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This is World Today. Hello and welcome to World Today.
I'm Zhaoying. The UK, France and Germany have begun the process of reimposing UN sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program.
The move will trigger a so-called snapback mechanism under the 2015 nuclear deal.
The three European powers took the step in a letter to the UN Security Council on Thursday.
The council now has 30 days to decide whether to continue sanctions relief or let it expire.
The E3 said they will continue engaging with Iran diplomatically during this period.
The move follows a meeting in Geneva between European and Iranian diplomats earlier this week that failed to achieve a breakthrough.
Iran's foreign ministry has condemned the move, calling it a provocative and unnecessary escalation that will be met with appropriate responses.
So with time running out for diplomacy, what would a potential snapback of UN sanctions mean for Iran and its nuclear decisions?
And what impact could the collapse in talks have on an already fragile Middle East?
Joining our discussion today, Kamal Mikhailiev, associate professor at the School of Global Studies at University of Gothenburg.
Zhang Chuchu, deputy director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University.
Professor Makelyaliev, let me start with you.
So now the E3 has triggered the UN snapback mechanism against Iran. but it also stresses that this does not mean the end of diplomacy.
So, in your opinion, what does this move actually mean for the chance of diplomacy going forward?
Thank you very much for the question, for having me on this panel.
I think right now we are seeing the situation where Iran as a state is at its weakest position for a very long time.
And I think what the move means for the diplomacy is applying additional pressure on the country that has been significantly reduced in terms of its power in order to finally push through the concessions on its nuclear program that Britain, France and Germany, for example, have been arguing and demanding and negotiating with Iran for a very long time. that would mean de facto dismantling the Iran's nuclear program that would allow it to enrich uranium to the grades that can be used in a nuclear weapon.
That would mean a strict monitoring mechanism on Iran, and that would mean the concessions of Iran in terms of how much monitoring can be brought to its territory, to its facilities and generally how much it's going to be invasive in terms of access to Iranian facilities and scientific research.
So this move is basically just another way to show Iran that it's in a very difficult position to negotiate right now. and that it better follow this kind of demands and so to say, the resistance to the demands of Britain in Germany.
And this actually is just another threat to push Iranian negotiation positions to a softer one in the coming diplomacy.
Okay, so Professor John, how do you think such kind of threat or such kind of pressure is going to be received by the Iranian side because Iran has called the move provocative and unnecessary, and it vowed an appropriate response.
Just how serious is the risk of escalation here?
And could this move push Iran even further away from compliance and international cooperation?
Well, indeed, I think right now we are at a very serious moment and right now it is very difficult.
And I think as you have already mentioned, for instance, Iran has already threatened to withdraw. from the Non-Proliferation Treaty sanctions are reinstated.
So I think Iran's repeated threats to withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, if the UN sanctions are reinstated, should be taken very seriously.
And this time, especially when Iran does not have a lot of cars to play, Although in history, Tehran used these sorts of discourse for leverage rather than immediate action, this time I think things can change.
And that is really a very worrisome scenario.
And also we have to take into consideration that right now an important disagreement between the United States and Iran in a nuclear talk is that Washington insists on Iran's acceptance of a zero enrichment agreement.
But Iran considers this requirement as sort of violation of its technological sovereignty.
Also, Iran also cares a lot about its internal security. political situation and knows that if it makes a great compromise, then the Iranian government's legitimacy might be affected So in this context right now, Iran has already made for a logical next step in a breakout scenario.
And we can see that recently Iranian officials, including a lot of negotiators and parliamentarians, have invoked this option multiple times. such as in drone amid the United States' strikes in August to deter Western moves.
And I think this actually signals internal political pressures and the potential shift if diplomacy fails.
Now, I think, so I think right now exactly we should take into its threats very seriously and also the international society should pay more attention to what is happening next.
Okay, so Professor Makhilyaev, now the snapback process gives roughly 30 days before sanctions formally return.
So how might both sides use this period?
And is there a risk of miscalculation or escalation?
Yeah, I think the 30 days window is quite narrow. for this type of negotiations, but it probably is designed specifically for that. specifically to make it uncomfortable for the site that is under pressure and to try to extend the timeframe as much as possible to try to gain more time, for example, by not engaging in the diplomacy with a good intention and this mechanism is the one that is connected to the UN sanctions regime and the policies that the United Nations have developed throughout the years since its creation.
