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Coming up.
China's A-share market has reached 400 trillion yuan in transaction volumes over the course of this year.
China slaps tariffs on EU dairy products amid trade row.
The Trump administration issues new warning to President Nicolas Maduro as Russia and China backs Venezuela.
And China is mulling over a law to regulate its activities in Antarctica.
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First up.
The yearly transaction volume in China's A-share market has exceeded 400 trillion yuan, or 569 trillion US dollars, for the first time this year.
According to financial data provider Hithink, the volume reached more than 405 trillion yuan as of the market closure on Monday.
It's estimated that the turnover rate, which measures equities liquidity, activity and popularity, could reach 174 in the A-share market over the course of this year, the highest level since 2016.
19 individual stocks reached 1 trillion yuan in transaction volume throughout the year.
2025 has also witnessed the Shanghai Composite Index touch a decade high.
So for more, joining us.
Now on the line is Dr Yao Shujie Chang Kong, Professor of Economics, West Chongqing University.
So thank you very much for joining us today, Professor Yao.
Now, first of all, can you help us explain how important it is to measure the transaction volume in stock exchanges as compared to say, other numbers, other indexes such as market capitalization?
Yeah, the change volume of the stock market is in important indicator whether the stock market is going up or down.
In this case the, the over 400 trillion uh there may be change hand volume over 2025, indicate a bull market in the chinese stock market.
Uh, because it is um once surpassing the the critical four thousand point, although recently is surrounding about four thousand uh.
Investors are regretting to push the market much higher.
So it increased the volatility of the stock market and the changing hand uh volume.
Uh in the market.
Some people predict it is a slow bull market and it's a longer term bull market.
But investors, they remember the kinds of potential risk.
So some people, they make some money, they go back to the market and sell it.
So people are hesitating to push the market into another peak like we see in 2015.
So it may take some time for the market to be stabilized for the next couple of months.
But it is a good sign that the Chinese stock market, up to 10 years of sluggish, is now going to the bullish market.
So it is a good opportunity for people to invest, to make money and also to consolidate the stock market, give confidence to investors and also the listed companies.
So overall, what do you think has made the transaction volume in the A-share market exceeds this 400 trillion yuan milestone over the course of this year?
Yes, I think it is a fairly large volume compared to the previous five years.
The previous five years is about 50 to 60% of the level. that we see in the current financial year.
So it is up to a long bearish market, almost 10 years from 2015 to now.
All the investors are hesitant to get into the market.
And it seems that in 2025 the confidence is coming back and there are lots of activities, especially new investors are coming into the market and also foreign investors are coming into China.
So this is an indicator of the long-term market confidence for the Chinese economy and the Chinese stock exchange.
I hope that this confidence will continue and to boost the financial market, which would serve the real economy in the medium and the longer term.
So, if we are to take a look at some of the individual AI stocks which have achieved some of the highest transaction volumes in 2025, they include, for example, the shares of Camber Income, which is a Beijing headquartered company that is sometimes known as China's own version of NVIDIA.
And also this Guangdong-based company called Victory Giant, which is one of China's largest printed circuit board manufacturer.
And it is also a supplier to NVIDIA.
And also we are talking about, say, EV battery giant CATL.
What do you think this tells us?
Yeah, it mirrors the real situation in the real economy.
There are some hot investments in expansion into the semiconductor sectors as well as the new energy, like the new battery, CATL.
Now this kind of reflecting the economy transition in the Chinese economy from the traditional manufacturing to the high-end manufacturing which feature with semiconductor, the high-end chips and also computer software, the so-called new three products for Chinese export, like the new energy vehicles and also battery with power, the new energy vehicles, as well as new energy equipment such as the solar power.
This will become a hot investor area.
Now the change in volume of one trillion or even two trillion in this company, reflecting these lots of interest of investors in putting their money to support this kind of particular industrial sector, as well as the key manufacturer.
Okay.
When it comes to foreign investors, a few years ago, like two to three years ago, we saw many of them pull back from Chinese equities and actually turn them as uninvestable.
That was the scenario back then.
Why do you think they are returning now?
And do you think their return is driven by the tech opportunities on offer in the Asian market or by other issues?
Other factors such as a growing demand for diversification beyond US assets, for example?
It could be both, but I believe it is more the former, because the company which people pulled off before they were in the relatively early stage of development.
