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This is World Today.
Hello and welcome to the panel discussion of World Today.
I'm Ding Hen in Beijing.
A key aspect of Chinese President Xi Jinping's global governance initiative is calling for practicing multilateralism.
As the United Nations marks its 80th anniversary this year, the multilateral global governance system is nevertheless faced with deepening challenges.
The UN finds itself increasingly unable to play a decisive role in ending international conflicts.
The tariff policy of the current US administration has disrupted decades of broad consensus on international trade rules.
Foreign aid to the world's poorest countries is shrinking and there is no increased global momentum on tackling the looming climate crisis.
So, is the golden age of multilateralism over?
What can be done to protect the multilateral system?
These questions and much more in this edition of World Today.
To listen to this episode again or to catch up on our previous episodes.
You can download our podcast by searching World Today.
So joining us now on the line are Ramesh Thakur, a former UN Assistant Secretary-General and Emeritus Professor at the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, Dr George Zagopoulos, Senior Research Fellow of CIFE, a France-based European research organization, and Professor Quqiang, Fellow of the Belt and Road Research Center with Mingzhu University of China.
So thank you very much for joining us today, gentlemen.
Professor Ramesh Thakur, to start with you, I mean the practice of three or more states coordinating their policies and seeking cooperation with each other actually has a long history.
But do you agree with this idea or with this point that this multilateral system or multilateral institutions that emerged after the end of the Second World War are somewhat unique in our human history?
Well, every system is unique to its time, to the number of states, the state of development, the dominant technologies and concerns.
And, of course, after the Second World War, one of the strongest features and attributes was decolonization.
For the first time in human history, we had a large number of states that came out of colonial rule and were interested in economic development, in safeguarding economic sovereignty, in trying to catch up with the advanced industrial economies, and so on and so forth.
And therefore the multilateral system had to accommodate them and reflect their values, even though for several decades after that and I expect we'll come to that, but for several decades it was still the old powers that dominated the multilateral system.
They had designed it, they had established it, they controlled the main mechanisms, and the wires ran through Western capitals, and all that is now changing.
But yes, this reflected the distinctive characteristics of the post-1945 world.
So the multilateral index compiled by the International Peace Institute shows that the number of states and non-governmental organizations signing up to the multilateral system continues to grow actually.
But, on the other hand, the same index also reveals that the performance of the system as a whole, in terms of how well multilateral institutions can implement their policies across their members, across their membership, has deteriorated during the last decade or so.
Professor Tokor, in your opinion or in your observation, why do you think this is the case?
Well as the number of actors has grown dramatically.
The UN membership, for example, has almost quadrupled from 51 in 1945 to 193 today.
As that has happened.
There's many more states pursuing different interests and the common elements have declined or diminished.
Their willingness to sacrifice hard national interests to a notional international interest has also gone down.
The multilateral system is now increasingly out of balance with the distribution of military power and economic might in the real world.
And the system no longer reflects the interests of the members, doesn't give them adequate representation in the major decision-making systems.
For example, Imagine how, or just think about how important the items on African countries' agenda is to world order in respect of economic development, in respect of poverty insecurity hunger, reducing conflicts and so on.
And yet there's not a single African permanent member of the Security Council, which is the geopolitical cockpit of the multilateral order.
How can the United Nations system adequately reflect the concerns and the needs and their priorities, given that major lack?
So that's just one example.
Then, of course, in the international financial and economic system as well.
The reason why BRICS and the BRICS Bank, for example, the New Development Bank, have come about is that the existing international financial architecture simply does not reflect the real world outside the multilateral system.
For all these reasons, legitimacy has declined, performance has declined And the prestige and credibility have gone down.
And once that happens it becomes a self-perpetuating pathology, because fewer and fewer countries believe that the multilateral system will represent their views and cater to their interests.
And so it just becomes, as I said, a self-perpetuating pathology.
So, Professor Quqiang, going to you, do you agree with this idea that representation is a major problem when we talk about why this existing multilateral system, its performance, has deteriorated during the last decade or so?
Well, I'm not quite sure about your question.
Look, it's going to be very complicated for what we call multilateralism.
