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One week into 2026, the year has begun with no less uncertainty.
The U.S. forcible seizure of Venezuela's President Maduro has sent shockwaves across the world.
Are we witnessing a turning point?
And what kind of world order may emerge from this?
Welcome to Road Today, the panel discussion with Mika Anna in Beijing.
It's been about a week since Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro and his wife were forcefully seized by US forces, an account that has rapidly reverberated across global media and sparked intense debate far beyond Latin America.
People around the world are asking fundamental questions.
If this abuse of unilateral power becoming a go-to tool for the United States, are we witnessing the return of a might-makes-right logic in international affairs?
And does this point to a 21st century revival of the Monroe Doctrine, one enforced not by diplomacy but by force?
To explore these questions.
We're joined by Ana Rosario Malindog-Oi, Director and Vice President for External Affairs at Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute.
Cao Ting, Director of Center for Latin American Studies of Fudan University.
Joseph Mahoney, Professor of Politics and International Relations at East China Normal University.
Ladies and gentlemen, I want to start by saying that, even though this happened about a week ago, I personally still shocked.
The forcible seizure of President Maduro isn't just a turning point in US-Venezuela relations or US-Latin American relations.
It's opened a huge debate about international law, sovereignty and intervention.
So let me begin with a simple but fundamental question here.
How would you characterize the nature of U.S. operation against Venezuela?
Professor Mahoney, would you like to start?
Well, I think there are three very brief talking points that just have to be clearly articulated.
The first is that this is a violation of the UN Charter.
It's an act of war and it's absolutely imperialism and domination by a stronger power over a smaller one.
Professor Malindog-Oi, how would you describe this?
Yes, as far as I'm concerned, I agree with Professor Joseph Mahoney that it was a US invasion of Venezuela and illegal arrest and kidnapping of their president Maduro.
It is actually illegal and it's like an interference in the domestic affairs of Venezuela.
And blatantly, it was a violation of international law, specifically a violation of the UN Charter.
And also it's a war against multi-polarity and a multipolar rule, because as far as I'm concerned, what I can see, it's not just about a violation of international law.
It's also some kind of intervention vis-a-vis, in a geopolitical sense, that it wants to prevent further influence of China in that part of the world, specifically Venezuela.
And also for me as far as US politics is concerned and the US Constitution is concerned.
I call it as an act of executive unilateralism.
It's imperialism and colonialism in the 21st century.
The kidnapping of Maduro is illegal precisely because Maduro There is such a thing as immunity as far as an incumbent head of state is concerned.
And this is an absolute protected by international law.
So this is really a violation of international in a glaring sense.
And you know, US act as if it owns the world, in this case, without any remorse or any kind of even regret.
It's really like a classic imperialist move as far as its action against Venezuela was concerned.
Professor Cao-Ting, what's your take on this?
Well, I agree with the other two professors.
Acts of the United States constitute blatant trembling on international law and the international norms in the UN Charter.
And the UN Charter has stipulated that the use of force is permissible only when authorized by the Security Council or in response to an armed attack.
While, through the domestic legislation, the US has redefined certain cross-border military operations not as traditional warfare but as law enforcement, thereby placing the framework of international law under the jurisdiction of the US domestic criminal law.
In case of Mazuro's arrest, the US leveled charges against him as a such as narco-terrorism conspiracy, claiming the military operation was launched at the behest of the Department of Justice of its country.
Following the operation, Maduro was transferred to the U.S.
District Court to stand trial.
These accusations, I think, lack substantive evidence.
There are, in a sense, an instrument of judicialization deployed to serve political and military objectives of the US.
Just to add, I just want to add an important aspect of it.
Since Professor Cao Ting has mentioned about what you call long arms jurisdiction of the United States, it is as if, like their domestic laws, applies to another sovereign state, which is really crazy.
As far as i'm concerned, and also, at the end of the day, this is not about laws, this is not about drugs.
It's basically all about resources, controlling the resources of venezuela, the oil and other national resources in there.
So this is all also about regime change, precisely because maduro is not a puppet of the united states.
So they want to impose something, or they want to control the country venezuela, for that matter, to control the whole country to their advantage.
So this is a classic, really imperialist move as far as US is concerned.
Let's delve a bit further into global reactions, especially from Latin America, Europe and Global South.
Many small and medium-sized countries now appear to be experiencing what some analysts describe as sovereignty anxiety and security anxiety.
In several Latin American capitals, protests were emerged carrying slogans such as, we are the next.
So, Professor Tauting, from your perspective, what impact does this incident have on smaller states globally, and especially on Latin American countries?
Yeah, I agree with you.
The United States' actions have triggered anxiety and unease among many small countries around the world.
The senior minister of Singapore stated publicly several days ago that the United States' military intervention in Venezuela will exert a long-term impact on the international system and can arouse concerns among small countries like Singapore.