And after a few years, because a couple of years is quite long for the high-tech industries.
After the last few years, the high-tech manufacturers, the multinational companies in China they have found a way to expand their market share and turn them into highly profitable enterprises.
Now foreign investors.
They see this opportunity, not only the maturing enterprises, but also the large market potential within China.
So the confidence of foreign investors coming back to this multinational size of the domestic company within China is a good signal.
The confidence is coming back to the Chinese emerging industries.
So I think it's a very good sense for the Chinese market to become ever more competitive in the international arena.
Now some say China's A-share market can actually be less affected by global turbulence or global market situation.
So that's one advantage of the A-share market.
Would you share this same observation, professor?
Yes, I agree to a great extent because the Chinese market, the Chinese economy is stable.
The Chinese economy fundamental is fairly solid.
They provide a great opportunity for the Chinese domestic-born enterprises to be attractive to foreign investors.
You know foreign hot money.
They are looking for opportunities whenever they are going to get, you know, profitable returns.
You know mature market.
They have expected you know return, such as the Daozong industry, the Fuxi 100.
But they have more potential in the Chinese economy, although it's less mature.
But the potential the potential for making profit is significantly higher than the former institution which I just mentioned.
The final question before we let you go, Professor Yao what reforms or adjustments for that matter do you think are needed in terms of China's macro economy if we want to see more meaningful long-term capital inflows into the Asia market?
I think it's government policy and also the regulatory environment to provide confidence for foreign investors.
The second issue is the Chinese stock exchange.
There is more transparency, digital management, information transparency and also the social responsibility of the listed company to export their information.
But most importantly, I think, is the Chinese economy fundamental the macroeconomic stability and also the sustainable, high-quality economic growth in a green manner, as we are just proposing now.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Dr. Yao Shujie, Chang Kong Professor of Economics with Chongqing University.
Coming up, China slaps tariffs on European Union dairy products amidst trade drought.
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China has imposed temporary anti-subsidy measures on certain dairy products imported from the European Union, starting on Tuesday.
China's Ministry of Commerce says preliminary findings indicate that the EU products benefited from subsidies causing substantial damage to China's domestic dairy industry.
Professional countervailing duties for simple companies range from 21.9% to 42.7%.
China's ministry has reiterated that China remains cautious in using trade remedy measures and is willing to resolve the disputes with the EU through consultations.
So for more.
Joining us now on the line is Professor Cui Hongjian from the Academy of Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Hi.
So, first of all, in your observation Professor, how substantial are those subsidies that are provided by the European Union to the milk and dairy products industry?
And why does Brussels subsidize this particular industry?
As we know, there is a very long tradition for the European Union to support its agricultural sector.
Also, you know, these are kind of common agriculture policy in the frame of European Union since, you know, 1916.
So since then also, you know, every year, every budget cycle, European Union will invest so much.
I mean to support itself, agricultural production, especially as we know there are two so-called pillars for this policy support.
One of them is, you know, to support the so-called marketing of agricultural production of the European Union.
And it is roughly more than one third, I mean, this budget to support marketing directly.
If we look at the current budget cycle of European Union, nearly 300 billion euro will be invested for this agricultural production subsidies or some other.
So I think it's a very, very big issue now, not only within the European Union and also without of the union because, as we know, these agricultural sectors, They need to get some more involvement into their political issues.
Also, there is a very, very strong lobby from these agricultural sectors in the European Union.
So I think that's the reason why the European Union will have some so big subsidies for agriculture.
So do you think this latest countervailing duties from China, from the Chinese government, mark an escalation in trade tensions between China and the European Union?
And do you think China has a point when Beijing says that it has been quite careful with those trade?
Investigative tools.
I don't think the Chinese government is trying to escalate the situation by deciding to have some investigation against the dumping or the subsidies cases from the European Union exports.
Because, as we know, by comparison now, the European Union has issued 18 final rulings and launched 15 new investigations during the same time.
So I think if we just look at the number of these investigation cases, we can find that China keep a very, very cautious attitude towards this issue.
Because, as we know, always China try to insist this law based order in trade, especially on the WTO rule or some other.
So recently, as we know, the European Union tried to have some more unilateral measures and to get a kind of protected market.
So I think now more and more protectionism from the European Union side escalate this situation.
So France is actually the hardest hit country in the European Union when we talk about China's latest countervailing duties.
