President Trump's sizable tariffs are still on the table, but markets seem very relaxed about this landmark change in global trade policy, and the economic data seems to be hanging in.
So why is that? And is there a risk that investors have become too complacent?
I'm Allison Nathan, and this is Goldman Sachs Exchanges.
today i'm joined by jan hatzius head of goldman sachs research in the firm's chief economist and dominic wilson senior advisor in the global markets research group jan dom it's great to have you back on exchanges again thank you jan as i just said the markets seem very complacent about tariff risk at this point but a lot is still happening around them so first just catch us up what's been implemented so far on the tariff front and what you expect to be implemented ahead.
So far, we've seen about a 9 percentage point increase in the average effective tariff rate on all US imports, which is composed of 30 % China tariffs, 25 % Canada -Mexico ex -USMCA, 10 % on a broad range of countries, and then some sector -specific tariffs, especially on on autos and on steel and aluminum.
We're expecting that 9 percentage point increase to go to something like 14 by the end of the year.
And we've been in that general vicinity for several months at this point.
It really hasn't changed very much, although the details keep changing and are probably going to continue to change.
Our current expectation is that the 5 percentage vantage point increment from here is going to be an increase in the sort of general baseline rate of from 10 to 15.
And then we'll also get some additional sector specific tariffs on things like semiconductors.
However, in our baseline, we pushed back our expectation of farmer tariffs into late next year or early the year after the midterm elections.
So the latest changes have have been sort of a wash.
So it is a very sizable increase in tariffs, much bigger than what we expected coming into the year, but somewhat below where we were expecting it in early April and very stable, actually, in terms of the average rate over the last several months.
So the key question remains, what will this all mean for inflation?
We got another round of U .S. inflation data this week, and it was yet again somewhat cooler than expected.
And that's been the case for several months now.
So will we see a tariff impact on inflation?
And if so, when will we see it?
Yeah, so I'd say on the latest inflation data on balance, I think they were in line, where if I look at where our estimate is for core PCE in June, which is what all of these CPI, PPI import price numbers feed into, we're at 25 basis points.
That's basically what we had coming into this set of reports.
I do think that there's actually more evidence of pass -through into consumer prices in specific categories that you could reasonably expect to already have been affected by tariff increases on China, the first rounds of China tariffs that have been in place for a while now, the steel and aluminum tariffs.
So I actually think that is happening, but it's happening gradually, partly because there was a lot of inventory building ahead of the tariffs.
And it's also offset in part by still ongoing improvement outside the tariff effective categories, in particular in services and rents.
So our expectation is still that we will see increases in year -over -year core PCE inflation from the sort of mid to high twos, where we've we've been for quite a while now to the low threes.
That's still our view.
However, I also think that most likely this is a price level effect, a little bit like a value added tax increase that we've seen in Europe many times that boosts inflation meaningfully for a period of time, 12 months, and then it drops out.
And I think that what we've seen on inflation expectations, especially longer term inflation expectations, supports that over the past several months.
And there's also some impact on growth from these tariffs.
What are your expectations at this point?
Some of the ways in which tariffs affect growth have proven to be, I think, definitely less dramatic.
We're seeing less of an uncertainty impact that's clearly visible in the data.
And in fact, some of the uncertainty measures have come down.
Of course, so far, we haven't seen a huge real income hit either because we're still in the early stages of the pass -through.
So you could say that what we're learning here is that this is not such a big deal.
On the other hand, actual growth in the first half of 2025 actually has been pretty soft. Right now we're estimating first half GDP growth only 1 .2 % on average.
You have to take Q1 and Q2 together because of the massive front -loading distortions in the quarterly numbers.
But I think the half year as a whole is a more reasonable perspective.
So it does seem that growth actually has slowed a substantial amount, in part because of tariffs, maybe in part because of other things that are harder to identify.
We've also seen a slowdown in employment growth.
Private sector employment growth has come down meaningfully, was well below 100 ,000 in the June numbers.
In fact, the ADP numbers, which I think deserve some weight as a private payroll processor figure, was even weaker than that.
So it does seem that we're on a slower growth pace.
