Hello and welcome to World Today, I am Jiang Yang.
Three months after the fall of Bashar al -Assad, Syria's interim president has been struggling to unite the country.
In a landmark breakthrough, the government struck a deal to merge the Kurdish -led Syrian democratic forces into state institutions.
The agreement will see the SDF cede control of civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria, including border crossings, airport and oil and gas fields.
It guarantees the rise of all Syrians in the country's political process, regardless of their religious and ethnic backgrounds.
While Syrian Kurds celebrate the deal with Damascus, residents on the northwestern coast remain wary after days of sectarian violence that killed over 1 ,000 people.
The government blamed Prabha Saad groups for instigating the violence and said the security threats had already been neutralized.
President Ahmed al -Sharaw also issued a decree to form a national security council to manage the country's security and political policies.
So will the fragmented country be able to achieve peace and unity after 13 years of civil war?
Joining our discussion today, Dr. Wang Jin, associate professor with Northwest University in Xi 'an China, Dr Joseph Siracusa, Professor of Global Futures with Curtain University, and Dr Stephen Wright, Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Hammat Bin Khalifa University.
Gentlemen, welcome to you all.
Dr Wright, let me start with you.
How big a breakthrough is this deal between the government and the SDF?
of will it be able to unite the country and establish a civil peace as Ahmed al -Sharra has promised?
Yeah, the deal is incredibly significant.
I mean, particularly as the country is divided largely with the SDF, the Kurdish -based force and then also HDC under Ahmed al -Sharra.
This was the key challenge about how you can actually bring these two main groups together in a way that actually can provide a pathway forward for the country to actually start moving towards a degree of stability.
I think it is very significant and it's quite promising, however, I think, you know, we also need a good degree of caution because it's still very early days.
I mean what has been panned out is that over the duration of the rest of the year, these issues and integration of the sdf forces into the Syrian army will have to take place and actually be achieved.
Likewise also then it's about the oil resources in the north of the country in the northeast of the country under control of the sdf and it's how those can be done in a way which balances the desires of the of the Kurdish sdf for some form of federal approach and greater autonomy within Syria.
So basically I think it is a significant breakthrough, but is it really, to come back to your question, like a civil peace, is it really looking towards that?
I think it's still early to tell.
Yeah, so Dr. Sirakusa, how optimistic are you that this could be a step toward an inclusive Syria or Or what do you feel is more like a tactical move by HTS to consolidate this power?
I think it's both a good move and a tactical move.
It has the advantage of stopping one of the players from attacking him, and it also has the advantage of sort of corralling the Kurds there who are at the Turk snack.
And keep in mind, he's dealing with the Basket Case.
Syria's been at war for nearly 14 years.
14 million of its 22 million people are either displaced internally or living abroad.
We've had five foreign nations intervene in the Civil War.
I mean, Assad of course is now in one of his apartments in Moscow.
And so the leader of the attacker, the leader of the guy who displaced him, Assad is trying to put these things together.
And, you know, I've seen many, many civil wars in my lifetime written about them, talk to people who were in them.
It takes a long time to put Humpty Dumpty back together again.
And he is to say he can get northeast Syria on board to be integrating the government.
It won't be a real federalism.
I don't even know how long it will last, but it gets everybody at the same table and you know, I'm a big believer in diplomacy, everyone's at the same table talking about the problem, at least they're not killing each other.
Well Dr. Wong, the agreement actually grants Syrian Kurds constitutional rights and citizenship.
How much of a turning point is this for the Kurdish population in Syria?
I think I totally agree with our two colleagues because actually it's just a beginning point.
We cannot say that it absolutely will reach a kind of level where the different sides will reconsider with each other with all the areas and all the views of the issues.
And we cannot say also that all the divisions between the different sides has been successfully settled.
It is just the beginning point.
Because actually in this kind of agreement, a lot of—we could say that a lot of the good terms, a lot of the good promises has been made, for example that they hope to—they They hope to through the dialogue to end all the rivalries and they hope that the kind of certain kind of autonomy would be reached and also that the kind of national unity will be organized, but it's just a pretty words.
So when we were talking about something new, how to put down the weapons and how to be reorganized into the coherent and the unified military factions led by the central government, It is still far from words.
We need more reality, realistic practice and realistic action.
So, that is just the beginning point.