So it's a very well-known mechanism. um what i would think is going to happen is that they're going to be by the back channels um when it comes to the Britain, Germany and France, the Pressure is going to be applied on Iran as much as possible, but we're going to see a period of quiet diplomacy behind the scenes, where Iran would be pushed to take a decision.
And the Iran would be trying to win as much time as possible and create the conditions as good as possible.
But there's of course a risk of miscalculation. if Britain, Germany and France push too far, Iran would feel that it's cornered by the other side that is not ready to make any kind of concessions or create some kind of room around the maneuver, it might abandon the negotiations and that would produce the opposite effect and Iran would move towards the creation of nuclear weapon because that would sort of be a kind of last resort measure for Iran.
Although on the other hand That relationship between Iran and its own internal policy towards nuclear weapons have always been very complex and complicated. ideologically Iran was never fully ready to embrace the creation of nuclear weapons because even for the religious so to say reasons um this is highly debatable subject in iran itself and it's always it's been seen as a tool to keep this strategic ambiguity in terms of we might get the nuclear weapon if we are pushed too far, but we also signalling that we are not ready to embrace nuclear weapons ideologically.
And that is a big feature of the Iranian regime, which is based on the Islamic interpretation of the law and of the norms.
So there is this very huge tension even inside Iran.
But of course, it can be also a corridor where the Iran might be pushed too far and would take that decision.
But as the previous speaker have have said there are also limitations of the geopolitical character, the threat of Israel's retaliation for that.
So there's a lot of question marks here.
Okay, so Professor Zhang, why do you think Britain, France and Germany are moving so quickly on the possibility of a snapback of the UN sanctions?
Well, I think one very important reason is that right now there is the impending termination date on October the 18th, 2025.
The urgency stems from here when the snapback mechanism itself expires, and that would permanently lift remaining United Nations restrictions such as the arms embargo and the ballistic missile bans without a new resolution.
So right now, I say by triggering now, the three European countries aim to reinstate all of those pre-2015 sanctions automatically after 30 days, unless Iran provides very concrete commitments. such as according to the requirements, halting advanced enrichment, readmitting the IAEA inspectors and also resuming talks etc so in this way it tries to allow them to defer or extend the process for diplomacy I think this kind of move actually follows weeks of warnings amid the heightened tensions after the United States and Israeli strikes on Iranian facilities in June 2025.
So for their part, I think the European powers are very much afraid that delaying further would risk losing this leverage entirely, potentially allowing Iran on freer arms trade and missile development.
And these kind of actions would be viewed by the European powers as a threat, But I think on the other hand, there is another very important factor that is tension between the United States and Iran, because after Donald Trump took power again, this year he tried okay although on the one hand he also took a hotline position at the same time he tried to talk with Iran about the nuclear issue, but actually after the air strikes in June,
Right now, it's very hard for the United States to talk to Iran directly.
So that is why right now the European powers are playing a bigger role.
Okay, so Professor Makhilyaliev, actually the sanctions to be reimposed are those lifted under the 2015 nuclear deal.
So how severe will these matters be for Iran for its economy and its nuclear program, especially if you compare it with the unilateral US sanctions that are already in place.
I think this would just make the situation for Iran even less comfortable in terms of of its economic development and its economy will generally suffer even more.
The problem is that for iran it's that all of these issues have been compounding unilateral u.s sanctions but not only sanctions on iran there have been instances of indirect pressuring anyone who would uh try to uh help iran evade the sanctions also so to say secondary sanctions uh on several countries and sometimes even targeted sanctions on the companies that have been known to help Iran evade the sanctions.
Combine the snapbacks of the yen sanctions, that's going to make the bad situation for Iran even worse.
To which degree this is going to affect around decision making is the biggest question because we have seen the situation in the previous iteration when the UN sanctions have been imposed in Iran, but Iran still had a lot of economic buffer.
It was getting creative in terms of how to switch its trading routes and economic partnerships in order to mitigate the effects.
But what we are seeing right now is a compounding of a lot of issues that have been there affecting Iran during all these years.
And the effects of this, so to say, economic pressure.
In the longer term, we've seen culminate in the inability of Iran to defend itself from the attacks of Israel and the United States for example.