We're still expecting one to one and a half percent growth in 2025 as a whole.
I would say that some of the The forward -looking soft indicators, survey indicators have looked a little bit better, so consistent with maybe some stabilization.
But it's a slower growth here, without much doubt.
Dominic, let me turn to you.
Jan just said, we have seen some meaningful slowing in growth.
And of course, tariff risks are still very much with us.
Yet the markets are at very strong levels, especially the equity market in particular.
Has that been surprising at all?
the market reaction in general to these recent developments it's pretty striking i think it's getting less surprising over time i feel like really this is a theme we're reinforcing it but it's a theme that's been going on since mid -april which is that the markets essentially moved to a position where they feel like they know some weakness is coming in the economy i think people expect the tariffs to have impact but as jan said as the kind of parameters have become clearer we've had this sort of high but fairly stable expected tariff outcome for a while.
I think people have just got more comfortable that this is going to be a meaningful one -off adjustment, but that you're not going to have a kind of extended period of weakness.
And then people essentially, particularly I think in the equity market, feel comfortable extending their horizon, looking through that weakness and anchoring more on the medium -term growth picture.
I think it is striking, again, this latest sort of escalation and the renewed kind of tariff letters coming coming around, definitely haven't shaken that confidence at all on the growth side.
It is striking if you look across different markets, and you mentioned that equities in particular have been relaxed.
If you look at inflation markets, we have priced over the last few weeks, I think, a recognition that tariffs are going to go up, the market's pricing more near -term inflation.
So it's not that the market is discounting that completely, but I think it is much less worried about the kind of growth and risk consequences of that.
And I think, again, Again, there are sort of three basic assumptions that the market's making around that.
The first is there's this sort of modest expectation that things will get dialed back and resolved.
I think the fact that you're seeing inflation pricing rise suggests it's not mostly about that.
The market does think more tariffs are probably coming.
But I do think there's been the greater sense that adjustments will be made if problems arise.
The second, which is what Jan referenced, is that I do think the worst of the economic impacts just look less visible.
we're clearly seeing weakness, but we're not seeing all of the weakness that perhaps people worried we might see initially.
Financial conditions tightening has reversed.
The uncertainty impacts, as Jan said, are smaller.
So I think there's just a general sense that the kind of deeper tail risks and economic tail risks are not as troubling.
And I would say the third is just this general notion that the market doesn't really need to believe that there won't be an impact from tariffs.
They just need to believe that it's not going to be a sustained impact.
If we have some quarters of weakness as we adjust to this new regime, but life goes on on the other side of that and growth returns, which is more or less the flavor of our forecast. That's something I think where the market can get broadly comfortable.
It does point, you know, you asked about complacency.
I'm not, I think that's probably too strong, but it points to where the vulnerability lies in that in terms of those assumptions.
Those assumptions are not that different from our central case, but anything that shakes that idea that you can plausibly look through the weakness, anything that raises the fear again, that something recessionary is on on the horizon, or that we might have to worry about a kind of more dramatic shift in the economic outlook, you know, cracks in the labor market, things we haven't really seen yet, but are still an ongoing risk.
That's where I think the market will find itself from this current position, vulnerable.
But if we don't touch that, then I think we're going to continue to look forward to the medium term picture and anchor on that.
I think we'll probably come back to that in this conversation.
But let me hit on some of the other big developments that have happened since we last spoke, one of which, Jan, of course, is Trump's fiscal package.
The big, beautiful act has passed and there was so much build up to that passage.
What will be the implications of will it move the needle at all on growth?
It's going to have a positive impact on near term growth taken by itself because it is fiscally expansionary.
The tax cuts are bigger than the spending cuts and the tax cuts also also arrive more quickly than the spending cuts.
And so that's fiscally stimulative in early 2026, probably to the tune of a few tenths of a percentage point, maybe as much as half a percentage point.
But it doesn't include the tariff impact.
And if you look at it from a revenue perspective, it is actually a bit more neutral once the tariff impact is included.
And I think the growth effects ultimately are going to be offset by the tariff effect.
So we haven't really made major changes on the back of this.
We also haven't made major changes to our deficit projections.
