Hello and welcome to World Today, I'm Ding Hen in Beijing.
Coming up, China calls on trading partners to reject rising protectionism.
China supports expanding Iran-Saudi Arabia ties at trilateral meeting.
Vladimir Zelensky says Ukraine is ready to halt elections if its allies provide security guarantee.
And Australia is becoming the first country in the world to ban social media for kids.
To listen to this episode again or to catch up on our previous episodes.
You can download our podcast by searching World Today.
Chinese Premier Li Qiang has emphasized that openness and cooperation remain the most effective way to spur economic growth, stabilize supply chains and drive technological upgrading.
He made a remark during a 1 plus 10 dialogue in Beijing with leaders of major international economic organizations, including the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Premier Li Qiang called for greater market access, opposition to the politicization of trade and a deeper collaboration in innovation to foster new drivers of growth.
He added that China's newly adopted recommendations for the country's next five-year plan will support steady economic momentum and unleash greater market potential.
Attending leaders have acknowledged China's sustained growth model and commitment to multilateralism, saying they look forward to expanding cooperation with China in areas such as trade, green development, artificial intelligence and financial stability.
So for more, joining us.
Now on the line is Dr Yao Shujie Chang Kong, Professor of Economics with Chongqing University.
So thank you very much for joining us today, Professor Yao.
The Chinese premier said that, starting from the beginning of this year, we have seen tariffs being wielded across the world, with growing restrictive measures on the economy and trade, which have dealt a severe blow to the global economy.
And as the situation has unfolded, the damaging consequences of tariffs, hurting both others and one itself, have become increasingly evident, and accounts from outside for upholding free trade have grown even stronger.
So to what extent do you think other countries, or the international community overall, want to share with China's concern about rising protectionism?
Yes, the recent escalating protectionism has sent lots of uncertainty to the global economy and the trading system.
China, of course, has been facing lots of challenges.
Number one, have to diversify export destination.
Number two have to reorganize the supply and production chain.
Now, china is a big country, so it is relatively easier for the adjustment.
For the smaller country, i think the difficulty is more evidence because they rely on the major economy for the trading activities and their industrial system is less, you know sophisticated, so it making more difficult for them to adjust their supply chain system.
This kind of situation, of course, is also hurting the countries which have been initiating the tariff, such as the United States.
You can see that the export performance of the United States is relatively weaker compared to some major economies such as China and the EU.
So this kind of loss-loss situation is not the way forward for the global trading system.
It certainly requires a lot of discussion and collaboration to calm the situation down, to send a stability signal to the global industrial production system.
Yeah.
So, talking about tariffs and protectionism, the Asian Development Bank says in a new report that Asia's economies have fared better than expected in the year of 2025, which has been dominated by tariff threats.
Professor Yao, what do you make of the factors that have enabled Asian economies overall to perform better than expected?
It's primarily due to the solid fundamentals of the Asian economies, which are still performing in the domestic system much better than the mature economies such as the United States and Western Europe.
In addition, because they are adjacent to each other, China is the biggest international trading partner, which provides stability and stimulation for the Asian economy.
In a sense, they are getting more and more integrated.
Because, as the tariff raised by the United States, it actually pushed a lot of Asian economy to look forward to making more collaboration with China.
Exactly that, I think the Asian economy are doing relatively better.
Because the economy is growing more steadily and the complementarity degree between countries is much higher compared to the general situation in the global economy.
So this situation will continue in the foreseeable future.
Now, judging from China's foreign trade figures in the first 11 months of 2025, we can see that the momentum of China's foreign trade, especially the export sector, has remained strong over the course of 2025, despite all kinds of tariffs or threat of tariffs faced by China.
But in the meantime, we are also hearing some voices suggesting that it is China's trade surplus and China's unwillingness to shift away from an export-driven economic model that are directly fueling the increased use of tariffs globally.
Professor, how would you respond to such voices?
Yeah, there are two key points in your questions.
The first point is why China is performing so well.
To my surprise, I'm also quite surprised that China is doing so well.
In the first 11 months, especially in November, the export volume increased by 5.9%.