So this is a much more serious situation.
So it is this combined effect that makes the situation worse than it would be, say, 10 years ago or 15 years ago. that actually makes a difference.
And I think that is the expectation from the European countries that this will be very convincing for Iran in the vulnerable position it is right now.
Well, Professor Zhang, just now you mentioned this October 18th deadline, but we know that Russia and China have actually proposed delaying this. snap back for six months to allow diplomacy.
Could this proposal gain any traction and what role do you think China and Russia are likely to play here?
Actually, we have to take into consideration that in the last round of the JCPOAs, Russia and China played a very important role and both countries used to be part of the P5 plus one mechanism.
And right now, I would say the proposal by Russia and China for a UN Security Council draft resolution to extend some key provisions of the UNSCR. two to three one by six months represents a very pragmatic effort. in order to avert immediate escalation of conflicts and also tries to buy some time for diplomacy. actually circulated in late August 2025.
The draft aims to postpone the snapback deadline to April 2026.
And this allows continued negotiations amid Iran's partial IAEA compliance and also U.S.-Iran back channels.
I think this kind of efforts aims to prevent a broader crisis that could disrupt global energy markets or regional alliance.
And also it could indeed provide a real opportunity for de-escalation by maintaining the snapback thread as leverage while enabling the IAEA axis and torques, potentially bridging the gaps exposed by the June 2025 US strike.
So right now, it seems that there are not a lot of choices.
So in order to maintain peace and in order to prevent a new round of deterioration of the situation, I think this draft could be an opportunity and also an option.
Okay, so Professor Makhilyaliev, If the sanctions are reimposed, like after 30 days, is there still a pathway back to negotiation or does it risk pushing Iran further toward confrontation?
The risk exists. And as I said, if Iran is going to be feeling cornered and without any other options, it might decide that the last resort escalation path is the one to take.
But it seems also that Right now, Iran is, as a previous speaker said, is going to be aiming at buying more time for negotiations and trying to create itself a maneuvering space, more than anything.
But if the sanctions are going to be snapping back this ultimately going to be the decision of Tehran and its political elite of the regime to decide if this is a last resort situation or if it's not, if there is still room for maneuver, if there is still an ability for the diplomacy to... lift at least the sanctions and then negotiate some kind of a deal with the European nations. so it is it is very uncertain space i would say it's very hard to make such a prediction because And internal political decision-making in Iran have never been very transparent. often prone to unpredictability in a certain way it is of course predictable based on normal geopolitical considerations.
But it is up in the air right now, I would say, because we are coming to that point where the escalation can be drastic and the risk of escalation is very real and it's very present, but it all ultimately going to come down to the decision in Iran if they are going to find themselves after the snapback sanctions in the last resort situation or not.
And of course, based on that decision, there's going to be retaliatory or conciliatory options for the Western nations, both European and, of course, United States and its ally Israel.
Okay, well, Professor Makhilyaliev, actually, Iran has earlier threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty if sanctions are reinstated.
I mean, how serious should we take this threat?
Do you think they are like real intentions or are just bargaining chips?
I think it is rhetorical, first and foremost, because I don't think the withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty is a necessary step for Iran to abandon its obligations of not creating a nuclear weapon.
They have shown and threatened as much before.
So because this is such a symbolic step, It seems that this is actually negotiations tactic.
It's the tactic that's saying you are pushing me towards last resort.
You're pushing me towards the nuclear option.
You're pushing me into the direction you're pushing too hard.
So I think this is a rhetorical threat, but it's also, of course, as I did rule out that Iran can go to this last resort kind of nuclear option, it is also a real risk. and it's just one of the signals that Iran is sending that it's feeling cornered or increasingly feeling cornered. and the pressure on it might have an opposite effect from what the Western states are trying to achieve, which is denuclearization of Iran, which is eliminating even the possibility that Iran can um reach the material needed for nuclear weapon then create nuclear weapon as a result Professor Zhang, what do you make of what's coming out of the Geneva talks on Tuesday?
What do you see as the main sticking point right now that's preventing the progress between the E3 and Iran.
Yes, sure. I think right now there are a lot of difficulties at the moment and lots of disagreements between the two powers.
