of their school education, and their skills in terms of seeking answers to exam questions are generally seen as very high.
Now it's interesting to note that this particular report finds that the Chinese Chinese use a mentality Similar to seeking answers to exam questions in terms of sorting out their complicated network of interpersonal relationship, preserving the most valuable parts of their personal emotions for their closest relationships.
What do you make of this phenomenon?
That is a very interesting conclusion.
I can share an example of my intern who worked exceptionally hard during her undergraduate studies trying to secure a direct track doctoral spot at a top university in China.
And her approach to relationships is similarly results-driven because, since she will spend the next four to five years in Beijing to pursue her doctoral degree, While working as an intern in my organization, she asked her boyfriend she persuaded and supported her boyfriend to apply for a similar program here in Beijing, because she recognized that a long distance relationship over such a long period would be difficult to sustain.
And she made it very clear to her boyfriend that if both of them wants to maintain this relationship, they need to be very pragmatic.
They need to solve it out.
And the way out is that they both pursue some similar programs in Beijing in top universities.
And they made it.
I think this approach differs from the more traditional mindset for the past generations like Oh, we support each other wherever you are, and we need to value more long-term relationship rather than the short-term distance.
This is never going to happen in Generation Z, because it reflects a more pragmatic, goal-oriented way of managing both career and personal life.
So this competitive so speaking with this competitive educational environment where they were brought up and where after school tutoring and examinations dominate much of their daily lives when they were children, when they were in the teenagers, have to some extent honed their skills in problem solving, in how to prioritize their agenda and in how to train their better in efficiency, extending beyond academics into their social and emotional lives.
So they focus on quality over quantity.
This phenomenon signals a generation that values efficiency, clarity and intentionality in both personal and the professional spheres.
It also suggests resilience and self-awareness as they consciously manage their emotional resources.
For China's future development.
Such a mentality can be highly beneficial, fostering a workforce and the citizens that are very focused adaptive, resilient and capable of prioritizing impactful efforts in an increasingly complex social and economic landscape.
Yeah.
And adding to what you have said, I think another interesting finding of this particular report is that China's Gen Z's worship an ordinary person's heroism, which is quite different from our traditional worshiping of say, superheroes or the elites or the meritocracy.
Now the final question.
Um, We noticed in recent years some foreign media outlets have published reports, stories depicting China's younger generation leading a so-called lying flat lifestyle amid frustration and lack of opportunities in a highly competitive environment.
Does that represent the real picture of China's youth today?
It represents half of the picture or partial the picture, but not the whole picture.
I think the portrayal of China's youth as embracing a lying flat lifestyle, opting out of work, ambition or social competition, is kind of an oversimplified way to describe them and does not reflect the full reality.
While some young people may choose a slower pace, comparatively slower pace, or reject extreme pressure, many continue to pursue personal growth, career advancement and meaningful relationships.
Most of my young colleagues and interns just as I shared with you, representing some of the top humanities students from leading universities from Beijing.
They are hardworking, they are very creative and, most importantly, they have a clear sense of what they want in both their career development and personal relationships.
So I think the so-called lying flat trend represents just a limited response to societal pressure, rather than a mass cultural movement.
Overall, China's youth remain, in my opinion, they remain industrially very adaptive resilient, comparatively resilient, ambitious and seeking to lead a work and life balanced life, to live more truly while navigating a comparatively complex social and economic environment.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Han Hua, co-founder and secretary general of Beijing Club for International Dialogue.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today.
I'm Dinghan in Beijing.
Bye for now.