And it generated the historically high trading surplus of 1 trillion US dollars in the first 11 months, which amounted to be greater than the total amount of the record high level created in 2024.
This in part.
China's domestic economy is fairly resilient to the external shock, and also Chinese product in terms of high quality, reasonable prices, are highly welcome not only by the traditional trading partner such as the United States, Western Europe, Japan and Korea, but also it's getting more and more popular in the bell and low initiative countries, particularly in Africa, Latin America and also Central Europe.
This reflects that China is being able to diversify the export destination.
The second point that you know, some people raise concern that China is not able to transform the export-driven economy to a more than domestic consumption-driven economy.
This.
To some extent.
It kept some reason, but forced a large country like China to transform from one by recent to another.
It may take a lot of time.
Actually, China has been doing particularly well in terms of stimulating domestic consumption, so that export may not become the most important driving factors for economic growth, because consumption, domestic demand, is getting more and more important.
This will require some time for adjustment.
The other things I think the criticism is probably not fully granted because China's export is now dominated by the so-called three new manufacturing product. uh new vehicles new energy vehicles uh you know solar power the new energy battery those things china have been becoming the front runner in the international market and there's a lot of demand for this kind of product in terms of uh you know climate change control reduce you know the the pollution carbon dioxide they need a lot of new energy and energy product and China is now getting stronger and stronger in this area so um you know because China have the advantage of exporting this product and semiconductors China is also doing very well these are needed by the international market and probably China would not willing to giving up the advantage product for the less efficient product in the domestic market Your point is well taken, Professor.
Now, in the meantime, we understand in some economies we're seeing rising investments in technology that are somehow outpacing overall investments.
Against this backdrop Professor, why do you think China is calling for collaborative innovation, as we heard from the Chinese premier on this 1 plus 10 dialogue?
The 1 plus 10 dialogue involves a lot of major figures in the international organization, including those heavily involved in the infrastructure investment in the Asian region.
IMF, the World Bank, which are covering a much wider spectrum of economies in the world.
Now, why countries are investing more in technological innovation is because in the new century it's now more and more dominated by new innovation and technology to drive the economic growth, especially the AI-based, the big data system.
They require a lot of money, investment and also technological know-how to make this system working fairly well for the economy growth.
And this is why countries are making effort to make this investment.
Without making this investment, I think the country will be lagging behind, and then the world will be divided again into the rich and the poor.
So the least countries, they are more concerned about themselves.
The poor countries.
In order to catch up, they have to do a lot of investment to counter the so-called division effect.
Now, why China asked for the collaboration of research is because China has a view of making common prosperity for all the countries, unlike some countries that are relatively more selfish.
China's idea is that if China does better, the rest of the world must also do better.
And this is why the building the common interests into inclusive goals, not only for the developing countries, but also for the rich countries in the West.
And China is very proactive in terms of domestic innovation itself, but also willing to help other countries to do the same thing, so that all the people, all the countries, can benefit from the technological progress.
Now the Chinese premier also pledged that China will continue to open its door wider to the outside world and welcome more foreign businesses to explore the Chinese market.
We know, the International Monetary Fund has just raised its forecast for China's economic growth for 2025 from the previous 48 to 5.
So, if China's economy can show continued resilience, what would this mean to foreign companies seeking to explore the Chinese market?
China has benefited from the openness policy.
By opening the door it will come foreign direct investment and foreign company to make investment in China, the domestic markets.
China is able to not only making the economic growth sustainable and resilient to external shock, but also help China to reduce the technological gap between China and the most advanced country in the world.
And this is the issue of the Chinese openness policy.
And this also explains why China is able to maintain economic growth at around 5, which is quite remarkable given China's economy level at this stage.
And if China is able to prove that China can make, it can become an economic driver of the global economy, then it will send a fairly strong signal to the rest of the world that China has the confidence and also the ability to attract foreign investment.
Multinational companies who come to China.
They not only fund the market, but they can also fund the profit.
And this is why mutual beneficial engagement between China and the rest of the world, between the domestic economy and also the multinational companies from abroad.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Professor Yao Shujie joining us from Chongqing University.
