Hello and welcome to the panel discussion of World Today.
I'm Denhan in Beijing.
French President Emmanuel Macron and the British Prime Minister Keir Stommer have in recent days traveled to the White House with a key message to US President Donald Trump.
Don't abandon Europe.
The US president's shift on Ukraine is shaking the transatlantic alliance, causing panic on a continent that has relied on US security assurance for 80 years.
Suspicions are deepening that Trump is effectively pulling the plug on decades of US support for Europe.
So, are transatlantic relations over as some Europeans have said?
And what are the challenges that Europe must overcome if it wants to pursue strategic autonomy?
These questions and much more in this edition of the program.
To listen to this episode again or to catch upon our previous episodes, you can download our podcast by searching World Today.
So joining us now on the line are Kathleen Burke, professor emeritus of modern and contemporary History with the University College London, Professor Doug Guthrie from Thunderbird School of Global Management, and a Kristine Thambadus, Associate Professor with Madash University.
So thank you very much for joining us.
Professor Burke, to start with you, French President Emmanuel Macron recently warned that quote, do not think that the unthinkable cannot happen including the worst." Unquote.
Do you think for Europe the unthinkable and the worst is already on the doorstep?
Some people say we are seeing an unprecedented transatlantic crisis.
What is your take? Well it's there's been a long history and the idea of this is actually the worst is problematic but it is difficult.
Transatlantic crisis is that the dependable United States is becoming less dependable.
The difficulty is I mean, President Trump is only 30 -odd days into his term of office and I think Europe and the rest of the world is only trying to come to terms with what he actually actually means to do or not to do.
I mean And the use of power can also be the lack of the use of power.
And I think that's what Europe has worried about.
They have always been with the encouraging, but the United States, I may say, complimentary.
And therefore, the United States also finds Europe useful because traditionally the navy in particular has interoperability, that is to say we use the same ball bearings as the United States does.
So I think it's unprecedented, because the United States is saying it is not dependable.
I don't think President Trump will withdraw entirely.
I think he's doing what Obama did in a rather more polite way which is to say, get your act together, or there's going to be difficulties.
What he has done is implicitly threatened them, and Europe is indeed trying to get its act together.
Whether it'll be in time, whether, I mean, the United Kingdom is trying to, but Europe is fundamentally a trade organization.
It is not fundamentally a military organization.
And what President Trump appears to be trying to do is forcing them to pay more attention to their military.
And this is proving difficult because it's not the usual thing that Europe is used to doing I take your point so professor Guthrie going to you if president Donald Trump as some people suggest do not does not believe in alliances, especially military alliances Then what do you think he would believe in?
For example, some people are talking about that He is believing in sphere of influence or something else.
So I will just speak as as a an American who is embarrassed by what's going on right now I think our leaders, I mean initially when he was elected I was very nervous about the transatlantic alliance I was nervous about US China relations.
I Sort of calmed myself down by thinking.
Well, these guys are business people.
It's gonna be okay which is true but these are very very transactional self -interested business people so the fact that the richest person in the world paid 250 million dollars to get somebody elected who would help him get tax cuts for the wealthy I think is just atrocious I think it's embarrassing but the key thing to to your question what are they focused on?
They're focused on one, trying to create a situation in which they can claim victory for, you know, making America first again and creating jobs in America, which, by the way, tariffs are not going to do.
But then the question is, what are they going to try to do and what is their focus?
And I think their focus is to have a lot of bluster around what they can do to make these industries great and then make claims about cutting government.
And so, I think the DOGE initiatives are crazy.
And I think the whole thing is insane and nobody's really thinking through carefully what is going to be the implications of, say, cutting government funding to things like USAID or to U .S.
universities. It's all craziness.
But to go to this larger point about what is their focus in the global political economy, their idea is to make America first.
they want to flex their muscles and you know have control over the relationships with China and with Europe and I think it's very dangerous and so so their focus, I think you know they talked a lot about their focus being international relations and a lot of the issues that we look look at but I think what their real focus is is on creating tax cuts for themselves and for the rich.
I think it's a very bad situation for America right now.
So professor Tom Badow's going to you.
In the meantime, we have also noticed that some Europeans are accusing the Trump administration of intervening in the politics of European countries, saying the United States is not only decoupling from the European continent, but also, and probably more importantly, deciding for and disrupting European countries.
