Welcome to World Today in News Program with a different perspective.
I'm Yulh good in Beijing.
In this edition of the show, we discuss whether US allies are ready for a second Trump disruption.
Before and after taking office for a second time, US president Donald Trump has been stirring up uneasiness among American allies.
He said the E .U. is quote unquote very bad for America and promised tariffs against European imports.
He has talked about purchasing Greenland or using economic and military means to take control of the Danish territory because he said the U .S.
needs the world's largest island for national security.
How have America's global allies been taking Trump's messages?
What does a second Trump administration mean for traditional American alliances in Europe, Asia and elsewhere?
For this question and more I'm joined by Kathleen Burke, professor emerita of modern and contemporary history, University College London, Jonathan Aronson, professor of communication and international relations, University of Southern California.
Also we have Dr. Tonjien Quyen, director of the diplomacy study center Hunan Normal University.
A big thank you and welcome to all three of you for joining me on this very important panel to discuss this topic.
Now let me begin by asking all of you what are some noticeable remarks regarding how to treat America's allies.
Have you observed in Trump's recent public statements because he says a lot of things, and why do these remarks stand out to you?
Maybe let me start with Professor Burke, please.
Well, it's there been a whole slew of extremely concerning comments.
I mean, first of all, we must realize that Trump is entirely unpredictable, and that's one of the great parts of his negotiating strategy.
So, I mean, if I were Canada, He's not going to make them as a 51st state, but it's probably beginnings of pressure on terror.
Greenland, there's mixed response in Greenland and in, well, not mixed response in Denmark, obviously.
No one's like a land grab by someone else.
But in Greenland, because they've not been entirely happy with how they've been treated by the Danes, there's a mixed response there.
Europe, of course. Europe is mixed, obviously.
On the whole, the major response is, oh, dear.
But there are various countries that aren't quite so worried.
We haven't heard anything really from Australia or New Zealand.
But the thing is, no one likes unpredictability.
No one. And this is the chap talking, of course.
So they are all in various ways of reacting, ways of talking.
that, and although they knew if Trump was elected, that life was going to change as it were.
But they weren't quite sure why.
Japan, of course, is worried, South Korea is worried.
So on the whole, we may get a different response from my American colleagues, but on the whole, I think if he wants to disrupt, he's done a very good job of it.
Now, let's hear from Professor Aronson, please.
Turn the page back 60 years.
Nikita Khrushchev was the head of the Soviet Union, came to the United Nations, proclaimed that Russia, the Soviet Union, would bury us, and for emphasis, took off of his shoe and pounded it on the table.
The impact was to create real concern that this guy was crazy, that he might do anything.
Trump is following in those footsteps.
He is quite capable of changing his mind.
He threatens, he bullies, sometimes it works, sometimes it won't, and everybody is in for a ride.
Well, very unpredictable.
China, certainly, is with tariffs.
He's all of a sudden at his last press conference, said he really doesn't want to put tariffs on China, and then of course, the head of North Korea is a great guy.
And that's a 180 -degree turnaround on the Chinese tariffs issue just from the day before yesterday.
Dr. Tong, what is your take?
What have you observed in terms of how Donald Trump might to treat traditional American allies, in Europe, in Asia, and elsewhere.
Yeah, this is the continuation of Donald Trump's administration to maintain the relationship with its allies in Europe, in Asia, in the commercial way.
On one side, I'm sure this administration will gain more in the responsibilities to its allies in Asia, for example.
he would like to make European countries give more and more responsibilities to support E -CREAM.
And on the other side, he would like to get more and more benefit from his allies.
This is actually a very interesting administration for the United States and for the international community.
I'm sure almost all the allies of the United States are now becoming more and more nervous about such a policy by the United States, because the United States is a major power, is an inflation power.
Any policy changes will give the relations between the United States and its allies in a very up -and -down way.
So this is a very specific situation I think the United States and its allies are facing.
Well, let's take a look at the case of Europe first, because there has already been quite some discussions among EU member states on how to deal with Trump, especially in a recent Paris meeting with a French president Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said, here I quote, President Trump will, that much is already clear, be a challenge, unquote.
So this has been quoted in virtually all international media outlets in the headline in the past a few days.
So, Professor Berg, how to interpret the sentiment behind this comment by Scholes?
Especially the word challenge?
Well, it's a combination isn't it?