Basically, when you're talking about representation, it means every nation or every region or every ethnic group should have a face in this multilateral platform that is called multilateral.
No, i don't think so.
We learned the lessons that's called equalism.
It will create a pseudo satisfaction, but it won't solve the problem.
It wouldn't improve everybody's livelihood.
The real representation means every stakeholders will have a voice and have their representation to this kind of a multilateral platforms.
No matter how small you are, your voice can be heard.
No matter how big your nation is, your power can be limited.
And you have to consider out of a common good, not only your own nation or your own ethnic groups benefit.
And that is real multilateralism, i think in the past uh, the whole world actually.
Well, we do not have so-called uh multilateralism uh, for example, before the uh first world war.
It basically are, you know, originalism.
So in the middle east you have several countries always engaging with each other, in the far east you have several countries and in the european continent several countries know, are linking to each other but uh, you know, whole global multilateralism doesn't exist.
The only multilateralism happened is after the second world war, when the terrible war taught the whole human being that there are some global challenges requires that every ethnic groups, every country from different backgrounds, they need to work with each other.
And sometimes the problem is even bigger than just one single nation.
Even as strong as a British Empire or as very, very mighty United States of America, they cannot solve it themselves.
So they need that everybody's engagement.
And that is what we have the you know multilateralism popping out after the Second World War.
And then we have United Nations, World Bank, IMF and et cetera, even though their intentional design is probably not for the equality or the fairness of the whole world, but actually they realized that this wide partnership, This kind of, you know, engagement and organization on a basically, you know, equal footing, can actually do a lot of the good, more than our original architecture for the humans community, like 100 years ago.
But somehow we're going to some other extreme after the Second World War, especially after the Cold War.
I think the problem we're having here is number one the multilateralism actually become the excuse for the unilateralism or hegemony, which means, even though you're looking at many, many countries are working together with each other, but they're under the authority or under the manipulation even for some country or a few countries, so they are working for them, not working with them.
So this is one extreme.
Another extreme is that what you're talking about, the uh representation.
So this kind of extreme liberalism and so-called the far leftism is saying okay, no matter how small you are, you need representation.
You need a face.
No matter how less of the contribution or how meaningless you're talking about, even though you only try to benefit your own group of people or small region.
But we need your face.
We need your representation.
We don't care about how we can make real progress, but we just want to make the agenda looking good.
And that's it.
So this kind of the far left multilateralism is also wrong, because they don't care of making any progress.
They don't care about efficiency.
They just want to play a game just to make a gain of display, make a gain of show.
And that's it.
Only beautiful agendas, but getting nowhere.
So neither of this kind of multilateralism with so-called representation is correct.
The real representation means we need equal footing.
We need win-win result.
We need to enjoy each other's beauty and diversity, even though we're a very different nation, a very different faith, believe in very different value.
But we don't want to change you.
We can work with you, respect you, and make progress together and benefit both you and me.
That is the real multilateralism.
This kind of multilateralism, represented by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Belt and Road Initiative and BRICS Nations, and all this can be a real good example for what is called real representation.
And I think this is the multilateralism 31 version and can be a new model to be learned and improved in the future.
So, Dr George Zagopoulos, turning to you, some say the two decades following the 1991 collapse of the former Soviet Union, when the United States was the world's undisputed only great power.
Actually, that period represented the golden period for multilateralism.
It seems the logic behind this argument is that this multilateral system, including the level of participation and effectiveness of the international institutions, reflects the power balance in our world today, and the fundamental shifts in power balance will shake the foundation of international institutions.
Would you agree in this regard?
Why or why not?
Well, I would say that the fact that the United States remained as the sole superpower in the world enabled the United States to shape the world on its own image.
And this required a decision whether to act unilaterally or multilaterally.
So in the first two decades after the end of the Cold War we experienced both tendencies in US foreign and economic policy.
But certainly the world remembers how the United States responded to the terrorist attack of 9-11, complementing the war against Afghanistan with the war against Iraq without UN authorization.
So several analysts suggest that the war in Iraq itself and the decision of the United States to proceed with this war without UN authorization represented the first serious crisis of the multilateral system in the 21st century.
