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Hello and welcome to the panel discussion of World Today.
I'm Ding Hen in Beijing.
China is lodging serious protests with Japan over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takeuchi's remarks on the Taiwan question.
Over the past two weeks, Takeuchi's remarks describing a Taiwan contingency as a survival-threatening situation for Japan have triggered strong outrage and condemnation from China and beyond.
In the words of Russia's foreign ministry Japan has not yet acknowledged its mistakes, 80 years after World War II.
Beijing is urging Tokyo to retract Takeuchi's remarks, stop making provocations, take steps to correct the wrongdoing and uphold the political foundation of China-Japan relations.
Why is Japan playing with fire on the Taiwan question?
What is fundamentally erroneous and dangerous regarding Takeuchi's remarks?
These questions and much more in this edition of the program.
To listen to this episode again or to catch up on our previous episodes.
You can download our podcast by searching World Today.
So joining us now on the line are Professor Chen Yun from the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, also a visiting professor at Seoul National University, Dr Warwick Powell, adjunct professor at Queensland University of Technology, and Selton Halley, a China observer and a retired Air Force officer in Pakistan.
So thank you very much for joining us today, Professor Chen, Warwick, and Selton.
Professor Chen, to start with you, no previous Japanese prime ministers, when they were in office, publicly specified how Tokyo would respond in the event of a Taiwan contingency.
They tended to embrace what some people call strategic ambiguity.
With that in mind, why has Prime Minister Takeuchi crossed the line?
Okay.
As we know, in 2015, Japan passed security legislation allowing the exercise of collective self-defense under special circumstances.
However, the connotation of the crisis of survival is not clear.
In the past, Japanese political leaders have all avoided giving specific assumptions.
They all have adopted strategically ambiguous.
Behind Prime Minister Takeuchi's remarks, I think there may be two political considerations.
Internally, this was to counter to the conservative voters, who decided that Japan should be independent, self-reliant and be able to express its own opinions.
That means becoming a normal country.
Externally, this is to show to United States if the United States gets involved in the Taiwan Strait issue, Japan is willing to offer support.
Furthermore, this statement has also been interpreted by some as having the meaning of deterring China.
This unconventional and bold statement is related to Takeuchi's political stance and personality.
She just took office and has already caused such a huge controversy.
Besides protests from China, there is also strong opposition within Japan.
The international community is also generally worried about the deterioration of the situation in East Asia.
Warwick, going to you.
Looking back, when China and Japan officially established their diplomatic ties in 1972, there was the signing of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement.
The Article 3 of the statement says the government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC and the government of Japan fully understands and respects this particular stance.
And then a political document signed between the two sides in 1978 says that the principles set out in the 1972 statement should be strictly observed.
And then in two political documents signed in 1998 and 2008 respectively.
Basically, our takeaway is that Japan reaffirms that it will continue to abide by its position on the Taiwan question.
So do you think, under these four political documents between China and Japan, there is any room for the Japanese government to suggest that a Taiwan contingency will be a matter of survival for Japan?
Well, the short answer is no.
And in fact, even if these documents weren't there, it's not a survival question.
It has no bearing at all on the survival of Japan as a state.
And it is part and parcel, I think, of a very dangerous recent trend from various countries in the collective West, including Japan, now to push the boundaries on the question of the one China policy and to, in effect, begin to salami slice the, the effectiveness and the parameters of that policy.
We have seen, for example, attempts to introduce a revisionist interpretation of various declarations, including United Nations resolutions as to the status of Taiwan Island.
And this unfortunately, is part and parcel of attempts by the collective West, as I mentioned, to water down the situation and the stance that these Western countries actually agreed to a long time ago.
The second issue that this gives rise to, of course, is the extent to which these kinds of agreements reached by Western powers are ultimately something that countries can rely upon.
Increasingly.
It's clear that many countries of the West are agreement incapable.
We've seen that in other arenas and in Europe in recent years we have seen, for example, important agreements, actually ones ratified by the United Nations Security Council.
And I speak specifically of the Minsk agreements.
They've never been treated with any respect at all by Western powers.
And in fact we have Angela Merkel and Hollande from France admitting in recent years that these agreements were never intended to be observed, but were simply there to buy time.