There's slight apprehension, there's sort of and fatalism, but also I think a resolution.
I mean again, remember how he treated Angela Merkel?
So and of course Angela Merkel treated him.
I think it is a wake -up call for Europe that there are bigger issues than some of the ones they've been discussing.
The thing is Europe is not united on how to treat Trump.
We can think of several countries which are almost more disruption than they are European.
So I think Schultz is going to, is saying we have got to get together, we've got to unite, we've got to be, he says they're united, but that of course is a note of hope rather than reality.
So I think Europe, I think is fragmented, Trump, there as far as Trump's concerned, they are weak and he doesn't like weakness.
And at this point still people are trying to, you know, make thinks that they are not precisely bowing towards him.
But he's so strong that he thinks that he can actually – well, not force – but he can actually threaten them, and they're not going to know what he's going to do.
And this uncertainty is probably one of his greatest weapons.
Well, in what ways, Professor Burgher, do you think Trump will be a challenge for Europe?
is it in terms of the kind of leadership style that you just mentioned, or the the kind of military or economic concept that Trump, you know, advocates will those be a challenge for Europe?
Well, unless the thing is that he, he likes about the previous six or eight presidents.
Well, not that many, but almost ever since NATO was founded.
In the old days, people, the various countries paid their dues as Trump would think of it.
But then the Soviet Union was seen as a threat and then for about 30 years it wasn't seen as a threat.
So he thinks I suspect, who knows what Trump really thinks, and I mean this is all speculation, but I am pretty sure that he thinks that Europe is not going to react.
If they don't actually, as he puts, pay up, they will.
he's not going to care.
Remember, he has said that if they don't pay, that Putin can do whatever hell he wants, to whichever countries aren't paying.
So I think he wants them to pay their dues.
He wants them to get rather more military than they do and also he wants them to open, be freely open, to American goods.
And he's more or less saying, if you don't do that, I can raise tariffs higher for you than you can do for me.
So essentially he's setting out his, well if I say setting out his stall, he's laying clear on the table what he expects and he's threatening and he's waiting to see how they react I suspect.
Professor Arizon, yes.
He's playing a game of chicken.
He's daring somebody to stand up to him and figuring that they will comply.
The danger is if neither side backs off, at that point, you have a collision that could lead to catastrophic economic, political, or even security impacts.
So that's why everybody is nervous, because they don't know what he's going to do.
They can't predict where he's going to pull back, where he's going to go forward.
So that, for biggest trading partners are Mexico, Canada and China in that order.
He said he promised throughout his campaign that he was going to put it on terrorist day one.
He's now backed off of that and said, no actually I'm going to do it on the first of February.
What he's exactly going to do, what the negotiations are behind the scenes, we don't know.
He manages to attack, threaten, whoever he is dealing with.
He spoke virtually to Davos at Davos and rattled sabers and said, you got to do this or there will be major consequences.
You've got to invest in the United States.
But then he'll pull back a little bit.
So what's going to happen with China, with Canada, with Mexico, with China?
I happen to be in Los Angeles, which has been having a terrible fire season.
A lot of people are gonna be watching very carefully how he reacts.
To rebuild Los Angeles because we've lost thousands of structures is gonna require Canadian hardwoods and Mexican workers, how is he gonna deal with that?
Well, yes. Because I might just add one point here to Professor Aronson's quite, quite correct assumption which is we have to remember that in the United States, and perhaps other countries, domestic reaction is important.
That is to say Trump may be walking out of his zone right now but he has to pull back if he doesn't have, if he doesn't have the support.
And especially that's going to become the case after the first two years.
So we have to remember that foreign policy for the United States is really in a sense an extension of domestic policy and pressure.
Yes, indeed. Well before we move on to Dr. Tanjian Shun, I have to say to Professor Aronson that wildfire in Los Angeles indeed is very concerning and we do hope that you are staying safe.
Now, Dr. Tong, you are an expert on arms control, you have understanding and observations on the development of NATO as a military alliance past one of the most noticeable alliance in the world today.
In his first term in the White House, Trump famously said NATO is obsolete.
French President Emmanuel Macron said NATO is brain dead.
Now Trump is talking again about NATO countries and NATO's European countries, you know, speeding up their efforts to increase military expenditures and that.
We also have the Ukraine crisis going on.