And actually, if we are looking at the situation in the past, certainly this war marked the beginning for a serious debate about how to reform the UN system.
So certainly the United States had several opportunities to restructure the world on its own image.
But the final result was that in the end, the multilateral system was certainly silenced by the American determination to act alone. after 9-11 in attacking Iran.
So I would say that, generally speaking, the war in Iraq in 2003 has been a turning point for world governance and for the beginning of the debate about how to reform the multilateral system.
Of course, a lot changed after 2003.
We'll have the chance to talk about that later.
The rise of of Russia and China, and so on.
The different changes in the international system.
But I would rather focus on the war on Iraq as a turning point for the debate.
Professor Takor, some say the current era is a little similar to the period between the two world wars in the first half of the 20th century.
Back then, the United States declined to assume global leadership and disengaged from the international system.
They say, just like today.
That period was also a time of deepening geopolitical competition and rivalry, rampant trade protectionism, for example, and also, for example, destabilizing technological change.
What is your observation?
And do you think there is any lesson that we could learn from that period in terms of how to uphold the multilateral system today? well i think you might want to hear from george on this since essentially the period between the two world wars was a eurocentric system it was the european powers were the great powers one edition of japan possibly at the time and it ended very shortly after the first world war and the establishment of the league of nations the outbreak of the second world war but the second world war in turn had two major theaters one was the North Atlantic, the other was the Pacific in East Asia with Nazi Germany and Italy as the aggressors in one theater and Japan in the other.
I think it's a fundamentally different world today.
But also in terms of the last question you asked about upholding the multilateral system.
There is nothing inherently virtuous in any multilateral system.
And if the multilateral system, as it exists today, fails to meet the expectations and demands and needs of its members, then it is better to get rid of it and have a new one which is more fit for purpose.
So the key question is not that, but the key question is whether we can avoid how that system ended with a world war.
Because again, with the reality of nuclear weapons today, if we have a world war then we all lose and we all die.
And that's not something that we want.
But the problem is, the multilateral system is better at telling countries what not to do and not very good at enforcing changes that most countries want and are in fact in the collective interest of most countries.
And it is, as I said earlier, out of alignment with changes that are happening in the real world.
The fact that something that is essentially a system created in 1945 should exist without significant structural change today.
Think of countries.
I mean, could China operate if it still had the government in power, the regime in power that existed in 1945?
India was a colony in 1945.
So was pretty much all of Africa.
So the idea that the world can operate the same structures and with the same design and the same countries in power in controlling these systems, that doesn't work.
In could argue that the tensions arise from misalignment of the existing multilateral system with the changes that have occurred in the world since 1945.
And if their system had adapted we wouldn't have needed the shanghai cooperation organization.
You don't necessarily have needed BRICS.
The rise of these institutions, the rise of the minilaterals or the D-groups, is an indictment of the failures of the multilateral system.
And that is where I think the roots of instability lie.
And that is something that we need to address.
Coupled with.
Who are the countries or actors that are going to provide the necessary international leadership as the US begins to disengage from providing global public goods?
George, would you agree that this post-World War II multilateral system is bound to end sometime in the foreseeable future or in the near future?
Because one argument is that over the past century, international institutions have exploded in number.
Today, multilateral governance comprises thousands of say, intergovernmental organizations treaties, consultative arrangements, regional organizations, international courts and tribunals NGOs, etc.
So do you think the multilateral system has a kind of institutional density that will somehow enable the system to persist despite, for example, despite the US withdrawal in terms of membership, in terms of funding for some major multilateral bodies?
Well, to start with a basic observation.
We all know that the world is encountered with several problems today, but the general system, how it was formed after the Second World War, has been successful in terms of preventing another tragedy like the Second World War from happening again.
And this is quite significant to mention, right?
So it is very important to focus on problems which are existing and to talk about potential proposers for a change in the multilateral system.
But at the same time, we should acknowledge the reality that it's very fortunate that this tragedy has not been repeated the tragedy of the Second World War and I hope it will never be repeated.
So, having said that, then certainly there are some limits in how the previous system is representing the interests of different countries in the world.