And peace and autonomy in Latin America are also facing the gravest threat since the end of the Cold War.
And Trump seeks to use this operation as a lesson to others to create a chilling effect in this region.
And Trump has also threatened that a second wave of strikes could not be ruled out, aiming to exert overwhelming deterrence on Venezuela's acting president and military and force them into submission to the United States.
And Trump has also threatened to intervene in Colombia and Cuba, while other left-wing regions are also under pressure from the US.
So I think now this region is facing a lot of pressure from the US and this dream of Latin America to build the region into a zone of peace is in danger of being shattered.
Professor Mahoney, what's your take on the concerns like sovereignty anxiety and security anxiety?
What kind of a pattern of responses from the international community do you see emerging?
Well, I would take it from a broader geopolitical perspective.
The thing that we saw was the Trump administration pulling out of another 66 international organizations, including more related to climate change.
And we also saw statements from some of his advisors indicating that they believe that Mike makes right, that Greenland is next and Trump saying that he doesn't need to follow international law, that the only thing that really guides him is his own sense of morality.
So I think that we put this in the broader context of him increasingly abandoning international organizations.
It demonstrates U.S. animosity towards multilateralism and global governance.
It signals the U.S. is firmly committed to this might makes right principle power.
And this was demonstrated not only against Venezuela, but also recently against Iran.
And we talk about threats against Colombia, but he's already forced militarily concessions from Colombia.
We know that Cuba has long been under an embargo and that it's most likely that Cuba is next, given the extent to which Marco Rubio is driving this policy, as both his NSA and the Secretary of State.
Rubio, of course, being a member of the Cuban-American community from Miami and strongly anti-communist and anti-Castro.
And, you know, I think that removing Venezuela is one step.
But it's also the case that the attack on Venezuela and gaining the ability to stop the flow of oil in Venezuela creates new opportunities for the US to prosecute its conflict against Iran.
It's part of a nested game that allows them to begin to put pressure on a lot of different people simultaneously, given the fact that the US is now the world's largest petroleum producer.
So I would say that, when we put all of this in the broader context, along with the mercantilist, rent-seeking global trade war that he imposed on the world, as well as from Biden to Trump, the demonstrated willingness to manipulate the dollar and exert control over the global financial system, above all, to protect the dollar as the global reserve currency and its relationship.
With oil.
I think we have to take these together with the issue of abandoning the effort to resist or to fight against climate change, to remember that his recent national security document is determined to make the United States global energy superpower, but above all through fossil fuels.
We know that countries in the global south are the ones that are most vulnerable to climate change, including China.
And it seems increasingly apparent that the United States is using its turn, its radical return to fossil fuels, as well as its negative disposition to not only the Latin America or the Western Hemisphere, but all countries in the world.
This has become not only a global trade war, but a global war or strategic endgame with climate change.
I would suggest that we are in a very precarious moment.
Venezuela is probably the best example of this danger.
But the danger is far bigger that we are on the cusp of a human tragedy that could prove much greater than the Holocaust.
This country's faced the worsening wages of extreme weather flooding drought, food insecurity and disease.
And I think we need to find a really clear response to this risk.
We know the US also suffers from climate change, but relatively not as bad as other countries, and above all because the US has to perpetuate its relationship with oil in order to sustain its dollar and therefore sustain its debt-driven economy, as well as its ability to manipulate the global financial system and to perpetuate that model.
So we are in this profound moment of a global economic security and climate change trap.
Venezuela is just the first major example of this.
So when I see smaller countries reacting to it, I think we can understand their immediate anxiety.
But in fact, this is an existential risk that all countries are facing.
And indeed a lot of people are concerned that none of the countries that Trump has mentioned are next.
What he's really building towards is targeting Brazil, Brazil's role in BRICS, the way Brazil has become instrumental as an alternative source for agricultural products, as China has diversified its agricultural products away from the United States.
And again, that this was about resources.
It's not just about oil.
It's also about the rare earths, the strategic minerals. that Venezuela also has an abundance.
And we know that China's outsized position in that market and its willingness to resort to export controls is what forced the trade war ceasefire on Trump.
And that has deeply frustrated the White House.
And so, by moving in and gaining greater control over the oil markets, but also potentially gaining access to these minerals in Venezuela, after realizing that gaining such access in Ukraine was probably not going to be feasible, is yet part of a broader attempt to push back and contain or knock down China and the multipolar world order.
Professor Mahoney, a very interesting tweet.
The U.S.
State Department recently tweeted America is back, noting that, just one week into 2026, The road has already taken notice.
In your opinion, what kind of America is back, and how does this administration see its role in today's world?
Well, I don't know how old the other members of the panel are, but I don't think I'm myself that old.