Do you think that is the case in your observation and do you think Washington is justified to intervene in the politics of European countries in a scenario in which the United States is still largely responsible for the continent's security issues?
So the United States is certainly intervening in European politics in a rather significant way.
The Trump administration celebrates anyone who opposes the European idea Boris Johnson, Naja Faraj, Viktor Orban, and so on.
The visit of the Vice President of the United States to Europe was very much in line with this approach.
Jay D 'Vance's statements at the Munich Security Conference were a case in point.
He accused Europeans as repeating from fundamental values, particularly free speech, using the example of the finding by the UK government of a British Army veteran by the name of Adam Smith Connor for praying outside an abortion clinic.
This is a rather amusing point.
It seems to me that the Americans are very selective when it comes to launching these kind of accusations.
Incidentally, talking about this particular incident that occurred in the United Kingdom, I'd like to point out something.
These sort of demonstrations of faith outside abortion clinics are, in my view, rather despicable.
The faithful are there to intimidate vulnerable women going through a very difficult time, nothing more.
Americans seem to confuse the right to free speech with the right to free audience.
The first is guaranteed by their constitution, the second is not.
Regardless of this particular point though, the fact that the vice president of the United States went to Europe and chose the occasion to launch accusations of this type is a constant clear indication of the United States intention to undermine the Union and to challenge the relationship between the European Union and the United States.
Of course, Vice President Vance proceeded to have a meeting with Alice Wedel, the leader of the ultra nationalist Far -right AFD party which naturally angered the Europeans.
The meeting was part of the broader strategy by the Trump Administration to support Far -right populist movements in Europe aiming to reshape the continent's political landscape.
So yes, the Trump Administration is intervening in European politics in a rather significant European way and I do not think that Washington is justified to intervene in European politics.
Despite the fact that it might have traditionally been largely responsible for the security of Europe, I believe that the U .S.
has gained as much as Europe from the U .S.
and that does not give it the privilege of interfering with European politics and certainly in this particular way, which aims to undermine the state of the European Union.
So Professor Gathery, going back to you, some people are still trying to figure out this question are the are the Trump's European policies shaped shaped more by impulses or by a deliberate geopolitical strategy, what is your take for example do you think Trump is intent on weakening Europe or simply trying to push or coerce let's put it this way, coerce European countries into for example, sharing greater burden in terms of defense issues or buying more weapons or buying more energy, for example, electrified natural gas from the United States?
It's a great question.
And here again, I'm very cynical about what's going on, but I will say these individuals are very transactional and they're very, very, they're not collaborative in terms of how they think about these broader issues.
And so just to give, you know, you raise issues about resources and such.
I mean, the issue that, you know, as a part of NATO, and, you know, given what�s been happening with the Ukraine over the last two years, or three years, we really needed to really step up and focus on what we were doing.
And I think we were�but the idea that we would go back now and say, well, we want access to�we want you to repay us and get access to all of your rare earths is, you know, this is not how geopolitical negotiations are done.
And so I just think it's very transactional, and it's very, very aggressive and oriented towards what are in the best interests of a few industries, and in particular Elon Musk.
And I think this is just a very dangerous moment for the United States, because we're so focused on these sort of broad brushstrokes of making America great again and downsizing government.
But then in terms of our international relations, we're not acting like a good partner in these processes.
And so I do think, to your question, there is a very transactional approach to these issues and what resources we can get out of this.
That's what they're aggressively going for.
And so I think you know, it's a very cynical approach to politics.
And I think it's wrong.
The United States is not in the right here.
So Professor Berg to what extent do you think the current situation represents a wake -up call for European countries?
Some people say what is being asked of European countries right now is not just simply to do a little bit more than usual but for the whole continent to effectively take actions that would enable it to emerge as a superpower on global on on the global stage.
Like you mentioned earlier the EU is largely a trading bloc but now there are calls for for this for this bloc to to transition from a trading bloc to a military and a geopolitical power.
Would you agree with these these ideas.
The problem is of course democracy, that is to say that a single power broker or power projector such as President Trump clearly intends himself to be is can improve the chances of actually at least in the short term of having, well, his colleagues or his opponents do what he wants them to do.
