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Hello and welcome to World Today.
I'm Zhao Ying. NATO leaders have agreed to ramp up military spending to 5 % of their national GDP by 2035.
They made the pledge at a summit in The Hague following months of pressure from U .S. President Donald Trump.
Trump hailed the summit as a big success and reaffirmed his commitment to collective defense.
In a private message that Trump later made public, NATO Secretary -General Mark Rutte wrote that Trump's push for increased defense spending would help achieve something no American president in decades could get done.
The former Dutch prime minister used even more flattering language later in the day, calling Trump the daddy who had to step in after the US president compared Israel and Iran to two kids in a schoolyard. Is NATO bending too far to keep Trump on site, or is it just what modern transatlantic alliance looks like?
And by raising defense spending to levels not seen since the Cold War, does this really make Europe safer, or does it risk triggering a new arms race and provoking more conflicts?
With me today, Ruud van Dijk, professor in history of international relations at University of Amsterdam in Netherlands.
Chen Weihua, China Daily EU Bureau Chief based in Brussels.
And Kamau Mikili -Aliev, Associate Professor at the School of Global Studies at University of Gothenburg.
Gentlemen, welcome to you all.
And Professor Van Dyke, let me start with you.
NATO just agreed to this massive increase in defense spending, 5 % of GDP by 2035, which Trump held as a big win for Western civilization.
I mean, what do you make of this decision?
Does it mean that NATO has emerged stronger and more united than before?
Stronger and more united than earlier this year, for sure, which admittedly is a low bar.
But I still think that the unity on display this week is meaningful, meaningful, if only because it also reflects how most European member states in recent months together have taken more responsibility for their common defense.
This very much includes defending Ukraine.
The Alliance kept the American president within the fold, maybe even pulled him a little closer.
And that certainly counts for something.
I think it may also reflect a growing realization in Washington that American interests continue to be at stake in this part of the world, as they were in 1917 and 1941, 1947 and so on and so forth.
Uh, so, um, we'll have to see, but, uh, even, uh, U .S. allegiance to, uh, NATO may actually last. Well, uh, Mr. Chen, uh, we know that Trump has long criticized NATO members for not spending enough.
So do you think this, this 5 % pledge is driven by genuine strategic necessity or is it more of a political concession to just keep the U .S. engaged?
engaged well I think you know from the US side I mean obviously Trump I mean even the Biden officials are not uh uh sort of uh keeping the secret I mean it's going to be a big win for US military industrial complex because I mean you basically European NATO members mostly buy from the United States.
So that's an economic win for the United States.
I mean, so the Trump like used the word sucker, I mean, the Europeans are the suckers.
I mean, because they are facing desperately, I mean, domestic pressure.
I mean, if they spend 5 % green deal or, you know, digital healthcare, medical infrastructure, education, that would be a win, I mean, for european now i mean you're spending five percent on killer weapons i mean are you going to revive world war one world war ii what do you what how what do you want to do with so much killer weapons i mean unless you want to destroy the humanity i mean i just sorted the european leaders they are so afraid of the u .s or afraid of trump in particular i mean because of his style i mean is unlike previous U .S. presidents, you know, and so they want to flat him, as
you mentioned already, I mean, what Mark Lutz has already said.
So they actually hope, I mean, by 2029, I mean, I'm waiting Trump out, that something will change.
So they will try to, because this this even 5 % is not something they target for the next year.
I mean, even within Trump is 2 .0, I mean next four years.
So I think they will try to, because actually if you look at the domestic opposition, I mean, it's not a public consensus at all.
I mean, since many countries, EU members, especially based in Brussels, I mean, they're facing really a budget crisis.
So, I mean, 5 % on defense is crazy unless, you know, you think you want to go to war tomorrow.
I mean, we're talking about there might be a ceasefire between Russia.
I mean, you should work.
Everyone should work for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.
Ukraine, right? Well, Professor Michaliy Aliyev, actually, Mark Rutte cited the rising threats from Russia as the primary reason for this spending hike.
And he even said Moscow will be able to launch an attack on NATO members within three to five years.
And then how credible is that assessment?
Or do you feel that that kind of threat is being overstated to justify their rearmament?