We still think that we're on track for 6 % of GDP federal deficits, pretty much as far as the eye can see, or at least until there's a more sustained effort to consolidate the budget outlook.
outlook. 6 % of GDP, that's a big number.
It means a large primary deficit, x interest deficit of maybe 3 % of GDP.
And that probably means ongoing increases in the debt to GDP ratio, again, pretty much as far as the eye can see.
And that's a reason, and we may come back to this, also for longer term premium, the amount of compensation that investors demand for holding long -term short -term treasuries for those term premier to probably edge over time.
So the fiscal outlook remains concerning.
We're certainly not in the camp that there's a fiscal crisis coming in anytime in the near term.
But over time, I do think the risk that you have these sort of mini crises, and we've seen some of this again and again over the last several years, I think that risk does go up.
So if I listen to what you're saying about these recent developments, basically growth is continuing, but at a relatively slower pace.
Inflation is set to rise a bit from here, but really we're looking at a one -off effect.
What is the implication of all this for the Fed?
You started to mention term premium.
What are your Fed expectations at this point?
Yeah, look, we're at a level of short -term interest rates that is above basically anybody's estimate of where the funds rate will be in the long term, the natural rate of interest or however you want to call it.
Most people have that somewhere in the low threes, maybe low to mid threes.
We're now in the low to mid fours.
So it's a question of when that adjustment comes in a broadly neutral economic environment.
Our expectation is that they're going to start moving down in September.
We have a 25 basis point cut in September.
We've got two more cuts at the subsequent two meetings, and then another 50 basis points in total in 2026 to get you down to the low threes.
And the timing of this is driven by really news on when they're going to be sufficiently confident that this really is a one off inflation effect.
And I think sometime time, September is a reasonable timeframe.
I think there's very little chance that anything happens in July.
So almost by definition, that means the risks to September are on the later side.
It could be a little bit later, but this is our current baseline.
Dom, let me ask you what the rates markets are making of all of this.
We have discussed inflation risk, fiscal risk.
There is another risk that's been very much in focus this week, the change in Fed leadership that is upcoming, and the potential to potentially have a new Fed chair that is dovish leaning.
So how is the rates market digesting all of this?
As I said, we've seen some swinging backwards and forwards coming off the tariff fears.
Initially, April into May, we had one of those rounds of worries that Jan mentioned about bond markets and yields went up a lot at the back end of the yield curve.
Then we got some meaningful relaxation after that, helped by some of the better inflation news.
We had the FOMC see members starting to talk about maybe cutting rates more quickly and some sort of excitement about the possibility of an earlier easing.
And I think the resilience of the job market, in particular, and just general data since then has blunted those hopes a bit.
So now we're shifting back towards dialing back some of that optimism.
As Jan said, we're pricing September a little bit over a 50 % chance.
As Jan said, there's still lots of ways.
I think it's easy to see how the case for cuts opens up and opens up more quickly again.
In particular, as I said, the market is pricing a higher inflation track now than the forecast that we have. And so if you combine that with relatively good growth pricing, it's easy to see how there's a little bit more softness in the data on the growth of labor market side.
And certainly if the inflation news continues to track well, that the Fed's going to, as they've been signaling, step off from talking about easing to actually doing it.
So our general view has been as the market winds back, it's sort of expectations of easing with a view like Jan and the teams, you should start to push back again against that at the front end of the yield curve.
I think the story for the longer end of the yield curve is in some ways a little bit the other way around.
Jan mentioned as well, the fiscal position is we're not worried about imminent crisis, but you have a lot of supply to be digested still.
You have an economy that is functioning with reasonable growth.
And what we're seeing is there's these sort of periodic upward pressure, this periodic upward pressure on longer dated yields.
And I think without meaningful economic weakness, it's going to be hard to pull back a lot away from those levels.
And on that side of things, I think our view is that it's the opposite way around, that if there's meaningful relief in yields, then you should probably get ready for things to drift back up.
Implicit in that is a view that the yield curve will steepen, that the front's more likely to go down relative to the back.
And that's been what's happening.
And I I think that's an ongoing trend.
You mentioned the Fed chair that is coming.