Actually, during the first 11 months of this year 2025, France shipped a total of more than 180 million US dollars of dairy products to China.
So do you think China's latest action in terms of tariff and countervailing duties will prompt Paris or the French government to try to say, push the European Union to talk to China more and try to resolve the trade differences, the trade disputes between the two sides?
According to the European Union's process, certainly because, as you know, the trade policy in the competence of the European Union.
So certainly I think that on the European Union level it will give some response to Chinese measures.
But of course I hope that France, and also some other European Union member states who are involved into this investigation case, they can play a more positive role to help the European Union.
Firstly, to understand the real situation.
Because, as we know, that these subsidies on the agricultural sectors is not a secret for the European Union.
And secondly, I think that France or some other member states, they need to help the European Union to have a more reasonable negotiation with China.
So I think To avoid any kind of escalation from the European Union side could be a very, very important and decisive step for the European Union to show its sensory attitudes to deal with the issue by working together with China.
Now many people say China's tariffs, the latest Chinese tariffs on EU products, such as the dairy industry products, are a kind of Chinese retaliation against the EU tariffs on Chinese made electric vehicles or electric cars.
Do you see that, um?
Do you see this issue that way, professor?
I'm asking this question because previously, for example, when we talk about china's tariffs on eu um porks the porks imported from eu such as countries like spain many people say that's a chinese retaliation in response to eu tariffs on chinese evs.
But actually Most recently, I think sometime last week, China actually decreased its duties regarding the pork imports.
Right?
Yeah, I understand the discussion.
Because, as we know yes, now there is a very, very big question between China and the EU on this E-waste issue.
And so far, yes, it's European Union side.
I mean, didn't show any positive attitude to be part of a reasonable negotiation with China.
But I don't think that the Chinese tariffs on some European Union products, including dairy pork or some other, not the retaliation issues against the EU tariffs on eBay.
Because, as we know, these investigations by Chinese side on these agricultural products, They have a very long time for this process and also they have a transparent investigation.
And, as we know, because of the subsidies from European Union on dairy products to China.
So it gives a very, very big problem for Chinese milk or dairy enterprises.
As we know, for the last two years, nearly 80 of Chinese milk or dairy enterprises lost their benefits and also nearly 80 of pastures lost their benefits.
So I think Chinese measures are trying to protect these interests of Chinese enterprises and also, to you know, have some to protect the marketing order.
But, of course, I think this EU-based issue is a very, very important environment factors because this issue is, you know, worsening this environment and also mutual trust between China and the EU.
Of course, once there are some more long-time and sustainable solutions between China and the EU, not only on EU ways and also on some other trade applications, I think it will give some more friendly and cooperative environment once both sides deal with these issues or cases.
I take your point.
The final question before we let you go.
In a bigger picture sense, we know both China and the EU are positioning themselves as a kind of steadfast supporter of free trade and this multilateral trading system.
At a time we see a lot of uncertainty in terms of Washington's trading policy.
So if Beijing and Brussels want to jointly uphold the kind of spirits here, how should they deal with their own trade disputes?
Yes, as we know, both China and the EU.
They are, you know, trying to uphold the free trade and the multinational, multinational trading system with, you know, WTO at the center.
But now the very, very big issue is how could for both sides to walk the talk?
As we know, not only just to you know support this multilateral trading system.
I think, especially from European Union side, it needed to have some more, you know, substantial measures and also actions.
I think now a very, very important issue for both sides is if it's possible for both sides to understand how about the interdependent situation, not only for trade and also for industry.
And secondly, for both sides yes, they need to try to look for maybe an innovative, a new type of, you know composition, complimentary cooperation, especially for this I mean agricultural products or some other.
Yes, China is looking for some more opportunity or to promote its living standard by importing some more agricultural products.
Thank you very much.
Yeah, your point's well taken.
Professor Cui Hongjian joining us from Beijing Foreign Studies University.
We'll be back.
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On the World Today program, you can find in-depth and impartial insight, as well as critical commentary, on key trends in the Chinese economy, financial technology, business and blockchain.
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U.S.
President Donald Trump has issued a new warning to his Venezuelan counterpart, Nicolas Maduro, saying it will be smart for Maduro to leave power.
Maduro has responded by saying that Trump will be better off focusing on his own country.
Trump also said that the US could keep or sell the oil it has seized off the Venezuelan coast in recent weeks.
Caracas has accused Washington of piracy.