I was born in 1970, but I grew up coming of age in terms of my awareness of the broader world.
During the Reagan administration.
I remember very distinctly a lot of the things that the United States was doing in Latin America during the Reagan administration, which in some respects are worse than what they're doing now.
We know that the aggression against Venezuela really started in 2000.
So Chavez came to power.
The U.S. kind of hesitated and hedged a bit.
But when you remember the election in 2000, the Gore George W Bush election, you may recall that that was decided ultimately by just over 500 votes in Florida.
That election, that was out of nearly 6 million votes cast in Florida.
So the entire US election, given the way the electoral college work, came down to a mere 500 votes and you may recall there was an extensive recount.
One of the things that came out of that recount was the idea that Bush ultimately won the recount given the stalwart support of the Cuban exiles living in Miami who had voted for him over Al Gore.
And that this is where you see, this coincides with the sharp turn as Bush began to go after, Chavez began to support his opposition, and even a coup.
And of course, at that time Chavez was trying to organize a broader South American union to resist American hegemony, was advancing relations with Cuba and had imposed higher royalties on US oil companies who held the oil contracts to extract oil from Venezuela, which had angered the oil companies.
Of course, the Bush, both the older and the younger Bush, were close to the U.S. oil industry.
So there were a number of reasons why that escalated.
We can go back and recall Chavez calling Bush the devil.
So what we're seeing is a long-term strategy that has had ups and downs through time, as the US found itself distracted by other threats 9-11, high oil prices and other things that caused it to mitigate its strategy or approach towards Venezuela.
But since 2000 it's largely been aimed at trying to overthrow the socialist government of Venezuela.
I would say that this is really nothing new.
It had its precedents going back all the way into the early 1800s.
You had different presidents Roosevelt, others who had their own corollaries to Monroe Doctrine, and now Trump.
By the way, John Bolton, who was his NSA during his first term, clearly enunciated that the Monroe Doctrine was back.
Of course, then Trump lost the power.
But then when Trump had his second inaugural address, he said it was back.
And indeed, it was articulated clearly in the new national security document.
But the point is, it's always really been here.
It's just, I think, as you said in the intro, the US has used different means from soft power or financial manipulation, the Washington census and sometimes just outright military intervention, in order to try to sustain or reinforce its hegemony over the Western Hemisphere.
Mm hmm.
Professor Melinda Goy, how do you interpret this idea of a returned America?
What does it reveal about how the current US government perceives itself and its own role in the world?
And how serious do you think this is, especially for smaller states?
And yeah, let me comment on that.
And also let me comment as well on the question of sovereignty anxiety and what happened to Venezuela, what it means for smaller state and for a country like mine, which is actually a US ally at the same time as countries in the global south, like the sub-region of Southeast Asia.
So for me, as far as I'm concerned, the incident reinforces a hard truth that many small and medium-sized countries or states have long since, but now feel more acutely.
Formal sovereignty is increasingly fragile when great powers speak and act openly in terms of interest, assets and leverage.
I'm referring to the United States, because that's really the kind of actions they project to the world, especially those who are not aligned with their interests or those who are not bowing down to them.
What we're seeing is not just a paranoia.
It is a rational anxiety in a more coercive international system.
So what does the incident in venezuela signals to smaller states like mine, which is the philippines?
The blunt articulation of power that is one, and whether over resources, territory or strategic location, This is actually what we sense at the moment, especially a country coming from the global south.
And this is also all about the signaling that sovereignty is conditional as far as the United States is concerned, and not absolute in every sense.
Because you know, when major power like the United States openly discuss another country's oil, land or strategic value, it implies that sovereignty is respected only insofar as it does not obstruct great power interests.
For this specific case, it's the great interests of the United States.
So for smaller states, what we think is this erodes the belief that international law alone is not sufficient shield.
So this means that you know norms are weaker when you talk about power, and also rules matter less than leverage.
Institution cannot reliably constrain powerful actors like the united states, because you know everyone is looking at the um system at the moment or the united nation asking what the united nation can do to constrain um the united states under a trump presidency.
What if united states would invade colombia?
Would, you know, invade greenland?
And even you know, countries like those countries who are not aligning with its moves and interests internationally speaking.
So there's also a question of moral language that is being dropped as far as Trump is concerned.
So in a way this deepens security anxiety, especially for smaller states, especially also for those states that they maintain neutrality and they have independent foreign policy and they don't have this strong alliance or deterrent capacity.
So it's sending what you call security anxiety as well.
It's not just sovereignty anxiety, but security anxiety.
So these are the things that is happening and, I think, in the minds of many smaller and medium power states.
So basically, for Latin America in particular, it signals that history is not yet over.
It was only rebranded as far as they are concerned, and that survival increasingly depends not on declaration of sovereignty but how skillfully states navigate pressure, ambiguity and power asymmetry in a very interesting global order at the moment.
