This is Hidden Brain.
I'm Shankar Vedanta.
More than five decades ago, an iconic scene in an iconic movie damaged the way millions of people thought about the art of negotiation.
In The Godfather, Marlon Brando, playing the role of mafia boss Vito Corleone, is approached by his godson, Johnny Fontaine.
The younger man wants a part in a movie, but a big -shot Hollywood executive refuses to give it to him.
The mafia leader assures his godson that he will get the role.
How? Vito Corleone says of the Hollywood exec, I'm gonna make him an offer he can't refuse.
By the standards of 1972, what follows is violent and gory.
Suffice it to say, the Mafia don't scare the Hollywood executive into giving his godson the role.
For decades now, that memorable line, I'll make him an offer he can't refuse, has helped inform how millions of people think they can get their way in negotiations.
If you want a raise, or a business deal, or an agreement to end a war, you do it by arm -twisting.
If you can make me hurt badly enough, I'll give you what you want.
Today on the show, we explore the science of negotiation.
What researchers have found about the art of crafting a good deal is more nuanced and more uplifting than the lessons of Mafia movies.
How to become a better negotiator.
This week, on Hidden Brain.
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When we head into a negotiation, to buy a new car, to get a refund, to figure out how to divide household chores, our focus is usually on getting the other party to agree to our preferred outcome.
We focus on all the ways the other side can be obstinate or intransigent.
What we don't focus on are our own biases and blind spots.
At Harvard Business School, behavioral scientist Max Bazerman studies the theory and practice of negotiation.
He says understanding those biases and blind spots can help us craft better deals.
Max Bazerman, welcome to Hidden Brain.
Thank you. I'm delighted to be with you, Shankar.
Max, I want to start with the story of a man named Robert Campo.
In 1987, he was featured in Fortune's 50 Most Interesting Business People.
He was a real estate developer from Canada.
But I understand he had a burning ambition to be more than a real estate developer from Canada?
Yeah, he seemed to be on the search for his new adventure.
And he explored a variety of eventually landing in the retail space.
I understand that some of this was not just about his business interests, he also wanted to be a somebody.
He wanted to be invited to the right parties and so part of his explorations of acquisitions was connected to him wanting to be a mover and shaker.
A lot of stories that we see in the acquisition world have people who have some ego interest in being on the front page of the newspaper, of making the acquisition occur, and this can often lead people to depart from what we might think of rational action or what's best from a financial perspective.
So, Robert Campo was a very colorful character.
I want to play you a clip featuring the financial reporter, Jon Rothschild, who wrote a book about him.
The reporter is talking with public radio host, Terry Gross about what happened when bankers trying to execute a deal for Robert Campo once tried to contact him.
They tried to get back to Bob Campo but he was off having a facelift. He always had other priorities besides his business.
The sideshow in this story is his self -improvement, his flying around getting injections for longevity and face lifts and having people following him squeezing fresh orange juice every 15 minutes because he didn't trust it if it was older than 15 minutes, and so he sort of had a designated orange juice squeezer for a time.
So, presumably between shots of freshly squeezed orange juice, Robert Campo decides he wants to acquire a company called Federated.
It's the parent company of the celebrated department store Bloomingdale's, as well as other merchandise stores and supermarkets.
There's only one problem.
He's bidding against Macy's, which also wants to buy Federated.
He basically ends up making a bid but ends up in kind of a bidding war.
And in lots of different acquisition stories, we often read about the fact that Company A buys Company C at a very high price.
And what we often don't think about is the role the Company B played in it, and that is that A and B ended up in a bidding war on who's going to get C. So we could think of the Campo story that you're telling where Campo ends up bidding against Macy's for federated, and I can't see directly into the brain of Mr. Campo, but it sure looks like he wanted to win at any cost rather than make a financially successful acquisition.
So I want to just zero in for a second on what happened in March 1988.
It looked like Macy's was going to win the bidding war with an outlandish number.