I think if Europe actually got it back together as a military, and certainly the United Kingdom and France, which are the major military powers in Europe, already do things together.
That is to say they have a joint strike force, and of course, the United Kingdom is working closely with the Baltic countries and with some of the others to actually organize what's going to happen.
Now, I think President Trump thinks he would like Europe to be stronger, but he would not want a strong Europe not to do what he wants them to do.
And he clearly assumed that in his position, he will be able to enforce his own theories.
But I don't think he wants Europe as a superpower.
He is a man of the 19th century in terms of balances of power, where the great powers actually decide over the individual countries on the basis of Britain containing the Empire and France doing what they can in Europe.
do you see what I mean?
So I think cooperation is not his style, but I think he will find that telling people what to do with the implicit threat of him doing something to them that they will not like is not an approach that's going to work entirely.
So because he can't at this point control Russia, he can't control China.
He's not going to be able to control India, which is going to clearly be sooner rather than later another super power.
So the point is that he will not be able to control the other 100 countries or he can perhaps if he wishes to do so.
But there are going to be countries which are strong enough and secure enough in their own ability to wage power that he's going to come up against and is going to be more difficult.
So in short answer to your question.
I think he wants Europe to be much more military power militarily powerful, but not so military powerful, that they can they can ignore what the United States wants them to do.
Hmm. So, Professor Borich, since you are joining us from from Britain, let's talk a little bit about the British perspective regarding this because, Jonathan Powell, who is the British Prime Minister, Keir Starmer's National Security Advisor.
He once caught on Britain in 2010 to stay close to American presidents even when things get tough.
Because he's logic at the time is that the United States will remember this and reward the UK by letting its officials, I mean by letting officials from London give counsel to Washington.
So looking at the situation today, do you think such a mentality will continue to work for London today?
And we know other parts of the UK for quite some time, there has been a self -appointed role as a bridge, serving as a bridge for the United States to the European continent.
Do you think this role will continue or somehow disintegrate?
Ever since the end of the Second World War, forgive me for being a historian here, it has been the conviction that you have to stay close to the United States, for all sorts of reasons, but mostly because of U .S.
power, and it is easier to elicit that power from the United States if the U .S.
thinks you're worth helping.
The alliances require a balance.
Both sides have to put something in that the other wishes.
Now, Henry Kissinger said that we're so close to the United Kingdom that it seems strange if we don't talk to them.
And any superpower needs someone to talk to.
But the question about being a bridge to Europe, this is much more difficult for the United Kingdom in no longer being a part of Europe, but Starmer is clearly wanting to put a foot in both camps.
He's trying to reconstruct this and it depends on whether Trump is going to find this useful.
Frederick Merritt, the new Chancellor of Germany, thinks that they can not just give in to Trump.
Macron thinks that they cannot just give in to Trump, but they have to be able to produce something that Trump wants to happen, that Trump needs.
And transactional, as all my colleagues have emphasized, certainly is the case.
And what Jonathan Powell and Lord Mendelsohn are, the new British ambassador of the United States, have said, you have to have something to present that he wants.
And hence, being able to present that the United Kingdom is ideally on the upward slope with reconstituting a powerful military is something that Trump wanted and Trump appreciated.
And the main thing is that the negotiation has to be so skillful that you, even though you may ideally get what you want, President Trump has to feel he has a victory.
And so the question then is do you stand up to him publicly, like Macron did, the French President, or do you go on your knees?
And essentially what the British are trying to do is neither to make themselves useful to the United States, which I think the US will in due course find them useful, but not ever take it for granted and to be very careful how you present your case to President Trump and while not being supplicant certainly talked to him as well as an equal but in a nice as possible way.
So Professor Tom Bados as early as 1963 former U .S.
president John F. Kennedy urged the Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own defense capabilities and over the years the same message has been repeated for decades, basically.
Why do you think Europe has basically or consistently ignored these warnings?
So as a matter of policy, American presidents may always ask for more, but their demands are not always justified.
I do not think that Europe ignored such warnings.
The European spending on defense during the Cold War was significantly higher than it is now.
For example, the UK, during the years of the Cold War, used to spend between three and four percent of its GDP on defence, whereas now it spends only about 2 .2 % of the GDP.