My concern is that, in this heightened geopolitical environment that we are now in in 2025, the Western powers, together with their allies and vassal states and client states, are now seeking to backtrack on positions that they agreed to many years ago which actually contributed to extended periods of stability.
This is grossly irresponsible, but it's clearly part and parcel of a political trend of the time.
Sultan, going to you.
This year is marking the 80th anniversary of China's victory in its war of resistance against the Japanese aggression, the 80th anniversary of our global victory in terms of the anti-fascist war, as well as the 80th anniversary of Taiwan's return to China from Japanese colonial occupation.
Not too long ago actually, China just designated October 25th as the day to commemorate Taiwan's return to China in history some 80 years ago.
Can there be a worse time for Takaichi's Taiwan remarks?
Well, frankly, there could not be a worse time for Takaichi's remarks on Taiwan.
This year is profoundly symbolic.
As you just mentioned, it marks the 80th anniversary of China's victory in the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, the global victory in the anti-fascist war and Taiwan's return to China after half a century of Japanese colonial occupation.
Now Beijing, as you just recall, has even designated October 25th as a day of commemoration for Taiwan's retrocession.
And against this solemn backdrop, for a Japanese leader to suggest that Taiwan's fate is tied to Japan's survival, it is not only provocative, it is deeply insensitive.
Let me tell you that it reopens historical wounds at the very moment when remembrance and reconciliation should be guiding the region.
Let us not forget that Japan's colonial rule in Taiwan was marked by armed suppression, economic exploitation and forced assimilation, with hundreds of thousands losing their lives in resistance.
Now suddenly, Takachi has become so favorable to the people of Taiwan, the same people her ancestors had suppressed.
Her words risk being interpreted as a revival of interventionist thinking from a former colonial power.
Now there is a Chinese proverb which reminds us when the tree wants to be still, the wind will not stop.
Therefore, Fakai Chi's remarks stir instability precisely when peace and reflection are most needed.
Instead of honoring history and respecting solemn anniversaries, she has chosen to inflame tensions.
That is why her gamble is so dangerous.
It undermines trust. dishonors memory and threatens regional stability at the worst possible moment.
Okay.
So, Professor Chengyu, as Sultan Ali was suggesting just now, I guess our historical documents has offered plenty of records regarding suppression, exploitation and very aggressive assimilation campaign during Japan's half-century colonial rule of Taiwan.
It's estimated more than 600000 people on the island lost their lives in their struggle against Japanese colonial rule.
So, looking back, what do you make of the main painful scars that Japan's colonial rule left in Taiwan?
The evaluation of the legacies of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan is divided and complex.
The collective memory is influenced by various factors.
I think the intervention of politics will lead to changes in the way of historical narration and inheritance.
For instance, the influence of textbooks is very significant.
It is undeniable that after Japan occupied Taiwan, it invested in Taiwan's agricultural, industrial infrastructure and education, objectively promoted the modernization process of Taiwan.
However, at the same time, the 50-year colonial history has left deep scars on Taiwan.
These scars include violent suppression, cultural assimilation, and resource plundering, etc.
Among them.
The history of the Taiwanese people joining the Japanese military to participate in the war of aggression is the most heartbreaking.
In the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan, there are still pranks for Taiwanese people to this day.
They are still regarded as martyrs. who died for the Japanese emperor.
I think this is a kind of second half.
What do you make of the main scars or the main harmful legacies that has been left on the Taiwan island by half a century of Japanese colonial rule?
What is the danger when a former colonial ruler of the island suddenly now comes out and hints at armed involvement or armed intervention in the Taiwan question?
Well as one of the previous guests mentioned, upwards of 600000 people died during the period of Japanese occupation of Taiwan Island.
And those numbers are quite staggering. given the size of the population on the island.
So that's the first point.
It also dovetails in frankly, with a sordid legacy of debauchery, barbarism and violence that the Japanese Imperial Army exhibited in its aggressive invasion of China from 1931 onwards and ultimately through its campaigns right across Southeast Asia until 1945.
And the scars that are, in a sense, reopened up, the wounds that are provoked by these recent riots by the Japanese prime minister, aren't just scars for the island of Taiwan.
They are also scars for the China mainland, and they are indeed scars for the entire Asia region.