The market value of Federated was about $3 billion but the bidding war had taken the price past $7 billion.
I understand Robert Campo approached Macy's with a deal.
Yeah, so Campo approaches Macy's and basically says, I'll let you win as long as you in turn agree to sell Bloomingdales to me.
So it's basically a side deal between the two bidders, something that today's Federal Trade Commission might not look fondly at all, because there are potentials for antitrust collusion going on in this story.
But Macy's basically turns down Campo.
Macy's had already sort of doubled the value of federated in the bidding war, yet Campo, being annoyed by Macy's rejection, turns around and bids another $500 million dollars above Macy's.
It's it's basically a completely irrational action where Campo is bidding to win at any cost rather than making any kind of wise financial assessment of whether this upping the bid makes any sense at all.
But he won. It sounds like he won the deal.
I once wrote a paper.
I won the auction, but I don't want the prize.
It's an easy strategy for winning any auction.
Keep on bidding until no one else wants to bid anymore.
He got federated, but he paid too much and two years later his own firm goes bankrupt and he's ousted from his position as a leader of the firm.
So it very much is a story of I won the auction, but I don't want the prize because the overall story that he inherits as a result of winning is not a very positive story and it's now looked back on as sort of an example of irrational negotiation.
So, more recently, Max, something along the same lines happened between Spirit Airlines, Frontier Airlines, and JetBlue Airlines.
Can you tell me that story?
Sure. Frontier made an offer to acquire Spirit Airlines.
These are two poorly rated airlines, financially they weren't doing great.
JetBlue, an airline that often had very good ratings for customer service and is doing fine financially, decides that it wants to enter the low -cost market in a more serious way to potentially challenge Southwest Airlines, a leader in the U .S. low -cost space.
And they make an offer for Spirit that's more attractive than the Frontier offer.
We get multiple rounds of bidding over an extended period of time in this story, and eventually JetBlue seems like it won the option.
But in the process, the stock value of JetBlue plummeted by more than 50 percent.
Wow. JetBlue kind of repositioned itself to be more of a low -cost airline, lowering quality of service, customer ratings fell, and then eventually the government doesn't allow the merger to go through based on antitrust issues.
So, the deal falls apart, and Spirit, in all this confusion and turmoil, did not do well either.
and in November of 2024, filed for bankruptcy.
When companies and individuals go into a negotiation, it's easy to get swept up in their desire to win at all costs.
In Robert Campos' case, he saw himself as going up against the titans of industry.
But in the end, his biggest enemy wasn't Macy's or the people sitting across from him at the negotiating table.
Robert Campo's biggest enemy was Robert Campo himself.
When we come back, how we self -sabotage our negotiations and how we can do better.
You're listening to Hidden Brain.
I'm Shankar Vedanta.
This is Hidden Brain.
I'm Shankar Vedanta.
When most of us think of a negotiation, we focus on the people we are negotiating with.
We ask ourselves what's going on in their minds and how we can take advantage of their flaws and foibles.
Most of us don't ask ourselves about the flaws and foibles in our own minds.
We don't ask how we might be making systematic mistakes as we negotiate.
It turns out this is a huge blind spot.
At Harvard Business School, negotiation expert Max Baysermann has studied the many ways negotiators foiled themselves.
Max, you've written about the career of a very promising baseball player named Matthew Harrington.
In the year 2000, he was profiled in USA Today and Baseball America.
How did those articles describe him?
As a pleasant, earnest, future pitching superstar, bound for the major leagues.
So, he entered the draft in the year 2000, and he signed up with a major agent named Tommy Tanser.
What were the discussions before the draft happened in terms of how he was going to perform and what kind of income he could expect to receive once the draft was done, Max?
Yeah. So basically the agent convinces young Mr. Harrington and his parents that he's worth a very large amount of money.
They agree to put a price tag at a very high number that they're assuming that the baseball team will eventually cave in.
And unfortunately, they don't.
And Tanser basically encourages Harrington to be patient and wait for them to cave. And under the rules of the Major League Baseball system, a potential employee can only negotiate with one team in any specific year.