Similarly, Germany used to spend between 3 % and 4 % of its GDP then and only 1 .4 % now.
Following the Cold War, the Soviet bloc was in shambles and no longer presented a threat, and the relationship with other global powers, such as China for example, was mutually beneficial, so they did not present a threat.
Understandably, with the absence of foreign threats, the continent reconsidered its priorities, and social welfare became more important than security.
Now of course things are very different.
The United States is reevaluating its position in NATO and Russia is emerging as a credible threat, which of course will naturally lead to a reevaluation of Europe's security decisions.
Okay, so Professor Gassre, very briefly give you a thought about this question before we take a short break.
Sure, yeah I agree with what's been said here.
And again, we're headed into a very just uncertain and I think dark and transactional time because, you know, in the post World War II era a lot of bridges have been built in terms of creating alliances and building this stable approach to dealing with issues and adversaries.
And then we saw the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of China in this time period.
And the United States has worked to be a partner and collaborator with Europe and NATO, and in the current era, it's just very unpredictable because President Trump and his main adviser are just very very uncertain in terms of what it is that they're trying to achieve and what is they're trying to do but it is clear that they are trying to take a position that positions them as sort of the lead superpower rather than sort of having a collaborative alliance across the regions.
So I think it's a very dangerous time.
Okay let's take a short break here and coming back our discussion will continue.
Stay tuned. You are back with World Today, I'm Dean Hunan Bajin.
Today, we are talking about the future of the Trans -Atlantic Alliance amid the crisis it is faced with.
Joining our panel, Kathleen Burke, Professor Emeritus of Modern and Contemporary History with the University College London, Professor Doug Guthrie from Funderburg School of Global Management and Christie's Tom Basall's Associate Professor with Monash University.
So Professor Guthrie, going back to you, from a different perspective.
Some people might say the current situation surrounding the transatlantic alliance might present an opportunity for Europe.
For example, U .S. Defense Secretary Peter Hexes has told Europeans that the U .S.
will, quote, prioritize empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security?
So are you optimistic that Europeans can somehow seize on this to build up their own defense industrial capacity or capabilities?
Is there a real alternative to to the U .S.
security guarantee in your opinion?
I think it's a great question and I would argue that there is a tremendous opportunity right now.
I think U .S. isolationism is a—we're in a very bad direction right now.
And I would argue that not just in terms of security, but in terms of economic development, Europe stands in a very, very powerful position if they take advantage of the circumstances.
So let's, for example, think about the U .S.
withdrawal of things like USAID, right?
I mean, they're arguing that this is really good for just budget cuts and overspending with the US Government.
But USAID is a tremendous force in helping developing nations in places like Sub -Saharan Africa, where there are tremendous rare earths.
So right now we're focusing on the Ukraine and the desire to have rare earths, which are important for a lot of different aspects of industry, especially in the high tech sector.
But why then would we pull ourselves out of sub -Saharan Africa.
And the interesting player here is, in my view, China.
So China and the realignment of the BRICS economy and the BRICS coalition and also the Belt and Road Initiative really stands to benefit tremendously from the U .S.
withdrawal from the aid of the world.
And as that pivot happens, my guess is that we're going to start to see much stronger economic alliances between China and Europe.
And so you are asking mainly the question about sort of the military positioning, but I think economic development and economic integration is going to be a key piece of this.
And so as the United States continues to isolate itself economically, I think Europe can fill that void.
And the more that Europe acts like a coalition and you know, we don't even have to talk about the NATO Alliance, we could talk about sort of a rebranding and re empowering of the EU I think that there's tremendous opportunity for Europe hmm okay thank you very much professor Guthrie thank you so much for having me okay so so professor Berg in your understanding is there a real alternative to the US security guarantee for Europe well of course there's an alternative Europe banding together more closely increasing their military spend and trying to keep in balance their own national egos, which is always
part of any. If we want to talk about national egos, of course we know whom we can talk about.
I take the point of Professor Guthrie in that United States is pushing Europe in other directions.
There is the possibility of a closer trade relationship with China, but in that case, Germany and China will have to come to some sort of agreement about cars.
I think people forget that if they work together, the European economy is larger than the American economy.