One thing is that they have a lot of disagreements regarding whether the E3 has the right to to re-trigger this snapback because actually the US withdrawal render the Washington, you know, ineligible to initiate the step back by itself.
But according to the European countries, they think that as it is no longer a participant, this does not actually strip the European countries of their status or their rights under the deal.
So the European countries think that they remain active participants and they have consistently affirmed their commitment even invoking the dispute resolution mechanism in 2020 over Iran's violations.
But from ERO's perspective, it keeps claiming that the E3 does not have this right to figures not back because it has failed to uphold their own obligations. by for instance, mitigating the United States sanctions effectively, and they have in fact, abandoned the participant status So this issue is still very much controversial and also they are under heated debate.
But I think at the same time, another more difficult issue here is the tension between the United States and Iran.
OK, right now, the European countries are trying to play a bigger role.
But in the end, I think the biggest players here are still the United States and Iran. because European countries cannot give any promises to Iran.
So, in the end, it cannot replace United States to do this kind of negotiation, but so far the tensions between United States and Iran have not yet de-escalated, especially The most important issue here is the disagreement over the you know, zero uranium issue.
So neither side is ready to make a compromise which makes things even more complex.
Well, thank you. We've been talking to Zhang Chuchu, Deputy Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University. associate professor at the School of Global Studies at University of Gothenburg.
Reminder listeners, if you want to hear this episode again or to catch up on previous episodes, Just download our podcast by searching World Today.
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Let's take a short break here, coming back we'll continue our discussion.
Welcome back. You're listening to World Today.
I'm Zhao Ying, joined by Kamal Mikhail Yaliev, Associate Professor at the School of Global Studies at University of Gothenburg.
Zhang Chuchu, Deputy Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University.
Professor Makhilyaliev, let me ask you, because just as Professor John said, Iran argues that the Europeans no longer have the legal right to trigger the snapback after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA.
I mean, how valid is this claim under international law? who ultimately has the authority to decide?
This is a very good question. This is a contested issue under international law and the law of the treaties.
Of course, there is a principle of pacta sans servande that the treaties have to be fulfilled. the agreement between Iran and its so-called nuclear deal is in the understanding of international law as a treaty, so it should be fulfilled.
But of course, there is a claim of the abandonment of the treaty, both de jure and de facto, from both sides.
This is coming to... not following its norms and not following its agreements.
And that is what complicates the situation.
Ultimately, you would go to the International Court of Justice with this kind of questions after all the if this is a possibility under this jurisdiction and if all the other mechanisms are going to be exhausted under the treaty provisions.
The problem here is that there is no time frame to do that or to resort to the international mediation anymore.
And claims are self-contradictory from both sides.
So they're mutually exclusive claims. and saying that basically from Iran's side that the treaty has been abandoned by the western nations and This is, of course, very hard to adjudicate between the sides because they don't have common grounds. for settling this dispute.
Is it a delaying tactic from the side of Iran?
Maybe. Are there valid international legal claims?
Also, maybe, because What does the de facto withdrawal of the United States actually mean for the treaty can only be decided by the court.
On the other hand, just the fact that the United States abandoned the deal does not negate that the other participants still have obligations under the treaty. um and the treaty does not oblige the european states for example to uphold or prevent the third parties from imposing sanctions in their bilateral relations. although even that position might be questionable in terms of so to say, customer international law.
So it's a very, very complex set of questions to which they're usually answered either by the appropriate body of mediation under the treaty or the international court.
But both of his options are now far away from the table and not really realistic ones.
So I think this is understood by both sides.
And for Iran, this is a delaying tactics more than an actual legal claim.
Okay, well, Professor Zhang, let's look at the US side, because the US has welcomed this snapback mechanism, but it also says it is available for direct engagement.
Given the Trump administration's record of hardline policies, Do you see Washington leaning more toward pressure or toward talks?
Actually, I agree with your argument. I think we can see that in his second term, President Donald Trump's approach to Iran retains his core elements of the so-called maximum pressure policy from his first term, such as reimposing and expanding sanctions to cripple Iran's economy and deter its nuclear ambitions.
But I think right now there are two issues that are worth noting.
The first one is that Trump does not really want to see a deterioration of the issue.
So for him, maximum pressure policy is more like a tactic.