Although this sounds like the historic moment we should say, we should encourage this kind of process.
But it is still far from the reality.
It's just the beginning of the process.
Yeah. Well, Dr. Wright, what do you think are the key factors that drove the two sides to strike this integration deal at this very moment?
Oh, that's a great question.
I think there were different motivations on both sides for this deal to be achieved.
I think if we're looking at Ahmed Al -Shara, basically it's the need to try to rebuild the country requires some form of unification to take place, otherwise basically it would fragment and then the risk is you it would descend into wider sectarian conflict internally.
So I think really a lot much for him was about trying to actually bring together the form that deal with the SDF so also it can provide some reassurances to the Alawite and Christian communities as well.
But I think the for the SDF, it's a little bit different.
It's also, I think in their case, related to the United States, and in particular, the position of the Trump administration, which is much more reticent and hesitant about being involved internationally.
And I think it was also, there was probably a recognition that that things have started to shift in terms of the backing that they were receiving from Washington and for the Trump administration I think they probably were more likely to say well look you know we don't want necessarily want to be fully to be involved as we have been so therefore try and find some type of accommodation because the SDF were very much supported by the U .S.
so I don't see the SDF actually willing to actually come to an agreement with Alshara unless they had the green light from the US to actually do this.
And I think also it's also about Turkey as well, because Turkey within the region is very concerned about the role of the Kurdish SDF and the links that it has to the PKK, which Turkey sees as a terrorist organization.
And Turkey's very worried about wider moves towards a Kurdish federal entity within Syria.
So I think the SDF probably, you know, you could say read the tea leaves that basically internationally its support from the U .S.
was not as it was. And also it would be facing more pressures from Turkey as well.
so coming to an accommodation with Al -Shara actually made a lot of pragmatic sense.
And I think, you know, broadly speaking, that can help the sides move towards stemming the wider risks of sectarian violence within the country.
But of course, for the Al -Shara, forming some type of agreement with the SDF is critical because that's where the oil resources are.
And it's also then about trying to, you know, rebuild the economy, which is in tatters.
Yes. So Dr. Sirakusa, I'd like to get your thoughts on the US factor.
What do you think this has something to do with the US withdrawal from its global leadership?
Because actually recently Donald Trump has denied ordering a troop withdrawal from Syria, but he did say that Syria is a mess that doesn't need US involvement.
So does this indicate that Syria has become less of a priority in U .S.
foreign policy. Well, I don't know about that.
Trump is not an isolationist.
He's noninterventionist.
He wants to get involved in the world up to the point where he doesn't get dragged into it.
And this deal of course is as old as the Founding Fathers.
This is what was embedded in their lifestyle while working against the reactionary forces from Britain in the 1770s and 80s.
I mean, Trump is really kind of just an old -fashioned type of realist here.
He doesn't want to get in over his head.
On the other hand, Trump has an ally with whom he's up to – obligated up to his eyeballs, and that is Israel.
One of the things going on now in this reconstitution of Syria is the place of – are the thoughts of the actions of Israel versus Turkey.
Turkey wants a very strong unified type Syria to come out of this, take a lot of pressure off a lot of things, and the Israelis want to see it weak.
They want that airspace.
They want to be able to attack Damascus or anti -Israeli hostility anywhere in the country.
So we've got these people in the background who Turkey and Israel are doing kind of this shadow dance in the background.
They're deeply involved in Syrian politics, and the United States is deeply involved in Israeli politics.
So if Netanyahu overreaches, overreacts, I think Trump is going to be stuck with him.
And you're right, Trump says that Syria is a mess, he said it's up for them to solve the problem.
He hopes it will stay as a regional thing.
Look, one of the reasons the leaders of Syria have to do something positive here is they They have to borrow money pretty soon to rebuild the place.
They have to go into the international markets, or the IMF, or whatever it is.
And they have to look like, you know, they got their head screwed on straight here.
So no one's going to lend people money if they look like they can't put the place back together.
So I think Trump is taking a very cautionary approach.
And, look, nothing about Donald Trump's administration suggests a hard and fixed position on anything.
you know, a lot of these people are just sort of watching events unfold and trying not to get involved.
But Trump is, you're correct, he is non -interventionists in the sense of, he's not too adventurous about getting involved in things and he's risk averse, he doesn't want to slide into something he can't get out of.