So how do you think Trump's second time in the White House is going to influence the fate of NATO?" Of course, this is actually very important military organization established during the Cold War time and the Trump administration will continue to ask the member states in that organization to continue to increase this military spending even from 2 % to 5 % in the coming years.
So I think as we discussed yes now, this is actually a very tricky policy by the United States by Trump administration and to some extent NATO has already become a military tour or regional information or affairs and this time I'm sure Trump would like to say something about the support to the organization And to say something about the withdrawal from the organization.
But I don't think the United States can go away from such a military organization.
This is actually very important to liberate for the United States.
To impose a difference on the European continent.
And to protect the commercial and geopolitical interests in European continents.
So, I think Trump administration this time continues such a tricky policy toward NATO or towards some other military organization established by the United States and its allies.
So, this time, I think the Trump administration can continue such a momentum of its policy toward the member states in Europe.
Well, indeed that is.
I had one thing, which is that Trump, I think would be loath to lose the control he has over a large section of the allies.
That is to say that if he just wandered off and left the alliance on its own, it would be more difficult for him to insist on his priorities.
Well, it's always interesting to see, you know, how different US governments have placed NATO in its national security strategies.
But we've been listening to world today, we're having a panel discussion on whether US allies are ready for a second Trump disruption.
We're going to a short break.
when we come back, will continue our discussion.
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I'm Liu Kun in Beijing.
In this edition of the show, we discuss whether American allies are ready for a second Trump disruption.
Now, to continue with our discussion, let's see how European countries have reacted and prepared, because in this Paris meeting with Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said – here's what I quote here – our position is clear.
Europe is a large economic area with around 450 million citizens.
We're strong. We stand together.
Europe will not duck and hide.
Now Professor Burke, does his remark represent a united voice from EU member states?
countries, what are the critical Trump issues that EU countries might disagree on?
Well, they're not united, that's quite clear, I mean Hungary for example, and various other, oh yes, and Austria, the ones who particularly are at odds with their colleagues in NATO.
So in that sense no they are not united.
Also they have different economic priorities.
The United States can't allow them all, can't accept them all.
The thing is there's there has always been a core European power bloc and that's France and Germany.
And it's not difficult for us to see right down they are drifting apart, and the new power is becoming Poland.
So I think that they are at odds about how difficult they think that Putin is going to be.
Those on the edge, those which are part of the old imperial Russia or the Soviet Union, are much more apprehensive than those in the middle, for example.
So the thing is that Trump might be considered a minor, might be considered, well, he is considered the major threat right now, rather more than Putin.
But I mean, you haven't mentioned the UK here, and although it's not any longer part of a United Economic Area, it is the strongest military power in that area.
And what's striking to me in near Oxford where I am, is that the discussions in this country have hardly mentioned Trump.
What's dominating, really, are the economic difficulties of the United Kingdom.
And that's because, not the expectation, because Britain is as apprehensive as the next country, but there's always been the expectation that somehow unlike the other European countries they know how to talk to the Americans.
That was one of the great losses of power of Britain when they was through from Europe.
They were the bridge.
They're no longer the bridge.
Italy is growing up to become something of the bridge at this point.
The question of a European response, Well yes, well yes, but there's a bit of drain out of some of the countries about who they actually when push comes to shove are going to support.
Well then, Professor Berg, a quick follow -up on that.
Do you think the United Kingdom still has the ability or the privilege of really knowing how to talk to the Americans, and especially under the current British government headed by Keir Stummer?
Well, the real change there is that, again, leaders come and go.
Trump is going to be gone in four years, unless there is an incredible coup, which I don't believe for a moment is going to happen.
And what has always happened with leadership is that what doesn't change is the bureaucracies, the military relationships, that sort of thing.
and they are all, by far, pro -Britain.
The difficulty here is that Trump is stripping out what appears to be most of the headships of most of the government department and therefore it's going to be more difficult for the United Kingdom to pull on its usual relationship.
But even great powers have to talk to someone.
They can't be, well, in a British poet's the cat who walked by himself.
So I think that the United Kingdom, after a while, is going to take a while, and it's going to take them building up their military resources as well, and that they will come back, they will come back, not as a special relationship, which is a very bad term, but as a necessary relationship.
Well, Professor Aronson, I want your reaction on that.
as and also in the US relations, what issues really matter for Trump, in your opinion?
A couple of things on that.
