Ted Audio Collective Hello, everyone.
You're listening to After Hours.
I'm Felix. And I'm Meir.
It's just the two of us.
You feel a little lonely?
I feel okay. I feel good.
Actually, all about how you feel today.
So we have just seen amazing market volatility.
How do you take that personally?
Are you calm? Are you freaked out?
What's your recipe for staying healthy and staying sane?
Well, that recipe is different from maybe what I actually do.
But I think the right recipe is to try to cabin it off in your life and not pay that much attention to it.
Because, you know, as I've gotten older, you worry and think about things that you can control.
And you try to spend a little time worrying and thinking about things you can't control.
So I don't pay that much attention to it on an hourly basis at all.
But I do think what is happening in the financial markets is completely fascinating.
And in a way, I'm quite relieved to see so much excess get rung out of the system.
And I feel like it's basically healthy.
That doesn't mean it's not painful for people because I think it is very, very painful.
But it is also fascinating to see what is happening and the speed at which it happens.
Yeah. Of course you know it's good advice.
You shouldn't check your accounts every other hour or so.
But at the same time, I find it quite hard.
Yeah. Because it impacts your finances.
It's something we're interested in professionally.
So this advice to stay away, stay calm, don't pay that much attention, I know that's good advice.
And at the same time, I find it's actually quite hard to do.
One way to think about that advice is kind of backwards in a way, right?
Which is you should be positioned in markets so that you wouldn't be so disturbed by outcomes in a way.
So that paying attention isn't that interesting because you're positioned in a way that is relatively calm and neutral and makes you comfortable.
But I agree. It is addictive and interesting and also can lead to a lot of anxiety.
But maybe Felix, we should talk about it.
What do you think? Let's do macro as one of our topics.
Where the economy is today, where do you think we're headed short term, long term.
I think that would be fascinating to talk about.
Yeah, let's do that.
And then I also wanted to talk about one of these crazy examples of the volatility that's happened.
It's a fintech company called Upstart, which was kind of the darling of maybe six, eight months ago and has lost 90 % of its value.
It's a fascinating company and I wanted to get your take on it.
Okay, that sounds fantastic.
Let's do it. All right, Felix, the macro take, inflation craziness, recession fears.
Markets melting down, all the drama you never wanted in your life is all of a sudden here.
I think it's a super interesting situation.
So maybe let's start with inflation.
So inflation came in at 8 % or so, much, much higher than the Fed would like to see.
If you look at the longer term outlook, most signs point towards roughly 4 % driven by an easing up of the supply chain issues, much hinges on what's happening in China, obviously, what fraction of the Chinese economy will be locked down.
But generally speaking, if you look at inflation index bonds, for instance, the markets are expecting about 4%.
And at that point in time, I think it's going to be really interesting what happens.
The healthy scenario says at that point in time, we go from supply side determination of inflation rates and the growth in the economy to really the demand side, which is the territory of the Fed where the Fed can say, let's dampen down demand because the economy runs a little hot.
Or actually, we don't really have to do much, which is, I guess, everybody's favorite scenario.
And the rationale for thinking that this is not unrealistic is if you look at the total capacity in the economy, given the economy pre -pandemic, how much output can we produce?
Actually, the level of output that we have today is a little less than what we could produce in an economy that looks like the pre -pandemic economy.
And then there are two changes to think about.
One is what happens to the number of people and then what happens to productivity.
So if we could magically go back to, say, same labor market participation rate that we have pre -pandemic and roughly the same productivity level, inflation would come down from 4 % to roughly 2%.
And actually, the job of the Fed is not all that hard.
Now, there are wrinkles in both of these stories.
One is we're missing roughly 3 million workers or so.
Mostly from low -paid jobs, often women, often people without college degrees, and it's a little uncertain whether they will come back.
And then productivity growth has just been not amazing, really.
It's been around 3 % or so.
So the big question that I pay most attention to is inflation is going to come down, and then it's all about how hot can the economy run, given current capacity.
And capacity is just a reflection of what's going to happen in the labor market.
What's your take? The reason I like the way you frame this up, Felix, is I think many people's intuition goes wrong with inflation, especially now.
You've identified it, I think, quite clearly as a supply -side phenomenon.
What goes wrong with people thinking about inflation is they're so used to thinking about demand that they don't think about supply.
They think, oh, well, here's what we have to do.