The Japanese interventions across Asia, its militarism across Asia in the years leading up to the Second World War, really should have caused the Japanese in the years after the war to actually deeply reflect upon its historical conduct and to atone for that historical conduct in meaningful ways, in ways that could actually enable the region to find closure in relation to these acts of barbarism but also importantly, for Japan itself to reconcile and understand its wrongdoings so that it could move forward as part of the Asian community.
Once again, the Japanese through the remarks of the Prime Minister, I think, have displayed not only an insensitivity to the concerns across the region, but actually reminds people across the region, and perhaps also a large proportion of people in Japan as well, who are also horrified by this return to militarization, that Japan has a long way to go and that the region needs to stand on guard and be alert to the risks of Japanese militarism and at the same time, be wary that this militarization could also be a front for Western provocations in the region, in much the same way that the collective West provoked Russia in the years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Okay so, Professor Cheng Yun, with regard to Beijing's reactions, or responses to Prime Minister Sanae Takeuchi's Taiwan remarks, Taiwan's regional leader, Lai Qingde, has actually accused Beijing of conducting hybrid attacks against Japan, urging Beijing not to become a troublemaker for regional peace and stability quote-unquote.
How would you comment on Lai Qingde's rhetoric here?
There has always been discussions about Taiwan independence, but I think there is no practical possibility for implementing the process.
The main reason is the international and the structural factors in the post-war order are very important and play a crucial role.
First, Under the pacifist constitution, public opinion in Japan is generally strongly opposed to getting involved in war.
The Japanese political arena is already highly factionalized.
Prime Minister Takeuchi's remarks have already sparked a great deal of criticism and dissatisfaction.
She herself has also expressed some kind of remorse and stated that she will not provide specific examples in the future.
If she fails to remain cautious, she may very well become another short-lived prime minister.
Secondary in Taiwan.
Some political forces may indeed view Takayuki's remarks as a commitment, or even a duty, to protect Taiwan.
But they also know that the actual possibility of this happening is very, very low.
On the other hand, the United States has been preventing leaders of Taiwan from taking reckless actions because the risk of military intervention is too high.
The United States has not reached a consensus domestically on using force to defend Taiwan.
So Lai Ching-te's own behavior after being elected as the leader of Taiwan has largely remained within the range that the United States can tolerate.
Okay.
So Salchun, in your opinion, what could be the consequences if Tokyo and the so-called Taiwan independence forces collude with one another to try to advance the so-called Taiwan independence agenda?
That indeed is a very good question.
You see, first of all, you must remember that such a collusion is going to be extremely dangerous.
And I personally think that it would be more what you call damaging for Japan, and also it will create a furor even in Taiwan, because such collusions are self-centered.
They are not on the side of humanity.
And there's a Japanese proverb which warns that the nail that sticks out gets hammered down.
By trying to rewrite history.
You see these people in the words of Confucius to see what is right and not do is a bond of courage.
And courage today means acknowledging history honestly, not erasing it for political convenience or getting into collisions which are only self-serving.
And there are attempts to whitewash Japan's colonial rule.
But you see, I would think that the leadership in Taiwan is behaving like an ostrich sticking its head into the sand by forgetting those very very, I would say, callous situations.
And I would hope that Sanae Takeuchi's provocative remarks that have broken with decades of Japanese strategic ambiguity has now inflamed tensions and this framing has become misleading.
Wang Weik.
Actually, this year, Taiwan's DPP authorities didn't hold official celebrations of the 80th anniversary of Taiwan's return to China in history.
And DPP Secretary-General Xu Guoyong even went a bit further than that, declaring openly that there is no retrocession day in Taiwan.
Do you think these are worrisome signals that Taiwan's DPP authorities are somehow beautifying or whitewashing Japan's colonial rule of the island in history?
Look.
The DPP has a record of denying the historical connections going back centuries in terms of the island being part of China.
And in many respects there are parts of the DPP political forces that actually look favourably upon the period of Japanese colonial occupation.
These decisions to not recognise the return of Taiwan to China really reflects a very disgraceful attitude from a group of people who, in a sense, live their lives in a totally hypocritical way.
They want to, on the one breath, make claims to the heritage of Dr Sun Yat-sen, for example, whilst at the same time denying these realities of history when Japan colonized and occupied Taiwan.
And finally, at the conclusion of a war that the Japanese were defeated in, were compelled to return it to its rightful sovereigns.
And so it doesn't surprise me frankly, that this is the kind of thing you get from the DPMT these days.