And he tries to keep setting the deadlines and keep throwing out the threatening words in order to to pressure Iran to make a real compromise, but he doesn't want to see real deterioration of, for instance, conflicts between Israel and Iran and see a real tragedy in the end.
And the second issue here is that the difference between his first and second term is that right now he shows some evolution or changes towards some more direct negotiations and willingness to use or threaten military force to force a new deal.
In the end, he wants to see a result, that is a new deal.
That is why in 2025, We see that Trump has tried to renegotiate with Iran.
And, you know, even after the strikes in June, towards Iran.
Trump keeps saying that he still wants to see a new round of negotiation at some point.
So right now he has not ruled out the choice to use dialogue as a way to ensure a new deal.
But so right now, I think he's right now, I think by. using this kind of maximum pressure policy, he's putting himself in a dilemma because on the one hand, he believes that his hotline policy is going to work.
But on the other hand, there is also a risk that is to say that it can also push Iran towards the other end.
And in the end, the as Iran has claimed that it might just withdraw from the already existed agreement with IEA, for instance.
So I think we should keep paying attention to what is going on next.
Okay, so Professor Mikhail Yaliev, would you agree that Donald Trump is sort of using the same maximum pressure policy as they did during his first term when he walked away from the JCPOA. or do you feel he's maybe having a little bit different approach to iran i think this is um we are in this uncertainty territory with when it comes to the foreign policy and Trump administrations, sometimes this always kind of strategic uncertainty that borders indecision. is one of the tactics that they have been employing.
And the predictability of the actions is also a part of this tactic.
But the problem with doing it in case of Iran is that Iran has reached such a point of saturation of problems that this becomes a little bit more dangerous.
It can actually put Iran away from, as we've talked about it before, away from the desired option.
What Trump is aiming at, is aiming at create the conditions for Iran where the most logical step for Iran would be to make a deal even if Iran feels that it is a satisfactory deal that is best suited to the interests of the United States and Europe.
Here, the situation gets more complicated by the vulnerability that the runner is now feeling.
When the state in the position such as Iran feeling vulnerable or extremely vulnerable, it's also prone not to act rationally.
And this irrational option of going full escalation is the one that is the most dangerous one.
But so far, Trump's actions pushed the Iran over the edge of problems in many ways and we've seen that in terms of how difficult it was for Iran to defend itself from the attacks of the United States and Israel, for example. but we've also seen it in the how much the economy of Iran has suffered and it's not clear if there is still room for the space to be able to withhold more economic and military pressure.
So this is a situation where Iran is calculating its options in terms of how much time it can buy and maybe create another space for itself to continue with its previous policies given to the United States and Europe and make a deal even if it's not from the random perspective is a good one, or going to the full escalation and the last resort option.
So in this sense, Trump is not helping too much with the first option of buying as much time as possible.
And that's the tactics of administration.
It is right now using its relations with European states to coordinate strategy. in terms of coming to the table and making a deal. because if Iran rules out the direct negotiations with United States, the European side is the ones that Iran is going to be talking to.
That's very basic calculation of Trump administration.
But again, the risk is pushing to par. Well, Professor Zhang, actually, we know that the Europeans have held two round of talks after the US Israeli strikes back in June.
And also now they are triggering this snapback mechanism.
So do you think the European powers are acting independently or are they effectively aligning with Washington's heartline?
Well, I agree with our other speakers here and I totally agree. that actually there are some coordination efforts between the United States and the European powers And also after all, they have some common grounds on this issue.
And I would say, actually, one important background here is that immediately after Trump returned to the White House this year.
And at the very beginning, he tried to kind of exclude the European powers and to just renegotiate with Iran himself.
But right now, after the drone, the airstrikes in drone right now that there are, you know, tensions between United States and Iran, and it seems very hard for both sides to keep talking to each other, especially it's becoming extremely hard for both sides to make compromises towards the others.
So in this particular context, the European countries are playing their roles at the moment.
And at the same time, I think... European is also increasingly in a bystander role amidst the US strikes on Iranian facilities.
So that is why at the moment they, because they did not launch any airstrikes towards Iran, now they can, you know, give exert more pressures towards Iran and to act as the real negotiator at the moment.
But still, I think their role can be very limited because while Europe has historically played a pivotal role in facilitating nuclear diplomacy with Iran, I think brokering a comprehensive new deal without direct US involvement appears highly unlikely in the current context.