Dr. Wang, your thought on this, because we know that the STF was a key US ally against ISIS and American troops still maintain a presence in northeastern Syria.
So does this integration deal suggest perhaps a winning US role in the region?
I think the United States is actually hopes to win in this region because from Donald Trump perspective, the United States should not waste too much energy and too much attention in the region, particularly in the conflicting region without enough resources and economic potentials like Syria, because Syria now is still a kind of war -prone country, and a lot of internal crisis and uncertainty is still maintained, and the United States should pay up to, should insert a lot of efforts and energy into the country if the United States want to play the kind of role.
So that's why I think the United States does not want to maintain a kind of too high profile role in this region.
And meanwhile, inside Syria, like Turkey, like Israel, and like Jordan, and maybe to some extent Iraq, they all have some kind of influence in part of the country or in the large areas of the country.
So, that's why United States does not need to be getting warped too deeply, or play a very living role in the country.
So, that is why in the future this makes a lot of more uncertainties inside the country.
Because without the leader, or without the leading country, external forces, it will make a lot of things much more complicated.
because everybody would compete with each other, and nobody can determine everything.
So that's why I think this kind of the external uncertainties and the external instability factors that would influence continuously the future reconstruction process of Syria.
Dr. Rai, as just now we discussed, actually the two sides are still in the early stages of this reconciliation process.
And a lot needs to be wait and see, but actually they are planning to put this into practice by year end.
And so how optimistic are you about this timeline and are there major obstacles that may derail this process?
Yeah, I'm I think it's cautiously optimistic, that's probably my position on it, but I think the amount, the scale of things that need to be done are considerable.
You know, the, domestically within the country, the economy is devastated.
Al -Shara needs to bring together a degree of confidence that he wants to have an inclusive role for, you know, all the different sectarian and ethnic groups within Syria as a pathway forward.
and there won't be necessarily retributions being carried out in an uncontrolled manner, especially with the Alawite community.
In addition to that, it's also the, you know, he's overseeing a patchwork of different groups within Syria, and this includes, for example, even mercenaries and Chechen fighters, it's the degree to which he will be able to control those different groups within the country.
And I think there's also in addition to that, there's also the separatists or the desires on behalf of the STF Kurds to actually have a greater degree of autonomy and I think that's really the key underlying issue that's really It's the, while the Kurdish SDF are willing to actually integrate into the Syrian army, what will be the nature of the of the amount of relative independence or autonomy that they would have within the future Syria?
And that is going to be the key stumbling block because the agreement that was signed was weak on the details.
But even domestic, even outside the domestic issues, there are, of course, the challenges that Syria will face from countries within the region.
you know whether it's from Turkey intervening in one way or another given the role of the PKK and the Kurdish forces and Turkey's own national interests in preventing a Kurdish Federation as well as that of course what's going on with Israel and other and Iran as well and other meddling countries that could actually you know destabilize the process but internationally there's also an oblis some obligations that need to kick in for this to be successful.
And that's going to be about easing sanctions, allowing the economy to rebuild because, unless those things all come together, it's going to be very difficult to actually achieve the promise of what's been agreed on.
So I would say, yes, I'm cautiously optimistic, but I don't want to downplay the challenges.
The challenges are real, and they could easily take it off -road.
So it's a very precarious situation.
Ok, well Dr. Syracuse, what do you think, how realistic do you think this timeline is and what do you think are the internal and external factors that may derail this process?
The timeline from my study of history, whether it's the American Revolution from 1774 to 1783 and beyond, you know, it takes 10 12 years to wrap up a civil war.
I mean, it may take that long, it may even take longer, but in the first instance they stopped killing each other except for the recrudescence of violence the other day when they started killing Elalites and all the rest of it.
There are some scores to settle, and of course, the central government of Syria has to make sure that these vigilante killings do not come from their offices and do not have their hand all over it because that would generate mistrust through the system.
But I reckon it will take about seven or ten years to settle the place down, unlike many parts of the Middle East that have been bombed, you know, in this case, by Russian air force, even.
It's going to take years and years to rebuild Syria.
And of course, geography is most spectacular and fraught.
It's fraught because it's in Israel's neighborhood.
neighborhood. And Israel is always going to be looking over at the shoulder of who's there.
I mean, Israel was always claiming to be killing elements that were trying to kill them, that is, ISIS -type elements and Hamas -friendly elements.