First on the EU, Italy is mentioned – Maloney in Italy is going to be very important because Trump gets on with her.
She is a bridge with the right wing, more conservative and government.
The other person and tusk in Poland is obviously important, but the other person who's actually often seen over here as the adult in the room is Pedro Sanchez in Spain.
He has, but all of these folks have internal problems.
So in Spain, they're balancing the masks of conservatives and the Catalans, Turkey, which is a huge military force in NATO, is distracted by the Syrian situation.
So coming together in Europe is extraordinarily difficult.
Britain has just sent a new ambassador to the United States who the Trump people don't like, But even a bigger problem is that Trump is firing everybody in sight.
So all of the old hands who have decades of relationships with their counterparts throughout Europe, if they're not gone, they're at least pushed to the side.
We do have a secretary of state, he's seen oddly as the adult in the room, even though Well he's a very conservative, very anti -Cuba, very anti -China spokesperson, and people are taking relief from him because they don't think he'll blow up the world.
They don't think he is going to do anything too crazy in terms of that.
But beyond that, we don't know who to talk to.
Well it is... a Trump, what a talk to America, and you just deal with Trump.
You have to deal with the others and we don't have the people in place.
Well, it will be interesting, as Professor Arendson has said who will be really the point person in terms of EU -US relations and talks and all that.
But you've been listening to World Today.
I'm Yokun in Beijing.
We're discussing EU -US relations or with a second Trump disruption.
We're going to a short break.
when we come back, and we'll continue the discussion.
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Welcome back. You're listening to World Today.
I'm No -Kun in Beijing.
In this edition of the show, we discuss whether U .S.
allies are ready for a second Trump disruption.
We have with us Kathleen Burke, Professor Emerita of Modern and Contemporary History University College, London.
Jonathan Aronson, Professor of Communication and International Relations at University of Southern California.
We also have Dr. Tang Jianxun, director for the Diplomacy Studies Center at Hunnan Normal University.
Now, continuing with our discussion, I want to take a look at what kind of complications might the Ukraine crisis play into this cross -Atlantic relations at the moment.
There have been some new developments regarding the Ukraine crisis since Trump took office, Putin signaled that he's open for dialogue with America.
At Davos, Zelensky questioned U .S.
commitment. He said, will President Trump even notice Europe.
And Trump announced on his truth social network that if Russia does not stop the war now, Russia should expect tariffs and sanctions.
Dr. Tong, what do you think Trump's eventual aim is regarding the Ukraine crisis?
I think his number one aim is to stop and the crises or the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
And the second, the Trump administration would like to take the European countries as the major supporter to Ukraine and the United States or the European countries can continue the sanctions against Russia.
But I think Trump administration can, can gain some, you know, changes in his policy toward Russia toward Ukraine toward European countries.
And the main focus for Trump's diplomacy is in Asia Pacific region to, you know, engage such so -called static competition with China.
European countries might be a little bit embarrassed at this time, because the almost three years conflict between Russia and Ukraine has already gave a very negative impact on the social and economic development in European countries.
The Trump administration would like to withdraw from the conflict, including the economic support and weapons system support to Ukraine, and Trump would like to have a face -to -face dialogue with the president Putin of Russia.
I think the situation in the crisis or in the conflict can be changed by the policy changes of the United States, I mean, by the change of Trump's administration.
Well, Professor Burke, so what does the EU as a whole?
I'm not talking about individual member states, but overall, what does the EU as a whole want regarding the Ukraine crisis.
And also, how might European countries react to possible US position of really retreating from the Ukraine crisis and put more energy and focus on the Asia -Pacific, particularly China?
They would be extremely upset.
What they are rather keep the four parts of Ukraine that it says they've won and they want to keep their spoils.
That's 20 % of the Ukraine land and I think obviously the Europe does not want this to happen because if Putin succeeds with this, who's next?
Estonia really worries that it's going to be next.
and of course the Baltics are the worried group, but the hope there is that Trump might, it might, he's fearful that it might be seen that he's being weak, that he's giving in to Russia.
So that must be one consideration.
And then everyone says, as it were, that he really won a Nobel Peace Prize.
And the question is whether he thinks that forcing the fighting to stop will actually gain him, that is the peacemaker.
But on the other hand, Ukrainians won't stop fighting.
It's been quite clear.
In fact, they've said that if this happens, they will still continue to fight, and Russia will have on its hands a rather daunting guerrilla war.