We have to give people more money so they can buy all the goods that are more expensive now.
That turns out to be wrong.
Oh, no, here's what we're going to do.
We have to cut taxes so that people will have more money, because then they will be able to buy more.
Well, that turns out to be wrong.
Or finally, you say, well, we got to tax all these windfall profits by these companies who are making too much money, but that turns out to restrict supply, which can make the problem worse.
So all these intuitions, I think, get us wrong, and what you're identifying is, fundamentally, these are supply considerations that have got to get navigated through.
And then there's a second element, before we get to your nice landing of 4%, is there is a sense in which these things can spiral.
And I think there's this wage -price spiral dynamic that can break out, and expectations can get out of hand.
Now, to your point, actually, expectations don't look bad.
Yeah, don't look bad, yes.
They don't look like they're spiraling out of control.
So in a way, I kind of feel like we all should take a little chill pill for the next 12 months, and try to figure out the supply side, try to figure out labor force participation.
How do we get workers back?
How do we get workers back?
How do you think about immigration?
How do we think about immigration?
How do we think about housing supply?
How do we think about all those kinds of longer -term solutions, and away from the political talking points, which will lead you astray?
Yeah. And then we're back to, like, a more normal world.
Yeah, where we know how things work, what the Fed can and cannot do.
My instinct is similar to yours, which is, I think we're going to get there in 12 months, but it's to this more 4 % level.
And as you point out, then we have to make a set of choices if we want to go back down to two.
Now, first off, there's nothing magic about two.
Yeah, that's true. So two is not a magic number.
It could be three. It could be four.
Two things, I think, to keep in mind.
One is inflation normally is a very slow phenomenon.
It comes on slowly.
It takes quite a while for inflation to dissipate.
And the current episode is really unusual in the sense that it's really only during the Korean War and the oil crisis of the 70s that we ever had these, oh, my God, inflation is coming on, and it's so fast.
And that's how you know whether it's demand or supply side.
If it's demand side, it's going to happen very slowly.
If it's supply side, you see these spikes.
And the other thing that I really love about what you just explained about the desired level of inflation is what's really costly about inflation is volatility so that your price expectations are never really quite right because the higher the average inflation, the greater the volatility around that average.
And really, when you think about terrible episodes of hyperinflation, if you could have 4 % but not much volatility, markets can easily deal with that.
I like the idea to say maybe, well, find out that at 4%, it just comes in regularly at 4%, in which case it's really not that big a deal.
Yeah. The other question that I think is interesting, Felix, is do you see a recession coming?
And would you behave in a way if you're running a business like a recession is coming?
Do you have an instinct on that?
So I do think that there's a risk of the Fed not getting it exactly right and producing a harder landing.
The job of the Fed is just extraordinarily difficult.
And history sort of gives mixed guidance.
The Korea shock actually the Fed handled really well.
It was a soft landing.
It worked perfectly.
And then the oil crisis of the 70s was the exact opposite in that it produced a very hard landing.
Unemployment shut up.
And it took a long time to get inflationary expectations in line with a much more stringent Fed policy.
My sense is that the current situation is probably somewhere in between.
We definitely don't have a problem where markets and the economy have just gotten used to fairly high levels of inflation.
Right. Exactly. So that makes me slightly more optimistic.
The other thing that is really important for businesses to think about is the trade -off between investing in greater margins today versus investing in growth.
In one of my classes I show participants a graph that says if you get one percent extra growth, what's the implication for the value of your firm?
And then if you get one percent extra margin, what's the implication for the value of your firm?
And what you see is that growth is so much better in terms of increasing the value of your company compared to an increase in margins.
And we talk about this in a totally fascinating conversation.
And then, of course, at the end you discover so much of that is just driven by extraordinarily low interest rates.
Right. When you discount the future, and the future is basically here because there's not really any discounting to do, then growth trajectories look really promising.
And investments that would raise your margins actually don't look so fabulous by comparison.
Say if you're meta and you want to create the metaverse, and that involves investing tens of billions of dollars every year with an uncertain outcome over the next decade or so.
That project has just gotten a lot less attractive.
I would recommend that every business look at its growth plans.
And if you have projects, if you have initiatives that are purely motivated by some speculation about growth potential, that has gotten less attractive now, and you should rethink whether those are really the investments you want to make.