I would say, at least in the market discussions, people have moved on from the fiscal debate.
Now the bill has become an act and the Fed chair discussion is more prominently in focus.
And we've seen, obviously, sort of market movement around some of the kind of rumors and announcements around that.
I do think that's something where the risk of someone who might push more actively for easier monetary policy is something that would probably reinforce that steepening dynamic in yield curves and probably also contribute to some further pressure on the dollar, which is the pattern that we've seen when those issues have temporarily entered the market.
Jan, how real do you think that risk is, that we are looking at a Fed leadership that might lean dovish because that is clearly what the administration wants?
I think over time, I do think that the administration is going to be able to make, of course, several Fed appointments.
And my expectation is that there will be an orderly transition.
And that's the latest, I think, turn that the president has, you know, what he's what he said.
said, but yeah, my expectation is there will be a new Fed chair.
I don't know who it's going to be, but I think it's going to be in May, 2026.
There are three appointments to the board of governors that president Trump is probably going to make.
There are 19 people around the table.
There are 12 voters at any one time.
So there's a lot of institutional stability.
And the Fed chair of of course, has a very important role in shaping the discussion and setting the agenda and working with the staff.
But there's still a broader structure and a broader set of people.
So I don't think it's going to be a dramatic shift in terms of actual policy setting that we're going to see over the next year.
I think it's still going to be driven by the economic data and the the Fed, the collective wisdom that Fed officials bring or collective views and analysis of the data, I don't think it's going to be a massive shift. And independence of monetary policy is very important.
We've written some things about it this year.
And I would say there was more concern around the possibility that the president gets the ability to remove Fed officials without cause before the Supreme Court decision that basically carved out the Fed from the president's ability to make those kinds of changes.
But I think I do take the Supreme Court decision as an affirmation of the importance of independent monetary policy.
Interesting. Let's turn to the dollar, because while U .S. equities have more than recovered from the April Liberation Day drop, the dollar has not.
Jan, you recently said that the dollar is the dog that didn't bark.
What did you mean by that?
I meant that concerns about the U .S. economy have receded.
Expectations of relative U .S. economic performance are not as negative as they were in April, when we thought that it was basically a knife edge case whether we were going to have a recession.
And in fact, for a very brief period of two hours.
On April 9th, we had a recession forecast, but it seemed a very touching goal.
Things have stabilized for a variety of reasons that we've discussed.
But nevertheless, on net, the dollar has continued to depreciate.
And I think that drives home that the dollar depreciation is driven not just by the cyclical ups and downs compounds of the near -term growth outlook, but really also driven by several longer -term factors, some of which we've discussed.
But the dollar is still very highly valued on a broad trade -weight basis, and that historically sets up for depreciation in coming years.
The U .S. still runs a very large current account deficit that needs to be financed by equal -sized capital inflows.
And then I think there are some of these more tail risk concerns around things like Fed independence that probably also have an impact on how foreign investors perceive the investments in the US.
All of these things are happening at the margin.
This is something that our team, Dom Cavacciatorvedi and team have really emphasized that this is not about a fire sale.
It's about making it a little bit more difficult to obtain the capital inflows that are needed to cover the current account deficit.
And all of these prices are ultimately set at the margin.
And I think what we're seeing in price action is that these effects are coming through.
So, Dom, do you think that dollar weakness has much further to run at this point?
Yeah, the general view is that it does.
And for exactly the reasons that Jan mentioned, that structurally there are a lot of these forces in place that traditionally have led to fairly extended periods of dollar realignment.
And if you look at where we started from in terms of valuation, if you look at where people are in that reallocation and those hedging decisions, we think we're probably in the middle of that process rather than at the end.
It gets more complicated as time goes on, I think partly because dollar weakness is now a pretty well -accepted story.
It's always better when you feel like something that other or believe something that other people don't yet believe i think the nature of the dollar weakening trend has changed we're deeper into that cycle we've talked in other contexts across markets about keeping the faith and i think that the story now more is that confidence that this is a process that still has room to go and that when it gets challenged temporarily for some of the kind of cyclical reasons that come up from time to time that you should not give up your confidence that the story is going to extend and i think we're having
having a little bit of that at the moment, as Jan said, the big picture story is that despite a lot of relief about the US economy in the second quarter, the dollar continued depreciating even after the reversal in a lot of other asset markets.