And so, you know, that feeling is still there below the ground.
It's a very complex place.
And I wish to say that a lot, you know, I hope that—I'd hope that more Americans and Australians understand the complexity not only in the Middle East but this neck of the woods because anything can and will happen.
Yeah well Dr. Wong, we know that the SDF currently detains about 10 ,000 ISIS fighters and holds 46 ,000 related individuals mostly women and children in several camps, so with this deal of transferring control to Damascus, how confident are you that the new government can prevent ISIS resurgence?
I think even that the deal has been implemented, would be implemented in the future, it does not necessarily mean that the central government led by Shah would directly control the affairs, particularly the justice and security affairs locally in the northeastern part of Syria, particularly in the areas controlled by SDF.
because SDF I think will maintain or the Kurdish other Kurdish political and military factions led by YPG will maintain the major kind of the mechanism of the major power in this area so that means that they would continue to have the very determining power over the future of the ISIS fighters and the the ISIS related individuals about more than 40 ,000 or nearly 60 ,000 individuals.
So the only problem is that on the one hand whether or not that the new agreements will lead to the assistance from the central interim government to the KDF areas, controlled, SDF controlled areas because with more resources and more money and more political and economic economic support from the central government Damascus to - to the SDF controlled area.
It means that SDF controlled area will have enough power capabilities to maintain the control over the region and prevent the coming back of ISIS.
And on the other hand, whether or not a new round of division or new round of even conflict will be erupted after the honeymoon time between the two sides and between the interim government and the SDF.
Because now it's the beginning point.
But then when something comes to be implemented, when something comes into the practice, a lot of divisions and a lot of problems are emerged.
So whether the two sides or different sides will find ways to end all these rivalries is still the kind of a question.
So that is why I think maybe we hope and we expect, we know that SS come back, will then finally lead to the disasters that everybody will actually order the vision.
But I, we should say, I'm cautiously optimistic about the deal, and we expect and we hope that this deal could work to help pacify the tension in the previous, prevent that SS come back again in this vision.
Well, Dr. Wright, would you agree?
Do you think there is a risk that we might see a resurgence of ISIS in this transferring process?
Yeah. Well, it depends really on the ability for Alshada to actually keep control within the country.
I'd say that the likelihood is that he'll be able to keep a good degree of control, because now actually having the unification with SDF actually provides a much greater degree of of control over the country as a whole and I think also the the move towards strengthening the central Syrian army I think is going to be or security force is going to be very key to doing that.
He also has a clear interest as well in preventing the resurgence of ISIS because it would completely derail the country, and derail also what he's trying to do.
And also remember these people are already been captured.
I mean the 10 ,000 fighters and 46 ,000 family members related people.
It's about then keeping them under control and managing them.
Do I think actually they have the ability to deradicalize such individuals?
No, I mean they don't have that capacity.
It's far from that, it's more of a case of just keeping them imprisoned and under control.
The ideology that underpins ISIS is something that is not realistic to completely eradicate because it will always be there and it's about the conditions of the country.
I mean, before ISIS, for example, we had al -Qaeda and this is all part of the same ideology that exists.
So whether it has a different name, different form, yes, the ideology will be there.
So there's always a risk, but I think it really depends on al -Shada's ability to stabilize the economy, firstly to maintain degree of social stability, prevent descending into sectarian violence within the country, and also having a control over the security forces.
That's the way I think how we can prevent the resurgence of an ISIS form of ideology coming up.
Let's take a short break.
coming back we'll continue our discussion stay with us welcome back you're listening to world today I'm Zhao Yang joined by Dr. Wang jin associate professor with Northwest University and Xi 'an China.
Dr. Joseph Seracusa professor of global futures with curtain University and dr.
Steven Wright associate professor and associate Dean for academic affairs at Hamat bin Khalifa University.
Dr. Seracusa we actually don't know many details of the seal yet, but do you think the Kurds will retain some sort of autonomy perhaps in a federal state, or will this integration mark the end of this long -held aspirations of the Kurds?
I think it'd be more like a confederation, rather than federated.
I mean, you're not going to give up any major way of life for the central government, but they are prepared to go along in terms of foreign policy, domestic policy, and that kind of stuff.
So, a loosely confederated Syria wouldn't be a very bad idea right now.