Well, and of course you've just told the story of the financial markets for the last six months.
When that happens on a macro scale, what do we see?
We see rates rise, and we see these long -tailed growth companies with remarkable expectations come crashing down to earth because of exactly the mechanism you described.
I think the other thing about this, Felix, that really strikes me is this is a time to stay very close to the data more than ever before.
You want to be watching your customers, you want to be talking to your customers, you want to actually get a feel of things.
So the more time you spend in the narrative of recession is coming, recession is not coming, inflation is spiking, the less likely you are to get your business right, because the heterogeneity is just so great.
So I love your advice about thinking harder maybe about margins relative to growth, but then I also just think generic answers are just so much less likely to obtain now than they were ever before.
Yeah. I wanted to also ask you about crypto.
Of course, crypto has melted down alongside other parts of the market, and I read two arguments that I find very interesting.
One argument is we've really learned something fundamental about crypto.
This is a moment when you should really rethink what cryptocurrencies mean, how successful they can be.
It's a moment of revelation.
And the other story is to say, actually, what you're seeing is investors using the current moment to shy away from highly risky investments, and that means there's far less money available for cryptocurrencies, and we learn nothing fundamental.
There's no information about the long -term potential of cryptocurrencies.
All you're seeing is investors' appetite for risk has changed.
Which do you think is true?
I kind of view those as being somewhat compatible.
Okay. So the answer is both.
Well, I mean, I've been a long -term skeptic of crypto, and I think that's been reinforced.
And just to put the numbers in perspective, currencies like Bitcoin are maybe down 60 percent from their highs.
We've seen the decline of what was considered a stablecoin, which was supposed to be this thing that would be anchored and would be pegged and would be backed.
To the dollar. To the dollar and would enable you to have the same faith and confidence.
Those stablecoins raised lots of interesting questions, which is, first, why do we need a stablecoin if cryptocurrencies are currencies?
But let's put that aside.
The one that exploded fantastically turned out not backed by U .S.
dollars. It was backed by this Luna currency.
And once it broke, it was staggering what happened.
Literally hundreds of billions of dollars of wealth lost in an instant.
So I don't think you can walk away from this thinking what you thought before, no matter how bullish you are on crypto.
I think you have to reassess first off what these stablecoins are, what kind of stablecoins work.
Second, I think you have to reassess if you ever put forward an argument that it's a store of value or it's a medium of exchange that's great.
I think you have to reassess.
And then I think finally it is what I think it's always been, which is it's a risky speculative asset.
And so that's what you thought before.
You've been vindicated by the evidence now, which is it moves like a risky asset.
But the question still remains unlike the blockchain.
What problem are we solving?
And is there a real problem that this is a solution to?
And to me, that question remains still very ambiguous and unanswered.
Yeah, I have one intuition that I think is more confirmed and then maybe a change that I see coming.
The intuition is exactly your point about a store of value.
Yeah, there's no reason to believe that you should think of cryptocurrencies as a store of value.
And actually, to your earlier point, we have stores of value.
What exactly is gained by creating something new?
I do think it'll be super interesting to see if this has increased the appetite for regulating some of these markets.
Because some of the shady behavior that you saw in cryptocurrency undermines trust, which is particularly important in situations like these.
And I'll be very interested and I think I'll follow the debate very closely, whether even people who put out cryptocurrencies now realize that you gain some of that trust by having a little more centralization than you advocated for to begin with.
And probably also more regulation just to keep bad actors in check, just to make sure that people who invest in cryptocurrencies and who believe in cryptocurrencies, that they can do so expecting the same kinds of safeguards that we have for investors in other asset classes.
And indeed, recent developments this last week with Coinbase and with Robinhood have been fascinating.
So Coinbase made a disclosure that suggested that it was not exactly clear during a bankruptcy where your crypto assets would go.
Now, I think that got overplayed because a lot of brokerage accounts are like that, frankly.
But, you know, it raises some real issues.
But none of this is going away fast.
So the other fascinating development to me is that Sam Bankman -Fried, who is a crypto gajillionaire, put in a 9 % stake into Robinhood.
So they're not going away.
They're going to fight back and they're going to really try to insinuate themselves into more and more infrastructure so that it gets valued in their way.
And that's the game they have to play at this point.
They can't go down easily.
It's going to be a really interesting situation.
Yeah, super interesting.