And basically, Tanser and Harrington push the team to the limit, and the team eventually says no, and when that occurs, that basically means this superstar who's been offered many millions of dollars in a variety of different forms, ends up being unemployed for the following year.
So the agent tells Matthew Harrington that any team that signs him would have to offer a $4 .95 million first year signing bonus.
Now this was an extreme offer at the time.
The Colorado Rockies who chose Harrington as the seventh pick in the draft actually made a number of fairly compelling offers including $5 .3 million over eight years or $3 .7 million without a long -term commitment.
But the agent and the family and the young man declined.
Yeah, so just to put this in perspective.
This is in 2000, so these dollars are very different than dollars today.
But still we're talking about a lot of money being on the table, and we're talking about somebody who doesn't have a college education, doesn't have a terrific alternative career outside of baseball, who's being offered around $5 million in a variety of different forms, depending on the number of years that Matt Harrington would sign for.
And Tommy Tanzler, the agent, pushes the Herringtons to be patient and wait for more.
Unfortunately, the Colorado Rockies, the baseball team, wants Harrington, but not at the price level that Tanzler and Harrington are demanding, and basically no deal is created.
So after holding out this first year, he gets a second shot at the big leagues the following year.
Matthew Harrington switched agents and entered the Major League Baseball draft again.
This time, the team from San Diego chooses him as the 58th overall selection.
But the final offer they make is $1 .25 million over four years with a $300 ,000 signing bonus.
Now, that's significantly less than what the Colorado team offered him a year earlier.
And it's also less than what Tommy Tanzer had promised that he would get when he became this baseball star.
So what happens in year two?
So we have a very similar kind of phenomena here in terms of Harrington being disappointed that his market value has fallen so dramatically.
So we can easily imagine that there is an anchor set by the prior year, and Harrington's hoping for something in the range of what, at least what he passed on the year before.
But during the year, he has not shown his potential, and his value has fallen, and basically with over a million dollars on the table, And, again, this is in a year 2000 dollars, or 2001, he basically passes on the opportunity holding off for more, and he continues to not be able to pursue playing baseball at the level of the major leagues.
And, as a result, his value goes down and down and down over time.
And Harrington never gets the opportunity to be a major league baseball player.
Perhaps because Tanzer and Harrington and then following your Harrington's new agent are basically overconfident that they can obtain an amount that wasn't viable in the first place.
And certainly the fact that this happens year after year in the Harrington story is suggestive of the fact that the Harrington team, with rotating agents, continues to expect more than what the market will provide.
So I understand that in year three he comes back to the draft again.
This time he's chosen as the 374th pick by the Tampa Bay team, and now he's offered less than $100 ,000.
Now, Of course, he'd been previously offered three plus million dollars, and then one plus million dollars, and now $100 ,000, and each time he says, how can I be offered so much less than my value?
He becomes the longest holdout in the history of Major League Baseball?
Yeah. So, the original offer was more in the $5 million range and then a little over one million and then a hundred thousand, and we can see what's happening.
The market is basically seeing him as a less valuable prospect as the time goes by.
But first he escalates his commitment in year one, and then he anchors on prior numbers.
And he's anchoring on numbers that the market does not see as appropriate or even worth paying in order to get him to sign.
And as a result, ends up working in a low level retail context, as opposed to ending up as a majorly picture, which seemed to be where his future had been headed.
So, yeah, by the year 2009, he's working in the tire department at the local Costco earning $11 .50 an hour.
And of course, now, that decision looks really foolish, but it's not just the initial contracts that he passed up on, presumably if he had played for these teams and had become a star, you know, there would have been future contracts that could have also been lucrative.
There could have been a future career in coaching and scouting and broadcasting.
There's so many ways in which, you know, his overconfidence at the front end may have cost him a great deal through the rest of his life.
Absolutely, and he seems to be a very nice human who copes with these losses well.
