Ted Audio Collective.
Hello everyone, you're listening to After Hours.
I'm Felix. I'm me here.
And it's the two of us.
It's just the two of us.
I have to say, Felix, this time of year on -campus is just so special.
So I was able to walk through a couple of different graduations.
Oh, yes. And it was just so wonderful.
To see the excitement, see the families, see the graduates.
It is really, really special.
And when the weather cooperates and there's lovely music and speeches and there's just so much joy, everybody out in their finery, I don't know, very, very special days on campuses around the world, I think.
Yes. This is the time of year when being an academic is especially fun, I think.
Yes, I think that's right.
You know how I always know graduation is around the corner?
If you pay any attention to lawn care, the lawn is in fabulous shape at the time when everyone visits campus, it's just a standing.
And we have topics for today.
What did you bring me here?
So I wanted to talk a little bit about indexation.
So one of the most interesting things going on in finance is the rise of index funds.
And now there are people who are getting very concerned about whether they've gotten too big.
So I thought we should talk about that, and I'd love to get your perspective on what you think of those concerns.
And I have a topic for you also.
Spirit Airlines has been in the news, a very controversial merger between Spirit and Frontier, and now competition in the form of JetBlue.
And I'm curious how you think about competition among airlines, how you think about the future of the airline industry, and which of these merger activities would give us the best outcome?
Perfect timing for summer travel chaos.
Yes, exactly. That's right.
Fantastic. Sounds great.
Let's do it. So mid -year, index funds.
Yeah. So, you know, in the last 10 or 15 years, I think the most important development in finance has not been Robinhood or retail trading.
It hasn't been some crypto thing.
It's actually been the rise of indexation.
Oh, wow. You would say it's the most important?
I think it is, by far, in fact.
We have to contrast what's called passive investing with active investing.
So, for a long time, mutual funds where managers actually made choices about what to own were dominant.
And then around 10 or 15 years ago, passive investing has really just begun to mushroom, which means effectively that money managers are not making significant choices or having significant discretion over what they buy.
They just buy the entire index.
So this can be in the form of passive index mutual funds.
It can be in the form of ETFs, and in particular, three players, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, are very dominant in that industry to the degree that for most public companies in the U .S.
and increasingly around the world, they are their largest shareholders, number one, two, and three, and collectively can account for as much as 15 to 20 percent of ownership and maybe even more.
So what that has done today has created concerns over whether those entities, BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard, are too powerful.
And there's really two streams of that criticism.
One is, well, wait a second, they're going to try to enact some agenda on the rest of us via ESG, for example, or some kind of political agenda, or that that common ownership will actually result in something anti -competitive going on in the world.
So, for example, you might have car companies like Ford and GM and Tesla, who all have the same shareholders, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, and therefore raise prices.
So now there's a great deal of concern about all this.
People are now wanting action on antitrust, people are worried about their political leanings.
What do you make of these developments, and what do you think should be done about them, if anything?
I find it useful to distinguish two effects.
One is, as index funds have become more popular, we have seen more concentrated ownerships.
That is, individual owners owning bigger chunks of particular firms.
And that, to a first approximation, is actually a good idea because we typically have this issue, say, I own a small fraction of Apple.
And, you know, I really want Apple to do the very best they can.
What's my influence?
Yeah, I can write the leather to Dream Cook, but not much is going to happen.
I have no influence.
And because I have no influence, I make no investments in thinking about what should Apple do.
Exactly. And so the idea that we have more important owners, a little bit like owners, the way we have it in family firms where there is a smallish group of people that have real influence, that's actually a good thing.
Yeah. And that, of course, the concern that comes, that people refer to as common ownership.
Let me describe one paper that I find personally very interesting.
What they did was, they looked at changes in common ownership.
So, say, Vanguard for a long time has owned American Airlines, and now they buy United on top of that.
So, all of a sudden they become an important owner of both of these airlines.
And that means for some markets that we would expect a big effect, namely in markets where American Airlines and United Airlines compete actively against one another.
Right. And in other markets, this means very little because it's only American Airlines or it's only United Airlines.
And so, common ownership actually shouldn't have an effect.
And they do, in fact, find that prices are higher, where common ownership can be active, for you would expect an effect.
And on average, it's anywhere from 3 % to 7%.
The big question to my mind is, how does it actually happen practically?