And, as far as America is concerned, when you talk about the international community, as you can see, there are a lot of protests going on across Europe, even inside the United States, even people from India, who also protested against the military actions of United States against Venezuela.
You can see that people are perceiving the United States as a declining power that is suffering from anxiety, that is trying to grip on power and perceive dominance in the world, especially in the Western Hemisphere.
That's the picture as far as I am concerned and as far as my friends are concerned in Asia, how we look at the United States at the moment.
So it is really a power.
It's a major power that is trying to assert itself. yet it's losing at the same time.
Indeed.
Professor, I think you made a very crucial point, because this also creates a sovereignty paradox, even for US allies, be it the Philippines or Denmark, which depending on US protection while risking sovereignty and resources.
Professor Cao Ting, how do you interpret this?
Because earlier Professor Mahoney mentioned about the US factor in Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine.
Some say in the period of U.S. former President Barack Obama, the Monroe Doctrine was over.
But under Trump, it seems very much alive.
So what's new about this today, and how does this new Monroe Doctrine differ from the old one?
Well, I think, under the actual background of multi-polarization, the target of the US has been a little different or has been expanded.
It not only targets traditional European powers.
That also explicitly takes emerging non-Western powers, just as Russia or China's key containment objects, aiming to prevent these countries from deploying forces or controlling strategic assets in the Western Hemisphere.
And it directly takes the resources of Latin American countries as the target of its actions.
For example, this time in Venezuela, which has the world's largest oil reserves and became its first victim.
And its issue as illegal immigration and fentanyl trafficking in Latin America and also has been used as the protection of the United States to attack other Latin American countries.
So I think the US has completely abandoned the disguise, the narrative of the old version of the modern doctrine and reveals the selfish nature of its America first.
It no longer covers up its desire from hegemony with high surrounding excuses, directly defines the Western Hemisphere as its absolute backyard and security zone and treats the sovereignty of Latin American countries as a tool to serve its own interests.
Professor Mahoney, a major concern we talked about from the countries around the world is whether we're witnessing the emergence of a dangerous new normal in international relations.
What does this mean for other states labeled as the so-called problem regimes by Washington when we talk about the next victims?
And where does their sense of security lie in the future?
So let me back up and say that it was mentioned earlier that Obama had declared the Monroe Doctrine finished.
But at the same time, we know that there were continuities, strategic continuities from Obama.
Although you know Obama did try to moderate its position a little bit vis-a-vis Cuba, that this ultimately failed.
It did not actually achieve significant results while he was in office.
It's something he introduced late, and then it was immediately rejected by his successor which, of course, was Donald Trump.
We know that this term, it reminds me of George W Bush, the idea of rogue states or rogue nations, or the axis of evil.
This has always been part of American discourse and American imperial efforts.
I think the key here is that two or three things that have put the United States in a position where it has now explicitly targeted Venezuela.
As I mentioned earlier, Biden expanded US oil production by opening up what had been very highly protected lands in Alaska.
This is what made the US the number one oil producer in the world.
And Biden consolidated that, I would argue by provoking and fighting a proxy war with Russia over control of energy markets in Europe and how energy is paid for.
Europe was trying to get away from the dollar.
This directly threatened the petrodollar and the power of the US dollar as the global reserve currency and therefore the entire US economy.
Now the US has made the strategic decision to increasingly withdraw from the Middle East, in part because and to go back to 9-11 one of the strategic objectives of 9-11 was always to find a way to establish and sustain a massive US military footprint in the Middle East to be able to lock down global oil supplies if a conflict erupted between the US and China.
This is what forced China initially to deepen its energy relationship with Russia, As China began to find alternatives to Middle Eastern oil and even African oil.
China finds alternative energy sources and begins to build green energy.
And, at the same time, the US failed in Afghanistan and China was able to advance positive relations with the Middle Eastern countries.
So what happened was?
The United States itself was able to provide enough of its own energy, But controlling Venezuela was key to controlling energy prices in order to avoid too much inflation hitting American consumers, which is a risk that whoever's in office faces.
So what we're seeing is the US is increasingly withdrawn from the imperial project of the Middle East and redirected that imperial project now to Venezuela.
Because it's closer to home, it's easier to hold and there's also other strategic minerals there in play, and
China has made considerable inroads in building constructive relations with Latin America and Caribbean countries in the past decade.
And this has troubled the United States as well, because the United States is unable to offer those types of assistance, because the US is not even able to do that for itself.
But to answer your question, we've had this behavior before.
It's just before.
It was directed against the so-called axis of evil or rogue nations, and it was directed against Iraq.
Remember, the United States illegally invaded Iraq.
The United States managed to overthrow that government, arrest its leader, and execute him.