And as we said at the beginning, you always want to think about am I learning anything really new here?
Am I looking at something that feels different from the kinds of patterns that we know from the past?
And then most importantly, what are the implications for your company?
If you run a firm, what are the implications for you as an investor, professionally speaking, but also maybe personally?
One of the heuristics that I often use when I'm sort of on the verge of freaking out is look at the S &P 500.
And you think, OK, so it's down to where it was last March or last April maybe.
And then I'm thinking to myself, well, how worried was I last March or last April?
And did I feel particularly poor?
Did I feel confident about my future?
And frankly, the answer is often I felt OK.
And this really helps me to weather these kinds of storms, to just take it in historical perspective, look at your portfolio and say, how did you feel last whatever it happens to be, however the market moves?
And I think the answer is mostly, is it painful that you lost a year's worth of gains in the market?
Yes, of course it is.
Did you feel terrible about your life last March?
No, probably not. As a result, there isn't really a big reason to freak out.
And the corollary to that, I think, Felix, is never extrapolate gains out into the future or losses out into the future.
And those gains are never as real as you think and you're never as smart as you think and you're never as dumb as you think.
Or those losses are never as big as you think they might be.
There's like a little bit of mental mean reversion you need to do to stay sane.
That is great advice.
So me here, upstart and buy now, pay later.
What's your take? Yeah, so look, there's been this incredible excitement about upstart, which is a lending platform, a credit platform, a firm, which is kind of like this buy now, pay later, SoFi.
All these FinTech companies that are not about payments, they're not about crypto, they're kind of about the more basic lending function in the economy and doing it better than traditional intermediaries have done it.
And upstart was really one of the highest fliers of all.
Next Googlers say they're going to disrupt lending.
This thing goes public last year, climbs as high as a market cap of 30, 40 billion dollars, and then crashes to earth.
What do they do? So they are an AI, ML driven platform for lending.
So the underlying idea here is they make personal loans.
And if you go to their webpage, you will see loans for your wedding or loans for debt consolidation or home refinancing kinds of possibilities and now auto loans.
And their premise is that they have algorithms that will help discern whether you are good credit, they will approve you very quickly.
Their business model is to charge fees, but then to lay off the loan onto a bank.
So just to be clear, they're a platform.
They are not historically thought to be somebody who takes risk.
They are somebody who is supposed to just connect the borrower with the lender and then do that, but do it exceptionally well and better than anyone else can do it because of these algorithms.
They look beyond FICO scores.
And indeed, they promise that, for example, for Black and Hispanic borrowers, they promise that their algorithms give you 30 to 40 percent higher approval rates and considerably lower APRs.
So they have like a real mission in what they do.
And then what happened this last week is the wheels came off.
The stock fell by 60 percent.
The stock is now down 90 percent.
Turns out they took some stuff onto their balance sheet.
Yeah. So I'm curious what you made of this high fire coming down to Earth.
Generally speaking, I don't really like these by now pay later services all that much.
The part that makes sense to me is that our way to allocate credit in the economy is unfair and is inefficient in many ways.
So, for instance, if you look at the 2008 2009 meltdown in the housing market credit histories, these famous FICO scores literally had zero correlation with the probability that your house would be foreclosed.
So is there room for improvement in how we allocate credit?
Yes. Yes, exactly. Right.
We have mixed feelings about this.
It's mostly from the borrower side.
Thinking about when is consumer credit a good thing and when is consumer credit actually not great.
And a system that constrains people from having access to credit may not be the worst thing on the planet.
So say should you borrow to buy a better car as an example?
There's two stories.
I think one is I need a car to get to work.
And if I'm not mobile, I can't take a job that would represent a better opportunity.
In that context, credit is really more of an investment.
That's the positive story.
Absolutely. But if the story is just I see a fancy new car and I don't really want to save for that car, I want it now.
And credit allows me to easily live beyond my means.
Then of course it's not great that people have access to credit.
Then in fact forcing people to save so that at some point in time now I can afford that really fancy car.
And now if that's what I like to have, absolutely, you should buy your car.
There's nothing wrong with it.
But in that context, credit is actually highly problematic.
And if you look at the buy now, pay later data, about 40 percent of people miss payments, which indicates it's just a way to live beyond your means.
And that to me is highly problematic.
And frankly, if some of that goes away, I'm not going to be sad.