Because it's not as though a representative of Vanguard goes to United Airlines and says, oh, on that route from Philadelphia to Las Vegas, please don't decrease prices because we own both of these airlines.
So, the practical mechanism is what I find super interesting to think about, but it's actually less clear what is happening.
Right. I think we just have to acknowledge how great the rise of indexation has been for the reasons you said, which is, first, it is an enormously powerful way to reduce costs relative to active investing.
And having this very low cost way to access financial markets in a diversified way is fantastic and has been great.
Is wonderful. And then to your second point, it is also good if you believe that managers need oversight to have bigger shareholders rather than smaller ones.
And so, they're solving that collective action problem.
On this academic evidence and this concern about pricing increases, that's one part of it, which is, are there things that are manifest in product markets that are being driven by common ownership?
And then there's just a general kind of power dynamic concern.
On the first, I have to say, this is one of those times where I kind of feel like the academic work doesn't get it for exactly the reason you said, which is, I can't imagine the mechanisms that are driving the outcomes that are being purported to arise from common ownership.
I just can't imagine that vanguard conversation.
I can't imagine that there is anything going on that would actually say why it is, in fact, that they would raise prices.
So clearly, the actual communication is not happening.
Vanguard is a cooperative that is not sharing information like this in any way.
It's a very low cost operation.
They're just literally buying everything.
So then you would have to say, well, no, it doesn't matter that Vanguard and BlackRock aren't saying anything.
It's just that the managers now know that there's common ownership.
I just find the whole thing utterly implausible, Felix.
I don't want to be close minded about it, but it doesn't really comport with my way of thinking about how the world works.
Yeah, I totally get it.
And this is what's tricky about a lot of empirical work, which is you can find effects, and then you have to ask yourself, first, identification is hard.
We know that, but second, really?
What's the mechanism?
And I just can't come up with one, Felix.
So let me try to describe the very best work that I know that tries to get exactly this issue and then see if I have any success convincing you or not.
So this is a very recent paper, really only out for a couple of weeks by Miguel Anton and some co -authors.
And their argument is as follows.
If a company becomes more productive, we generally expect two things to happen.
The first is that they get more profitable because they now have a competitive advantage because they're more productive.
And the second is that they lower prices because they can now afford to be more aggressive in a competitive setting.
So that's the expectation.
We expect profits to go up and we expect prices to go down.
If common ownership is in fact important, we like the first effect.
We like profitability.
Vanguard is all about maximizing long -term profitability for its investors.
We don't like the second effect so much because lower prices means now in the context of common ownership that some other businesses that we don't, they now don't do quite as well.
And so higher profits for one firm means lower profits for other firms.
What would the owner then do?
It would basically push management to be a little less aggressive in competition with others.
And management sort of gets the view that not so much that they're talking, but there's not endless complaints about, oh my God, you're not aggressive enough.
Here was an opportunity to lower prices and you didn't do it.
It's essentially inviting the quiet life.
And what's really interesting about the paper is that in that kind of a world, you see two things.
You see higher prices, but the higher prices are actually not because you have productivity advantages.
The higher prices is because you have higher cost.
You're a little more relaxed about managing.
You don't push your people quite as hard.
And as a result, you get a combination of higher costs and higher prices.
And that's exactly what they find.
They find that as common ownership goes up, the link between a CEO's wealth and changes in performance becomes weaker.
Why? Because I'm not pushing you aside.
I'm not talking to you about prices from the Vegas to Dallas, the reduced sensitivity of the CEO's wealth to changes in performance, I think is largely consistent with a much more credible story.
I think you're absolutely right.
I think that's the best version of it.
Let's just try to think it through.
So I think that's exactly right, which is productivity gains may not be shared in the same way they would be otherwise.
And this quiet life, I think is a wonderful way to think about it, right?
Which is there's just not as much pressure.
I think the question that that begs is first, empirically, of course, over the last 10 or 15 years, rise of passive indexation has happened in a secular way.
So it's really hard to know what is going on because of that and what is going on because of lots of other things.
But I guess the deeper question I would have is, how is that different than what the mechanisms that are in place when it's a bunch of active managers or a bunch of other investors?
Fidelity owned a lot of stuff before and was actively managing.
And in fact, there's this counter effect that you alluded to, which is the rise of large shareholders should put more pressure on managers.