And there's a problem of representation at first, but there are additional elements that need to be taken into account.
Another element is the element of accountability, for example, as far as the UN and other organizations are concerned.
And another element is that of efficiency. efficiency, right?
So one of the main reasons why international institutions are not necessarily performing to a degree which is responding to world problems is the lack of efficiency.
So representation efficiency transparency, accountability all these are key goals that need to be taken into account and lead states to work together in order to respond to global challenges.
So I would say that the current system itself certainly has some flaws but, at the same time, for the time being, it is the best we have and it is the basis that can allow cooperation, which is still existing despite the problems.
So I would say that as long as we rely on the current system, then the debate about governance reform will go on.
And, as you nicely pointed out in the question itself, the structure of the system itself, with so many different organizations, NGOs and also states themselves supporting multilateral itself, can to some extent at least guarantee that multilateralism will be part of the agenda of states in the future, despite the existing problems.
Even if we are looking at the United States, different governments opt for different strategies as far as unilateralism and multilateralism are concerned.
So I would say that, again, to sum up, that multilateralism is suffering by a crisis.
But at the same time we should acknowledge the success in preventing terrible wars like the Second World War from happening again.
Your point is well taken.
Well, let's take a very short break here.
And coming back, our discussion will continue.
Stay tuned.
You are back with World Today.
I'm Ding Hen in Beijing.
Today we are talking about what could be the future of multilateralism.
Joining our discussion Ramesh Thakur, a former UN Assistant Secretary-General and Emeritus Professor at the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University.
Dr George Zagopoulos, Senior Research Fellow of CIFE, a France-based European research organization, and Professor Quqiang, Fellow of the Belt and Road Research Center at Mingzhu University of China.
Professor Qu Qiang, going back to you, in your observation, who is likely to bear the cost?
Who is likely to bear the heaviest cost of a diminished multilateral system?
And why do you think upholding multilateralism is now a key guiding principle of China's foreign policy?
For example, do you think it is China's intention to try to Fill the gap or to fill the vacuum left by the United States under President Donald Trump?
I think a crippled multilateral system probably will cost the heaviest to tow towards those vulnerable small, poverty trapped nations, and these nations well, They used to have a better day.
Because you know the past, international rules and globalism and NGOs multilateral platform, try to, you know, maintain those kind of the fairness.
Try to make sure the international orders can benefit as many countries as they can.
And also to mobilize every nation together to deal with the common global challenges, like the global climate change, like the pandemic, like the extremism.
And that kind of the solution really requires multilateral platform in the middle to find out all kinds of resources and powers to tackle those issues.
For example, recently the international ocean waters has been temperature up and many small island countries are facing the drowning problems and also floods, tornadoes and all those things that have been hurting those nations.
Well, if we're talking about 200 years ago, they're probably just going to wait in there and get drummed.
But now multilateralism.
International organizations can mobilize lots of the consensus to find the resources technologies, human resources to help them, to get them out of this survival crisis.
And also talking about the poverty alleviation.
China has been working with the World Bank, United Nations and Asian Development Bank together to help all those vulnerable countries to find out a way to get out the poverty.
Say investment infrastructure, technology transfer and all that has been phenomenally changed the fate of small, poverty-stricken nations and now they have been lifting their living standard for a very, very long with a very large progress.
But if we just cut out all this multilateralism and their achievement out of the picture, you will probably see those small nations, those small ethnic groups, small cultures, is going to face very dangerous position.
So I'm going to say, if we quit the current multilateral system, this danger will be very, very real.
But don't get it wrong.
It's not only those small nations, small players crisis.
If it goes on and on, it can be everybody's problem because of the spell over effect.
Well, when the major nations think, okay, this is none of my business.
I don't need to spend my taxation on a country like 3000 miles away which have nothing to do with me.
No, because climate change is not just your country's problem.
It's everybody's problem.
When those poor people are forced to burn down the forest...
Your nation can also be the victim when they are trapped in the poverty.
So people trafficking and international drug trafficking network can also endanger your nation when they are trapped in the poverty and the natural disasters extremism, terrorism.