Let's not forget too, that in the last month or so, Lighting has played host to APEC the Jewish lobby and, in fact, faked them whilst they were visiting Taipei.
His talk favorably of Taiwan in the context of it being the Asian equivalent of of israel, and in fact, have been actively causing the political support of the dinosaur in um in washington as well.
Um, you know this.
This is the.
These are the links that liking that will now go to to um to try to hold on to what is actually a precarious political position.
He assumed his position um with with actually a minority um of support um and um and over the during the course of his tenure, his political position has actually become weaker.
And when politicians like him get desperate, they start to say and do desperate things.
And that's exactly what we've seen.
Thank you very much for your perspective.
Let's take a very short break here.
And coming back, our discussion will continue.
Stay tuned.
You're back with World Today.
I'm Ding Hen in Beijing.
Today we are talking about the danger of Japan's Prime Minister playing with fire on the Taiwan question.
Joining our discussion, Professor Chen Yun from the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, also a visiting professor at Seoul National University.
Warwick Powell, adjunct professor at Queensland University of Technology, and Sultan Khali, a China observer and a retired Air Force officer in Pakistan.
So, Professor Cheng Yun, going back to you, we know since the end of the Second World War, a key cornerstone of regional stability here in Asia or East Asia is Japan's post-war pacifist constitution.
But nowadays, it seems, amending its pacifist constitution has really become a serious political talking point in Tokyo.
For example, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its new coalition partner recently began talks towards drafting proposals for the first ever revision of the pacifist constitution.
How much should we be concerned about the steps taken by the Japanese government to steer the country towards rearmament?
And why is Tokyo playing the Taiwan card in its path towards rearmament?
Prime Minister Takeuchi has been playing the Taiwan card, which has drawn widespread criticism in Japanese society.
So I think if she truly intends to use these remarks to push for constitutional amendment, the result will be the opposite.
Recently, the LDP and the Japanese Distribution Party has indeed initiated constitutional amendment agenda, planning to submit the draft in the 2026 fiscal year.
The contents of the constitutional amendment include deleting the second paragraph of Act 9, ending the National Defense Force and ending provisions emergency situation, etc.
The main goal is for Japan to return to a normal country, that is, to completely shake off the shadow of the defeated country.
These proposals do not touch upon the core of the pacifist constitution.
Moreover, constitutional amendment faces high-age holders.
Firstly, the consent of two-thirds of both houses of the parliament is required, and then it must be put to the national referendum.
Only when more than half of the people vote in favour can it finally be passed.
As for the public opinion, Japanese people the public support for constitutional amendment in Japan has included.
According to a poll by Asahi Shimbun, the supporter rate is about 53.
But the majority opinion is that A wide-ranging discussion should be held first.
The public's concerns are that, after the amendment, the government might abuse its power to suppress freedom of speech, thereby causing Japan to get involved in another war.
Well Wick, we understand in the Japanese society a revisionist narrative underpinning Japanese rearmament.
It is seeking to explain that Japan's wartime aggression against its Asian neighbors was morally justified somehow as an effort to liberate them from Western imperialists.
It argues that an otherwise peaceful Japan made the mistake of mimicking Western imperialism, thereby resulting in the war, where the Japanese people were a primary victim of the war.
They were talking about the nuclear bomb in Japan in 1945.
In your opinion, what is fundamentally erroneous?
What is fundamentally wrong with this kind of narrative?
Look, the first thing is that it's historically inaccurate.
That's the first point.
The Japanese imperial state was more than happy to embrace the technologies and powers that the Western colonialists brought into Asia, with a view to using those to advance Japanese imperial ambitions of their own.
And that began during the late 1980s and continued all the way through to the conclusion of the Second World War.
So historically, it's incorrect.
The second thing is that it is an insult to all of those people who died at the hands of the Japanese and who died and were wounded terribly in their resistance of the Japanese Imperial Army as they worked their way through China and then into Southeast Asia.
It's an insult to those people and their memories, as well as the families who were affected by Japanese aggression.
And the third thing I'll say is that it represents a very dangerous ideology.
We are witnessing at the moment in global history an attempt in certain quarters, particularly amongst sections of the collective West and their allies, to create room to revive what is, in effect, a proto-fascism.
Let's not forget that the Second World War and the warfare leading up to the Second World War was, in large part, a global war against fascism.