But just over the last couple of weeks, as we've got better growth news in the US, as we've dialed back some of that kind of Fed expectation with people already fairly heavily positioned, we're getting a little bit more dollar support again.
And you can see people's confidence in the theme, even though it's something people are quite heavily subscribed to.
You can see that confidence waning.
We're getting a lot more kind of incoming questions about whether the shifts are done.
And I think it is one of those moments where, in some sense, what's distinctive about the view now is that belief that we're probably midway through a more extended adjustment to deal with some of those kind of flow imbalances that Jan talked about.
And that doesn't stop some ebb and flow through through the course of these things, we had a very long dollar depreciation, 2002 to 2005, and then beyond that.
And there were definitely periods where the dollar strengthened.
But when you step back and look at the broader trend, what is a kind of sustained depreciation story?
And I think unless something changes very dramatically to reinforce the US sort of exceptionalism theme again, I think that's the environment we're in.
I did want to ask you about that because I I struggled to find a view that is more of a consensus view than the soft dollar view at this moment.
So I was going to ask you if that gave you pause.
Yeah, the answer is I think it makes it more complicated.
It means you're more likely to have these sort of moments of challenge.
And as I said, then what becomes distinctive is continuing to hold your view or add to your view or retain that commitment as other people become more nervous about it.
But it definitely increases the chance that there's a bit more back and forth.
Right. So, Jan, when you think about the second half of the year, recap your expectations for the U .S., but really, globally, what are your expectations for growth?
Not too much change.
So a reasonably fairly subdued growth pace.
For example, in Europe, we don't expect a lot of growth sequentially in the second half of the year.
although I would say that in general, European growth has come in a little bit ahead of expectations for several quarters now.
And there are some reasons to think that some of this borrowed growth, there was a front -loading boost. I mean, I think a real front -loading boost in some U .S. partner economies because there was a desire to import and that benefited the European European industrial sector, but so second half of the year I think could be pretty soft in terms of sequential GDP growth, but we still think we're in a kind of 1 % environment for the euro area.
We're probably seeing a pretty sizeable fiscal boost in Germany over the next couple of years.
So we think 1 .5, maybe close to 2 % growth for a period of time.
The challenges for the German economy from industrial structure competition with China, energy costs, all of those structural challenges are definitely still there, but with the much more expansionary fiscal policy that's providing a lift, and that's also visible to a lesser degree in the euro area as a whole.
Similarly, I'd say China continues to be an an economy with a very strong industrial sector that continues to upgrade and a still challenged domestic sector.
Demographics are bad.
The hope that housing would end its long slide that I heard quite a lot about a couple of months ago.
Those have again given way to disappointment.
The latest house price numbers have been quite weak.
So it's a very bimodal economy.
economy, our overall forecast for GDP growth in China continues to be basically four and a half or a little bit more than four and a half percent, which is effectively where we've been all year with a short period where we thought it was going to be four or less when you had these sky high U .S. tariffs.
But what we found is that the Chinese industrial sector has been remarkably able to deal with with the ups and downs of U .S. tariffs, even during the highest U .S. tariff levels, overall exports from China didn't really decline.
The exports to the U .S. declined.
Exports to the U .S. are still down somewhere in the mid 20 % range.
But nevertheless, overall exports in the goods producing sector in general continues to be pretty resilient.
Interesting. So if you think about the second half of the year, what risks are you most focused on that could derail some of your views?
There is, of course, a big tariff deadline.
There potentially are going to be more tariff deadlines.
We're focused on August 1st. There is the 30 % Europe threat.
There is a 30%, 35 % Canada -Mexico ex -USMCA threat.
There's a number of other threats out there.
We're building that into our forecast to a much more limited extent.
extent. We have a 15 percent baseline tariff up from 10.
But of course, it's possible that these things actually take effect the way that the reciprocal tariffs, the full reciprocal tariffs took effect, albeit only for a few hours, on April 9th.