And there's no doubt that everyone has come to realize that not only the Ukrainians don't want this to happen, they will continue to fight, but they've shown themselves so innovative on the battlefield, you know, making their own drone, practically out of old kitchen parts, that Ukraine isn't as passive a dog that will roll over at Trump's bidding as Trump might at this point think they are.
He thinks they're weak.
This assumption, I think, has shadows on it.
Yes, they're weak in terms of the Russian steamroller, but the Russian steamroller has 36 % inflation right now.
They've had to get to the North Korean soldiers as mercenary soldiers.
So I think if you unlire Russia and its power, I think they are not as strong as they want to be, as they think they are.
So I think Europe is on tether hook.
They don't know which way it's going to go.
I don't think they are yet united.
You've made quite clear, my colleagues have made clear, quite clear, about themselves about what actually they would do.
Now Professor Ahrensen, I mean when we look at the domestic sentiment in America, how does the Ukraine crisis stand out?
Is it still a priority for the American politicians and the American public?
President Trump promised to solve the problem on day one, he's not managed to do that.
It will take some time.
But he really wants to get out of this.
He really wants to stop the Russian and Ukrainians going at each other.
I disagree a little with what was said previously in that I think Trump would be perfectly happy with giving up Ukrainian land, even if Ukraine does it.
How much Russia exactly wants other than the Russian speaking areas, plus a land bridge to Crimea, is not exactly clear.
This land is destroyed.
It's not quite as bad as Gaza, but almost.
And Russia doesn't want to rebuild it, so I can imagine a scenario where the Russians will actually pull out of a lot of land and leave it to the Europeans to try and help Ukraine rebuild.
Now, my colleague correctly says the Ukrainians really don't want to just stop.
They don't, they do want their territory back.
But everybody's exhausted.
Russia not only has the inflation, But Russia has done themselves a terrible, terrible harm because many of the very best young, well -trained engineers and thinkers have left Russia.
We have a generation of Russians without the technical skills that they're going to need to rebuild their own country.
So, I think that there are some possibilities.
I suspect that European troops in the middle that as peacekeepers may be needed.
There's great reluctance about that.
But to a final stay in place, I think that there are going to have to be people, peacekeepers of some sort in the process to make that happen.
because the United States is losing interest, frankly, in Ukraine.
We'd rather have Ukraine—most Americans would rather have Ukraine win than Russia win.
But it's not the top of the priorities.
Americans, as the election showed, are concerned primarily with two things.
One is the price of the wave of immigrants coming into the country, which has been gined up by Trump and the Republicans.
They don't care much about foreign affairs.
U .S. elections are not fought on foreign affairs.
I just follow out. I think the professor is quite correct that the Trump administration has already adopted a unilateral approach to his domestic policy and foreign policy, that is to say the inward policy.
I think he would like to focus all his attention on the domestic issues, including my immigrants and the restoration of the traditional industries including oil gas and auto and the reorganization of the government and the restoration of the society of the United States.
So I think this is a very big task for the Trump administration to focus its attention And the foreign issues like the conflict between Ukraine and Russia might be not on the top agenda of his diplomacy.
And of course, the Middle East is not on his top agenda.
So I think if we can understand such a change, I mean, the focus of his job, I mean the focus for Trump's administration, should learn that the most important part of the frontier is at home, not abroad.
Yes, indeed. And yet one thing about that, which is, all presidents, once they are elected, say we are going to focus on the issues at home and then they get pulled into the international issues.
So, US relations with Ukraine, with Middle East, with whatever happens in Syria and with China are going to be taking a lot of Trump and his people's time, whether they want it or not.
Well, another case I want to briefly mention is Greenland, the Danish territory, because Trump has been floating the idea of either purchasing it economically or even militarily control it.
I just wonder, Professor Burke, how has this possible Greenland purchase been playing out in other European capitals, other than Denmark?
I mean, how do leaders in EU countries feel about it?
Well, it seems to me that there are at least two approaches.
First of all, they don't like what they would see as a land grab by the United States.
Purchasing it would be alright as long as Greenlanders and the Danes agreed to it.
After all, the U .S.
purchased the Virgin Islands from Denmark quite, you know, 150 years ago, so there is a precedent for that.
But on the - as well, I think they would not - they might talk that they don't like it, but I think, probably, that they would rather welcome it.