And I think the Kurdish leadership, if they're real smart and they played a pretty good hand up to them now, I think they're going to look at the chips on the table and they're going to say to themselves, well, we got good American relations with the Americans, Trump or not.
And President Erdogan may back off a little bit and they got now standing in Damascus, They might be biding their time.
I mean, it doesn't hurt any of these people and the Kurdish backers to play this game for awhile and see what they can get out of it.
Certainly, you're going to get out of it more than being shot at or anything like that, so I think the Kurdish leadership is very smart to play this game so far, and I think if they can get on with Erdogan, Erdogan of course is carrying on Damascus to keep the under wraps.
So, you know, it's all starting to fall into place, and if we could diminish the violence, then we can start to rebuild the country.
So, Dr. Wong, what foreign government system do you think might be the best option for the country to move forward?
I think the best kind of formative of the government should be the formative that people choose by the Syrian people, because only the Syrian people themselves know what kind of formative would benefit them well and only the Syrian people have the rights to choose what kind of format they hope to establish, but the precondition, as we've always repeatedly stressed, is that all kind of divisions should be properly settled, particularly given the fact that there were still wars and conflict in parts of the region, and there were still possibilities of wars coming back in other parts of the region,
particularly in the southern empires, between the local military factions and the interim government, and also between the Prom Assad, some kind of military groups in the western coastal provinces like Latakia areas, where the Alavi minority ethnic groups located, and they are still resisting to some us let the interim government.
So that is why I think we still need patience and time.
No kind of the good government could be established or finish the construction within the very short term.
All the things need to be settled down through a longer term.
And needs patience and needs a lot of effort to bring everybody sit down together and to end the rivalry.
So that's why I think the Syrian people should make their own choice.
Yes, the Syrian people need to make their own choice.
But we know this is a country with multiple ethnicities and religions.
So, I mean, just as we see this deal, that is trying to unify the Northeast, the violence is actually rocking the west and Syria has just experienced this worst violence since South fall.
And over 1300 people, mostly Alawite civilians have died in the clashes between government forces and Assad loyalists on serious coast.
So Dr. Wright, what do you think this reveals about the depth of sectarian division that is still plaguing this country, and what lessons do you believe the government could learn from this crisis?
Well the situation is incredibly fragile.
What it tells us is that we have to have a long -term perspective on how the country will be able to address those issues.
You know, we have to think back what happened in Iraq after 2003, I mean it was I think in 2005 that a constitution was formed, but it took more than 20 years for the country really to have a degree of stability.
And there were episodes of reprisal violence, lack of control within the country, by the central leadership, moves towards separatism by the Kurds within that country, challenges with regard to the rise of extremist ideologies, which, you know, resulted in the Islamic state rising within Iraq.
Syria is going to be facing very similar issues.
And I think that's really the challenge.
I mean, what happened in the west of the country was really like remnant forces of the Assad regime rising up.
And then that then saw then an outbreak of uncontrolled violence and attacks being done against the Alawite community, which, of course, were, you know, part of the Al -Assad or the Al -Assad from the Alawite themselves.
The risk is, I think, that there is genuine fear, especially among the minority communities within Syria, the Christians and also the Alawites, that there could be widespread attacks acts being taken on them, and the Druze as well, and also that they will be excluded in the future order of Syria more broadly.
So I think the challenge is a long -term one for al -Sha 'ra, and also, I think it's one now, he really needs to build an inclusive form of a system that genuinely actually gives – secures people's rights and provides security.
He may have the control of the various groups, but they are acting with the degree of agency, they're acting quite autonomously, and we saw this in the violence in the area, so I think we have to have a long -term perspective on this, and the challenges are very real.
Okay, well Dr. Serakosa, our Shara's government actually said that the security threats has been neutralized in the North Western coast as they announced the end of the military operation but do you think the shara can really restore otter without alienating minorities like the alawites or perhaps this heavy -handed response risk a broader backlash.
I'm sort of an old -fashioned historian I don't think even nature has changed much in 2500 years, there'd be people in Syria who have scores to settle, ancient scores to settle, I mean it's terrible things we've done to five, seven years ago, people are going to try to get even.
And so you have to be able to control this.
This happens after every revolution or after every civil war.
I mean, even in parts of America we still fight the American Civil War.
A hundred years after the war.
So, you know, he's got a job on his hand.
And so what he's got to do, as your guest has suggested, is to look for common cause.