Well, with this kind of geopolitical situation and the conflict that's going on in Ukraine, the sheer scale of the conflict, the geopolitical implications, one can say that the threat is theoretically credible in the context of the future strategic ambitions of Russia, maybe, right?
But the immediacy, it's very much amplified to justify the rearmament that we have have been seeing, you know, being on the top of the discourse and this NATO summit's resulting in the not so binding obligations of this 5 % increase in relation to GDP of the budget of the NATO members.
So yes, theoretically, the threat is credible, but realistically, I mean, the immediate is very much amplified.
Russia's bogged down in Ukraine very much with all the problems associated with the conflict.
It's also under sanctions, it has been expanding a lot of its military equipment and troops.
And even if we take into account that Russia spends over seven percent of its GDP on its defense, defense, even that cannot compensate for the losses in the Ukraine conflict in the next years, because the conflict is still lasting, right.
That would make the immediacy of that threat very much credible.
So unless the conflict doesn't stop tomorrow and Russia doesn't spend the next 10 years years spending this 7 % or more on the GDP and rearming, I don't think it will have a capacity to credibly threaten NATO earlier than that.
And that's again, that's why the threat is theoretically credible, but practically very much over amplified.
And I think this was done particularly for political reasons to push the NATO members to agree to the Trump's aim of increasing the budgets to 5%.
Okay. Professor Van Dyke, would you agree that the threat is being somehow amplified?
I mean, does that remind you of Netanyahu's warning that Iran is on the verge of developing nuclear weapons, that kind of rhetoric that has been repeating for about three decades?
No, I don't think that comparison is very useful.
I agree that the exact timeframe of a possible Russian attack on on a NATO member is is uncertain, but Russia's intentions certainly are not.
You know, it was just this week that President Putin said that I think this is an exact quote.
Wherever a Russian soldier sets foot, that's ours.
And that's just the latest in a long line of actions and pronouncements confirming his hostility to the West in general and NATO in particular.
As he's said from the start, it's also the first step in pushing back NATO from the old sphere of influence.
And if you look at the Baltic states, just to give one example, and you're responsible responsible for the common defense, I don't see how you cannot conclude that serious rearmament, common effort on the part of NATO in the interest of common defense is urgent.
Okay, so Mr. Chen, what is your thought on this?
Do you think Russia has the intention to attack attack NATO members once it has the capability?
And does Trump even see Russia as a serious adversary?
Has he really offered a strategic explanation beyond burden sharing for why NATO members must pay more?
I mean, in a word, I think it's all nonsense.
Because, you know, you know, Mark Lutz and U .S. politicians, especially, they like to use words like may, could.
I mean, OK, I could say the United States or Russia could destroy humanity tonight with their nuclear arsenal, right, and they have that, that kind of, they have that capability.
So, but is that going to happen?
I don't think so, because I don't think that they are that crazy.
And for the same reason, I don't think Russia is insane, stupid to attack a NATO member, member wage war against NATO, because NATO is so much more powerful militarily, economically.
I mean, I haven't heard any, you know, serious foreign policy experts, you know, talking about that, except politicians like Mark Lutz.
Okay? And also, I don't think, you know, if you look at the facts, it's all the NATOs which which has been waging this war from Afghanistan, which the first time they triggered the so -called Article 5, a collective defense, despite the fact there is no Afghans that was in the September 11 attacks.
So they, you know, we can go on from Iraq, Libya, you know, bombing regime changing.
I mean, it's the NATO which has been a war machine.
I mean, you talk about NATO expansion.
And then, I mean, the previous panelists talk about the Baltic states.
I mean, it's exactly.
I don't think it's maybe the 100 percent of the cause, but it's one of the major cause that triggered the Russia Ukraine conflict, I would say.
I mean, so how about Russia has a military base in Cuba or Mexico?
Would the US allow that to happen?
No, of course not. you will trigger a strong response from the United States.
The same reason, because NATO believes that we should be able to threaten you and you should not be able to threaten us.
And that's illogical, right?
Okay, well, Professor Makilyaliev, just put us in context.
What exactly does this 5 % really mean?