And we have now got the reemergence of a legitimation of fascist ideologies in Europe.
And we are now starting to see the legitimation of fascist ideologies emerging once again, in Japan.
This is very unfortunate.
I'm sure that the vast majority of people in Japan would be horrified at the thought of a return to a fascist political disposition.
But nonetheless, it is something that countries and people across Asia should be incredibly wary of and very concerned about.
What concerns me also is that, in fact, the United States, being Japan's major sponsor and, in fact, the military occupant of Japan, has not come out and made any remarks about the Japanese irresponsibility and the risks of giving life to fascism in Asia.
Grossly irresponsible all around.
By the way, Warwick, another argument that backs Japanese rearmament goes like this.
If Japan can become a a so-called normal country, and then Tokyo will be able to better contribute to regional peace and stability and even world peace.
Does that make sense to you?
Look, I can understand that argument.
The concerns we have around all of that, of course, is Japanese historical practice.
So how is it that countries can be sure that the imperial ambitions that Japan has exhibited in the past are not given life to again?
Part of the problem, of course, lies in the fact that the United States is actually giving room to the Japanese for this kind of reviving of Japanese imperial ambitions, without any concerted efforts to conceive of a genuine Asian security architecture.
Japan can, of course, become a normal country.
But to become a normal country it needs to properly and thoroughly atone for and recognise the wrongs of its own past and ultimately come to peace with its own history.
It can't keep celebrating war criminals through attendances at shrines.
It can't keep pretending that it can slice and dice the question of Taiwan when it was the colonial aggressor.
It needs to come to terms with its history in a proper way, not in a superficial way that subsequently is ignored or watered down.
And until it can do that, it's understandable that most other people around the region views their attempts or their rhetoric of wanting to be a normal contributor with a lot of suspicion, a lot of suspicion.
They need to do a lot more to prove that they can be a reliable, normal nation contributing to regional peace and stability, as opposed to one at the moment that is clearly, clearly inching towards the revitalization of Japanese fascist militarization.
So Sultan, how would a re-militarized Japan that somehow no longer feels guilty about its imperial past?
How would that complicate matters in Asia and beyond?
Well, a remilitarized Japan that no longer feels guilty about its imperial past.
It would definitely complicate matters in Asia and even beyond in several dangerous ways.
Firstly, it would destabilize Asia's security architecture.
Since 1945, Japan's pacifist constitution has been the cornerstone of regional stability.
Now, if Tokyo abandons both pacifism and historical guilt, its neighbors China, Korea and the other Southeast Asian nations.
They would see rearmament not as defensive but as a revival of militarism.
Now, that perception alone could trigger an arms race and heighten mistrust across the region.
Secondly, it would erode the moral foundation of reconciliation.
Japan's post-war remorse was the basis for rebuilding ties with countries it had once occupied and ravaged brutally.
Now, if guilt is replaced by revisionist narratives that justify past aggression reconciliation, I'm sorry to say, collapses.
Now.
This would reopen historical wounds, dishonor the victims and embolden nationalist forces in Japan and elsewhere.
Thirdly, it would complicate global geopolitics.
A Japan that feels no responsibility for its past could align more aggressively with the US containment strategies against China, turning Taiwan into a flashpoint, and such a posture, by the way, risks dragging not only Asia but also global powers into the confrontation.
Finally, it would undermine Japan's own credibility.
As Confucius warned, to see what is right and not do what it is is want of courage.
True courage for Japan lies in acknowledging its past honestly and committing to peace.
A re-militarized Japan without guilt would be seen as rewriting history to justify present ambitions, which damages trust internationally.
In short, the danger is that Japan would cease to be a stabilizing force and instead become a destabilizing actor, fueling mistrust in Asia, complicating the world power dynamics and risking a repeat of the very mistakes its Pacific constitution was designed to prevent.
So, Professor Cheng Yuying, How much support do you think Takeichi and her government can get from the Trump administration of the United States in terms of dealing with the consequences of provoking China over the Taiwan question?
Okay, it's, I think, questionable.
I have two points.
First, the United States at present is a business-oriented government.
So how much support Takeuchi can obtain from the United States depends on how much strategic benefits her government can offer to the United States.
Takeuchi is very proactive in terms of security and defense.