You are listening to World Today.
Stay tuned.
You're back with World Today, I'm Ding Hen in Beijing.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have reaffirmed their joint commitment to implementing a China-brokered deal to resume bilateral diplomatic ties.
The Trilateral Committee of Iran, Saudi Arabia and China recently held the third meeting in the Iranian capital, Tehran.
The committee is responsible for follow-ups on the implementation of the 2023 agreement.
A joint statement issued during this particular meeting praised China's continued positive role in terms of facilitating dialogue.
And China has reiterated its willingness to support further cooperation between Tehran and Riyadh across political economic, cultural and security areas.
So joining us now on the line is Dr Zhang Chuchu, Deputy Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Fudan University.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Thanks for having me.
So, first of all, at a time when the peace prospect regarding the Gaza Strip, for example, is facing continued uncertainties right now, what do you make of the meaning of reaffirming this commitment to restoring a workable relationship between Iran and Saudi to the region?
Well, in fact, reaffirming the Iran-Saudi reconciliation, which was brokered by China in 2023, carries profound implications for the Middle East, especially amid the ongoing Gaza crisis and broader regional volatility, as you mentioned.
Because right now, with Gaza's ceasefire fragile and spillover risks evident, a stable Iran-Saudi relation could act as a stabilizing counterweight.
Also from a broader perspective.
It underscores a shift towards intra-regional dialogue which diminishes the dominance of zero-sum rivalries, and also it shows regional actors' aspirations for prioritizing their own economic development rather than sectarian confrontation.
And also, I would say, a unified Gulf-Arab stance, bolstered by Iran-Saudi cooperation, will also be very helpful to work on inclusive Palestinian solutions.
Now, in terms of facilitating further cooperation between Tehran and Riyadh in political economic, cultural and security areas?
What exactly do you think the three parties are talking about?
Right so far.
We can see that the three parties have reached the joint statement, which builds on tangible progress since 2023.
And I would say it has a lot of implications in different sections.
For instance, politically speaking, it refers to sustained dialogue on shared regional concerns.
And also it promotes coordination of different parties' positions on Gaza issue and the Syrian issue in order to avoid proxy escalations.
And economically.
I think the focus right now is on expanding trade and investment ties between those countries.
And regarding the cultural dimension, it also points to growing exchanges between, let's say, research centers, academic institutions, the media and also cultural bodies.
Whereas in security cooperation likely means trust building at the very beginning and also arms restraint to prevent arms races in the region.
And in this process, China's role as facilitator actually ensures neutrality.
Now this joint statement has also reaffirmed their backing of a comprehensive UN-led political solution in Yemen.
So what do you see could be the future for the Yemen issue?
And talking about this issue, some say Yemen needs its own two-state solution.
What is your take on this?
Okay, so far.
The Yemen conflict still remains deeply fragile, according to the United Nations assessments.
And so far we can see that the three parties during their recent meetings they have emphasized a nationwide ceasefire in Yemen, economic stabilization, alleviation of humanitarian crisis and also inclusive talks under the United Nations auspices.
And I would say, looking ahead, a positive trajectory could emerge if the Gaza ceasefire spills over reducing the incentives for residency disruptions.
So in any case, to reduce the residency crisis is the first priority.
And regarding the two-state issue you have just mentioned actually, I think Yemen's situation is extremely complicated at the moment, as it's a multifactional civil conflict overlaid with foreign proxies and economic grievances.
So formal partition can be very risky, as this would entrench division and also lead to endless border conflicts and undermine national unity.
I guess, compared to say, the Palestine-Israeli conflict, the Yemen situation has a different nature, to put it in this way.
So, when China managed to mediate this repression between Iran and Saudi Arabia in April of 2023, At the time there were a lot of guesses, a lot of analysis regarding China's Middle East policy, Middle East strategy and what could be China's endgame in that region.
Now, more than two years later, almost three years, what do you think China is looking for in the Middle East?
Well, China has proposed the Global Security Initiative, and that reflects China's intention and visions.
And actually, China sticks to the principles like respect for sovereignty and non-interference.
And also regarding the region.