We'll come back and put a toe on your nation as well.
So don't think this is only their problem, not my problem.
If this system is gone, we are going to be back in a savage period of time.
And we are going to deal many, many issues with the ugly mess that we don't want to see.
So yes, I think we need to do more to improve the system, not quit them.
Okay.
So Dr George Zagopoulos said We understand a clear message from China is that institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS must play a key role in terms of upholding this United Nations-centered international system.
If we take a look at President Xi Jinping's keynote speech in this year's Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, held in the Chinese city of Tianjin.
So what role do you expect the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS to play in terms of safeguarding or improving the current multilateral system?
I think that the role of that type of organizations will be crucial for the day after in safeguarding multilateralism.
And it is indicative that in the recent summit of Tianjin, for example, the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, was present.
And also both the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have signed memoranda of understanding with the United Nations, as their actions are to some extent aligned with UN priorities.
So that type of initiatives are certainly important to understand, also from a Western point of view or from a European point of view, because I'm based in Europe and certainly knowledge about that type of initiatives is rather limited, I would say, in understanding the word order.
So, looking at the role of those organizations from a European point of view, it is certainly important to understand why they are currently at the agenda, how they are aligning their actions with the priorities of the United Nations and obviously, why the role of China in that regard is pivotal.
But certainly, once again, I would like to repeat that the more the world is changing, the more that type of organizations will need to be taken into account in understanding how the world order is being changed and how these organizations themselves are contributing to changes in world governance.
Professor Takor, going back to you, like you said earlier, immediately after the end of World War II we saw a massive wave of decolonization across Asia, Middle East Africa, Latin America, etc.
And definitely that was a very exciting period.
We saw landmark events like the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia or the birth of these five principles of peaceful coexistence, etc etc.
Now, that decolonization has turned its page.
Now we are talking about the rise of the Global South.
So what do you think the current rise of the Global South entails for our existing multilateral system?
That's a very key question.
I think in the aftermath of the Second World War we had the establishment of the US-led and Western-designed liberal international order.
With the end of the Cold War.
For a decade or two you had essentially unipolar multilateralism, meaning one country, the United States, was dominant pretty much across the board on all dimensions financial economic trade geopolitical military, technological.
What have you?
Now we have essentially multipolar or polycentric multilateralism, where the Global South is asserting its presence, its role and its influence on multilateral institutions and multilateral decision making.
And therefore it's a more decentralized and dispersed system where the wires of global governance no longer run just through the major Western capitals.
But Beijing is increasingly important.
For example, more countries have China as their dominant trading partner than have the United States as the dominant trading partner.
And this is reflected in the various institutions, like the Belt and Road Initiative that has been mentioned.
And this gives the Global Southern an opportunity to reclaim the agenda and reset the priorities.
But I think it's also worth making two further points.
One US actions under President Trump are not necessarily a radical departure from previous US actions, but an acceleration of the same trends.
And two.
Many of his core priorities align surprisingly well with long-held priorities of the global south.
Economic sovereignty, resistance to excessive globalism in the sense of global institutions supplanting national sovereignty, so political sovereignty, the wish to resist external interference in your own internal affairs, putting your country first and relying on multilateral institutions at a secondary level of cooperation.
So these are areas where the Global South will make its presence felt.
It might try to reduce its dependence on the dollar as an international currency.
So efforts at de-dollarization, not so much necessarily again as an anti-American trade, and more to reduce the cost of international transactions for themselves.
If they can conduct those transactions as barter trade or in local currency or evolve to a new BRICS currency for trade inside the group.
I think, if you think of not so much the total global south, I just think of Asia as a region.
In the last decade and a half or so, I think something like 57 of the growth in world trade has come from the Asia region, even though Asia accounts for what?
40 plus percent of GDP, of total world product.
So Asia has been the engine of growth for the world more than any other continent.
And that feature is likely to grow rather than diminish.
And how will countries individually and institutions of global governance, both what we call the mandated multilateral system, but also the informal g groupings like the g20, like the g7 uh, like brics and the shanghai cooperation organization, how will they adjust to this?
Things like the regional comprehensive economic partnership, which is now what?