So some conservative forces in the United States believe that Takeuchi's stance of being tough on China plus strengthening defense aligns with the expectation of the United States regarding security in the Indo-Pacific region.
For instance, she proposed that Japan should achieve the goal of defense spending accounting for 2 of GDP ahead of schedule.
Second point is, The America First policy is uncertain.
There is a risk.
Takahashi is following in the footsteps of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and promoting head of state diplomacy, attempting to strengthen the Japan-US alliance by forging close personal ties with Mr Trump.
However, this approach carries risks.
Also, the United States currently needs Japan to play a role in the security affairs of the Asia-Pacific region.
But the internal affairs of the United States may change.
Next year, the US will hold the midterm elections.
Different election results will have different impacts on the U.S.-Japan relationship.
And meanwhile Takeuchi's remarks suggesting the possibility of getting involved in the Taiwan Strait conflict have drawn strong opposition from China.
This has placed the United States at high risk and cost.
The United States, I think, will wait for the risks and the costs of confrontation with China and will not easily abandon its ambiguous strategy.
The strategic ambiguity, I guess, on the part of Washington.
That's a decades of policy of Washington.
Salton, what is your observation?
I mean between Washington and Beijing.
We just saw this high profile summit between President Xi Jinping and President Trump in Busan, South Korea.
And after that meeting there were some demonstrated commitments from both sides to try to adhere to this one year, at least one year trade choose between the two sides and some stabilization efforts in terms of the bilateral ties.
Do you think President Trump himself and his administration is willing to offer concrete support to Takeuchi's government in terms of dealing with the consequences of provoking China over the Taiwan question?
Well, in addition to what Professor Yuen Sen just mentioned in great elaboration, I would like to add that Takachi can expect only limited and conditional support from the Trump administration.
While the Trump's team is likely to intensify its pressure on China over Taiwan, his transactional approach means Japan would be asked to shoulder more costs and responsibilities rather than receiving unconditional backing.
Now, the Trump administration has signaled a tougher stance towards Beijing in its second term.
Now.
This includes imposing steep tariffs on Chinese exports and intensifying strategic competition over issues like technology supply chains.
And in this sense Takashi's provocative remarks may align with Washington's confrontational posture, giving her rhetorical support.
But please remember, these are transactional alliances.
Trump's foreign policy, in the opinion of analysts, is that he often demands greater burden sharing from allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia.
This means Tokyo would be expected to contribute more financially and militarily to any joint effort, rather than relying on US protection alone.
But Trump has a history of criticizing U.S. partners even while confronting China.
His administration may support Japan's tougher rhetoric on Taiwan, but it could simultaneously pressure Tokyo on trade imbalances, defense spending and market access.
This dual approach complicates how much practical support Takahashi could count on.
But there are regional consequences to this.
If Tokyo and Washington appear to collude on Taiwan, Beijing would likely interpret this as a direct challenge to its sovereignty.
That could escalate tensions, undermine regional stability and place Japan in a precarious position, caught between its alliance obligations and the economic risk of antagonizing China.
Takahashi may receive verbal and strategic backing from Trump's administration in confronting China over Taiwan.
But it will come with strings attached and Japan would be expected to pay more, rearm faster and take on greater risks.
In reality, this support could leave Tokyo more exposed, not less, to the consequences of provoking China.
So Wang Weik, we understand.
Japan's most recent quarterly GDP actually contracted for the first time in six quarters, partially due to President Donald Trump's tariffs on Japan.
And now, of course, provoking China over the Taiwan question is definitely inflicting further harms on Japan's commercial ties with China.
Do you think Japan can afford to damage its commercial ties with China, its trade links with China, at a time when Japan's economy is facing both the external pressure from Washington as well as lukewarm or even sluggish domestic demand?
Look, the Japanese economy, as you say, is not in a particularly strong state, and it hasn't been for a long time.
But the point is is that when countries go through tough economic times, it's important to not underestimate the capacity and willingness of people to, in a sense, wear the burden whilst other matters float around.
So, whilst it is clear that there will be economic damage and, as a consequence of that, adverse impacts on the living standards of many Japanese, it's not necessarily the case that there would be an automatic reaction to backtrack questions of national pride and all those things will always come into place.
The issue though, is that it points to the medium term irresponsibility of the new Japanese administration, because not only does Japan have secular economic challenges, It also has long-term economic challenges in relation to food security and energy security.