The United States has been increasing pressure against Maduro in recent months, including expanding the US military presence in the region and conducting strikes on vessels that the United States claims were trafficking drugs.
So for more.
Joining us now on the line is Ina Tengen, Senior Fellow of the Center for International Governance Innovation, a Canadian think tank.
Thank you very much for joining us.
A pleasure, Deng.
So what do you think we know so far about the ultimate goal of Mr Trump's pressure campaign against Venezuela?
Well, it seems to be aimed obviously, at getting rid of the current government, whether it's through a decapitation strike, through a combination of military moves, economic pressure, etc.
We know that there's been a significant military escalation to build up 25 boats with people on them.
Speedboats have been interdicted, over 100 deaths.
Three tankers are now under U.S. control.
They've been taken.
Donald Trump has put it very bluntly that he believes that he has a right to go into Venezuela, as well as Panama Canada Greenland, etc.
What we're seeing is the erosion of all of the institutions that were put up after World War II to prevent large powers from simply doing what they want because they could.
It's unfortunate that we're in this situation, but Donald Trump wants to take over Venezuela, probably because of the oil.
One question I guess many people have on their minds when they take a look at the latest development is that if Washington really goes ahead to try to sell those oil it has ceased off the coast of Venezuela, will there be legal or legitimate buyers?
Well, you know, the legitimate is uh, it's a hard word to quantify.
First off, you know he sees these tankers without any.
You know he says he has a right to seize them.
No, they have a right to inspect them.
That's under international law.
If they're falsely flagged, these are entering international waters.
And he's seizing the boats and the cargoes, insisting he has the right to keep both.
So there's a real question as to the legality of it.
I would say it's just a common act of piracy.
And then the second part is what does he do with the ships, the oil?
Obviously the ships, whoever owns them, will try and test them and say that you know, these are my ships.
It depends a lot on how they are registered and whether they can defend themselves.
But the oil itself is interesting.
I mean, he could simply pour the oil into, you know, tanks that the US has there's a reserve tanks and then, just you know, sell off other reserves.
That's one way.
The other is, He can sell them to any willing buyer in the United States.
They're not breaking any laws because they're just buying oil from the government.
But there's a larger question here.
It's not just who buys oil, but what you do with it.
Venezuelan crude is heavy crude, and that means that it has to be specially processed.
Well coincidentally, the United States has many, many heavy crude refineries in its southern area, Louisiana and Mississippi.
In fact, it's one of the major heavy oil refineries centers in the world.
And with the problems with Canada and things like that, he might be looking to shore up that steady reserve of supplies that be coming from Venezuela.
And there's a lot of speculation about this, but You know, this is all highly unusual.
Like I said, it's just such a complete departure from you know the rules of law and everything like that, that the United States was preaching just a few years ago about how important institutions were.
And now you hear just you know, you see piracy see, you know taking self-interest, and really no apology.
Yeah.
China's foreign ministry said on Monday that China stands against any move that violates the purpose of the UN Charter and all acts of unilateralism and bullying, adding that the international community can understand and support Venezuela's stance of defending its own rights.
Why do you think China, and Russia for that matter, is voicing support to Venezuela and President Nicolas Maduro?
Well, quite frankly, there's first off, let's point out the obvious irony.
The United States is saying that it has the right to attack Venezuela and to take all Canada Greenland Panama, et cetera because it's in their security interests.
Well, it was the United States that objected to when Russia actually had security interests, NATO creeping onto its border and then into Ukraine and then mounted what they say is a defensive war against aggression.
Oh, that was all terrible.
That shouldn't happen.
But here you have the U.S. doing exactly the same thing now.
The difference here is that Venezuela in no way provoked the United States.
Yes, they have been at odds.
The United States doesn't like their government, doesn't think it does a good job.
But I think the Venezuelans could say the same exact things about the United States.
And Russia is supporting them, partly because they're against the United States, but partly because of this idea that there has to be some limits.
What happens in the world?
They had what they saw, legitimate security interests.
The U.S. is creating these security interests.
It's all part of Donald Trump's plan to, in essence, take the whole Western hemisphere.
So Canada, Greenland and all of South America as he implements this kind of phase two of the Monroe Doctrine or the Donald Doctrine, however you want to call it, where he just says this is mine and he divides up the world.
Now, this is exactly opposite of what China's view of the world is.