Already 10 years old, i think, or close to getting there.
So all these are important signposts on a system that is changing across the board.
And in that change, the role and visibility and impact of the Global South is very important.
And the fact that BRICS this year has several new members and partner countries reflects the attraction of realigning to the new trends in a world where the United States is no longer able to provide all the required global public goods and is no longer able to underpin the existing multilateral system in all its manifestations, from trade through to technology, nuclear proliferation, if you like, etc.
And that, I think, is where the Global South becomes important and institutions like BRICS give voice to their multipolar normative concerns.
Your point is well taken.
So George, let's talk about the European perspective, because currently the European Union is still portraying itself as a plausible defender of multilateralism, that's for sure.
But in the meantime, some people say the European Union's internal say, demographic challenges, economic stagnation, political divisions and its institutional rigidities are actually a stumbling block to the EU upholding the multilateral system.
What is your take on this?
Well, this is a very important question.
It's significant to mention that two European countries one EU member state France, and another one which is not any longer an EU member state, the United Kingdom are members of the UN Security Council.
And this itself is indicative of the historical importance of Europe in safeguarding multilateralism.
And certainly history itself is significant in terms of understanding that Europe has played a crucial role in safeguarding peace for many decades.
And this is also one of the main reasons why, right now, the European Union is so much concerned about wars which are taking place in its neighbourhood, in Ukraine and in the Middle East.
On the other hand, of course, as you correctly pointed out, the European Union is encountered with important problems.
I would say that the most important one is the lack of cohesion as far as important decisions are concerned.
Even if you are looking, for example, at how EU member states big EU member states to be precise are looking at the UN reform proposals.
Countries like Italy or Germany are advocating for different ideas concerning the proposed reform of the United Nations.
This is again indicative of cleavages which are existing in the European Union concerning how the world should look like in the future.
However, at the same time, the general role that Europe is playing in safeguarding multilateralism is significant both in terms of guaranteeing peace and in terms of guaranteeing fair trade and free pre-trade across the globe.
So yes, I would acknowledge problems.
At the same time however, I would also place emphasis on history and place emphasis on the general role that the European Union is playing in safeguarding multilateralism, especially in today's world.
So, even if we are looking at the general statements or the general actions of the European Union in the years of President Donald Trump, it is evident that the European Union is emerging as an actor which does not have necessarily the capacity to guarantee multilateralism, but certainly has an interest and determination and plays a role toward this direction.
So, Professor Quqiang, do you think the future multilateral system is likely to morph into what some people would call as minilaterals, where things will become more fragmented and small groups of like-minded countries or partners will join to solve some particular problems?
Yes, they can be a form of the future multilateralism.
Because the current world are facing more of the original topics and agenda the pan-global topics and agenda has been replaced by this kind of original and many kinds of multilateral platform and its actions.
So yes, for example, in some climate change issues or in some river treatment issues, because the river only passes along several countries, So that might only take a few countries on the upstream and downstream to work together for that cost.
And also for the trade, probably it's only an original trade issue.
So that only takes a few countries in that trade regions.
So they can work together to find out a way to lower the tariff, to lower the threshold for the market entry.
So yes, this kind of mini-cooperation can totally work.
And, to be very frankly, in a foreseeable 5 and 10 years there can be a very important mainstream multilateralism to happen.
But it doesn't mean that it's against the traditional globalism.
And also this is not called the original club or a closed mini-club is because a mini-lateralism is actually trying to work out the things in a small region, trying to find solutions within a small group of countries or the international players, because they are things that do not need a very wide representative or they do not need such a large number of participation.
They only want to make progress.
They want to find out solutions, not just to be politically correct.
So this is actually very down to the earth, a very very, you know, with a can-do attitude kind of a way of working.
And also another feature for them is that they are not exclusive.
They should be very open.
Um, even though the they only work for the original issues or try to solve the problem within a few numbers of you know players, But once they find out the issue they want to solve probably will have some other potential stakeholder.
They need some other third-party partnership.
They will hesitate no more to expand the discussion to include more partners into the dialogue and rulemaking.
It's like the RCEP.
I think this is a perfect example.