Ian, I mean, do you think this could trigger a new arms race as we saw in the Cold War?
I think the new arms race is very likely.
The political context is going to continue in the way it is.
But the 5 % target, it doesn't really speak to anything of an intention of, you know, going into the new arms race.
Because this 5 % target, as it was accepted as a quasi -obligation during the NATO summit, it also consists of 3 .5 % for the military spending and 1 .5 % for the spending on the supporting infrastructure, so to say, double use, such as roads, electricity lines, etc., et cetera, et cetera.
A clever move to dilute the 5 % target is actually confined to this 3 .5%, making it easier for the European capitals to sell to the public and to reach those kind of goals.
Because if we take the numbers seriously, and right now there are still eight member states of NATO that haven't reached even 2 % goal.
0 .5 % goal is very, very ambitious, even in the timeframe that they're setting up.
Okay, well, Professor van Dijk, so now the European leaders, they frame this massive military spending as a necessity in an increasingly volatile world.
But I mean, how much of this volatility has been created or worsened by by Western policy decisions over the past few decades.
And in your view, what is the fundamental cause of the security challenges facing Europe right now?
Yeah, well, just talking about Europe and specifically Ukraine, the West has been faced with a dilemma for the past two decades.
Live up to its own principles and pronouncements, supporting democratic societies, And if they meet the requirements, they can join the organizations.
And so one part of the dilemma has been we live up to that and we open a path for a democratic Ukraine into the EU and into NATO membership.
The other part of the dilemma, of course, is risking an angry and eventually aggressive response from Moscow.
And by emphasizing the importance of the former over the risk of the latter, you could say that the West has contributed.
But that conclusion assumes that trying to maintain a constructive relationship with Putin could have succeeded.
But right up to February 2022, the assault on Ukraine, there was plenty of working with Russia.
Russia, just think of the North Stream Two project, the gas contracts.
And that was in spite of what everything should have known about Putin's intentions since 2007 he held that very anti -Western speech at the Munich Security Conference.
conference certainly it should have been known since its attack on Ukraine in 2014.
so I think a better answer would be that yes the West has contributed to the volatility by not doing what it belatedly started doing with Russia's full -scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
uh I I've sort of migrated to the view that Western appeasement, instead of confrontation, helped to get us where we are now.
And if the West had been firmer earlier, for example, the assault on Ukraine might have been deterred and we would be in a different situation right now.
Mr. Chen, would you agree?
I mean, what do you think is the fundamental cause of the security challenges currently facing Europe?
And do you agree with Professor Van Dyke?
No, I actually have my view.
You know, I think, you know, being observer of the EU, I mean, even during the Russian -Ukraine conflict, I think the biggest failure, I mean, especially in the last two years, is that the lack of diplomacy.
I mean, EU basically giving up.
I mean, you actually have talked about, like Trump, I mean, reaching out to Russia.
I mean, they have already met, talked on the phone.
I mean, I mean, Trump is not shy about meeting leaders, you know, even so -called adversary or whatever.
I mean, he wants to meet everyone.
But you don't see that from European leaders.
They have no seems to, no communication even with Russia.
Russia, that's really bad, because you cannot have a working sort of normal relationship with Russia.
I mean, Russia is not going to move.
It's going to stay as the largest country on the planet and next, it's just in Europe.
And so it seems that some European leaders are planning for a permanent hostility, hostile relationship with Russia for generations.
situation that's crazy I think they should seek to you know mend up ties you know use diplomacy uh push for more seeds five you know that's the way forward and it's five percent even ten percent of on defense is not going to bring permanent peace and it's going to bring everyone into a disaster wall I mean if we remember World War one World War two oh started in Europe literally I I mean, so I don't think that's the right way forward. I mean, just to mention one thing, I think, you know, if you look at the world today, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, because I
wrote on China Daily, my column today, actually, you know, only five countries last year spent more than 5 % GDP on defense.
You know, Ukraine for the obvious reason, 34%.
The next number two is Israel, 8 .8%.
Algeria, 8%. Saudi Arabia, 7 .3%.
And Russia, 7 .1%. No other country, most countries don't even spend more than 2%, most European countries do, not more than 2%.