So you can certainly imagine that he had potential for a second career after being a major league pitcher in other aspects of sports.
The same kind of negotiating mistakes show up in our personal lives.
Each partner in a marriage can overestimate the value they bring to the relationship.
If we ask two partners in a romantic relationship, what percent of the household work do you do?
Depending on the study, it seems to come in at 120 to 130 percent.
More recently, Nick Epley and Eugene Caruso and I asked MBA students who worked in study groups, what percent of the good ideas or what percent of the work came from you?
And the sum total comes up to more like 140 percent.
Wow. When we ask coauthors of academic papers, what percent of the work did you do?
We come in at 140 % when the sum total of the actual work has to be 100%.
And what's going on is we all see the work we did do.
We don't necessarily see the work that other people have done.
So if we go back to my education, I was an accounting major a long time ago, which this leads to the notion that I should be able to do my own taxes, and when I spend time doing my taxes, my spouse doesn't give me full credit for that work.
And meanwhile, you know, when it comes to walking the dog, you know, I'd say I average about a mile of walking a dog.
Marla's more in the range of two or three miles a day, but I think that's because she likes walking the dog.
I don't think she should actually get credit for the extra mile, because it wasn't for the dog, it was for Marla.
So you can begin to see the wide range of ways in which we can see our own work, our own contribution, but not see the work of others.
Yeah. So, with Eugene Caruso and Nick Epley, you've also researched a technique to take the focus off ourselves and onto the other person.
Tell me about this work, Max.
So let's go back to the context where there's four people working on a project, and we'll call them A, B, C, and D.
If we ask each of them, what percent of the work did you do, we get perhaps 140%.
Yes. But if instead we ask A to write down what percent of the work was done by A, B, C, and D, Now all of a sudden, I as A will think about B, C, and D in a more significant way.
I'll realize that they, in fact, did do some important work.
And that 140 percent falls.
So, the 140 percent as the sum total of what each claimed as credit for themselves seems to come down by about half of the overclaiming.
They're still over claiming, but it's down to perhaps 120%.
In other words, you're focusing now on the contributions of the other people rather than on your own contributions.
Right, so I engage in less over claiming, but there's a problem still.
And the problem is the fact that I'm thinking more about the topic, I become even more reluctant to deal with these other folks in the future because they didn't do enough work.
I'm thinking more about them and my negative inferences about them go up as a result.
So we reduce the overclaiming, but we don't create a more constructive group in this process.
So one of the problems with overclaiming generally is, if the other side doesn't do their fair share of the work, I don't want to work with them in the future.
So one way to apportion credit properly is to follow the advice of the philosopher John Rawls.
Can you explain what you mean by this, Max?
Sure. So John Rawls basically argues if you want to think about what a just society should look like, you need to put on a veil of ignorance.
You need to forget about whether you're male or female.
You need to forget about whether you're American or from Lithuania.
You need to sort of drop all of your own identity to try to imagine how the world should operate if you didn't know what role you had in society.
And across a number of studies, we find that getting people to try to put on a veil of ignorance allows them to think about what would be just in a much fairer and more objective way.
So anytime you're in a dispute, if you could get yourself out of the fact that you're the landlord or you're the tenant and think about what a fair resolution would be from the perspective of a third party, you're more likely to have a bearing on what would be a fair settlement to whatever dispute you happen to be involved in.
And this idea of using the veil of ignorance comes up across lots and lots of different studies.
So more recently with Josh Green and others, we even looked at the allocation of scarce resources.
Like you could imagine who gets the limited health resources under COVID.
And so imagine, for example, there is only one ventilator left and whoever gets it lives and whoever doesn't get it dies.
And the 65 -year -old arrives two minutes before the 25 -year -old.
And if we ask the question, who should get it, we find that people tend to be self -serving in the direction of which of the two people are more like themselves.
So old people are biased towards the 65 -year -old, young people toward the 25 -year -old.
But if we encourage people to think about What would be fair if they don't consider their own demographics?