I mean, yeah, the only way to go forward is to stand on the same page and not kill each And, look, the alternative to diplomacy at the domestic level is violence.
And the violence hasn't paid off.
I mean, the country is devastated, futures are destroyed, commerce is destroyed, manufacturing is destroyed, education is destroyed, and God knows what the health services are like in Syria.
And so, you know, this is a time where people have to put their feelings aside, and whether Whether you're a loyalist or not, or whether you're a hell raiser or not, you got to come together on this occasion.
I mean, this is going to require a great deal of enthusiasm on the part of the central government in Damascus.
That is, they're going to have to call on people to be their better selves.
And this is the hardest thing after a revolution, is to get people to forget their grievances and to rally around the new flag.
Well Dr. Wang could this unrest be seen as some kind of a test of the new government's ability to unify Syria and if so what lessons do you think the al -Shara's government should learn from this crisis?
I think every kind of the government or every kind of regime they face different problems although these different problems seems to be similar with each other and particularly inside one country.
And the problem always comes from, comes out of the very particularly the same or particularly similar circumstances, such as ethnic crisis, ethnic tensions, such as the different secondarian rivalries, such as the different original and the tribal crisis.
Although they come from, come out of the And even the same problem, but this problem finally are different because under the different circumstances and they happened under the different powers, interactions.
So for Al -Sha 'a, I think on the one hand he has, or the new interim government, has to consider what kind of the format, as we repeatedly mentioned, that what kind of format, what kind of structure would benefit most for the Syrian people, because if they wanted a very centralized power government.
It means that they have to bow down the local power and the local capabilities.
But given the fact that the different factions are scattered all around the country, it is very difficult to end, to realize this goal within the very short term.
And on the other hand, I think Al -Sha 'a has to carefully deal with relations with different countries, because I'll do that.
Turkey, I'll do Jordan and Iraq, and maybe United States.
And maybe, for example, Iran, they could, to some extent, reach a kind of balance outside the territory border.
But this does not necessarily mean that there were no divisions in the future, given that the fragility of economy and fragility of military forces and fragility of political balance inside the country, inside Syria.
Any kind of external turbulence will lead to the faction collapse inside Syria and lead to a further, bigger disaster for the country, so I think that is why he needs to be very, very careful and needs to be very, very cautious about any kind of division, on any kind of the problem and not to over well many using a violence that to because that could they easily easily provoke the further tension.
And then finally, destroy all the construction efforts.
So that is why I think he's facing the very, very big problem.
And we hope that the Syrian people will have the good luck in the future.
Well, so do you think it might be more realistic for these regions to maintain some sort of autonomy, like where the regions like the Kurdish Northeast, the Alawite coast, and the Druze in the south, govern themselves to some extent.
I think we're talking about reality because the Kurds in the Northeast, this is kind of reality.
Because after the 2011, the Kurdish people were not talking about the YPG.
Okay, the the SDF, no matter what kind of a slogan, or no matter what kind of the brand, they had already been standing there, and they have become the very dominant role, dominant factions in that area for more than a decade.
We cannot say within the night that all this kind of the power would disappear, it's impossible.
So that we should respect the reality and then construct the piece based about that kind of reality.
And also we are talking, as you mentioned, that Al -Avi in the Western coastal provinces like Latakia, it has been there, I mean, for centuries.
And then Al -Avi powers, particularly in the government, Al -Assad government, it has already become a very dominant power faction for decades.
So as soon as they enter the new period of the interim government, but then we cannot say that this Alavi faction, they will follow all the others directly from the central government.
They still have their own sectarian freedom.
They still have their own sectarian willingness that they hope to maintain.
So they also have to respect this reality and construct a peace upon this, truth of this reality.
And also in the south, it's become more complicated because, on the one hand, Israel maintains a very closely monitoring system in this region, And, particularly in some areas, they usually still keep their military presence there.
And they on the other hand, in the southern Syria, they have the D lauz minorities.
D lauz minorities have close ties with the D lauz minorities in Syria, in Lebanon, in Israel.
And also, in history, the D lauz minorities always kept a very, very high level of autonomy in the southern part of Syria.
So this kind of reality should also be respected because they have their own groups, they have their own areas, and they have their own independent tribal connections.
It's very difficult to completely, we say, tame them within the short term.