For years, it's been pushing the Belt and Road Initiative, a shared future for all.
And the principles that a country has to be secure, they have to have a path to development.
Their countries have to be respected intact as they are.
And there has to be a global governance system instead of countries just walking around taking whatever they want because they're powerful.
So these are the tensions going around.
Whether you want a world in which it's the law of the jungle the US just takes what it wants when it wants or do you want to have an international set of values that China has been talking about, where Now some say Washington's current campaign against Maduro is reminiscent of former US?
President George H.W.
Bush's pressure campaign against Iraq. prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of the country.
And quite coincidentally or uncoincidentally, both Venezuela and Iraq are oil-rich.
What is your thought on this, Ina?
I always think back to the Crusades.
You had a series of five Crusades where people from uh europe, you know, marauded their way down into, you know, the center of civilization, which at that time was in the middle east.
They had riches, they had tea, they had, you know, advanced learning geometry medicine, etc.
And they were the barbarians.
And they went there because, you know, the idea was that it was god was telling them to do this, to recapture the holy lands.
In actuality, they were just after the money, and this time around it's the oil.
You know, Bush thought he wanted to control the oil in the Middle East.
Trump thinks it's better to control oil near to home.
And remember, Venezuela has some of the largest crude reserves in the world.
So it would be very convenient.
And you know, as I said before, gee whiz, we have all these facilities that can process heavy Venezuelan crude.
So, you know, it's clear that this is the law of the jungle.
Donald Trump is just trying to take whatever he can.
Bush had a slightly different idea, but it was the same thing.
We're going to take what we want because we deserve it because we're American.
And this is the essence of what is called American exceptionalism, this idea that America leads the world and can do as it wants in the interest of all, regardless of how many people die or whatever else comes.
Thank you very much for joining us.
I'm a senior fellow of the Center for International Governance Innovation, a Canadian think tank.
This is World Today.
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I'm Ding Han in Beijing.
Analysis indicates that the recently unveiled US National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, reflects notable divergences from the US National Security Strategy, or NSS.
According to a report by The Paper, experts from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences analyzed the two defense documents released by the United States within a month.
Experts say the NDAA, signed into law by President Donald Trump, adopts a hardline approach seeking to curb China's tech development and deeper military cooperation with US allies in the so-called Indo-Pacific region.
By contrast, the NSS is taking a more calibrated tone.
While labeling China as a near-peer competitor, it avoids ideological framing and focuses on strategic competition in technology and military capabilities.
The document also signals a shift in US priorities, placing greater emphasis on the Western Hemisphere.
What is or what are driving these differences?
My colleague Xu Yaowen spoke with Professor Shen Dingli from the Fudan University's Institute of International Studies.
Professor Shen, the latest U.S.
National Defense Authorization Act and the previously released National Security Strategy showed significant differences in their strategic outlooks.
For instance, when it comes to China, the NDAA continues its heartland approach and focuses on the Indo-Pacific, while the NSS takes a more moderate stance on China.
So, considering that the NSS is issued by the White House and NDAA is a bill passed by the Congress, how do their differences suggest that there are still no unified consensus within the US on its China policy?
We need to look at those actors who created these different documents.
The National Security Strategy Report was created by the White House, the executive branch of the US government, while the NDAA has been created by the US.
Congress, which is another branch of the U.S. government.
The US government has three elements of government executive, congressional and judiciary and each of them is important.
No one is more superior than the other.
They are equal and they are different, but they are the same.
They make a united government.
Therefore, we cannot say that the United States is divided.
No, they're always united.
Putting all these two documents together, they make the US national security and the military strategy.
Sometimes some portion of the two documents may look differently, but this area where they agree with each other or they look different make a united US document.
The U.S. national security has three range of timeframe, one year, four year, and 10 year.
So if we were to look at one year, come to NDAA, that is the U.S. national security for one year.
And the U.S.
Congress make a law and the White House has to implement it.
Otherwise, it would violate the law.
But Congress cannot make a second year national security arrangement because they are only authorized to make one year.
For second year, only the first year is finished.
They start to work on the second year.
So the shortcoming of this approach is they could not have a long range view.
They only authorize the money spending for one year.
That makes the U.S. not good because they need to have sort of a long-range view.
Then the White House would take a view, four-year view, because that's the range of any US president.
Normally, they would have authority to make a strategy for four years.