It supports the Middle Eastern states' pursuit for their strategic autonomy.
And also China, believes that the Middle East is not an arena for great power rivalry and it has no intention to become a hegemon or fill in any so-called political vacuum.
Actually, China believes that stability and prosperity in the Middle East can definitely help the regional actors in the region build their common interests and therefore reduce regional conflicts.
And also, you know, regional development and prosperity can also facilitate economic cooperation between major powers and the Middle Eastern states.
So, like you said, from China's perspective, Middle East is not and should not become an arena for major power rivalry.
So, with that point in mind, between China and other powers, other major powers from the external arena, such as the United States and Russia for that matter, do you think there are shared interests in the Middle East?
Why or why not?
Well, absolutely, there are a lot of overlapping interests and a lot of like common interests.
And I would say actually the commonalities between China and the United States regarding the Middle East are more than their differences.
China and the United States share several interests in the region, rooted in like mutual stakes in stability and prosperity.
So, for example, energy and navigation security is very important for both big powers, because both United States and China rely on the Gulf oil flows.
And secondly, counterterrorism and non-proliferation is in the interest of both China and United States, because they have the shared aversion to extremism and also they both want stability in the region.
And the third issue here is the economic resilience because, let's say, preventing rule, induced disruptions can benefit United States and China's investment and trade with regional powers.
And last but not least, is the regional de-escalation, because both big powers favor Gaza ceasefire and Yemen dialogue to avert wider conflict.
And also they pursue coordination under international organization such as United Nations framework.
Thank you very much for joining us and for your analysis.
Dr. Zhang Chu Chu, Deputy Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies with Fudan University.
You are listening to World Today.
To listen to this episode again or to catch up on our previous episodes, download our podcast by searching World Today.
We'll be back after a very short break.
You're back with World Today.
I'm Ding Han in Beijing.
Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, says Ukraine will be ready to halt election within 60 to 90 days if the United States and Europe guarantee security for the vote.
He also said that Kiev is working with the United States and Europe on three key documents that include a 20-point framework deal, security guarantees and a reconstruction plan.
The statement came after U.S.
President, Donald Trump suggested that the Ukrainian government was using its war with Russia as an excuse to delay elections.
President Zelensky's term in office as Ukraine's elected leader expired sometime last year.
So for more.
Joining us now on the line is Dr Kamal Makili-Aliyev, Associate Professor at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg.
Thank you very much for joining us.
Thank you for having me.
So actually earlier this year, Ukraine's parliament overwhelmingly approved a resolution that affirmed the legitimacy of Mr Zelensky's wartime stay in his office.
So, with that in mind, why does Mr Zelensky still need to respond to this pressure from Trump calling for elections?
That's a very good question.
Well, even though Ukraine's parliament affirms Zelensky's wartime legitimacy, he still needs to respond because foreign political pressure affects security and financial support.
And, in the sense, this foreign political pressure coming from Trump, publicly questioning Ukraine's democracy, it risk undermining bipartisan backing in Washington.
So by saying election could happen within 60 to 90 days if allies ensure security, which is very important, Zelensky signaling first responsiveness.
While at the same time he's highlighting that the safe elections under missile fire aren't really a feasible notion without external guarantees.
So it's a diplomatic balancing act, preserving Western unity without compromising national security, at least in the understanding of Ukraine.
So, judging from President Donald Trump's questioning, recent questioning of Ukraine's democracy, for example, some say his pursuit of an end to this war between Ukraine and Russia is increasingly being driven by his own impatience, his own frustration.
What is your observation?
What is your take?
Well, I largely agree.
Trump's focus is tied to his urgency to wrap up U.S. involvement in the war.
He signaled that many, many times.
And he can present his progress then to the domestic audiences, right?
So that's his wish.
The elections issue has become like a lever to pressure Kiev into engaging with his accelerated peace timetable.
Let's call it like this.
So, all while this framed as a concern for the democracy, the motivation here, I think, appears to be more about forcing momentum towards the negotiated end.
This is a negotiating tactics, even though it means pushing Ukraine towards concessions faster than European allies, for example, are comfortable with.