So all kinds of this kind of reality should be respected.
And then the new government should be constructed based upon these kind of realities.
cities, and I think that is why we need a lot of patients and we need a lot of dialogues that not only within the interim, not only within Damascus but also between Damascus and different cities, north -eastern, western and southern cities with local factions to discuss what kind of the future that they hope to construct altogether.
Yeah well, Dr. Wright, so do you think this SDFDO can serve as a model for integrating other minority groups like the Druze and the Alawites, or does it risk alienating them even further?
Yeah, I mean I think there is some possibility that it could help, you know, work as a model, you know, moving forward, but I think the, you know, more broadly I would say that it depends on how it's framed by al -Shara.
Is he going to be looking for a meaningful integration for these parties or is it going to be one of just finding some form of accommodation.
I think the SDF deal is going to be, is unique in Syria simply because of the bargaining position that actually the Kurds had.
It is different, the Alawites and also the Christian, the Druze, they don't have that same position that the Kurds actually had for any type of integration.
So I think it's unlikely to be replicated, but aspects of it in terms of integration, meaningful integration, can be adopted by al -Shada in terms of how he can approach the Alawites and the Druze to try to find some form of move towards national unity.
But no, I don't think it's going to be a complete model because it's just a totally different dynamic for the Kurds -STF and what exists with the other minority groups within Syria.
But the underlying principle of trying to find some form of inclusive approach that can actually accommodate these these other ethnic groups is certainly there.
So, yeah, I think aspects for it can be adopted.
OK. So, Dr. Syracuse, would you agree?
Do you think this Kurdish deal can be a test case for broader reconciliation framework that could also be applied to alawite and Druze communities?
Or do you feel the situation are totally different?
No, I think it could serve as a positive model about what could be done.
And I was thinking here as the gentlemen had been talking about that famous Shakespeare quote from I think it's the Tempest, where misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows.
Well, politics makes strange bedfellows.
I mean, I think people can see the way forward.
And I'd like to see the United Nations embrace society, you know, give these people a chance to give them some kind of international support, Whether it's economic, monetary or even spiritual emotional support, I mean they have to know they're headed in the right direction.
And I think at the end of a miserable time for a nation, I think people are prepared to lay down their weapons and to, well, make common cause.
I'm thinking here of the great surrender and epidemics between Robert E.
Lee and General Grant.
It comes to a point where killing each other doesn't make any sense, doesn't further anything, and it makes life very, very precarious.
But, look, I never thought 2025 would see Syria as sort of a moment of hope.
Most international relations lately have been so miserable.
But the idea that the Syrians themselves can come together over the future of their country, I think it offers people like me, anyway, great hope that common sense will prevail.
Yeah, so Dr. Wang, what do you think?
Because I mean if you look at the Kurds in the northeast and also those coastal clashes, they both highlight serious minority challenges like the Kurds are seeking the rights and alawites, they're fearing persecution perhaps.
So, with that in mind, how challenging will it be for Shiraz's government to turn his promises of inclusivity into action?
I think now that the people came out suddenly, I mean, in different parts of the country, just because Syria is actually at a very historic moment, because now the Syria interim government, organizing a kind of national committee or the national conference to determine what kind of future they hope to choose.
That is why they were different models.
For example, we know that al -Sha 'at, he led the HTS and other factions are very, very Islamic and very, very conservative political Islamic factions, and which they hope that, for example, the Shagya law, the Islamic law, should become the foundation of the country.
And the Shi 'a, the Islamic ideas, particularly in some areas, very conservative ideas of the Islamic religion should be maintained as the very leading belief or leading ideology for for the daily executive, as well as the daily communication manner.
So that means that the leading ideology now is actually might threaten the life of everybody.
But then in some other parts of the region, and some other parts of the country, that the minorities, they hope to maintain their own autonomy, cultural autonomy, religious autonomy, and political freedom.
So when now all these kinds of divisions now meet together, that is why in some areas, Alavi, for example, their groups.
They hope to voice their own kind of claims to the government and also in the past, I mean, in the past weeks that although some kind of agreement has been bridged between Kurdish people and the interim government, there are still a lot of things that are known.
For example, what kind of this structure the country would be established and what kind of ideology, leading ideology, for the country.
It would be the secular or it would be the very religious.
So, that is why I think it now, Syria is now facing the very critical moment.