Again, I think it's possible that somehow they are internalizing their owners' interest by basically not working as hard.
But again, I got to tell you, this runs counter to what I see in the world.
Like, do I think managers are being super lax about pricing and productivity because they feel like no one's watching them?
That doesn't strike me as right.
And by the way, there's activists playing in the background.
There's other shareholders playing in the background.
So I think you're right.
That's the best version of it.
It's just still hard for me to believe in some way.
Maybe I've been co -opted.
I just find it a little implausible.
What do you make of the larger claim, which is just there is too much political power in the hands of Vanguard, BlackRock and State Street, so that they own so much of corporate assets that somehow it's anti -democratic.
This, of course, is related to what are the rights of the owners.
And as we get more concentrated ownership, as you get say Vanguard being really important or BlackRock really being important, are they doing a good job representing everyone else's interests?
So I think it usually comes to the fore when we talk about how aggressive should companies be when it comes to fighting climate change.
And so now you have a situation where Vanguard says, well, you know, I don't want to be overly aggressive.
I don't want companies to destroy profitability today in order to perhaps make some contribution to climate change.
And then you get the question, well, they have influence by voting in a particular way when it comes to suggestions from shareholders.
And they essentially decide how aggressive companies are going to be in particular, because if they would just vote for themselves and they would be individuals, it's easy to think about that scenario.
But since they're voting for so many other people who might have quite diverse interests, it's harder to know whether that stance is right.
My problem with that whole argument is what's the alternative?
The alternative is that we get completely dispersed ownership, and then no one has influence, and managers get to do the kinds of things that make most sense to them.
Yeah. But you put your finger, I think, on the deep question, which is what is the alternative?
If we don't like this, what are we going to be moving towards?
And so the ideas have been things like we can cap the level of ownership of large players, or we can make them own only one company in an industry.
And I got to tell you, that feels really short -sighted and problematic.
Yeah. Again, I think it's just divorced from the way I think these index funds work, which is basically in a robotic way.
Now, there are these splashy letters that Larry Fink writes, and maybe they have an effect.
I think they are more a manifestation of the zeitgeist than they are something that is actually effectual.
But it just feels like we could end up doing a lot of damage to what actually has been a great improvement in the financial markets, which is the reduction of fees and the availability of diversification at relatively low cost.
And despite all the buzz about behavioral finance, the triumph of efficient markets, which is markets are roughly efficient and paying somebody to manage your wealth is kind of complicated.
I think it's at our first approximation really good, and we're going to somehow mar that development with these concerns that are totally feasible and possible, but somehow they just run counter to my sense of the way the world really works.
I really love this latter point, Mihir, and I think it's important to keep in mind, why is it that these companies got so big and why index funds were so popular?
There is a very different dynamic as investors become bigger in active and passive modes.
In an active mode, even if you see an amazing investment opportunity that no one else has discovered, acting on that investment opportunity becomes harder and harder as you get bigger and bigger, because guess what?
As you start to act on it, other people will notice what you're doing and then the opportunity goes away.
For index funds, it's exactly the opposite.
As they get bigger and bigger and bigger, there's economies of scale that kick in and then in particular in cooperative models like Vanguard, you're kicking it back to the investors.
So to a first approximation, size is a good thing in passive investing.
I wish that we had much more of a conversation about what's the downside?
What's the trade off?
What if we keep them smaller than they would be just given market dynamics, and then recognize the reason it's not a coincidence that they got so big.
It's because they have a competitive advantage relative to active investors.
In fact, the equilibrium we're at isn't so bad, Felix.
So basically we have lots of passive ownership and then we have a bunch of people doing the hard work, which capital markets need to do, of acquiring information.
So those are activists and hedge funds and short sellers who are doing all the work that frankly index funds aren't doing, because they can't do it at their cost level and they shouldn't be doing it because they're fiduciaries to do one thing, which is buy everything.
So this kind of barbell equilibrium we're at where you have a bunch of passive folks and then you have a bunch of super active folks.
It's actually not a bad outcome, I think.
Now we have something that represents, I think, a better combination of what capital markets should be doing, which is providing diversification, but also acquiring information.
And you need sharp incentives to do that, and that's what a lot of the activist folks kind of have, in fact.
But this, I think, will not go away for the reasons you just alluded to, Felix, which is size is important in their industry and they're able to get better as they get bigger.