The partnership has been expanded several times because the trade zone has been expanded.
And also Shanghai Corporation Organization is the same thing.
Many countries are not actually in the same region.
But later they find out they have a wide connection to the original members.
So this mini multilateralism organization has been expanded.
So I think that will become a future paradigm for this kind of a platform to work and grow.
So, minilateral is one idea.
In the meantime, some scholars have also raised this idea with regard to what they call pragmatic multilateralism.
And two examples or two cases they are pointing to are, for example, when the main appellate body of the World Trade Organization can't function because of the reason everybody knows.
The organization's multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement, or mpia, provides a process to resolve trade disputes, and since 2020, mpia membership has actually tripled.
And also, After the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, we saw the rest of the TPP members continue with their work and make the TPP into the CPTPP.
So, George, what is your thought regarding this idea on pragmatic multilateralism?
Do you think this pragmatic multilateralism can restore the best of the multilateral system?
Well, my answer to this question is that options like the ones in your question are certainly on the agenda of today's world including, for example, the role that the multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement is playing.
But at the same time, if we are looking at how many cases this arrangement has settled in the last years, the results are not necessarily leading to the conclusion that such a body, for example, could replace the appellate body which is not working in the last years.
I would rather place emphasis on the interest of states to build their own mechanisms or to work through their own special bodies, like the CPTPP, as you mentioned, because these are providing or these are functioning as platforms where states themselves are attempting to overcome hurdles and problems, guarantee free trade.
And I would also identify another option, especially in today's world of the Donald Trump presidency, which is the interest of countries themselves to proceed to separate trade agreements with the United States.
So I think that this is certainly indicative of a changing order as far as trade, including what both the European Union and China are doing as far as their trade relations with the United States are concerned.
Certainly, my attention would turn toward the role of the United States in that regard, because this is the main reason why the general role of the World Trade Organization has been undermined in the international system.
So, in this context, It is natural for countries themselves to look for alternatives, either in terms of the structure or the body they are participating, or in terms of the methodology they are employing in order to respond to the new trade problems.
So, Professor Takor, we are actually hearing voices calling for both reforming the global governance system and for protecting the multilateral system, or safeguarding the multilateral system.
So, in your understanding, are there contradictions between these two missions, or would you say they can actually go hand in hand with one another?
I don't think there's a contradiction at all.
In fact, I think if you want to protect the multilateral system you have to reform it otherwise it's going to die out it cannot continue to survive in its present form and if it doesn't uh if it's not capable of reform serious not incremental minor reform but serious reform then it's going to be replaced by something else so far from a contradiction one is necessary for the other And this is something that they have ignored.
And it's not something new.
When institutions begin to prioritize their own mission and structure and interests of their personnel rather than the purpose for which they were set up, then they are no longer fit for purpose.
And they become impediments to their own mission.
And they need to be replaced.
And what we are seeing today is All the pillars of the existing international order are under stress and under threat.
That's because they meet the interests, priorities and preferences of fewer and fewer members.
And it's not just the United States and President Trump, but others who are also questioning the extent to which the existing system continues to be fit for purpose.
And that is a major problem.
And symbolically, the most important element of that is the Security Council, both in its structure, in its composition, with respect to both the permanent membership and the elected membership, and also in terms of its method of operation, its relationship with the General Assembly.
What we have is the Security Council as a geopolitical center of the UN system and therefore the multilateral system.
But the General Assembly is the normative center of gravity because that's the body that houses all members and every member has one vote and no one country or a group of countries has a veto.
So all these have to be reformed.
They have proven incredibly resistant to reform.
And the result is a greatly diminished credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness of the systems.
And I'm not sure how many countries today would look to the UN system compared to the situation that existed.
For example, when Kofi Annan was the Secretary General, who was the last good, widely respected Secretary General of the United Nations.
Well, a big thank you to our panelists.
Ramesh Thakur, a former UN Assistant Secretary General, Dr George Zagopoulos from European Research Organization CIFE and Professor Qu Qiang from Minsu University of China.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today.
I'm Dinghan in Beijing.
Thank you so much for listening.
Bye for now.