Why you want everyone?
If you trigger 5 % for NATO members, you are inviting China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, everyone to do that.
That's arms race. That's a scenario for the doomsday of the world.
Okay. So Professor Machiriyariev, do you think, is there clear evidence that more military spending equals more security?
Or would you agree with Mr. Chen that it may provoke further escalation and more conflicts?
So, I mean, I think it's much more complex than that, because you can set up any number of goals or numbers, or you can put them arbitrarily or into the agreement.
The problem is reaching those goals and actually following through on them.
Even if you invite everyone with your big goals to spend more on defence, it's not really clear if they can do that.
And it's not really clear if Europe can even reach 3 .5 percent, you know, more or less across the board. At the same time, I also want to agree with both speakers that, you know, there's two sides of the coin.
point. The Western interventions in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq and Syria, for example, over two decades, they undoubtedly contributed to instability and humanitarian crisis on one hand.
On the other hand, you have states like Russia that resulted in their policy, resorted in their policy to outright aggression against Georgia and Ukraine, for example.
So that's another side of the threat that everyone is facing.
But neither of these actions contribute to peace.
These are both contributing to the volatile situation we see right now.
And what I agree with the previous speaker is that, of course, if you keep on spending more on defense, you are basically feeding the fuel to the fire at some point.
Undoubtedly, when you're faced with threats and with an aggressive behavior of the states, you want to see to your security.
But you need to also think about this kind of escalation pattern that you are going to be feeding yourself if you keep aggressively increasing your defense budgets.
So there needs to be a balancing act between the diplomacy and, of course, security considerations somehow to be achieved in this kind of relationship and maybe coming to some sort of a balance instead of sliding to the arm race.
But this is a very difficult thing to do.
So that's the whole dilemma.
the whole global security dilemma right now, is it going to stop at some point where there's going to be a sort of a balance like it has been during the Cold War, or is it going to escalate, as the previous speaker said, to a very big global conflict?
And, of course, one would hope for a former than the latter.
Okay. Well, Professor Van Dyke, also during the summit, Trump likened the U .S. strikes on Iran to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Do you find that kind of comparison worrisome and does it signal a more aggressive doctrine?
And do European countries risk being drawn into this U .S.-led Middle East policy that may not align with their own interests?
I think we'd all be better off if we didn't pay so much attention every time the president says something, this president says something on social media or elsewhere.
elsewhere, I don't think there is any chance of NATO being drawn into the current Middle East conflict if you look at formal European criticisms of Israel's policy, for example.
As far as NATO is concerned, increasing its deterrent capabilities so as to remove any doubt in the mind of an adversary that a new attack will cost it way more military and politically than could possibly be gained and that's that's that's the paradox of deterrence for it to work for it to help prevent armed conflict it has to be credible so you do need to rearm and you look at the the the history of the Cold War, I agree, you know, this was, you saw similar trends.
It was dangerous. It was worrisome.
Gradually, and we're not there yet in today's world, gradually in the world of the Cold War, you got, please, for a detente, you got actually an actual detente in the 1970s, whether it lasted or not, is a matter of discussion.
We have to keep looking for ways in the world to improve the political situation because these arms races, they're products of bad political environments where there's no trust between countries.
Thank you. Let's take a short break here.
Coming back, we'll continue our discussion.
welcome back you're listening to world today i'm zhao ying joined by rud van dyke professor in history of international relations at university of amsterdam chen wei hua china daily eu bureau chief based in brussels kamal mckinley alief associate professor at the school of Global Studies at University of Gothenburg.
Well, Mr. Chen, how do you view Mark Rutte's flattery of Donald Trump for his Iran strikes and even calling him the daddy?
Do you think he's bending too far to keep Trump on side?
Or is this just what modern transatlantic alliance looks like?
Yeah, I just want to first briefly comment on your previous question where you And I think it's totally inappropriate for Trump to compare, you know, U .S. atomic bomb, you know, being dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the U .S.-Israel attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities.
Because, I mean, we all know, I mean, that attack on Japan is during the World War II and it's against Japanese aggression.
You know, Japanese aggression in China, in other Asian nations, and the Japanese attacks of the Pearl Harbor.