And one problem here is that any meaningful agreement would still require substantial sanctions relief, which is predominantly under the US control. through its unilateral measures and extraterritorial enforcement.
And right now, Iran has repeatedly emphasized that it seeks the lifting of US imposed sanctions as a prerequisite for compliance or new commitments.
And Europe lacks this kind of leverage to deliver this independently.
So I would say that in the next step, we would see even more coordination efforts between the United States and Europe.
Okay, well, Professor Mikhail Yeliev, Khamenei has ruled out direct negotiations with the U.S. as he accused Washington of seeking an Iranian surrender.
So do you feel it is possible for Europe to broker a new deal with Iran without direct US involvement?
Or would you agree that any kind of extension of the nuclear deal or any sort of new deal would require US buy-in from the very start.
Thank you very much for the question. So the bigger deal would not be possible without United States, a coordination of this will be United States. or even just a tacit agreement or tacit approval of the agreement by the United States.
The smaller deals, the interim deals to putting the steps to bring sites closer to in the negotiation positions, for example, de-escalating situation, I think it's possible, but that will still be at least communicated to the United States for their silent approval.
So the scope will be decisive and It seems that the ambition and the push right now from all sides is for the bigger deal.
And this is very evident in what the sides are asking each other to do. on how the sides are trying to maneuver around the diplomacy and of course this back sanctions deadline. that is looming.
So all this speaks about the ambition for an immediate bigger deal that will resolve the situation. of United States and European partners.
But in such a tight diplomatic windows, there are sometimes rooms to creating a smaller deals of the escalation.
For example, maybe differing in time, the snapback sanctions in Iran, for example, would cooperate with United Nations Atomic Agency for monitoring, provide deeper access to its monitoring will seize the any kind of operations that is irritant to the United States and Israel and European allies when it comes to the nuclear material transfers, something like this that buys everyone a little bit of time, but also de-escalates the situation to negotiate a bigger deal.
We cannot rule that out. This is possible and I think the European allies have a potential to achieve that.
Maybe that is a secondary goal for the European allies.
But the signaling, again, is pointing towards a bigger deal that is not possible without the consent of the United States.
Okay, well, Professor Zhang, we know the June strikes by Israel and the US reportedly caused serious damage to Iran's key nuclear sites.
So from your perspective, How much did these attacks actually set back Iran's nuclear program?
Did they cripple Tehran's enrichment capabilities?
Or is it likely that Iran can repair and resume operations fairly quickly?
Well, I think in the end that there are a lot of damages.
But at the same time, of course, Iran has its own resilience. although initial reports and claims from the Trump administration right after the airstrikes described the damage as obliterating Iran's nuclear capabilities.
Subsequent assessments reveal a more limited impact.
For example, an analysis of various reports actually showed that the strikes inflicted temporary damage likely setting back Iran's program by six to 24 months at most.
But Iran's program has the resilience and it has its own tactics.
Because, for instance, IAEA Director Rafael Grossi noted that Iran could resume enrichment in months. with surviving cascades of centrifuges.
Also, satellite imagery confirms visible craters and debris but not total underground destruction.
And also, since there were confrontations between Iran United States and Israel for a long time.
So Iran also had this kind of experience.
So it means that Even before the airstrikes, there were reports that Iran already expected that and that is why it has changed some of its facilities of nuclear to the other place underground.
And right now, I think it's very important to note that Iran had its pre-strike preparations hardened infrastructure and accumulated expertise.
And these elements could all enable a rebound or even acceleration to what breakout capability.
But after all, all these things, they all need time.
So, Professor Makily Aliev, And we know the Israeli and US strikes, they targeted the nuclear sites, military leaders, and also the scientists.
Can military action ever erase the knowledge behind Iran's program?
I think the knowledge cannot be bombed away, but the knowledge without the capabilities and capacity to create a nuclear weapon is is less harmful so to say because potentially then Iran would be able to communicate that to somebody who has the capabilities of capacities but I mean without means to create a nuclear weapon, the knowledge itself is not going to be as harmful to the United States security and to Israel security, or rather their perceived security in this context.