So this is the tactic that Trump is using.
So, realistically speaking, if an election is really held in Ukraine right now, for example tomorrow, To what extent do you think the final outcome may be able to reflect the real public opinion, the real people's choices in this country?
I don't think it's going to be very reflective.
There are currently several issues that make credible elections nearly impossible to be held in Ukraine.
First of all you have legal complications because martial law that has been enabled by the Ukrainian government.
It makes legally a prohibition on actually holding the election.
So you need to overcome legal concerns first.
Then there are security risks that remain not just present.
They are acute, like daily strikes from Russia, disrupted infrastructure, lack of safe polling locations and stations.
It's going to be a major challenge.
Moreover, the representative part of a democracy, right, there is mass displacement of Ukrainians. millions are abroad millions are internally displaced that would skew turnout and representation a lot so that also means this same challenging questions for the democracy and how much is it going to be a realistic polling so even with western support elections now would capture only very partial and uneven snapshot of a public sentiment they could weaken democratic legitimacy more than strengthen it it's real risk OK, so Zelensky is making a vacant promise to Trump.
Can we put it this way?
I would say it is like that in many ways.
I think it's a counter manipulation, as I said, because he is playing for the diplomatic response without actually providing a real solution.
But, I mean, it is also a question of what and how are they going to work.
Kyiv and Washington are going to work on the proposal towards at least ceasefire, if not peace.
So all of it is going to depend on that.
So actually President Zelensky on Monday worked with the leaders of Germany, France and Britain regarding revising America's original 28-point peace proposal for the war between Ukraine and Russia.
And according to him, this proposal has now been shaved down to some 20 points, after some openly anti-Ukrainian points were taken out from the original plan.
So in the days ahead, do you think Zelensky can manage to make Washington accept this revised version?
When it comes to Washington, I think, yes, he has a realistic chance.
The fact that Kiev and major European powers work together to remove the most of the anti-Ukrainian elements from the original 28-point plan shows that Washington is willing to adjust when Europe presents a unified front.
So the revised version better reflects, I think, Ukraine's security concerns.
It also removes language perceived as leaning towards Russian demands.
But acceptance here, of course, is not guaranteed.
We are talking about Washington.
We're talking about Trump administration right now.
So I think Washington wants a plan that keeps both dialogue with Moscow open and US strategic flexibility at the same time, which is very difficult also, of course.
I think success depends on three key factors.
European alignment behind Ukraine's revision.
That's first.
Second, I would say domestic US political incentives to show diplomatic progress.
That's second.
And then the third would probably be whether the revised plan still allows Washington to claim it's moving negotiations forward in a credible way.
This is going to be also very, very much important.
So if all of those conditions hold, only then the U.S. is likely to accept negotiations.
I would say much of Ukraine's revised framework, if not all of it, even if a final version, I would say, would remain in itself a compromise.
But that would also put you in a position where Washington may accept, but then it needs to be further delivered towards Russia.
And this is much less certain.
Thank you very much for joining us and for your perspectives.
Dr. Kamal Makili-Aliyev, joining us from the University of Gothenburg in Sweden.
Coming up, China's consumer inflation hits near two-year high.
You are listening to World Today.
We'll be back.
You are listening to World Today, I'm Ding Hen in Beijing.
China's consumer inflation has picked up.
The consumer price index, or CPI, rose by 07 year-on-year in the past November, the fastest the monthly increase since March 2024.
The rebound in terms of the headline inflation was driven largely by food prices.
Meanwhile, on the industrial front, the producer price index or PPI remained under pressure.
It fell over 2% year-on-year in November, exceeding a prolonged trend of factory-gate deflation.
For more analysis on these numbers, my colleague Xu Yaowen spoke with Dr Li Lun, assistant professor of economics with Peking University.
Professor Li, China's CPI rose 07 from a year earlier in November, marking the highest increase since March last year.
Could you walk us through the key factors behind this rebound and do you expect the upward trend to continue into the next quarter?
Yeah, so I think we have to notice that behind this 07 CPI rebound, food prices actually contributed a lot to this increase.