When you consider what's happening in the Baltic Sea, and the fact that the Russian spy ships are all over, that Chinese ships are helping to cut cables, that at least if Trump has hole control or hole responsibility, or the United States has a hole responsibility for that part of the polar area, essentially North Atlantic.
They probably think that would be a good thing.
They don't like the way it might be done, they don't like threats, but if greenlanders agree, and there's an awful lot of mixed feeling in greenlanders about it, because they don't like the way they've been ignored and treated by Denmark, both historically and at this time now.
So to what extent, it wouldn't be an open door.
but if the United States could promise them the sorts of attractive policies that they aren't getting from Denmark, I think that going past Trump's rhetoric, it might actually be welcomed by the Europeans and even by a good chunk of the Greenlanders.
Dr. Tong, I mean, the significance strategically militarily of Greenland is self -evident.
It is a very important place in terms of expedition in the Arctic area, et cetera, because Professor Burke mentioned that there are Chinese ships over there.
So what is China's interest in this?
I think China's interest is only to have exchanges with the native people, with the local people, for trade, for economic cooperation.
No security concern in this regard.
And I'm sure China will continue to, for example, to help the native people to give more and more strong infrastructure because of the cold conditions in Greenland.
So we can give some contributions for the improvement of social life and also the infrastructure.
No security. I don't think China can send a submarine or destroyer or even aircraft carrier to that region.
That is really a ridiculous point for the public to understand the presence of Chinese there.
Well, I'm much more cynical on this one.
Because I think that is one point, that should be mentioned, which is Greenland is one of the areas that is relatively rich in rare metals.
And that's what this is really about.
It is. Sorry. OK. The U .S.
already has a major air force space in Greenland, in the northern parts.
Putting huge new buildings into that is not the case, but the U .S.
is looking very eagerly.
And some of Trump's friends are looking very eagerly at, are there opportunities to get mineral rights?
And I suspect that if they are, if the United States is going to go after one piece of property, it's going to be Panama much before Greenland.
I think this is actually a very interesting topic for us to discuss.
I think in a, to my memory in 2020 at that time, President Trump and the first lady then want to stand just stand before the rush where a presidential mountain and together with the four former US a present.
No, Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and also Roseville and also pose and picture stand together with the for former great President of the United States.
I'm sure in the heart of Trump, he would like to be the great president, as great as the four, just to stand in the mountains.
So this is actually a story, I think, of Trump, but I don't think he can make it.
Because we should share respect to the Union chapter.
We should respect to the sovereignty or integrity of an independent country.
century, and this is actually the 21st century.
We cannot use the idea of 19 or 20th century's idea to take island or territory from other countries by force.
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Continue with our discussion.
I want to make sure we have some time for the Indo -Pacific, for the Asia -Pacific region as well.
Biden has increased America's presence to some degree, either in terms of economy or in terms of military, in the Asia -Pacific region.
Professor Aronson, how do you think Trump might adjust Biden's Asia -Pacific policy, particularly regarding America's ally policies in the region with Japan and South Korea.
That's, I think, the critical question.
How the U .S. is going to deal with China?
How tough it's going to try and be, particularly with respect to the two nations, Korea and Japan?
How good an the United States will be.
The United States is proving not to be a great supporter of NATO, and Japan and Korea are worrying, what happens if the U .S.
pulls back from us.
And I think this is one of the most dangerous possibilities in the region, because both those countries have the capability of going nuclear if they want to.
Both of them have resisted that, but if the U .S.
pulls back and they don't trust Trump and his willingness to support them, we could be in for a really bad situation.
Biden's government actually signed quite a lot of deals or small deals with Japan through the court system, and some agreement with South Korea in terms of ramping up in chips management and production?
Professor Arendson, which area do you think Trump is going to focus more on?
Is it the technology, the trade, or the military in Asia Pacific?
I think he's going to worry more about the economic side of it and worry about the military aspects of it.
I suspect that China and the US will manage to come to a halt on Taiwan, but there is certainly more concern now around the region of whether China might at some point move into Taiwan.
That becomes really difficult because 20 % of the highest most cutting -edge chips are made in a one square mile area of Taipei.
Now two of them can't be separated altogether.
But the other point about, yes, Biden made certain advances to try and help the situation with Japan and with Korea, but what Trump has shown so far is if Biden did it, he'll do the opposite.