And now, all of a sudden, people realize that the 25 -year -old has many, many more years to live than the 65 -year -old on average.
And now there's a shift among the older people we asked this question to, to give this limited resource to where it can do the most good.
Consistent with what we think Rawls would mean by putting on a veil of ignorance.
I'm wondering in the modern world in which we live, Max, there are so many ways in which we now collaborate not just with people face -to -face who are working down the corridor from us, but people who are working remotely, people who are working in other parts of the world.
I would imagine that the challenge of apportioning credit fairly, of understanding what other people might be contributing, of understanding in a negotiation what somebody else is giving, becomes so much harder now than it was before.
Absolutely, and you're highlighting one of the important ways in which the game has changed.
We deal with more people who differ from us today than we ever did before.
And so we're dealing with people in different locations, from different ethnic groups, on a much, much more regular basis, and we're often doing it without seeing them face to face.
So the farther people get, both in terms of our connectivity to them and our identification with them, the easier it is to not place full value on what they're bringing to the deal.
And how do you fix that?
Because of course, I don't know if we're going to go back to a world where all of the negotiations are always going to be face to face.
I mean, we are in a world now where, for better or worse, we are stuck with, you know, virtual communications and handoffs that can span many, many time zones.
Yeah, so to begin with, you kind of already brought up an answer.
To what extent can we put on a veil of ignorance so that we're not as biased by our own lens?
We have found that people are pretty good at taking a neutral perspective if we ask them to and to put on a veil of ignorance and think about that problem.
So, it's not that we're incapable of thinking about the other side, we simply don't.
And the more they're distant from us, the easier it is to ignore their critical role in a negotiation.
So, simply stopping and adopting in the perspective of the other side not only makes you a nicer person, but it strategically makes you a more effective person to understand who they are in the negotiation.
And the failure to consider the perspective of the other side is one of the key barriers that keeps negotiators from being more effective.
I want to play you a clip from the television show The Office.
In this clip, Michael Scott, played by Steve Carell, has quit his job as the manager of a paper supply company and started a rival firm.
Michael and his business partner are now negotiating with the chief financial officer of his former company about selling their startup.
I mean, in some ways, Max, this is comedy, of course.
But all of us do this in real life.
We simply don't pay attention to what's important to the other side in a negotiation.
There is something kind of over the top obvious about not listening to the other side.
But so often in real life, we think of negotiation simply as a haggling session when we could be so much more effective if we think about it strategically by asking, how can I best understand the perspective in which they're making me an offer?
To what extent do they need me in their firm?
What are they going to do if I don't accept their offer?
This helps me to formulate how far I can push things to my advantage.
It also provides a basis for understanding where there's interesting opportunities for trades.
I mean, so much of this comes down to how we are anchored in our own minds, Max.
So much of what we've been talking about here comes down to the problem of egocentrism.
We're seeing things from our perspective.
we are seeing things from a narrow perspective.
We're not able to get out of our own headspace.
We seek confirming evidence to back up what we previously thought.
We don't go out and seek more information from the people we are negotiating with.
All of these are ways in which we are trapped inside our own heads.
That's right. Sort of a wonderful example of what you just described is the work of Linda Babcock and George Lowenstein.
They basically study people in a legal dispute.
So, everyone agrees that there's been an accident.
And what they find is that the plaintiff's role, the role representing the injured party, think that the case is worth roughly twice what the party representing the defendant thinks it's worth.
And some people say, but it's only a simulation.
It may only be a simulation, but once we put people in those roles, they begin to believe their side has some kind of moral justice to it, that the other side lacks at a remarkable level.
I understand that over the years, you have fielded many requests for negotiation advice and you regularly receive what you have termed the Sunday Night Real Estate Call.
What is this call, Max?
Sure. So, first of all, why Sunday night?
And the answer is the American institution of the open house in the residential real estate market.
So Sunday is the most common day for people to post a time online about when their house will be open, so you can go take a look at the house without having an appointment, a house, condo, whatever.