So President Trump pushing this through is possibly, although perhaps not during his term of office, if he leaves, when he is supposed to constitutionally, is going to find Europe is much more difficult to deal with Because using economic weapons will not always work.
He cannot attack Europe, particularly.
One of the main reasons for NATO was not just to save Europe.
It was also to give the United States a landing strip for, actually, sort of any invasion of Europe as necessary.
People who think that NATO is only for Europe are just wrong.
But the Americans certainly think of it that way, that it's their gift to Europe.
And what Trump is saying, of course, is that it's not a gift, you have to pay for it.
And then the question is, what is it worth Europe to pay to have the Association of the United States that is wholly untrustworthy?
What President Trump has done is to take dependability out of international relations at this point.
It has always been the case that the world works together when it is predictable in most respects what other countries, what their reactions are going to be.
And again, as I put before, Trump's major intention is the gathering of power.
And his power is, of course, undependability, unexpected moves.
and the idea that that the United States controls the room controls the way things are going to move and if Europe doesn't get its act together a bit more and they have prioritized social networks for their own people it's going to be an even worse unpredictable world that we're all going to have to live in Hmm.
I take a point. So Professor Tom Badoz.
Some people say that when we talk about how to pursue strategic autonomy for European countries, the first real test for Europe will be providing security guarantees to Ukraine without a US backstop.
We understand that's currently a key demand from say, from the British Prime Minister Keir summer when he was visiting Trump in a White House earlier this week.
What is your take? Okay that's an excellent question.
Before I get to that, though, if I may I'd like to elaborate a little bit on the previous question.
Yeah, sure. Is there a real alternative to U .S., to the certainly is the concept of a European army has been floating around for a very long time since the 1950s actually with the idea of a European defense community however that idea failed to garner enough support and never materialized for well -known and well understood reasons still there have been several initiatives that laid the groundwork importantly there is the European Defense Union which is an ongoing effort to integrate Europe's defense capabilities more closely without merging individual armies.
This includes a number of initiatives, such as the European Defense Fund, which finances collaborative defense projects, the permanent structured cooperation in which European states cooperate on military training and to share equipment and so on, and various other things.
So the current crisis is likely to reinvigorate these efforts.
And in any event, Europe does not really have a choice but to become self -reliant.
So moving on to your current quick question, whether the first test for Europe will be providing security guarantees to Ukraine without a U .S.
backstop. I would think that this would have been the first test if the U .S.
withheld future support to Ukraine.
However, Mr. Trump has managed to blackmail Ukraine to sign an agreement giving the United States significant rights over the mining of minerals in Ukraine.
And it's understood that this was in return for some undisclosed as of yet explicit security guarantees.
So my expectation is that to some extent or another, the U .S.
will continue its military support to Ukraine, perhaps not to the extent that it has been providing that support so far.
Therefore, I do not think that Europe will have to pass this test, because the US is not out of the game of supporting Ukraine yet.
Unless, of course, Mr. Trump changes his mind, which is very possible.
because Mr. Trump is not someone who exhibits a commitment to alliances, but rather someone who thinks in very narrow, transactional terms and who lives for the now, not for the long run.
So, by the way, Professor Tom Bados, do you think some EU member states, especially those on the Eastern flank of NATO, do you think they will be somehow pushed by the current situation to pursue nuclear proliferation as the ultimate security trump card?
Why? Or why not? Well, I would think that that is unlikely.
Most countries in Eastern Europe are NATO members, and the Alliance provides a nuclear umbrella through its nuclear sharing agreements.
This is backed, it's important to point out, that this is backed not only by the United States nuclear capabilities, but by other nuclear nations such as France and the United Kingdom.
Incidentally, given that the United Kingdom is now losing the United States as an ally, it is likely to reconsider its position in Europe.
And a number of commentators are now talking about a possible rejoining with the European Union.
In any event, nuclear programs are prohibitively expensive.
And in addition, there are other legal constraints, notably the European Union's firm support for non -proliferation and disarmament.
So, in this context, I doubt that any of the Eastern Flank of Europe is likely to be able to pursue a credible nuclear ambition.
May I just make one further comment?
The Eastern Flank has deep rifts.
Slovakia is very pro -Russian and Hungary, as you know, also.
it tends more to Russia than it does to, well, shall we say, the rest of Europe.