So I think this is something which we're going to just see more and more of as we progress.
Felix, just in time for summer travel craziness in airports around the world.
I know. You want to talk about JetBlue and Spirit and Frontier Airlines.
Tell me, what caught your mind?
So, you're excited to buy Spirit, and the two companies agreed roughly it's valued at $20 a share, and it will create the fifth largest airline in the United States with roughly about a percent market share.
And, Felix, this is also in this category of ultra -low cost carriers, or like, that's at least no free lunch.
Then you have fees for everything.
You have fees for choosing your seat.
You have fees for luggage.
You have fees for thinking about maybe you should switch to flight.
So fees for everything, essentially.
And there are basically two questions about that merger.
The first one is, should you approve it because it will create more competition for the really big guys?
So the four largest airlines in the United States have about two -thirds of the market, so they're really dominant now.
And you can be of two minds.
On the one hand, if Spirit and Frontier were together, maybe they could exert more market pressure.
And that's not an unreasonable idea because Frontier is really strong in the Western United States, and Spirit is really strong in the Eastern United States.
And so maybe combining them, they are more of a substitute for, say, airlines that fly everywhere in the country.
And then, of course, the counter argument is, well, if Frontier and Spirit are one company, they don't compete with one another.
And so you might fear that that's actually not such a great thing.
So this sounded complicated to begin with, and everything got so much more involved because JetBlue, true to its name, out of the blue, pretty much, also decided to offer to buy Spirit at a much higher valuation, offering $30 a share.
So that's like a $10 difference.
With an opportunity, if Spirit's board were willing to talk, they would even go as high as $33 a share.
And JetBlue's motivation is a little different.
So JetBlue also has slightly lower prices than the big airlines.
But it's this interesting mix of prices are a little lower, but then some things are amazing about JetBlue.
So we're giving you television, we're giving you free Wi -Fi, and so on and so on.
So why is JetBlue interested?
Mostly because they would like to grow very aggressively, and they can't because it's really difficult to buy planes.
So their motivation is not so much to become a lowest cost airlines.
It's incredible to think their motivation is to actually buy their order book for new airplanes.
I mean, that's kind of a big part of it.
That's exactly right.
It's a really interesting motivation.
Part of it is the planes themselves.
And then also we have a shortage of pilots.
So Spirit has 170 planes right now.
And of course, they have the staff that comes with these planes and in a labor market that is really tight.
And that is the second motivation.
And there's back and forth between the two companies.
Spirit declined to decline the offer of JetBlue.
And essentially, what we're telling them is there is no chance that the Department of Justice will allow this merger to go forward.
And so it's not in the best interest of the Spirit shareholders to even entertain the fantasy that we will ever be bought by JetBlue.
And so they declined JetBlue, then switched tunes and started a hostile takeover with the $30 tender bid that is now out.
So I'm curious, among all this drama, what do you make of it?
Do you think Spirit should accept the JetBlue offer?
Well, so there is so much going on here.
And that's why I love the story because I think people sometimes don't appreciate how much drama there is in business and in finance.
There's actually a whole soap opera element to this and I'll raise two more aspects of it.
So one accusation by Spirit against JetBlue is JetBlue introduced this offer basically because they don't want someone else to become the fifth largest airline because JetBlue then would miss out on the opportunity that they need to desperately grow because scale is so important in this industry.
So the Spirit accusation is that JetBlue is just trying to muddy the waters and prevent a good merger from happening by creating a bid that's not even realistic.
And then the other part of it that is soap opera is that JetBlue has accused Spirit and Frontier of kind of insiderism.
There is a controlling shareholder of Frontier who also has influence, it is claimed, at the board level of Spirit.
And so JetBlue is kind of saying, I'm offering you way more than Frontier is offering you.
And the only reason you won't talk to me is because you're trying to enrich the Frontier shareholders by giving them a really good deal to buy Spirit.
Anyway, it's just crazy.
So I think just to abstract up, my instincts are this is why competitive markets for companies and corporate control contests are important.
Because I actually think in this setting, my instinct is that JetBlue should be allowed to negotiate with Spirit and actually is a reasonable take over offer.
And Spirit's recalcitrance and kind of reliance on, oh, there's anti -trust concern problems here, we can't even talk to you, feels a little shady to me.