But Iran attack to nobody.
It's an unprovoked aggression by the United States and Israel.
Israel. So don't confuse, distort the truths, confuse right and wrong.
So that's, you know, I think, you know, they like, you know, to hijack, confuse people.
I mean, back to your question about Mark Lut.
I mean, I actually mentioned, you know, previously, I mean, European leaders and Mark Lut, I mean, unfortunately, I mean, you know, as a secretary of the NATO.
I mean, it's a US -dictated organization.
I mean, it's not some equal membership.
I mean, they pretend to, you know, to present to the world.
I mean, so Europeans, I mean, they don't like Donald Trump.
I mean, public opinion in Europe consistently shows they want a Democrat, I mean, Harris, to win the election.
But I mean, the result, of course, is Trump.
So they disagree with lots of Trump's policy, almost every Trump's policy.
So with Trump's unique style, I mean, trade war, tariff war, even sort of quitting NATO… And you heard JD Vance, Peter Hague, says sort of assault on Europe, I mean, whether at the Munich Security Conference.
You know, they are afraid of Trump.
So now they thought the only way to appease, to please Trump is sort of to threaten him.
That's why you saw he has this deadly rhetoric from, you know, Donald Trump.
But at the same time, it's a reflection of Europeans, you know, decades, decades since World War II.
I mean, sort of over -dependence on the United States.
Europeans just are addicted to that.
Okay, then Professor Makhilyariev, why do you think European leaders now, they're so eager to appease Donald Trump and to cater to his America first agenda?
Are they compromising their own strategic autonomy to keep Trump on board with NATO?
too well i think right now we are living in the world where the trump's personality -driven diplomacy is actually becoming um a new normal and i think the nato leadership especially mark rutter they understand that and that's that's why this is this mixture of a pragmatic approach and pandering at the same time so pragmatic approach through pandering um so to keep the trump a peace and on their side, because right now, as I said, the numbers do not speak in favor of NATO established goals to this 5%.
And the danger right now is as follows.
Because United States is pondering of withdrawal of its troops and some of its defense capabilities from Europe, NATO has a very small window though of keeping this um kind of situation under control because if trump and nobody can't predict what trump's next geopolitical move is going to be withdraws heavily from europe europe is going to be strategically uh and defensively vulnerable for a very long period of time in terms of of the years that are coming on the borders of the European Union being less secure towards the threats that originate from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
In this kind of situations, that's why the NATO leadership would like to keep Trump on their side as much as possible and as trump is also not telling what what his plans are for the engagement with nato keeping this kind of um what is a strategic uncertainty but it's more of a tactical uncertainty until he will decide on his next move um it's very dangerous situation for uh the nato alliance which is right now let's let's be honest in the strategic crisis Because from the perspective of Trump Administration and the United States presently, the main geopolitical threat originates in China.
And the United States would like to keep Russia neutral in this kind of engagement with China.
While in Europe, it's exactly the opposite.
The strategic geopolitical threat for Europe is perceived as being Russia, And they would like to keep China neutral in this kind of situation.
So this kind of disconnect between the European allies and the United States is actually what leads to the whole crisis in the relationship.
And everything else that we see, this is just the result of this kind of misunderstanding and misalignment within the alliance.
Okay, so Professor van Dyck, do you think such kind of flattery is necessary, you know, diplomatic strategy, or are they kind of going too far?
Because Mark Rutte also said in this message to Trump that he is achieving something no American president in decades could get done.
And we also hear from Italy's Maloney and promising to make the West great again.
I mean, that's Trump's language, too, right?
So if keeping the U .S. engaged now requires creating a summit around Donald Trump's moods and preferences, what does that mean for NATO's ability to make unified and rational decisions?
And should European public be concerned that their foreign policy is being shaped more by personal ego than collective strategy?
Yeah, you asked what it means.
It means nothing good.
It means, you know, Europeans, European member states of NATO, the alliance as a whole, is in a very, is in new territory because we've never had an American administration since the founding of the alliance in 1949.
1949, that was so unreliable, and in some respects, if we remember the speeches by the Vice President and especially earlier this year, sees the Europeans as a problem, as a rival or maybe even an opponent politically.