And so those are our risks.
Europe cannot expel those two because Russia could well move troops up there.
Poland is the one country there that has the possibility of building nuclear.
It already spends four and a half percent of its GDP on weapons, on its military forces.
But the problem is that if they tried, Russia would would be very tempted to take them out, or at least it's just so threat that it would be more dangerous than it's worth.
Hmm so your points well taken.
Professor Berg, by the way, when we talk about say European countries shoring up there on defense budgets, this will likely come at the expanse of social safety nets?
Do you think that's something that Europeans, especially European voters, judging from the current political dynamic on the continent, are willing to accept?
They may not have no choice.
I mean you're absolutely right that that's probably the crux of the situation in Europe.
But Europe has prided itself, or most of Europe anyhow, on its social network, on people not having to sleep on the streets, on people having houses, on people being able to feed themselves.
And this is particularly strong in the Scandinavian countries.
So it's going to be very difficult to answer your question directly.
It's going to be difficult for European voters to make this choice.
And that was one of the problems between the social Democrats and the Christian Democrats in the current German election is which direction to go in.
I think there's not so much the problem in the, in the United Kingdom, because it has more of a military tradition than many of the European countries.
And people implicitly understand what is it, you know, what they have to do, what is this state.
But even in the United Kingdom, there is quite a reaction against this, and there was a very strong reaction against cutting some of the foreign aid so the money can be spent on the military forces.
So you're absolutely correct, that's going to be the real problem, but it's going to depend on to what extent that European electorates accept that there there is a threatening problem that they cannot let the United States take care of.
And at this point, Europe can't strongly take care of.
So Europe is at a crux, it's at a turning point.
I think eventually they will accept that money has to be spent on their forces.
But whether that's going to be in time is what is, we have to wait and see, or not wait but prepare for whilst waiting and being.
Hmm, so Professor Burke, the EU, the European Union is known to have carbon storm decision making processes.
And again, once again, you're talking to us from the UK, I guess that's one of the key reasons why London decided to have this divorce with Brussels a couple of years ago.
So if Europe wants to adopt a new collective defense strategy, is it going to be structured around the EU or some kind of new and yet more efficient grouping specifically for military related matters?
Well, there's already a number of bilateral military agreements.
As I mentioned before, I think, the United States and France have worked together for some years.
I mean, institutionally, they've set up joint military forces as a rapid reaction force.
The United Kingdom and the Baltic States have agreements, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian states have agreements.
The difference is that there are no others of those countries who actually have working bilateral, militarily based bilateral agreements because they haven't needed to have so, and Britain is not going to rejoin Europe in the sense of they will not join open borders for example.
And Starmer doesn't want that and he wouldn't be allowed to go for it.
politically here in the UK.
But you're quite right is that he wants to help organize a military ability, a military response.
And I think Europe is going to have to accept that because, again, Britain is one of the two only military powers on the continent.
One real problem in foreign policy is that America has always resented having to hold back on some of these foreign policy ideas because in an alliance they have to modify their demands just as other people in the alliance have to, and the difference here is that under President Trump he has the power that he does not need to take any account of other opinions.
He's going to find this is bit wrong, but he's only been in power for 31 days, although seems like forever to some of us.
Professor Tom Bezold, some people say the last major example of European powers acting independently of the United States was the Suez Canal crisis in the in the mid 1950s.
So looking to the future, how comfortable do you think the United States would be was independent European security policies.
If somehow that became the reality earlier in our discussion we heard Professor Berg giving her observation regarding this question like Washington wants European countries to become stronger militarily, but not to a point that European countries can somehow begin to challenge the dominance with the military, the global military dominance of the United States, what is your take about this?
So this independence is not in the benefit of the United States, not because it is ever likely to engage in military conflict with Europe, but because it cuts the ties between the two, which have other notably economic benefits to the United States.
However, the Trump administration, as both my colleagues and myself have argued in this discussion, does not live in the long run.
His approach is transactional, and it concentrates on immediate benefits that President Trump can take to his electorate and claim as successes of his overall strategy, notwithstanding that there is not such thing as an overall strategy.
A lot of the time president Trump shakes the tree and waits for something to fall out and when something falls out he takes that, presents it to his electorate and claims to be the result of his strong position in negotiations with international partners.