What I take away from this story is people look at mergers today in this very distrustful way, which is, oh my God, it's increasing concentration.
That's bad for economic inequality.
Therefore, merger is bad.
And in part, what I'm taking away from this story is, a, first, in some industries, scale is so important and operating at these lower levels is just not sustainable.
And second, if you don't let the market for corporate control play, then you kind of have bad outcomes and maybe entrenched insiders doing nasty stuff.
So I guess part of what I take away from the story is, I actually think it's really important to have mergers and have mergers happen in kind of messy ways.
And if there's this background noise of all mergers are bad, it actually prevents things from happening that are good.
A, scale, and B, maybe the ability to throw out managers who aren't doing this good a job or maybe even more nefariously, managers who are doing insidery kinds of things.
So I don't know. But that's what I kind of take away from this, Felix.
What do you take away?
Part of what's fascinating to me is that historically, most airline mergers were sort of defensive in the sense that the airlines were not in great shape.
We fear that they might collectively collapse.
And then you see merger activity that led to maybe more concentration than we would generally like in markets where only four companies dominate two thirds of the US airline market.
And we know from these past mergers that they did increase prices.
So on average, I think five, 6 % higher, but that price increase is, of course, not nice to consumers, but if that's the price at which you can have a sustainable airline industry, then that's probably a price worth paying.
And so we have historically speaking, a trend towards more concentration that goes hand in hand with higher prices, but the higher prices are not problematic in the sense that all of a sudden you see now airlines that are just incredibly profitable.
They're not. It's still a very difficult business.
It's a very cyclical business.
It's a really tough industry to be in.
The whole, I think, in JetBlue story is the collaboration that they have with American Airlines in the Northeast.
This started sort of as a co -chairing agreement.
And I have definitely noticed how prices and options and opportunities have changed as a result of that collaboration.
So when Spirit argues now, yeah, you're telling a story about you want to really aggressively compete against American Airlines, and then in part of the country, you have this clearly anti -competitive collaboration.
I sort of buy that, and I think it's supported by the Department of Justice now looking into this collaboration and maybe deciding that it wasn't legal what they did.
Yeah. And that is the crazy part about this, right, which is JetBlue is under investigation for this Northeast Alliance, just as they're making claims about what Spirit and Frontier would be able to do.
So it is a little bit hard to believe, but I guess underneath it all, I come back to this comment that you made, which is that the view of the world that is, I think, dominant is capital is making out like a bandit and consumers are suffering, and that's why we have to block mergers.
I don't know if that's relevant or right here.
That doesn't feel like what is happening here.
And so I'm just a little bit skeptical about it.
And the presence of a fifth largest carrier who is a JetBlue operating model as opposed to maybe an ultra low -cost carrier operating model, I think strikes me as something that could be really good for fostering competition amongst the larger players and making the ultra low -cost carriers kind of up
their game a little bit.
Yeah. So this previous conversation about Vanguard and BlackRock, it really makes me think about the messiness of antitrust and the messiness of trying to adjudicate what market structure should look like by government ruling and how complex that process is and how it is only getting more complex if we
decide that we want to use antitrust to not just worry about consumer prices but to address more broad issues of economic inequality.
So now we're going to think about market structure and optimal market structure based not on just consumer prices but on this much fuzzier idea of what does it do to economic inequality.
And then my head really starts to hurt.
And I kind of want to just go back to, well, wait a second.
What's wrong with JetBlue buying Spirit with a really competitive offer that is great for Spirit shareholders?
Why shouldn't we be doing that?
That feels right to me and it doesn't necessarily feel like we should be protesting so much.
Yeah. The other element that I think is really important to keep in mind here is what we're asking of the government and what typically the Department of Justice will do when it reviews these collaboration agreements or mergers is incredibly, incredibly hard and is incredibly sophisticated at one and the same
time. The economists working at the Department of Justice are just heroes.
They're amazing people who run these really complex analyses trying to predict what's better and what's not better.
If you asked me without any sort of econometrics I would have said, well, actually at the very low end of the market where people are really, really, really price sensitive, having active competition between Frontier and Spirit is actually a good thing because prices matter so much.
And then seeing a beefed up JetBlue being more of a viable substitute maybe to the big airlines and doing things that actually might help JetBlue, that would have been my general take.