And as a result, an awful lot of house visitations on the real estate market occur on Sunday.
This means that agents are busy on a late Sunday afternoon, early evening as people sometimes decide to make an offer.
So, in an example of this story, I'm at home on Sunday night, and it's 9 .30, and my phone rings.
I pick up the phone and say hi and on the other end of the line is somebody who introduces themselves as a friend of a friend of mine.
And I like our mutual friend so I want to be polite despite the timing of the phone call.
And after introducing themselves as a friend of a friend of mine, they explain why they're calling.
They looked at a house this afternoon, in fact, they've been looking at houses for the last three months.
They've looked at over 20 houses.
But today, they found an amazing house.
And they proceed to describe it to me in intricate detail.
They seem to be under the illusion that on Sunday night I care what it looks like.
But they proceed to the reason for the call.
So the house is listed for $599 ,000.
Earlier in the day at 4 .30 in the afternoon, in fact, they made an offer for $550 ,000.
So 599 offer, asking, and they offered 550.
And that evening they went to our mutual friends' house for dinner.
And about 10 minutes ago, the agent called back and said that the seller had countered at 585.
Yeah. And they wanna know what they should do next, because they had been talking with their friend who said, I know what to do.
Let's call Max. he teaches negotiation.
And when I get this call, and I promise you I've received some version of this call so many times, the first thing I ask them is, what are they going to do if they don't buy this house?
And they typically respond with some notion of, Max, we didn't call you for how not to buy the house.
We called you for advice on how to buy the house.
So I've been trying to figure out, what are these people actually asking?
And I think what they're asking is, Max, how do we get a great deal?
And by the way, we don't want to run any risk whatsoever of losing the deal.
And that question I know the answer to is you can't.
To get the best deal possible, you probably need to run some small risk that you'll lose the deal.
And if, instead of feeling like I have to have this house at any cost, you had a second house or a second and third house that you liked almost as well but you needed to repaint the kitchen, then all of a sudden, you're empowered to counter in a way that runs some risk but allows you to get a significantly better price.
So, if the world ends, if you don't buy this house, you should pay the $5 .85.
If there's another house where buying the other house would make you indifferent between that and paying $5 .70, well, now you can counter at $5 .60 knowing, no tragedy's going to happen.
You can always go to the other house instead.
So, in other words, you say that the most important rule in real estate is to fall in love with three, not with one.
That's right. For most negotiations, falling in love with three rather than with one is a pretty good piece of advice.
When we come back, when to stick to our guns and when to fold.
You're listening to Hidden Brain.
I'm Shankar Vedanta.
Him. This is Hidden Brain.
I'm Shankar Vedanta.
We've all seen the movies of cool negotiators who bluff their way into amazing deals.
By exuding overconfidence and charisma, they get their opponents to fold.
Real life, of course, is not the movies.
The people sitting across from you at work or at the kitchen table are unlikely to be overwhelmed by your charisma and overconfidence.
In fact, they've watched the same movies you've watched.
They may also falsely believe that you'll fold if they just push you hard enough.
Max Bazerman is a social scientist at Harvard Business School.
He's the author of several books about negotiation, including Negotiating Rationally, Negotiation Genius, How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond, and, most recently, Negotiation, The Game Has Changed.
Max sometimes advises people who are confronting a negotiation to ask themselves an unusual question.
How would I feel if the other side instantly accepted my offer?
So I'll tell you a story based on my travels.
So I've taught in Thailand a fair amount, and Thailand ends up being kind of a center for sapphires and rubies.
So I'll ask you to imagine that you take a trip to Thailand, and you're walking down Silam Road, a major market street in town.
And for some reason, you know a little bit about sapphires and rubies.
And you're walking down the street, and in the window you see a beautiful ruby ring, and your first guesstimate is that it's worth about $5000.
But you don't want to pay anywhere near that because your knowledge is rusty.