Well, there is this problem, Felix, exactly as you said it, which is, God, the system feels screwed up in terms of credit allocation.
You feel like there's got to be a better way.
And then somebody comes along and is like ex -Google, and they're going to AIML their way through it.
And you're like, yeah, that sounds right.
That's exactly right.
Let's do it. And then you look under the hood and you ask yourself, first, the question you asked, which is we should always think about credit not as a good or a bad, but as enabling good or bad choices.
And some of those choices are good and some of them are bad.
And to the degree this part of the market, which is not housing, which is not autos, but personal loans and then the kind of consumer finance, like a firm kind of thing, buy now, pay later, it's not clear that they're going to be more likely to be those productive investments.
Yes. They may well be more likely to be more like consumption spending.
Now, just to be clear, there's nothing wrong for borrowing for consumption at certain parts of your life because you are out of income or you want to consume, you want to smooth your consumption over life.
There's something to be said for that.
The problem with these folks seems to be, one, they started to keep the loans, which was not really part of the deal of being a platform.
And we've talked about this with Zillow.
Yeah. All of a sudden you find yourself taking a risk position.
And the way this actually works is banks specify the FICO scores that they want.
And then Upstart basically gives them a bundle of loans.
Well, then guess what's probably left on the Upstart balance sheet, the stuff that other people may not want.
And then there's the final thing that's fascinating to me because it goes back to our earlier discussion about the macro story, which is it turns out their algorithms outperformed for the last couple of years, meaning they were over predicting defaults and the actual performance was much better.
Well, guess what? It turns out that when there's a lot of stimulus checks and there's forbearance on student loans that people pay off these loans and they do better.
And so all of a sudden now it looks like their models are underperforming.
And so was the thing that we saw that we thought we liked about Upstart, which is, oh, they're better than the plain FICO scores.
They're better at figuring out who should get credit.
Was that just an artifact of this weird time?
And that's what's causing, I think, a lot of concern, is you shift to taking risk and you shift to, wait a second, maybe this AI ML thing isn't as easy as we thought it was going to be.
And in fact, I went on Upstart and I got approved for a loan, I'm happy to say.
Surprise, surprise.
It is a fast approval.
It's remarkably fast.
It is interesting just to think that maybe this was just a manifestation of a weird period, as opposed to something significant that they have that's super special.
Yeah. In fairness to the company, we should probably say that it's about $600 million in their balance sheet at this moment.
Right. And their explanation is that they're going into auto, there's a lot to learn, there's a lot of experimentation.
And that frankly sort of makes sense to me.
If you've never done auto loans, it will take a little while for your statistical models to get the idiosyncrasies right.
And maybe during that period of time, it's hard to unload these loans.
I agree. But of course it is extra risk because it means maybe auto isn't really amenable to an AI ML model that is vastly superior to the way we give auto loans today.
We just don't know.
So the market response, I think, was the right response, which doesn't mean that the company itself was doing something that wasn't right.
Yeah. But the problem I think is in a world where you're syndicating some of it and keeping some of it, you're going to get stuck with maybe the roughest part of it.
And then the other part that's fascinating to me is I think people don't understand this about banking, which is a big chunk of what banking succeeds with is low -cost deposits.
People always think about lending and they don't think about the value that banks extract because they're able to provide a low -cost funding to a lot of different businesses.
And so Upstart will never have that, or at least in its current manifestation, will never have that.
Let me push back a little bit on the notion of what it means that some of the risk stays in their balance sheet.
So one story is a story that you just told is like all the good risks get syndicated, banks are happy to invest, and I'm left with the terrible risk.
Right. But of course, terrible as seen from the perspective of the banks.
Yeah, absolutely. In fact, the model is a good model.
The banks will have the risks that they understand, and Upstart will have the risks that Upstart understands.
And if their understanding is not a problem, then that is literally the way you would measure how they contribute value to the economy.
Yeah. And I think the first thing that I would love to see as an investor is break out non -performing loans by the fraction of the loans that are syndicated so that I know, are you really doing better than the banks?
That is fascinating.
Or is it just your story that the risks that you can't get rid of are really terrible risks and we should be really worried about you?
You're exactly right.
So the loans that can't get syndicated are the purest signal on the quality of the model.
Yeah, that's how you would know.
And that's exactly how you would know.