It has problems in terms of addressing regional security questions, notably the DPRK, which can't be addressed without a strong and functional relationships with the People's Republic of China.
And so this intervention on the Taiwan question really shows that the new prime minister does not have her sights set on Japan's real priorities and its fundamental interests, which go to security and prosperity.
Taiwan is a Chinese question.
The Japanese actually agreed to that back in 1972 and even as they try to salami slice the interpretation of these agreements these days, the reality is that any attempts by the Japanese to poke their nose into the Taiwan question will not be to the advantage of Japan at all.
Japan would be well served reflecting on this episode not only in terms of the instability that it's caused in the region, but actually use this as an opportunity to understand what its real priorities are.
And they go to strong regional economic collaboration, coordination amongst regional economic powers on issues of trade, investment flows, monetary and liquidity support, particularly in an environment where the United States is causing so much disruption to global institutions.
These are the issues Japan should be focused on.
Unfortunately, they're distracted by wanting to be a geopolitical game player and carrying favour with Washington.
So, Professor Cheng Yun, Do you think China-Japan relations are entering a long winter ahead?
Back in the year 2012, a major crisis in bilateral ties was also triggered by Tokyo's decision to nationalize the Diaoyu Islands, which both China and Japan claim.
And during that period, during that episode, leaders of the two sides didn't meet for two and a half years.
Compared to that low point in terms of the bilateral ties, how would you assess the seriousness of the current Japan-inflected crisis?
I'm not so pessimistic.
Also, Takahichi said she had no intention of withdrawing her remarks.
She also indicated that she would be more cautious in the future.
This means she is already aware that similar remarks could have serious diplomatic consequences.
Diplomatic conflicts.
In my personal opinion, it is advisable to adopt separation of politics and economy approach and leave some leeway.
Also, the all-out separation approach may seem grand in scale.
It can also easily lead to a desperate maturity and eventually result in complete decoupling.
There is a mutual need between China and Japan.
So it is hoped that the two countries will return to the track of normal exchange as soon as possible.
Hmm.
I take your point, Professor.
So, Sultan, the final question goes to you.
During his meeting with Takeichi on the sidelines of this recent APEC summit held in South Korea, Chinese President Xi Jinping said conflicts and differences should not define bilateral relations.
So what do you think needs to be done, especially needs to be done by the Japanese side, to prevent conflicts and differences from defining the bilateral ties.
Well indeed, you see, by making provocative comments on Taiwan, Sanae Takechi is allowing conflicts to define China-Japan relations.
And she has misunderstood President Xi Jinping's message at the APEC summit, which was clear and constructive.
He said differences should not overshadow cooperation and conflict should not define the trajectory of bilateral ties.
These are pearls of wisdom and a vision which is rooted in stability and mutual benefit.
Unfortunately, Takayuchi chose to disregard that and her remarks do absolutely the opposite.
By declaring taiwan contingency could be a matter of japan's survival, she has broken with decades of strategic ambiguity.
She has contracted four solemn political documents signed since 1972, and she has reopened historical wounds from japan's colonial rule of taiwan and, of course, the rest of the far east.
Now, instead of focusing on areas of cooperation trade climate, regional security, Her rhetoric elevates confrontation as the defining feature of the relationship.
Now, that is treading on very, very dangerous waters.
The danger is that such comments they transform bilateral ties from a framework on pragmatic engagement into one dominated by mistrust and suspicion.
Now, as Professor Noriyuki Kawaruma has observed, her stance itself becomes a crisis of Japan's survival, because it undermines the credibility of Japanese diplomacy and destabilizes the region.
In short, while Xi Jinping is urging that conflicts should not define relations, Takahashi's gamble risks ensuring that they do.
That is why her remarks are so damaging.
They let provocation shadow overshadow partnership and then push China-Japan relations towards a long winter of instability.
In fact, to borrow from William Shakespeare's Richard III, A Winter of Discontent.
And I conclude with Sun Tzu's warning that he who wishes to fight must first count the cost.
Well, a big thank you to our panelists.
Professor Cheng Yun from Fudan University, also a visiting professor at Seoul National University.
Warwick Powell from Queensland University of Technology, and Sultan Khali, a China observer and a retired Air Force officer in Pakistan.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today.
I'm Dinghan in Beijing.
Thank you so much for listening.
Bye for now.