So you go in, you have a conversation with a store owner, And finally you ask to see that ring, and she pulls it out, and you ask how much would this ring cost?
And she says, that ring just showed up yesterday, I haven't even put a price on it, but in Thai culture, the first sale of the day brings you luck.
So Shankar, make me a reasonable offer and I'll do my best to accept it.
And you wanting to protect yourself and get a good deal, you pull out a thousand dollars out of your wallet.
You say to her, I can give you a thousand dollars, but not a penny more.
And she says, okay, I'll take it.
How do you feel? Well, most people feel unhappy because her quick acceptance tells them something like perhaps that isn't a ruby, but rather or a red piece of glass.
Now, perhaps before you offer a thousand dollars, it makes sense to think about how would you feel if she accepted it?
And this might tell you that I need to have the ring assessed by an independent party before I part with my thousand dollars.
Now, what's intriguing about this is had she haggled with you and allowed you to pay 1 ,700, you might've been happier.
But that wouldn't improve the quality of the glass anymore than with a story where you pay $1 ,000.
Now this may sound remote, being about a ring in Thailand, but many of us end up being busy when we take a job in a new city.
And we have limited time to look at the real estate market.
So we fly in and we make what we think is a slightly low offer, and the seller says okay.
Well, who knew more about the market?
The buyer or the seller?
Yeah, the seller did.
Exactly. And again, this is an example, a different kind of example of what we earlier called the winner's curse.
They're more likely to take your offer when you least want them to.
What I love about the question, will I be happy if my offer is accepted quickly, is that by asking ourselves the question, it's a way of actually pointing out to ourselves we might not know the terrain on which we're standing.
Therefore if this offer was accepted quickly, it would actually tell me that in fact I do not know the terrain on which I'm standing, I should actually educate myself.
The question is really a disguised way of telling me go out and do more research, go out and learn some more?
Absolutely, and when we think about things more deliberatively in advance of negotiation, we prepare more thoroughly and we're more effective in negotiation.
Max says that he is often surprised by how little research people do before going into a negotiation.
One of the aspects of the modern world is that there's so much information online.
And this means that we can so often do our homework to have a better idea of what the zone of possible agreement might look like before the negotiation ever begins.
So one of my favorite examples is the negotiation context that so many people find terrifying, which is going and buying a new car.
And what I find fascinating about the fact that people are terrified by this task is that it's so easy to get good information about the dealer cost of a car online.
There's probably better than a dozen websites that will allow you to punch in the details of what you want to buy and find out the dealer cost. And once you do that it allows you to have a very good idea of what the zone of possible agreement should look like.
And going back to your question, if you're going to put the number on the table you want to put a number that's favorable to you but yet reasonable enough that you're not so far worse than the other sides, that they end up walking without wanting to talk to you anymore.
I want to go back to Bangkok, Thailand, for a second.
As you mentioned, Max, you used to teach the art of negotiation to students there, but I understand that your students would challenge you on your own negotiation skills when it came to hiring taxi cabs?
So every morning class started the same way.
As teaching a group of Thai students and as teaching negotiation, of course, they want to know does this professor actually know anything in the real world?
And their favorite way of accessing this is to say, Professor, where did you go last night?
And after I would tell them, they would say, and how much did you pay the taxi driver to bring you home.
Now, I need to put this into perspective.
So this is before the taxi system changed in Bangkok to using meters, and before taxis used meters, you basically haggled with the taxi driver.
You'd tell them where you want to go, and they would make me an offer, which would be too high, and you'd haggle.
And typically in about 40 seconds, you'd converge on a price.
You know, the first few days, they laughed at me, and they would basically tell me that I paid 40 cents too much or 80 cents too much, and that gave them a great shot goal and they were happy.
But I would say within two weeks, I had some increased credibility based on my sort of mastering the art of negotiating with a taxi driver.
But then the problem showed up and that was my spouse.
She flies into town, we go for a long walk the first evening to go to a restaurant across town, come out of the restaurant.
And my wife Marla is, she's a bit tired from having flown from the US to Bangkok that day.