So I don't think that future administrations would be comfortable with an independent European security policy, but certainly the Trump administration couldn't care less about that.
It focuses on the now, on what it can gain and not on tomorrow and what its behavior if I may comment on your earlier question, regarding some kind of a more efficient grouping in Europe, specifically for military -related matters, and I agree with everything that my colleague pointed out.
Though I would like to add one more consideration, that a more efficient grouping, I believe, is already morphing in Europe and it includes the countries that President Macron recently invited in Paris to discuss the war in Ukraine.
The invitees were very carefully selected and were the leaders of the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Italy, and Denmark.
Together with France, this group includes two nuclear powers and Europe's most capable defence forces.
And I believe that a future European army is likely to be led by this collection of nations, at first, before the remaining European countries will be asked to contribute forces and perhaps expertise to a more unified European army.
So, Professor Burke, even if the two sides of the Atlantic can somehow survive the current crisis in their alliances, will the scars heal easily?
For example, if four years from now, if we're talking about the scenario where a pro -European or a European -friendly U .S.
president is once again elected into the White House, will that weaken or delay the European's determination to pursue strategic autonomy?
I think it will not.
Because Europe will have learned its lesson.
One thing that President Trump may not have thought of, but others probably have, which is that a stronger, one reason he may like a stronger Europe, because it provides another barrier against Russia getting too many ideas about how do these things on its own.
If you see what I mean, the United States has oceans on both sides of it.
That is something that has always been part of their safety.
Now that there are missiles that can fly across the Atlantic, hemming in Russia on land, it can only be a contribution in that sense.
A small comment on whether American power and Ukraine is that, publicly, the Europeans our calling and and the Ukrainians are calling is for air cover I think probably at least as important is continued access to American intelligence cooperation and of course the Elon Musk's satellite organization I can't recall is it star light or star bright but you know what I mean that that by use of that, is Zelensky and the Ukrainians can keep a track of drones, both being the Agrestor and fighting the ones coming in from Russia.
So American power includes intelligence power.
But I think if a new Democratic president comes in in four years' time, Democrats wanted And they wanted the Europeans to pull themselves together military as well.
So I don't think that Europe will feel it can now return to its own position, depending on American power.
I think once Europeans and the United Kingdom are on this particular track, they won't not least because they will at that time invest in the factories and the education needed to build up their own industries, their own defense industries.
For example in the United Kingdom it's not that we don't have the metals and the expertise.
What we don't have is welders.
It's the manpower, the woman power that can actually build these things.
engineers, yes, but unless they can get on the shop floor and help build them, all the thought and planning is not going to be particularly useful.
So I think that it's more than one layer you decide to build, you're going to start building and then you're going to find you don't have the skilled labor actually to build it.
Hmm, okay. If I may, regarding whether the scars can heal easily.
Briefly please. Yes.
My view is that the scars are here to stay.
Regardless of future administrations, Mr. Trump has destroyed the trust between Europe and the United States.
He has provided a glimpse of what can be, and this is not something that Europe is likely to forget anytime soon.
Donald Tusk, the prime minister of Poland, put it very eloquently in a Tweet recently.
And his Tweet said something along the lines that the new international order is no longer guided by alliances of trust, but uncertainty, unpredictability and deals.
And I think he absolutely hit the nail on the head.
Okay, thank you very much.
The final question before we let you go, Professor Taumbadzels, do you think a transatlantic crisis will prompt Europeans to rethink their engagement with other powers in the world?
I can answer this in 10 seconds.
As the ties with the United States are strained, I believe that Europe is very likely to reevaluate its engagement with other powers of the world, most notably China.
China, not so much Russia, but China, without a doubt, is a country that is likely to be viewed very differently by Europe once the ties with the United States, between Europe and the United States, given that those ties are no longer what they used to do.
Well, a big thank you to our dear panelists, Kristines Thumbadot, Associate Professor with Monash University, Kathleen Burke, Professor Emeritus of Modern and Contemporary History with the University College London, and earlier we were also joined by Professor Doug Guthrie from the Thunderbird School of Global Managment.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today.
I'm Dean H unclean Beijing.
Thank you so much for listening.
Bye for now.