That is why a different faction, different groups, they hope to voice their own claims.
They hope to speak out their own understanding of what country should be.
So that is why I think Syria has to make a very difficult choice to make concessions with each other for different groups and also to establish a kind of consensus with each other in the future.
Well, Dr. Wright, let's look at the Israeli factor, because since Assad's fall, Israel has taken control of the UN buffer zone in Golan Heights, and it has carried out hundreds of airstrikes on targets in Syria since the overthrow of Fassad.
Does this signal a permanent Israeli push into Syrian territory?
Well, I think the motivation for Netanyahu is about creating some type of buffer zone in particular.
And it's about trying to deal with the potential risks from the various groups that actually are operating within Syria.
It's opportunistic.
It's, as I say, creating a buffer zone of some form.
Whether it's permanent I think it's unlikely and it can be used as a some form of negotiation tactics in the future but broadly speaking I think this is a pattern that we've seen with Israel.
That you know it's going to be taking advantage of this of the situation you know to you know maximize its security.
I think you know Israel in general I think what it would be looking for it, it finds that a week, which is divided, actually it works in its own national interest because it isn't actually then a threat that's credible on the northern border, but at the same time I think the challenge for Israel is really the various groups that operating within Syria.
So I think actually, yeah, it's a buffer zone, but it'll be more likely that it won't necessarily be a permanent presence.
There'll be something that can be used in negotiations with the government in future, provided that actually Al -Shara and the Syrian armed forces can actually exercise, you know, proper control over the territory and the different groups operating within it.
Well, Dr. Syracuse, would you agree?
What do you think? I agree.
I mean, I think Israel is kind of a sleeper here.
It depends what it wants to do.
I mean, if it just wants a buffer zone, that's fine.
If it wants to keep the government in Damascus permanently weak and on the back foot, that's something else again.
I mean, I'm not seeing too many clear thoughts coming out of Jerusalem.
I mean, Netanyahu's government doesn't really have, really didn't know what to do with Syria.
That is, they didn't expect they would have to do something with Syria aside from attacking their enemy or the opposed enemy from time to time.
So this leaves them something.
But I worry about the possible confrontation between the Turks and the Israelis in these buffer zone areas or in the route to Damascus by air and et cetera.
I mean, Turkey of course is not spoiling for a fight, but the President of Turkey has made it very clear that Netanyahu is the bad guy here, and if he starts using that Turkish Air Force to intercept the Israeli Air Force, we're going to be in for quite a ride.
Well, Dr. Wang, what role can the international community play in helping restore peace and or in Syria, like should the international community step in to shape Syria's future?
Or is this like strictly an internal matter for Syria to resolve?
Where do you draw the line?
I think the international community also has to determine what should be done or should not be done.
Because actually, we are looking at the Syrian crisis has been lasted for more than a decade.
One of the important reasons is that the international community, particularly some countries, some great powers, as well as the regional powers, they hope to do the things.
They hope to intervene the internal affairs of Syria and they hope to determine what the Syria construction should be.
So then it led to division.
Then inside Syria it led to wars.
But on the other hand, the international community really needs to do something.
particularly international community should give much more economic aid, humanitarian aid, and political assistance to the new government, and to encourage more inclusive, and more sustainable, and stable government inside Syria.
Because we know that the Syrian is just after war.
A lot of reconstruction efforts are highly needed, and a lot of investment are highly needed.
Particularly that we know the United States is still blockading, is still importing sanction against the Syrians, makes the Syrians economic reconstruction very difficult.
So that is why I think international community should on the one hand to reach a kind of consensus.
And on the other hand, to try to try themselves to, based on this kind of positive consensus, to restart the approach model with Syria and to start the kind of assistance to help the people and to help them to end the wars and the rivalries to to establish kind of the more inclusive and the more open -minded government is possible.
Okay, thank you Dr. Wang Jin, an associate professor with Northwest University in Xi 'an, China, Dr. Joseph Sirocusa, a professor of global futures with Curtain University, and Dr. Stephen Wright, associate professor and associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Hammad bin Khalifa University.
Thank you again for being with us, and that's all the time we have for this edition of World today.
To listen to this episode again or to catch up on previous episodes, you can download our podcast by searching World today, and you can also follow us on X at cgtmv.
I'm Zhao Ying, thank you so much for listening, See you next time.