So in November, we noticed that the headline CPI rose 7.7% year on year.
So basically it's up from the 0.2% in October, and it's the fastest pace since the early 2024.
But if we look at the actual acceleration of that, a lot of that can be contributed to food.
For example pork, fresh vegetables and fruit.
They all basically, you know, swung up from their early declines.
We're seeing, you know, the a year ago, for example, food prices, especially pork, is in a, you know, pretty deep deflation.
So basically, right now we're seeing a mild price recovery which is basically translate into a relatively large year-on-year rate.
So that's why we're seeing that the cpi pick up.
Um but of course i mean core cpi, which exclude food and energy is also running high.
So um basically, you know, the core inflation is remaining stable.
That's uh, the reason why we're not seeing the inflation go down further.
Basically, it has stayed above 1 for three consecutive months, which is gaining momentum in categories like household goods apparel, healthcare and some services.
Looking at the future, I do expect CPI to definitely stay in the positive territory, but it's definitely not going to be above 2 in the next quarter.
It's probably going to stay around 1 year-on-year especially, I would say, excluding the food and energy, the core inflation is probably going to be between the 1 and 2 range.
If it goes low, it's probably going to be 0.5%, but it's not going much higher as before.
Well, as you mentioned, the core CPI, which excludes food and energy prices, has maintained year-on-year growth of over 1 for three consecutive months.
Then to what extent do these trends reflect the effectiveness of policies made at expanding domestic demand?
Yeah, so we're definitely seeing a structural transformation of the demand.
So if we break down these core prices, we're seeing, for example, categories like household goods and services are rising 2 for the prices, and clothing and healthcare are all rising above 15.
So these, I think, can be interpreted as policy, basically quietly showing up, quietly supporting the structural transformation of people's consumption patterns.
For example, the trading programs behind home appliances and automobiles, also including subsidies for green devices or smart devices, support for household renovation or support for the durable goods. they're they're all showing up in you know the statistics which is basically pushing up demand for these household appliances electronics and and and so on also i think um in the future i i do think consumers are basically upgrading their purchases rather than buying more so i think the structural shift is going towards better quality basically know higher quality products smarter products instead of you know buying more quantity basically i think yeah you know the consumers is going to shift towards for example ai enabled consumer electronics or health related you know services or education or recreation and so on so so forth so i do think this pattern is you know consistent with a you know policy supported uh you know recovery Professor Li, now let's look at China's PPI.
It has risen month-on-month for two consecutive months, yet its year-on-year decline slightly widened due to a higher comparison base.
How should we interpret this combination of rising sequential prices and falling annual prices?
And what's your outlook for PPI's year-on-year performance in the coming months?
Yeah, so in November we see that PPI rose 01 month-on-month for the second straight month, but year on year basis is still a 22 decrease.
So a lot of people are pretty worried about the PPI number because people worry about the deflation spiral, meaning that when the prices goes down, especially for the companies, for the firms that's making the products
This means the wages or the profitability is going to go down, which means the dispensable income for people will go down, and there goes the demand.
But I do think some of that PPI that's falling year on year is reflective of the increase or the improvement in the production technology that the firms are using.
So think about an economy or a production technology that's basically depending more and more on automation AI, on improved or smarter manufacturing plants.
So these will definitely cut the cost.
So basically making it cheaper to produce goods.
So of course, I do think we have to be cautious about companies competing in these low quality, low price, basically the competition that we don't want to see, basically cutting each other in prices.
So a stabilization in industrial prices are important.
But I do think behind some of that 22 percent falling figure is reflective of actually the production technology or the production cost of these daily goods are actually declining.
But of course we have to be cautious and and see if, for example, in 2026, the year-on-year decline whether keeps going or it's going to narrow.
So it's still pretty complicated to say at this point.
Professor Li, we know China's top leadership has said expanding domestic demand as a key economic priority for 2026.
Then based on the latest data, where should demand expansion policies focus to be most effective?
And how can policymakers better coordinate efforts to stabilize industrial production while boosting household consumption?
Yeah, so that's the million dollar question.