And that is what's fun about this story, is I think for me this is a little microcosm about lending and credit, but also about artificial intelligence and the powers of it relative to the traditional methods.
Yeah. So we're going to find out exactly how that's going to play out as we watch Upstart.
One last change that I would love to see is as credit becomes more available in the economy, it's just much better consumer education.
Right. The easy point that we made before that you should think of every expense as is this really investment or is this consumption?
And then you should think about credit in the context of consumption really very differently from you think about credit in the context of investment.
So investments say in education, they're just very, very different from investments in a fancier sneaker that you have seen somewhere online.
And I guess there's two challenges here.
One is people are not always thinking about this consumption versus investment criteria.
And then the second challenge is something more personal.
Are you pretending that something is an investment?
It's really consumption.
I think in housing I see this all the time where people basically buy a house or an apartment that is beyond their means.
And the justification is, look, it's a fabulous investment.
No, it's not an investment.
It's consumption. And you should think about, can I really afford it?
As credit becomes more available in the economy, which to a first degree might be a good thing, we really need to couple it with much better education so that everyone has a good sense of how to think about these personal decisions.
And that conflation of consumption and investment isn't just housing.
It's buying a car that's going to get you to your job, but also is really, really nice.
It's about signing up at the French Culinary Institute for some cooking classes.
And you tell yourself you're going to become a sous chef at Le Bernardin, but you're really just having a good time.
It's everywhere. So true.
Well, we will see. That is great.
All right, Felix recommendations.
What do you got? Yes, it's actually related to the first topic or maybe even to both topics that we talked about.
Nice. I'd like to recommend the articles of a journalist at the Wall Street Journal.
His name is Greg Ipp and he's the chief economics commentator at the Wall Street Journal.
He is doing a fantastic job.
He mostly writes for a column called Capital Account.
So that's like a column I follow religiously.
And then sometimes, you know, it's longer essays on the weekend.
But I appreciate so much what he's doing on the one hand, you get the news.
But that is not so special today.
Like even Google News is doing a reasonable job giving you the news.
But then almost every time I learn something new, he really provides a way of thinking about things that is linked to underlying economics or underlying finance.
And he would go out to analysts and you'd say, OK, so here's like a prediction you made.
Let me understand where the prediction comes from.
But then also tell me a little bit about what if you change this assumption?
What if you change that assumption, say predictions of inflation?
How do they change as we make different assumptions about what is happening in the auto market?
So if you're interested in macro, if you're interested in where the economy is headed, I think there's really an amazing place to learn about the economy from a very thoughtful, very knowledgeable writer.
Greg Gipp at The Wall Street Journal.
I totally second that.
And he plays it straight down the middle.
In a time when it's hard to get a good clean take on things and an educated take and from somebody who's really good at educating, I think it's fantastic.
It's a great call. He's really fabulous.
So mine is less elevated.
You might recall Felix several years ago.
I recommended a documentary on Netflix called The Staircase, which is this true crime documentary, which is a brilliant piece of work about Michael Peterson, who is accused of killing his wife by pushing her down a staircase.
And the question is whether it was accidental or whether it was murder.
And the documentary was amazing because there was so much footage because he allowed this documentary team from France to follow him everywhere.
So here comes the second round, which is HBO has released a fictionalized show of those same events.
No, the same events again.
Exactly. And now at first you would say to yourself, this is completely unneeded and redundant because the documentary was so rich.
Why would you need it?
And in fact, the first episode or two, I was like, the documentary is better than this.
And by the way, it stars like Tony Collette and Colin Firth and a lot of great people.
Oh, wow. Okay. But by the next couple of episodes, it turns into like a little bit of a meditation on the documentary.
So was the documentary really fair?
And what does it mean to be telling the story of this via a documentary?
Yeah. So it's really fantastic.
Like the acting and everything would be great in and of itself.
But then it's asking this question, which is, what does it mean to do a documentary?
Should you believe what you saw in the documentary really?
Or is the fictional account more true than the documentary?
And so I think it really makes you think about what the nature of fact in fiction is in a really interesting way.
So if you haven't seen the actual original documentary, I totally recommend it still.
But seeing it with this pairing of a fictionalized version of that same thing is really fascinating.
Yeah, that's fabulous.
What a wonderful recommendation.
Excellent. All right, good.
So this is it. Thank you for listening.
This was After Hours from the TED Audio Collective.
And I'll see you next time.