You know, the comments they made about domestic politics in certain European countries.
And of course, West European leaders, the new West German chancellor, for example, has spoken very openly about being in a new era where if you're serious about European defense and its importance is necessary, you can't really, if you're a responsible leader, rely on the U .S. bailing you out.
That's just not where we are anymore.
And but as my colleague just said, the problem is that currently and for some years to come, Some Europeans can't do it alone, by themselves.
They need the United States.
They need the United States' military deterrent.
They need to be able to buy military equipment and the like from the United States.
So there are steps on the way to becoming more autonomous.
I think in your question earlier you talked about what does it mean for their European strategic autonomy?
Well, they don't have it yet, and they realised they should strive for it now.
But in the meantime, given the threat, it's important to keep the Americans on board as much as you can.
And again, I said that in my earlier answer, there's something to work with because it's It's not as if the United States doesn't have an interest in a stable and a prosperous Europe for all kinds of reasons.
That's what the world, certainly the United States, seemed to have learned in the course of the 20th century.
We kept being drawn into these wars in Europe.
Why is that? Well, we have something at stake there.
Then we should be involved.
That basic situation hasn't changed, but it's all a little up in the air now because of who's at the top in Washington.
And so I wouldn't want to be in Rutgers' shoes.
It must be very difficult at this point to be the head of a military alliance with 32 members.
He does it his way.
Let's just say that they had a fairly successful summit meeting this week where a lot of people a couple of weeks ago didn't think that might happen.
OK, so Mr. Chen, do you think this successful summit meeting and the increased defense spending, are they enough to keep the U .S. engaged in NATO?
Should the allies now feel reassured about U .S. reliability?
Yeah, I don't think you know, I first want to say I mean regarding the previous speaker I think we are good we I mean sort of European have interesting this conflict I mean, okay the US attack on Iran you could play a facility I mean you could argue country from China India Europe too.
I mean and And Japan, South Korea, I mean, we all have an interest because we need oil from Middle East. We don't want to trigger wars there.
Should all those countries send armies there?
I don't think so. So anyway, there is other ways.
I mean, there was a sort of a wisdom, you know, not solving disputes through military means.
I mean, I want to go back to your question.
I would say that Trump's, you know, sort of principle really scared Europeans because, you know, we all mentioned what J .D.
Vance lectured the Europeans at the Munich Security Conference.
At the same time, Trump won the 2020 election, you know, because his mega bases basically basically a tide of, you know, U .S., you know, forever wars.
I mean, from Middle East to, you know, Afghanistan to every, I mean, even in this Russian -Ukraine conflict, U .S. so much involved, right?
I mean, during the Biden administration.
So Trump knows that if you look at, I mean, listen to what the J .D.
Vance tried to explain to the mega bases after US attacks on Iran nuclear facility.
I mean, he tried to appease the mega bases that this is not going to drag US into another forever war.
I mean, but you don't know when you start in Afghanistan, you don't think you are going to stay there for 20 years.
I mean, I remember in 2022, 2022, Tony Blinken talking about a Russian Ukraine conflict is likely to end at the end of that year.
I mean, now we are looking at maybe going on for another three years, and that's a disaster for everyone, I mean, including especially Europeans.
So I think Trump's philosophy is really scared.
I mean, he said, I mean, if you don't pay, we're not going to defend you.
That's sort of words that no previous U .S. president has said.
So that's what makes Europeans think twice.
But at the same time, I mean, in previous speak, talk about German leader Fred Merz about a new era.
But when they meet Trump face to face, they all try to flatter him.
They totally forget that they have something called a strategic autonomy for Europeans.
Even if you look at Emmanuel Macron, who was a strong advocate, I mean, he would just join the U .S. on this, you know, even on this Iran issue, which is totally a violation of international law.
OK, well, Professor Michael Iali, actually, just before the summit, Trump raised some questions about the security guarantee.
He said it depends on various definitions of Article 5, although later he affirmed his support for this collective defense.
But do you think he has genuinely changed his view, his idea about NATO, that he now believes NATO is a valuable alliance?
Or is he just satisfied because it's finally doing what he demanded?