The United States illegally involved itself in Libya and contributed to that leader's death.
You don't have to go back to Vietnam.
It's something that has always happened.
Wherever the US has focused its strategic energies because that's what it needed to do, it felt in terms of its strategic passion.
So nothing new.
It's just directed in a new way with slightly different rhetoric.
Where I would again disagree with the idea that Obama was somehow a nice guy.
Let's remember that it was Obama who continued the disastrous policies in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and not just in those countries, but did so with drone warfare that killed a lot of women and children without putting American service members at risk.
It's been despicable through and through.
None of this is new.
It's just the same game.
I just think it's become a little more desperate as the conditions facing everyday Americans has become more desperate.
And the United States is trying to not only distract people from their own problems, but externalize their woes and costs onto other people.
Thanks, ladies and gentlemen, for your in-depth perspectives.
Let's have a short break.
Coming back.
We'll continue our discussion on the aftermath of a US forcible seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.
Stay with us.
Welcome back.
You're listening to Road Today, the panel discussion with Mika Anna.
We've been talking about How the US forcible seizure of Venezuela's President Maduro has altered the global landscape.
Let's continue our discussion.
Professor Mahoney.
Building on that, The Economist recently said that Trump's blunt honesty has made the road nostalgic for America's former hypocrisy, with Washington openly talking about Venezuelan oil and even Greenland.
So how do you rate this bluntness about U.S.?
And what does that mean for NATO and US allies, who rely heavily on US security guarantees while facing potential risks to territorial or resource integrity?
There are two sort of responses to these.
One of the responses is academic.
We know, for example, that the great Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, is the one who really introduced the world to the concept of hegemony that we use today often.
Now, use this concept in tandem.
So hegemony or imperialism.
And it was the British Marxist Hobsbawm who contextualized this perfectly in his studies of Gramsci, where he said hegemony is the velvet glove that masks or hides the imperial fist within.
The velvet glove uses culture or economics or soft power, various forms of manipulation or intimidation, to tell people to do on their own accord what the power wants.
This is rule or domination through consent.
But when that breaks down, for whatever reason, when other countries simply fail to do what you are trying to manipulate them to do, then you see the glove come off and you see the imperial fist.
But again, to think that this is something altogether new, that Trump is simply being more candid is, I think, a little misrepresentative of how candid the Reagan administration was and how direct the Bush administration was.
The only difference is that at least the first Bush administration tried to put together an international coalition.
It was able to do this in part because the Soviet Union was no longer really in a position to create an alternative, provide a moderating force.
This was in the first Persian Gulf War after the invasion of Kuwait.
But it was also the case that in George W Bush they did go to the UN, They did construct an international coalition, but they did so by lying, by creating fabricated evidence of weapons of mass destruction.
The two differences today are firstly, that we are in a new era of great power competition.
China is now a major power.
That wasn't the case in the first Gulf War.
It wasn't the case in the second Gulf War, but it is the case today.
And it is part of the calculus that's taking place.
The second issue is part of the problem that we have with Europe is that Europe has been complicit on the financial markets, the bond markets.
A lot of the leadership, the elites, have been complicit not only with what's happening now in Venezuela, but also in Trump's tech war against China implemented tech blockade against China but also complicit in the genocide that was conducted against the Palestinians in Gaza.
So there has always been this sort of European free-riding, or merely taking advantage or selling under the table the weapons or the systems that have perpetuated the same grave crimes that we see being committed by the United States.
So where this becomes problematic for the Europeans, of course, is that Trump has also disciplined Europe.
Trump has also imposed a devastating trade war on Europe, after Biden had already dispossessed them of cheap energy.
And, at the same time, what we see is Europe was actually forced into a conflict with Ukraine and public opinion was manipulated by Western media to believe that Russia was an existential threat, that Russia was singularly responsible for provoking this conflict.
Now it's very difficult for the European populations, and therefore their politicians, to abandon a narrative that had been advanced by the Biden administration that this was an act of aggression against the sovereignty of Ukraine and that this was a threat against the entire system.
And now that Trump is himself doing this but at the same time, forcing concessions on Europe related to Ukraine, you have this awareness that all the fictions that the European leaders have been either exploiting for their own gain or the European markets that have been exploiting for their own gain or that they have depended on for the political narratives that they've sustained,
These are all being exposed in very uncomfortable ways, while the United States is, at the same time, supporting right-wing movements against these various leaders.
So the European leaders themselves are in a very exposed position.
They're in an economic trap, they're in an energy trap, they're in a security trap.
And some of their markets are actually quite happy with what's happening in Venezuela.
So I think what they wish for is the old hypocrisy, the old lies that were previously told, because that was much more comfortable for them to move along in ways where they got to pretend that they were innocent and they didn't get their hands dirty, even though the United States is really just emulating the imperial model that they pioneered in the first place and that they have long benefited from as being part of the developed world and under the security rubric of the United States.