Dr. Tung, how would you respond to what Professor Aronson has said?
Yeah, I think the Trump administration will continue their policy to engage the so -called strategy competition with China in the Asia -Pacific region, and will give more and more support to its military allies in this region.
But on the other side, I'm sure Trump would like to You know, ask the allies to take more responsibility in defense in this region.
And to gain more benefits to the United States, including the payment for the deployment of US troops in ROK, in Japan, in Australia, in the Philippines.
And on the other side, I'm sure President Trump will have a good engagement with China, China with Russia or even with DPRK.
This is actually a new tendency for the U .S.
policy towards this region.
It's a con with two sides.
On one side, the United States will enhance its engagement with these allies in this region for the sake of the so -called strategic competition of the United States with China.
And on the other side, I'm sure that Trump would like to maintain a little bit of soft policy towards China to get more and more benefit from the exchanges in trade, economic cooperation with China.
Now on the issue of Taiwan, because Professor Aronson made a point on that, Dr. Tong, from your observation, are there genuinely worries in the region, in East Asia or Southeast Asia in terms of some military actions that China might take regarding Taiwan or allies of the United States such as Japan and South Korea are only using this as a way to push the US to send military forces more into the region.
Yeah that might be an excuse for the United States, for Japan, for ROK to enhance its military presence in this region, and President Trump cannot change such a momentum by the government, by the situation.
Of course, Taiwan, Taiwan questions should be the most decisive, and the most important question in the relations between China and the United States.
It's actually another corner of two sides.
I'm sure the Trump administration would like manipulate the situation across Taiwan street, but on the other side, the domestic politicians in the United States also can take advantage of the question.
So, this is a very complicated situation.
But I think that two countries, I mean China and the United States, should have the common target, the aim to maintain the peace and stability across Taiwan street.
This is a good thing for China, for Taiwan and also for the United States.
Well, I want to conclude our discussion by asking all three of you and briefly, you know, Republicans and Democrats in the United States tend to have similar but sometimes rather different ways of dealing with American allies.
So let me start with Professor Burg.
How do you think Trump's way of dealing with US allies different from traditional Republican outcome way of doing it?
Well, the difference, as much as anything, is between trying to threaten one way or another and cooperation on the whole.
NATO and the Europeans, with Trump, have, oh, theoretically have responded better to the United States' dic taps when it's done in a, how do I put it, more gentlemanly, manner.
On the other hand, the Europeans don't seem to react unless there is a threat.
that. So it is, he has cut it off, it's very different from traditional diplomacy, it's very different from traditional diplomacy from most of the countries.
But if it seems to work, it might become a new approach for the United States to get its own way.
Professor Aronson, what about you?
This is the least diplomatic president we have had in a very, very long time.
He tends to carry a big stick, but he doesn't want to get into a fight.
So it's really difficult, he says, I'm the peace president, but I'm going to be ready to push you around and bully you into things, and how that's going to go over and whether it will have continuing success is a big question.
Dr. Tong, what about you?
With the unilateral approach for domestic and foreign policy adopted by President Donald Trump or Trump administration, I'm sure there should be some big changes of the United States towards the international community, including towards its allies in the coming four years, And including the withdrawal of the military organizations or world organizations like WHO, or some other international organizations.
That means the United States, I mean Trump administration would not like to give more and more commitments to the international affairs.
And the Trump administration would like to focus its attention on domestic development, including the restoration of the traditional industrial sector, so I think the international community might have a more easy situation in the coming four years, because, as Professor Just said, Donald Trump would like to be a president of peace.
Well, it would be interesting to see whether he will make any deals on the Ukraine crisis.
The Gaza conflict has already had a peace deal in place, but the implementation of it remains to be seen.
All these are rather complicated issues.
I wish we had more time, but that is all the time we have for this edition of World Today.
Again, I want to thank our guests.
They are Kathleen Burke, Professor Emerita of Modern and Contemporary History, University College London.
Jonathan Aronson, Professor of Communication and International Relations, University of Southern California.
Also, we had Dong Jie -chun, Director of the Diplomacy Studies Center, Hunan Normal University.
If you want to catch up with more of our discussions, you can find our podcast by Searching World today.
You can also follow us on the X -Platform at CGTN Radio.
I'm Lyokun in Beijing.
Thank you for staying with us.
Bye for now!