But every year, they need money to implement every year's money schedule.
Then they ask money from Congress.
Congress only gives them some money for one year.
You said that the U.S.-China policy is now divergent, but how do you explain?
The NDAA characterized China as part of the adversary camp, extending competition to military technology, diplomacy and other sectors, while the NSS defines China as the near peer competitor, with the focus primarily on economic rivalry.
How do you think these divergent positions on China will affect the future Sino-US relations in key areas such as trade cooperation and technological exchange?
Okay, the white house totally agrees with the congress.
They know china is america's arch enemy, but they know china because more strong with the second edition of the trump government.
So China becomes more powerful.
China is really near peer.
Even though China is the U.S. most strong rival and enemy, they think to say that is not smart.
You cannot tell the truth.
You have to fool China.
I'm your competitor.
I'm sort of your friend.
Please give me rare earth metal.
They try to pretend China is not enemy.
And they are happy for the Congress to tell the truth.
And they tell China, look, some of the US government people don't like you.
They want me to be harsh with you.
So please be nice to us.
So this kind of White House, Congress working together to beat China.
And the Congress gives the White House some formula, some weapon to deal with China.
And the White House can say, I don't want to be your enemy, but you can make me as your enemy.
So they work together rather than they play different roles.
They play a united role to tell China, China is an enemy in 10 years, in one year.
But to make the White House convenient to work with China tentatively.
The White House would not say China is an enemy.
So if we take this way to read the two different reports, we understand one government, three components saying different things, but with the same consensus beating China with strategy, with tactics.
Strategy is China is American enemy.
Tactics don't say that.
That's my reading of these two reports.
Professor Shen, another key difference in the US foreign policy is its focus on the western hemisphere versus the so-called Indo-Pacific.
We have noticed that the NDAA significantly strengthens US defense and industrial cooperation in the so-called Indo-Pacific region.
While the NSS emphasizes a Western Hemisphere First strategy and seeks to reduce US military engagements elsewhere.
How do you see this divergence in regional strategic focus affecting the US alliance building efforts in the Pacific region?
I see no difference because I believe most of the key members in the White House fully endorse the NDAA.
But they notice that China is risen into a near-peer.
The US has less resources to beat China and the US partly depends on China on rare earth metals.
So it's unnecessary to write those languages of the NDAA into the NSS.
So if it's already written into the NSS and it's dropped, the white house tried to delete this language with understanding.
China is the arch enemy, but don't say it.
To say us would focus on the western hemisphere, But at the same time, US has testily raised its military budget to beyond one trillion US dollars, with not a focus on Venezuela, on Russia, on North Korea, on Vietnam, on Brunei, but only on China.
China is realistic.
China cares the data.
China less cares the language.
If the U.S. data is rising, China would spend more money next year to race with the U.S.
So let's race.
The Congress would tell the White House, you are not asking enough.
So I would give you the money you need to help.
So this is a real message.
Both white house and congress understand china is america's arch enemy and they would unite together to beat china.
But uh, in daily talking to china, department of state tried to play a good guy in order to make a channel to take a more moderate position.
And the White House can every day tell China if you don't make a concession to me, my Congress would beat me.
So I would again say one country, one government, three components saying different words but with the same purpose.
Don't beat China.
Professor Shen Dingli from Fudan University, talking with my colleague Xu Yaowen.
Coming up, China mouths over Laos to regulate its activities in Antarctica.
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Chinese lawmakers have begun reviewing a draft law on Antarctic activities and environmental protection.
The draft was submitted on Monday to the ongoing session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for its first reading.
The proposed legislation seeks to better coordinate and regulate activities in Antarctica, including scientific research, tourism and fisheries.
The law would apply to Chinese citizens and unincorporated organizations conducting activities in Antarctica, as well as to foreign individuals or entities that organize Antarctic activities within Chinese jurisdiction.
So for more insights.
My colleague Song Ruixin spoke with Andy Mauck, professor with Beijing Foreign Studies University.
And, practically speaking, how will this legislation better coordinate or regulate the increasingly complex web of Chinese Antarctic activities, especially from state-sponsored scientific expeditions to growing tourism?
Well Ruixin, I think first of all, we have to understand a little bit more about what exactly Antarctica is.
So we think about the Arctic and Antarctica.
Lots of ice, same ice, but completely different politics.
So if we look at the Arctic, which is melting, it really is a contest for resources, shipping routes minerals hydrocarbons, etc.