I think in your question, it is the latter.
better he is just satisfied that the Alliance is doing what what Trump is saying but he can project this kind of power he knows what he has this kind of power and I think he right now looks at this as a strategic tool to pressure Europe and to make Europe uh go to any kind of concession that the Trump would wish that you would go to um so right now he reaffirms his commitment and And that is the result of a relatively successful summit that we had, just like Professor Van Dyke said.
It was relatively very successful in the sense.
But this is always a conditional approach with Trump, right?
Because he would always now hang this 5 % target over the European capitals should any kind of disagreement there would start from something else, for example, trade relationships or any other political cause, he would just say, OK, you are not following up on your obligations and I will threaten to dismantle NATO.
That would be the approach that Trump will be taking in the future.
It's very hard to prognosticate what Trump actually would do.
It is true. But from the previous iterations and from the previous actions that Trump did, it seems like this conditionality in everything that Trump says and does is there to exactly do that to always keep you know your even ally not even an opponent on the toes deep going and not knowing what to do next and this conditionality also creates a leverage for United States which will the power in the relationship to then in the future impact any kind of decision making but the Europe and European capitals together within the EU framework or within the NATO framework are going to decide on.
So this is what Trump wanted to achieve, and he got it.
So this is the win for the United States in terms of keeping the leverage, but it's also a win for the euro for now securing conditional good graces of Trump and the administration of the United States.
Well, Professor Van Dyck, as we know, this 5 % target could divert enormous national resources toward defense.
So what do you think will be the social costs of this rearmament?
And will European leaders be able to balance the domestic pressure with their commitment to the alliance?
Yeah, well, we'll see.
It's been pointed out this week, however, that a much less prosperous Western Europe managed to do this during the Cold War.
So, in that sense, we've been there before.
Much of it is of course political, it depends on the ability of politicians to make the case to their populations.
And nothing in these matters is automatic.
I think yesterday we saw some reports from Spain how that country's leader was actually actually celebrated by many at home for sort of resisting, taking exception to the 5 % target.
But we also have to keep in mind that because of Russia's attack on Ukraine and this three and a half year war at this point in the news, just about every day with these attacks on Ukrainian cities, the images from that, that the populations of many European countries have already accepted that the security situation on the continent has deteriorated and that this has consequences for the way of life in this part of the world.
In my country, the Defense Department has been expanding its activities, recruiting programs for young people to get a sense of what it would be like to be in the military or to have a reservist role.
There's actually more interest than they can accommodate, just as one example.
And also when we're talking about NATO today, it's not the old Cold War alliance.
Instead, it includes Eastern European countries who have a very different view of the Russian threat from, say, Spain or Italy.
It now also includes Finland and Sweden, two countries that only joined after it became crystal clear in 2022 what Putin's intentions really are.
So it's difficult to predict how in these individual countries these budgets are going to be adjusted and what kind of trade -offs are going to be made, if they're going to be made.
But we shouldn't forget that people follow the news and they understand that.
And what I should mention here, of course, is also the shock of the election of President Trump, the rhetoric that has come out of Washington, especially earlier this year.
year. This also has given people, made people realize, wait a minute, this is something that we should be doing more of.
And it's really up to us because we can't really count on our American friends anymore.
And meanwhile, the threat is very real.
Mr. Chen, actually, apart from the domestic pressure, they are, these European leaders, they are still facing pressure from the U .S., like Trump publicly attacked Spain during the summit for spending too little, and he threatened to impose higher tariffs on Spain for not meeting the 5 % target.
I mean, that is very Donald Trump, right?
He is the tariff man.
But do you think it is dangerous to kind of mix the security obligations with trade coercion?
Right. Actually, and I'm speaking to you from Madrid, Spain.
I mean, I'm on a trip in Spain.
You know, it's very interesting.
I think, you know, typically, you know, when Donald Trump issued such a threat, I mean, if any other country issued such a threat to European Union member states, you should and you would expect, you know, EU leaders, you know, from Ursula von der Leyen, or even a European leader from Macron defending fellow members against such so -called coercion, threats, intimidation, but you don't hear that.