But that is five million miles away from the kinds of analyses that the economists at the Justice Department will run in order to determine the effects of these collaboration agreements.
And so we tend to sort of get little credit to the government of the quality of the work and the kinds of insights that they bring to these conversations, but they're amazingly competent and they're doing really fantastic work.
And just to be clear, as mind bending as these efforts are, meaning they are fundamentally very difficult because they require us to think hard about several counterfactual worlds.
It's so important to do.
You can't live in a world where these analyses aren't done.
I think that gives very little credit to just the professional work that goes into these kinds of judgments.
Are they always right?
No, obviously they're not.
Are they very sophisticated and should you have every confidence that really smart people thought really carefully about these problems and they came up with what they think is the very best answer?
Absolutely. So what gives me a level of confidence in all of this is, even though I know these are hard problems, once I see what the DOJ has decided, where they came out, I actually have no problem thinking that that was the best guess about what the future will likely look like.
And we can live in a world where we might agree, we might not agree, but we know professionals made the very best call they possibly can.
Alright. So when our listeners are waiting in long lines at airports all around the country and the world, hopefully they'll look alright recommendations Felix what do you got?
I want to revisit a recommendation that I made earlier.
Remember I once talked about Google Lens and how Google Lens allows you to now do visual search and you can recognize a church or you can recognize a tree that you don't know.
I've used now Google Lens in the context of trying to figure out menus written in languages that I don't speak and I have to tell you it is fantastic.
So what you do is you literally just point your smartphone towards the menu and you click that translation function and then it shows you the menu in English and I was in Corsica for a doctoral consortium and most of the menus are written in French but many of the menus also include terms in Corsican which sometimes
reminds you a little bit of Italian and sometimes reminds you of nothing that you have ever seen written down and Google Translate was amazing.
It just really helped me understand what it is that I'm going to order and what I should expect.
And the translate function is embedded in lens effectively.
Is embedded in lens in particular for menus.
I think it's absolutely fantastic.
You can also point it at signs that you can't read.
That's great. Sometimes even in that same print it tries to mimic the visual image that you have.
Oh wow. Really fantastic.
So useful for anyone traveling this summer.
Google Lens is your friend.
Felix I want an even bigger version of this right which is so you know how Asian restaurants especially Japanese restaurants and particularly in Japan you know how menus are like in the window and they have like a plastic depiction of the meal.
Yes. So I think what Google Lens should do is like you should be able to shoot any menu and they should give you that version of the food.
Like I want a full Japanese restaurant display because I love those displays where you actually see the food and what it's going to look like.
Yes. That sounds great.
That's a great recommendation.
And a great recommendation for the developers of Google what comes next.
There you go. So I also have somewhat of a culinary recommendation and it's a little bit close to home and it's specific but there's also a general version of it.
So my favorite restaurant in Cambridge and in maybe America is Julia which is right on MassApp in Cambridge.
I love it so much. I love Julia.
It's just fantastic but the really special part about Julia is they have a table at the back which is a pasta table where you can bring a group and it's family style.
So my specific recommendation is Julia as a restaurant and the owner is now opening a seafood place just next door.
But my general recommendation is restaurants that do family style where you bring a group of eight or ten, you don't really order and they just bring food, that has got to be one of my favorite dining experiences ever because you don't order, you just share and you feel like you're in the hands of some
master chef and they just bring whatever and then you share everything.
It is just a wonderful experience and I've had it many times with Julia and I just recommend family style eating where you don't order anything and the restaurant just brings you food.
I think more restaurants should do it.
It just makes for a different kind of magical evening when it's like that as opposed to people ordering their own food or you come in and everybody says what they want.
There's something so special about sharing and there's something so special about not having to decide that I really really recommend.
Yeah it's such a great recommendation and observation.
I've always wondered why at the very high end among restaurants it's actually not uncommon that you just say I let the chef decide, I eat whatever you will serve.
Right. I think many more places could just have a chef's tasting menu where you just don't know what you're going to get and you'll be happy with whatever they decide to do for you.
Exactly and I think with bigger groups it becomes more practical for their purposes and then also it just creates a fun dynamic at the table because you're all eating the same food and you can talk about it in a fun way.
Anyway so that's my recommendation and particularly in the summertime.
Fantastic and this is it for tonight.
Thank you for listening.
This was After Hours from the TED Audio Collective.
So