So that's risk number one.
The Fed chair discussion is going to continue.
We're going to learn more in the next several months.
Probably there's going to be a candidate that will have been identified, even if the removing Chair Powell concerns come and go, even if that isn't where we go.
We will learn more about who the next Fed chair is, and I think that's going to have a significant impact.
Those would be, from a U .S. perspective, probably the top two things on my agenda.
And Dom, I think the question we all get is what could shake these equity markets from these highs?
So what are your biggest worries there?
I think there are a lot of things that could provide local challenges.
We're pricing inflation growth in a pretty friendly way, as we discussed before.
We're looking through some of the tariff threats and treating those as manageable.
You know, lots of things that could cause some local wobbles.
I think in terms of more serious challenges, the primary one, and not to be too reductive, I think the list narrows.
If you look back over the last 12 months and you think we've had two big equity drawdowns and sort of volatility events, one in August 2024 and one in April 2025.
And what they both have in common is that they were heavily focused around like real fear that a recession was coming.
And I think what we're learning is that's the biggest source of risk for deeper vulnerability in equities.
If the market thinks the unemployment rate is is set to rise properly in a way that we really haven't seen for a while, that is the sort of thing we, I think we've seen visibly creates a lot of risk aversion and creates a lot of worry, particularly from this sort of very benign level of pricing.
Right. And of course we are not expecting a recession.
So we're not expecting, so I would say that's a, it's a tail risk.
It's an important tail risk, but that is obviously not the baseline view.
So given that baseline view, what are your key messages for investors right now?
So I would say echoing the things that we've said, there are probably four things.
The first is there are some structural things that we think are trends that are going on now that we think are going to continue.
Dollar weakness being one of the key ones, that pressure towards a sort of steepening of the yield curve, perhaps somewhat lower yields at the front end of the yield curve, and this periodic testing of yields higher at the back end.
One of the things which we haven't talked about here, but our commodities team has been very consistent about is over the medium term, move lower in oil prices over time and the skew of risks lying in that direction.
So those are longer -term structural stories that we think are going to, there'll be ups and downs, but we have reasonably high confidence will continue to be things that play out over the coming months.
The second thing I would say is that broad macro backdrop on our baseline forecast is still fairly friendly for risk markets.
We're pricing things well, there's less room than there was, but it's still a reasonably benign story given that you're not going to trigger that recession fear along that track.
MAC. We've said, and we think there's still value in diversifying US equity holdings, probably more value than there has been at some point in the past. They underperformed in the first quarter, they outperformed in the second quarter.
And we've said that non -US investors should think about hedging their currency exposure on their US equities.
But there are still unique exposures in the US market, particularly around AI, that people are going to be enthusiastic to have. And so it's not a case of backing away from US equities at all.
And I think it's just that broad equity story still looks like it has some support from the macro.
The third, which we just talked about, is that big tail risk is around recession for me.
So I think if the unemployment rate ticks up, that's the thing you need to worry about.
It's a tail, but that's the tail that you need to worry about.
I think to extent, shorter dated bonds, but bonds in general should be somewhat protective of that risk.
But that's an area where people need to feel like they're at least aware of the risk they're taking and the portfolio is structured in a way that makes them comfortable with that.
And I think the final one, which is a sort of newer thing, is that we have seen more of these episodes of sort of less common institutional concerns around fiscal sustainability, around monetary independence, things like that, where we've seen dollar weakness, bond weakness, equity weakness together.
That hasn't been a long -lasting theme, but I do think, again, those are deeper tail risks, but having some awareness of the the possibility, that possibility is a higher possibility than you would normally say.
And so when you look at the book that you have, the portfolio that you have, just to be comfortable that, you know, you're not taking too much cumulative exposure to something jointly like that happening, which is not something we've seen as much of over the prior years.
So a lot to focus on.
There's always a lot to focus on.
I always enjoy these conversations.
Thank you so much, Jan and Dom, and I would say good luck to investors out there.
Thank you again, Jan and Dom for joining us.
Thanks for having me.
Thank you. This episode was recorded on Thursday, July 17th.
I'm Alison Nathan. Thanks for listening.
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