Why? Because it's from Donald Trump.
It's from the United States.
And the EU always considers it a subordinate partner, a junior partner in that transatlantic relationship.
That's pathetic, that's tragic, I mean, to me.
And, you know, I think you already heard, I mean, the Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Santos already defended his position because he thought a 2 .1%, you know, military budget is very realistic.
I mean, I think it's realistic, I mean, actually, because most other EU member states, NATO members, wouldn't dare to say that.
You know, they probably, you know, there is something called a political correctness.
You can think, you cannot say it.
So that's among some European leaders.
I mean, you have actually the lawmakers in Spain even talk about in the face of Trump's threat, Spain probably should quit NATO.
I mean, I don't think it's, you know, the majority voice yet, but, you know, that sort of a public resentment against this Trump threat is real here in Spain.
Professor Makilyaliev, we know that NATO is a product of the Cold War, but do you think it is increasingly out of step with today's multipolar world?
And do you think it is still operating with a Cold War mindset, which may now be exacerbating global insecurity rather than reducing it?
Thank you. I would say yes, but to an extent.
NATO collective spending returned to the levels of the Cold War.
I think it suggests, you know, at least as a target, right?
We always need to make that correction as a target.
So just as there is kind of a lingering mindset of a state conflict deterrence.
In today's multipolar reality, it's marked very much by cyber warfare, strategic cries of the bigger countries of what we used to be, what we used to call the global south, hybrid threats, asymmetric conflicts.
I think NATO is lagging behind to adapting in its structure and its mission.
And I think that's very much evident from how NATO behaved during these years of volatility, especially the last 20 -25 years.
So while deterrence actually remains very much vital, I think NATO must evolve beyond this kind of Cold War paradigms and address a little bit more complex 21st century challenges.
I mean, the rise of AI in the warfare as well is very much a big question mark right now.
And if NATO fails to do so, it actually risks exacerbating global insecurity, which will in its turn lead to less security for the NATO member states.
Overall, I think this lingering mindset is provoked again by the return to the big power politics on the global arena, the downturn of multilateral institutions, the increased irrelevance to the global politics.
And I think this is unfortunate because it's unraveling very fast and with unpredictable consequences.
Okay. Well, Professor van Dijk, what's your thought on the future of NATO and do you think it is still relevant in today's world?
If you look at the history of NATO, I will emphasize what I said earlier that we are in a new era for the alliance, given the change in Washington.
Washington. But still, NATO's strength has always been its ability to evolve with a changing international environment.
It's gone through many crises during and after the Cold War and somehow has always managed to close ranks and remain relevant.
A product of the Cold War, certainly, but after this week's summit, you could say that currently NATO is as much a product of Putin's war as that it is an inheritance of the Cold War.
The kind of outside threat gets people's attention and tends to unite alliance.
You could say with all the challenges that my colleague just mentioned for NATO in this 21st century world.
And I think that's what NATO has decided to do this week and we'll see how far they get in implementing it.
Okay. Mr. Chen, your thought on this, very briefly?
I think, you know, NATO is a war -mongering machine.
It's a war machine.
It's not, as they say, defensive.
It's an offensive organization.
I mean, you know, even try to portray China as a threat.
I mean, despite the fact China has not engaged in a single war, I mean, for decades, I mean, has much better records than every single NATO member numbers and being dragged from war to war I mean just let's remember I mean NATO wants say they have interesting Asia to Asia Pacific I mean but you know that's all excuses they use this to wage war I mean against other countries I just want to say one thing at the very last I mean you know I think it's a total waste of money to spend five percent or six percent or even three five or four Because Russia has nukes.
OK, you cannot win a war.
I mean, you should win through diplomacy.
I mean, otherwise, we will all be nuked.
OK, thank you, Mr. Chen Weihua, China Daily EU Bureau chief based in Brussels.
Ruud van Dijk, professor in history of international relations at University of Amsterdam in Netherlands.
and Kamal Mikhail Yeliev, Associate Professor at the School of Global Studies at University of Gothenburg.
Thank you all for joining us today.
And that's all the time we have for this edition of World Today.
I'm Zhao Ying. Thank you so much for listening.
See you next time.