So i think the first priority is we definitely have to put more purchasing power, or more cash in the pockets of each household.
So basically, by increasing the household's dispensable income at a faster rate that basically, when people have deeper pockets, when people don't have to worry that much about, for example, health care, child care, elderly care, and they don't have to worry that much about their job prospects, they will have, you know, less precautionary saving and they will have more, you know, incentive to consume.
So that's, i think, the number one important factor that's behind uh, you know, household consumption and in basically, in theory and reality we see time and time again so, people having more confidence towards their future, people having more, you know, social safety nets.
People have more, you know, disposable income.
They usually have higher consumption.
But also, I think, linking the expansion of demand to the upgrading of industrial products, are very important as well.
So basically, we're seeing that high tech products, like you know EVs, solar batteries, you know solar cells are actually booming in terms of exports.
So the traditional sectors usually, you know, during the, the technological transformation, sometimes they struggle.
But these new sectors, they usually prosper and drive up the GDP and exports as well.
So I do think that you know, in terms of double down on the innovation, double down on the RD, I think that's also very important because that's going to help us make new products at a cheaper price.
And that's also going to help our consumers boost demand as well.
For example, during the Double 11 shopping festival, we see that smart glasses actually have a 300 increase year on year on its purchase.
So new products like these, like AI-driven glasses, electronics and these smart devices, can actually be the next driving power for China's demand.
Last but not the least, I think boosting the coordination between investment consumption or between the demand and supply is also very important because in the past the stimulus usually leans very heavily on real estate, on the local infrastructure.
But looking forward, I do think there's There should be more public investment towards, for example, urban renewal in the digital infrastructure that's basically helping to boost household-oriented subsidies, basically to help households to be easier accessible to, for example, shopping malls, to the venues where they can actually spend money for recreation, for their sports, and so on and so forth.
So basically having a policy that's supportive, that's coordinated between consumption and and supply, I think that's also very important.
Professor Li Lun with Peking University talking with my colleague Xu Yawen.
You are listening to World Today, I'm Ding Hen in Beijing.
In Australia, kids under 16 are now officially off social media, as the country is rolling out the world's first ban targeting teen users.
The law is ordering platforms like TikTok, YouTube and Instagram to block underage users or face up to 33 million US dollars.
While tech companies and free speech advocates are criticizing this move, many parents are supportive.
For more.
My colleague Song Ruixin spoke with Dr Terry Flu, professor of digital communication and culture with the University of Sydney.
Terry, as an academic observing this policy shift, what do you see as the broader societal implications of banning or restricting social media for Australians under 16?
Well, thank you very much for having me.
I will make one qualification at the outset, which is it's not a ban on using social media.
It's an age-based restriction on having social media accounts.
So it's not that people can't watch videos on YouTube or you know, look at posts on TikTok and so on but they will not be able to hold accounts until the age of 16.
And for those currently holding accounts, those will be kept for to be reactivated when they turn 16.
So it's certainly an age-based restriction, but I would say it's not a comprehensive ban.
The broader issues around this, I think, relate to concerns about mental health issues for young people, that there's well-documented instances of cyberbullying, sense of high level of anxiety among young people.
I would note that there is some debate about the evidence and whether these developments are primarily attributable to social media.
As you'd expect,
There are other causal factors, but there certainly seems to be a correlation between greater use of social media and mental health issues.
So what I think the government is hoping for is that, over a period of about two to three years, we start to see some changes in questions of wellbeing and mental health of young people and possibly associated with a relative decline in their use of social media platforms.
Okay, so then if we move to your own analysis, I've read some of your commentary and one point in particular impressed me was the key reason you think for global interest is the abject failure of industry self-regulation regarding content moderation and minor protection.
How can we understand this?
Well, I think if you step back to the mid 1990s, when the Internet first became globally popular and it was a development led out of the United States, there was a very conscious legal set of legal and policy decisions made to say that the Internet is not like other media and therefore should not be regulated like other media.
And one of the regulations that we've historically had about media has been the different types of content are accessible to people at certain ages.
That said, when platforms such as Facebook and Instagram commenced in the mid 2000s, they did have age based restrictions.