It speaks to really a darkness and evil, I think, in those hearts that would wish for the continuation of the old lies, aside from the difficult truths that they're now having to face, as the Western system itself is in a period of rapid decline.
Indeed.
When such a hegemonic power exists, no country, including its allies, can stand entirely apart.
Now, ladies and gentlemen, let's look ahead to the future of the international order.
Professor Malindag Oi.
I came across an article from Kurdistan titled The Venezuela Precedent, which asks whether similar scenarios could appear closer to Central Asia and stresses the importance of regional security alliances.
I think this is certainly not an isolated case.
So do you think this incident will push more countries to rely on regional security mechanisms, because global ones no longer feel reliable?
Yes, I think I would say that many countries or different regions of the world like, for example, Asia Pacific or Southeast Asia or the Middle East, would be pushed more towards regional security coordination and cooperation rather than relying on a collective security globally speaking, precisely because you have this what's going on and what you call moves and geopolitical moves of the United States, which is, many countries in the world right now are very much quite afraid it's.
You have this what you call anxiety going on and they are seeing that.
I actually agree with professor counting that you know it's not anymore for america, it's america first as far as the world is concerned.
So I think the push for regional security cooperation, may be in defense and military, among countries in different parts of the region will be something that we might see would be pushed.
Institutions like, for example BRICS, the Shanghai cooperation.
These are alternative and groupings or alternative multilateral frameworks or groupings that are in existence at the moment.
This will gain more leverage, I think, and this would gain more attraction as far as the Global South or the rest of the world is concerned, precisely because, if you look at BRICS, these are composed of major powers that are basically, as you can see, they are not in agreement and not in an alignment with the United States.
So I just want to comment as well.
You know it's very important to understand the Montreux doctrine.
But I think what is very important in this re-emergence of the Monroe Doctrine as far as Trump is concerned is it's not anymore really about US dominance in the Western Hemisphere, which was executed through US military intervention, regime change and economic domination, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean.
If you look at the Monroe Doctrine originally speaking,
But you know, the Mondo doctrine in as far as Trump era is concerned is quite alarming in many sense.
This revived the doctrine in practice, not anymore even in terms of rhetoric.
And it's not anymore focused actually on Europe or even in Not necessarily only in Latin America, but this is more about blocking alternative powers using sanction, economic pressure and diplomatic coercion.
Not necessarily direct intervention like waging war, but it's more really the economic force.
He wants to have that dominance in the economic side.
And this is actually also a reassertion of this doctrine under Trump.
It's waging a war against a multipolar world.
Because, if you look at the world right now, there's such a thing as an emergence of a multipolar world.
The era of a unipolar world dominated by the united states is ending, because the united states really is a declining power, as you can see.
What's america doing that makes people and makes other countries really anxious.
It's not anymore about only colonialism.
This is really a wage of trying to prevent an emergence of multipolarity.
This is some kind of dangerous or alarming to a greater extent, and For me, the way I see it, countries in the world, especially region, we will see more probably regionalization would be emerging as far as security and defense is concerned.
Well, in my part of the world, Asia and Southeast Asia like, for example, regional organization like ASEAN, probably right now is thinking you know, how are we going to protect ourselves if, in any case, the United States will be on us and will do something against us, may it be in economics or in security part.
But of course Southeast Asia is very much have good relation, I think, with China and even with other major powers in the world like India.
So this is what is going on at the moment.
But the bottom line is United States.
The concern there is how the international community will be able to some extent restrain the United States.
That is a big question for everyone at the moment.
Because right now, it's like a hegemon.
It's still a hegemon to a certain extent, but it's like a hegemon that has no restraint.
It doesn't care about international relations.
It doesn't care about international law.
It withdraws from what?
How many?
66%? multilateral agency and international organization as far as Trump is concerned.
It was announced two days ago or yesterday, I think, from what I've seen in papers.
So, you know, this is the challenge of the people of the world.
How far are we going to accept this kind of actions coming from a major power like the United States?
That's indeed a crucial point.
Professor Salting, what's your assessment on the future of the international order?
Do you think this incident will push more countries to strengthen regional collective security mechanisms as a form of self-protection?
Well.
From the broader geopolitical perspective, I think this event may accelerate the evolution of the international order toward a more multipolar pattern centered on regional cooperation and strategic autonomy.
I think this event has become a touchstone for testing the stance of the Global South on safeguarding national sovereignty, and it has sounded an alarm for major middle powers such as Europe Japan, South Korea and some small states such as Singapore, making them realize the risks of over-reliance on US security guarantees.
But I think the solidarity and cooperation in some regions still face severe tests, such as countries in Latin America now are divided in their attitudes towards the US.