But Antarctica is one of the most unique places on Earth because no one lives there.
It's about the size of Europe.
It's enormous.
No one lives there.
No one has sovereignty there.
So China's draft Antarctic activities and environment protection law can really be understood as a way to place all Chinese activity in Antarctica.
So scientific expeditions, logistics operations, tourism et cetera under a unified domestic framework.
And why is this important?
This is important because it shows that self-regulation is how responsibility is demonstrated.
So if we look at the Arctic, it's really, again, like a competition for assets.
But Antarctica really is a test of conduct.
So it's really answering these questions of who is seen as a responsible actor, who produces scientific knowledge others can trust, who helps shape environmental standards and who can be best relied upon to follow rules without enforcement.
So I think this is what we're looking at here, Ruixin.
Okay then, building on that, the draft law is framed as part of China's shift from capacity building to rule shaping in polar affairs.
So how do you view this move in terms of China's influence on future international norms and legal frameworks for the continent?
Well, I think one, it's a natural progression. for China.
Again, you know, Antarctica is unique.
There are no people there.
You can't really fight over natural resources.
So it really is a venue for demonstrating a development of reputation and legitimacy.
So I think, from that perspective, along with many other things that China's doing, is that it shows China as a responsible global actor, not only able to deliver important global public goods infrastructure, increasingly technology, but also to provide global standards and internationally acceptable rules of conduct.
So I see that this is really an important piece of that effort for China's increasing importance on the global stage.
It's more intangible versus things you can see and touch, like building ports et cetera, through the Belt and Road Initiative et cetera.
It's really more about, as you mentioned, standards of conduct.
But how do you evaluate the timing of this move?
Well, I think we really look at it from an Antarctic perspective, right?
So it's increasing tourism because of global climate change.
This is a place that can be seen as important in.
You know that there's so much ice there and it affects the global climate, global ocean currents, etc.
So from that perspective, I think this is again a natural progression for China.
Exactly.
So at the heart of the law is an emphasis on China's scientific endeavors, which are seen as the foundation of its governance role in Antarctica.
So, reflecting on this, what would you consider the most significant achievements or breakthroughs from China's Antarctic scientific research over the past decade?
And which of these, like development, do you think have had the greatest impact, both domestically and internationally?
Well, I think there's a couple.
So, you know, first of all, again, this is an incredibly inhospitable environment.
Again, you know, no people, no infrastructure.
So China's Qingling station on the Ross Sea, I think is important because it's in one of the most sensitive regions and it provides year-round presence.
And this again is really about discipline logistics, environmental management compliance, under constant scrutiny.
So I think this is one very important achievement.
You know I mentioned earlier that Antarctica plays a very important role in better understanding climate change.
So this is another, I think, important Chinese achievement.
At Dome A.
China's Kunlun Station supports ice core and atmospheric research that is precisely aimed at extending the Earth's climate record far beyond current baselines.
So I think this is also very important.
And then more generally, just the long horizon observation.
The China provides expanding continuous monitoring of the atmosphere, ice, ocean system.
So I think not very exciting work, but very, very important.
And I think this is how I think China again is demonstrating trustworthiness and legitimacy on the global stage.
Then, turning to China's broader international positioning, like you mentioned before, China is trying to show its role of responsible global actor.
So how does this law align with its peaceful use principle in the polar regions?
Well, you know, I think again, you know.
It shows China's ability to regulate in an area where there's no people, no resources to fight over.
And it really is just about demonstrating legitimacy, relevance, respect for global norms.
And I think this is very, very important because this again provides, I think, another piece that China can utilize in addressing other topics that also require legitimacy and acceptance of global norms and shaping of global norms as well.
Given the ongoing international concerns, do you think that this legislation will be sufficient to address worries about China's long-term strategic intentions in Antarctica?
I think that this is a very unique part of the world.
And as it stands now, I think there's a pretty well-established consensus about non-militarization, etc.
That looks like you know that all countries want to respect this.
So from a strategic perspective, I think again this is more about reputation than if we contrast it with the Arctic right, which is about shipping routes minerals, hydrocarbons etc.
That it's a very different kind of situation with different objectives.
Andy Mauck, professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University, talking with my colleague Song Ruixin.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today.
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I'm Dinghan in Beijing.
Thank you so much for listening.
Bye for now.