What the United States is trying to achieve is trying to show the Iran sort of futility of trying to hold the threat of creating the nuclear weapon. over the United States and Israel in the way that they have been trying to do it for many many years as I said there is no clear and detailed position even in Iran itself about the creation of a nuclear weapon.
It's a very controversial question even inside Iran, inside the political elite of Iran.
It's not very clear if Iran's supreme leaders, Romani's fatwas, or so to say the religious dogmatic norm on that creation of nuclear weapons is actually is a sin in terms of religious norms. even prevents the actual creation of it.
But what it doesn't prevent and what we around have been demonstrate is coming closer to its creation and saying that If Iran is threatened with existence, then these are means that are legitimate even under the religious system. norms.
So we still haven't seen this point of no return.
We still haven't seen this kind of final decisions made in Iran itself.
But hanging it as a threat over the United States and Israel, that was always the strategy for Iran.
And that's what the United States and Israel are trying to eliminate.
I think it's in that perspective that we need to view why the strikes on the Iranian infrastructure and capabilities.
Yeah, and Professor Zhang, the IAEA has reported that the first team of inspectors is back in Iran now.
So although the access to bomb sites remains unclear, How significant is this development and what challenges do you see in restoring the food monitoring especially given the damage from the June strikes by the US and Israel.
Well, I think this move is very significant because the return of the first IAEA inspection team to Iran actually marks a modest but very important development in de-escalating the ongoing nuclear tensions And this offers a potential off-ramp from the impending UN snapback sanctions.
And also I think it signals Tehran's willingness for some sort of cooperation at least amidst the E3 talks in Geneva at the moment.
And also we can see that the IAEA director describes it as a breakthrough. after a two-month suspension following the drone strikes with inspectors initially accessing the Bush nuclear power plant for routine refueling oversight. and we still have to take into consideration that this is a less sensitive site not directly tied to enrichment activities.
But still, this shows an obvious progress.
Also, this step could build confidence and facilitate broader talks between Iran and European countries and maybe even United States.
But still Iranian officials emphasize that this does not constitute a full resumption of the JCPOA era monitoring, and it requires case by case approval from the Supreme National Security Council. and faces domestic protests from hotline elites who view it as a compromise.
So therefore, I would say access to bombed sites like the Natanz and Fordow remains very much unclear and restricted.
So far, I think there are several challenges here in restoring for monitoring.
The first challenge is the physical damage and the safety issue because The drone strikes actually cause extensive structural damage and this can complicate the safe access and require specialized equipment. or decontamination, for instance.
So there are technical issues. And on the other hand, also there are political hurdles within Iran itself.
Because right now there are some domestic opposition from the parliamentarians and also there are the need for high level approvals.
So these issues can all become obstacles for restoring the full monitoring process.
Okay, well, Professor Makhlialiev, one last question for you.
How do you think countries like North Korea are watching these developments in Iran and adjust their own nuclear strategies.
I would say that in this sense, the strategies of countries like North Korea are completely different because find themselves in a completely different situation.
The situation in Iran is unique, as is the situation with North Korea in terms of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is also unique.
But if we are talking about what kind of messages situation around Iran since the North Korea it's probably for North Korea and its perception it is confirmation that their strategy in terms of acquiring the nuclear weapon as fast as possible was correct. and that there is too much power concentrating with the Western nations that that arbitrarily can use its power to sort of impose its will on other countries that are maybe disagreeing with their political positions and the global arena.
That would be North Korea's logic. Is it flawed?
Yes, of course it is. There is also the nuances and the balance between all those things, because there is a sort of tacit agreement between all the nations that the nuclear weapons should not be proliferating.
And there is the treaty that is very important in that sense. that have been adopted after the World War II and the bombings in Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
So there is this kind of tension between these kind of positions, but it is for North Korea, for example. uh a very much a confirmation that its strategy have been the right one uh but again As I said, for Iran, this is a bit different in terms of that North Korea had no internal... pressures not to create nuclear weapons and if they have been, they have been very little and marginal. and the relationship between the North Korea and the United States, sorry, the United States and Iran, are of course very much different, the dynamic is very different, the geostrategical situation is very different.
Yeah, thank you. Okay, thank you. Kamal Mikhail Yaliev, Associate Professor at the School of Global Studies at University of Gothenburg.
Zhang Chuchu, Deputy Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University.
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I'm Zhao Ying. Thank you so much for listening.
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