And we know some left-wing governments, such as Brazil Mexico Cuba Chile, have condemned the US military action, that Argentine President Milley has publicly voiced his support for the US stance, and other countries led by right-wing administration have remained silent on the US actions.
And this reflects the divergent positions of the Latin American governments with different ideological leaning towards the US policies.
I think the regionalism in some regions still face a lot of challenges.
Professor Cao Ting, we mentioned China several times in our discussion today already.
I've noticed the discussion in international stage suggesting that, as a unilateral regime change by force becomes a reality, the world looks for stabilizing forces and China may be facing a historic choice.
Should China continue its path of development-centered, non-interventionist civilizational rights, Or should it evolve into a more proactive provider of international order, capable of deterring unilateral actions?
How do you view this debate?
Well, I think the two orientations are not contradictory.
Instead, I think they reinforce each other to serve China's long-term goal of promoting a more equitable multipolar world.
And I think now.
China remains the world's largest developing country and development is still the top priority to address domestic challenges.
And a development-centered foreign policy ensures that China's external strategies serve its domestic modernization drive.
So China has to avoid the trap of overextending military or diplomatic resources.
So, unlike the US rule-based order that imposes its value unilaterally, China's approach emphasizes sovereignty, equality and mutual respect.
I think this has also won the recognition from countries in Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia.
And I think China does not need to abandon its civilizational rights to be a proactive defender of the international order.
On the contrary, I think it is precisely by adhering to the principles of non-intervention, mutual benefit and multilateralism that China can provide a new type of international order leadership, one that contrasts with the US hegemonic order-providing model.
This leadership will not only help deter unilateral actions, but also accelerate the formation of a more equitable multipolar world where the sovereignty and the interests of all countries, large or small, are respected.
Professor Mahoney, how do you view this growing discussion that China is being pushed to the forefront by external situations rather than by its own choice?
I think there are a couple of issues.
The first is the United States has recently provoked China the proposed 11 billion weapons sale to Taiwan.
And we believe the US has encouraged the return of militarization or militarism in Japan, as well as the sort of rhetoric that we've heard from the new prime minister about some sort of security alliance with Taiwanese separatists.
And we know that China has interest in Iran.
We know that controlling Venezuela would maybe give the United States a fair hand to move against Iran without disrupting oil markets in ways that would bring inflationary shocks to American consumers, which would then, of course, damage Republicans ahead of the midterms.
If Republicans lose the midterms, Trump is in trouble the last two years.
But of course when US presidents get in trouble domestically they tend to act more dramatically or radically in foreign affairs, when they face no constitutional, very few constitutional restrictions.
So all of this is a situation that I think is a little more dangerous than we might recognize.
And certainly the people who are responsible for strategic thinking in Beijing.
They are looking at every different component and thinking very, very carefully.
That said, I would suggest that what we saw with the trade war, what we see in Venezuela, What we have seen with the strategic failure of the United States in Ukraine, the failure of the US in Iraq, the failure of the US in Afghanistan, we are seeing the limits of American power.
One of the fictions here is that the United States has not actually defeated Venezuela.
It has not actually occupied Venezuela.
It is not actually imposing its will directly.
It is threatening.
It has, yes, taken some extraordinary actions.
The Venezuelan people are facing grave risks right now.
But to what extent can the U.S. actually impose and get what it wants?
To what extent?
And it forced the Venezuelans to sell oil through American companies that they don't want.
To what extent would those oil companies not be subject to militant attacks or rebel attacks within Venezuela, if this moved forward?
So I'm not really sure that what the US has done is actually going to achieve even its strategic objectives in Venezuela, because it hasn't really achieved strategic objectives anywhere else.
And instead, we continue to see the decline in that capacity.
So this threatening all the different countries, I think that we don't want to be in a position where we're just going to wait them out.
We don't want to be in a position where we're going to encourage the United States to prove that it can kill people in Venezuela.
But at the same time I don't think we have to take a defeatist or capitulationist, altogether fearful approach to it.
I think, with even a small amount of international solidarity and resistance, the US project will fall apart, because indeed, as I've already argued, this is already a desperate attempt by the United States to buy itself a few more years at the top.
Whenever you get this desperate and this blatant and you risk these types of risks, which the US is increasing risk for itself.
We can talk about the strategic risks that it's posing for other countries, but these are also risks for the US.
So the extent to which the US continues to go down this road And the rest of the world either resist or says OK, prove it, US.
Prove what a nasty country you are.
Show us how you're going to kill women and children.
Show us how you're going to starve people to death.
I think at that point you begin to see US having to step back from the brink, because I don't think American voters or the American people are that evil.
I don't think that they will ultimately support that type of government.
At least, that's what I feel and hope.
So I'm not optimistic in a broad sense.