You weren't allowed to open an account unless you were 13 years or over.
But the reality was that was completely ignored.
I was reading, just reading, information from the UK finding that 800000 children aged three to five have social media accounts in the UK.
Had the platforms acted earlier on this issue, there probably wouldn't be the same push for government regulation.
And I don't think Australia is a country that tends to go for government restrictions as a first option.
But there is a sense, particularly among parents, that they feel very disempowered in their dealings with children, their children around these questions, given the overwhelming push of algorithmically determined content coming from what they perceive to be highly addictive platforms.
With that in mind, let me turn to a more specific issue, like the criteria behind choosing the certain platforms for restriction while excluding others like TikTok and Instagrams, and then WhatsApp and similar messaging services are still outside of the ban.
How do you understand the government's criteria for drawing these distinctions?
The focus was on the social dimension of the platform.
So the extent to which participation on a platform brings you into sustained interaction with one's peers, as well as with complete strangers.
So on that basis, Instagram is clearly a publicly facing platform.
WhatsApp, for the most part, not.
And obviously, government rules are not going to extend to person-to-person platforms such as email.
So there has been some debate about what constitutes social media.
YouTube was originally excluded from the legislation but was subsequently included.
Google may choose to contest that judgment.
Other platforms, such as Reddit, have said that they are information sharing platforms rather than social media.
It's possible that this question of what constitutes social media may continue to arise with this legislation.
You talked about the UK before and then.
Meanwhile we are seeing other countries like Malaysia, Denmark and New Zealand, etc.
Are closely monitoring Australia's approach and even preparing similar bans for under-16s.
Then why do you think so many governments around the world are viewing youth social media as a pressing issue?
Well, the first thing I would say is that in Australia, this appears to be a popular political decision.
So opinion polling published this week indicated 65 support for the ban, and that's similar to the figures that were coming through in 2024.
So any politician, any government's going to look at those figures and take an interest.
There is the frustration with the inability to get platforms to act based on their own self-interest around addressing these concerns.
There's a sense that the issues have been raised for some time and have not been heard.
I would note that the United Kingdom, where the discussion is not on the agenda there, appears to be a higher level of support for it than there is in Australia.
So polling published this week indicated 70 support, and I read that there may be a private member's bill introduced into the UK parliament proposing a ban of this nature.
So I think it's The sense that other measures to try and bring the platforms to act in their own self-interest around these questions have not been successful, and so government has therefore stepped in to act.
So, from your perspective as an educator, have you observed a noticeable change in young people's behaviour or wellbeing in recent years that might justify such widespread concerns?
I think there is a greater level of anxiety.
I deal with university students.
I think there are greater levels of anxiety there.
Whether it's driven by social media is always going to be a question, whether it's about concerns about the job market or climate change or other issues.
They're all very real.
I mean one of the points that's been made is that marginalised youth may be particularly adversely affected by measures such as this.
So I think It's important that governments, if they're going to restrict access to the online space, are prepared to invest in resources to support young people in their communities, in their neighbourhoods, in other environments.
I think that has to follow from any measure like this.
Otherwise, young people will just simply move around to less regulated platforms.
It looks like the government says the list of restricted platforms will evolve as new services emerge.
Do you think regulators can realistically keep up with the rapid change in digital landscape?
No, I think that the legislation has been written in such a way as to give the Office of the eSafety Commissioner the power to designate a platform within it.
So gaming platforms like Twitch and Kik were not in there at the end of 2024, but have subsequently come to be in there.
I think that the government's expectation or hope, I should say is that platforms may start to take on some of these responsibilities to a greater degree themselves.
So It's notable that Instagram have created a teen accounts framework, and companies like Roblox are aiming to try and restrict the extent to which young people and adults are interacting across their platforms.
So it has taken government legislation to put the issue firmly on the agenda.
But I think there's a hope there that platforms themselves will increasingly respond adopt design practices and age verification practices that can reduce the need for governments to directly legislate.
Professor Terry Flu from the University of Sydney talking with my colleague Song Ruixin.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today.
I'm Dinghan in Beijing.
Bye for now.