I think we are on the cusp of something very dangerous.
But at the same time, I don't think the U.S. can really achieve what it aims here.
And sooner or later, this falls apart.
Let's hope that when it does fall apart, It doesn't spark a wider war.
But as China is itself thinking about how to respond, or whether or not China needs to take a more militant or activist approach, I think China has to be very careful not to be drawn into conflicts that will likewise expose China to greater vulnerabilities or demonstrate the limits of China's geostrategic position or undermine the goodwill that China has among other nations who appreciate the fact that China is not an aggressive imperial nation that doesn't involve itself, one that doesn't involve itself in other countries.
So your question gets right to the point.
Should China play a more proactive or militant a role internationally?
I would suggest that China should play a role.
I would suggest firstly, that I have a great faith in the intelligence and the strategic thinking of the leaders in Beijing.
And so, whatever they do, I'm going to probably strongly support speculating what they might be able to do without getting stuck in a downward spiral with the US, which serves no one's interest.
I think they can reinforce global solidarity through organizations like BRICS.
They can ensure that India Brazil Russia Iran, South Africa others, India are all together on the same page, that they're firmly resisting these types of behaviors.
You know, I don't think the UN is going to offer any sort of relief, as much as the US is able to block things there, given its role in the UN Security Council.
But it's clear that some type of global resistance, as well as pointing the finger and, at the same time, saying to the US if this is the road you want to travel, show us how dirty, how evil you are and see how far you can carry that before your own people turn against you as well as the rest of the world.
That's an important observation.
Professor Malinda Goy, what's your last assessment on this?
How do you interpret the argument that China is increasingly being pushed into a more prominent role by current political landscape?
Yeah, that's a very good question.
I think this is very important as well, not for China and even for the rest of the world.
And for the Global South, because if you look at the Global South and if you look at the global economy, developing economy at the helm at the moment, to be very honest, especially when you talk about this, the rise of Asia or Asian century it's China.
And China is in the middle of all of these things.
And I think there's also a pressure as far as China is concerned.
So this debate actually reflects a genuine strategic crossroads for China, but it is often framed too simplistically, as if Beijing must choose between moral restraint and hard power activism.
In reality, China should not, at least as far as well, if you ask me.
China should not choose between non-intervention and intervention.
It should reflect or decide in terms of how visible, how institutionalized and how risk-accepting its power should become in a system where a unilateral force like this assertion of the United States of trying to prevent a multipolar world to emerge as per the unipolar where it dominates is reemerging as an accepted tool.
So for me, if you look at China China as far as my observation is concerned and I am in Beijing and I observed what's going on in China for me, the way I see it, China is still at the moment, and I think it will continue the path of being focused and being development-centered.
And of course, it will always stand on the principle of non-interventionist approach.
And thus far, as from my observation, it has delivered three strategic advantages.
First is legitimacy in the global south.
China is seen as a power that grows without invasion, regime change, or ideological exports.
I think this is established in history that China is not a major power that will invade or will colonize any country, because it experienced colonialism as a country as well.
And the second point, I think, is strategic patience.
I think China is very patient.
It prioritizes growth, economic and prosperity.
And, as far as its neighbor is concerned, many countries in the world, even especially the Asia-Pacific region, benefits from China's economic progress.
And China has this, from my observation, it always has this kind of perspective, that it avoids imperial overreach or the classic trap of a rising power.
Because, you know, China is a rising superpower.
And I think when you talk about moral contrast in a world of coercion, it exercise restraint.
And also it tries to be a benevolent, a major power by helping other developing countries across the world.
So, in a way, at the moment there is indeed a challenge of how China will position itself amidst what is going on right now vis-a-vis what the United States is doing, not only in the Western Hemisphere, but even across the world.
So there is a bit of a pressure on China.
But I think, as far as I'm concerned, China is not being asked to abandon its civilizational rise.
It is being asked to update it, and i think the historic choice is not whether china becomes a hegemon, but whether it becomes a guardian of restraint in an age of coercion, especially us coercion.
If unilateral regime change is becoming normalized, then the most stabilizing role china can play is not to mirror force with force, but to make force less legitimate, less effective and most and more costly though institution, through coalitions to institutions and credibility.
And we can see it in BRICS, in the Shanghai Cooperation and other multilateral organizations, that China has a huge presence or a strong presence.
So this is what I think is important for China to reflect, because the pressure for China is huge at the moment.
Thanks to all of our panelists for those valuable insights.
Anna Rosario Malindog-Oi, Director and Vice President for External Affairs at Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute.
Cao Ting, Director of Center for Latin American Studies of Fudan University.
Joseph Mahoney, Professor of Politics and International Relations at East China Normal University.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today.
I'm Guiana.
Thank you so much for listening.
Bye for now.