And I held down a taxi.
And in my best tie, I say to the taxi driver, Pabnaman Shau Siak Sharanpan, which I think means something like, can you take me to the shell station by the corner of Sharanpan.
And in response to this, he holds up seven fingers for 70 baht, which is basically worth $2 .80 at the time of the story.
A dramatically high price for the ride I was asking him about.
So I respond by holding up three fingers or $1 .20, to which he responds with five fingers, or $2 .00, eventually he comes down to four fingers, or $1 .60, I'm holding at $1 .20, which I've already taken this ride for $1 .20, so I know I can get it for $1 .20, and he responds by driving away.
So I held down another taxi driver, who starts at a much more reasonable five fingers, or $2 .00.
I respond 120, he comes down to four fingers or 160 and I respond with three fingers and he drives away.
At which point, Marla, my tired spouse says, what's going on?
And I explained to her that they were both asking for $1 .60 when the fare price is a $1 .20, and she says, so you're telling me I'm standing here because you're too cheap to pay an extra 40 cents.
And I said, well, you have to understand I have to explain to my students tomorrow morning how much I paid.
And this did not impress my spouse at all.
And so in this story, you have this notion of sort of, sort of is it worth the cost of disputing.
So I was literally keeping my tired spouse awake on the streets of Bangkok, Thailand, over 40 cents.
And you can simply, you can easily argue that I could have paid the additional 40 cents.
So you can see how getting a good deal can take over things.
But it is such a powerful story because I think it shows how negotiations, I think, have a way of sucking us in.
And then we're almost enmeshed in the narrative of the negotiation that we lose track of the bigger picture.
Absolutely, and to this day, I'm still guilty of when I'm looking for a hotel online or an airfare online, I over search to the point where I'm working for a wage that I wouldn't remotely accept if someone offered me work at that wage.
So this notion of getting a good deal can become obsessive in ways that don't make a whole lot of sense.
In our companion story to this episode, available exclusively to subscribers to Hidden Brain Plus, we explore what Max calls integrative bargaining… negotiating in a way that tries to leave both parties better off.
Max says a crucial idea in getting to win -win outcomes is to negotiate multiple issues at the same time instead of going after them one at a time, as many of us are prone to do.
As soon as we have two or more issues in a negotiation, the parties are likely to have different valuations on those issues.
And if we can find out who cares more about which issue, we can make wise trades that create value, and make both of us better off.
We also examine the single biggest psychological obstacle to coming up with win -win outcomes.
It has to do with a certain mindset that is extremely common. Mack says fixing this one error can save companies and litigants lots of money and save relationships much grief and heartache.
If you're a subscriber, that episode is available right now in this podcast feed.
It's titled Relationships 2 .0 Win -Win.
If you are not yet a subscriber, please visit support .hiddenbrain .org, or apple .co slash hiddenbrain if you are using an Apple device.
You can get a free 7 -day trial in both places.
Again, that is support .hiddenbrain .org or apple .co slash hiddenbrain.
Max Bazerman is a social scientist at Harvard Business School.
He's the author of Negotiation.
The Game Has Changed.
Max, thank you so much for joining me today on Hidden Brain.
Thank you so much. If you have follow -up questions about negotiating and you're comfortable sharing those questions with a Hidden Brain audience, please record a voice memo on your phone.
Email it to us at ideas at hiddenbrain .org.
That email address, again, is ideas at hiddenbrain .org.
Use the subject line negotiation.
Hidden Brain is produced by Hidden Brain Media.
Our audio production team includes Annie Murphy -Paul, Kristen Wong, Laura Quarrell, Ryan Katz, Autumn Barnes, Andrew Chadwick, and Nick Woodbury.
Tara Boyle is our executive producer.
I'm Hidden Brains executive editor.
We end today with a story from our sister podcast, My Unsung Hero.
This My Unsung Hero segment is brought to you by Discover.
Our story comes from Paul Cotter.
More than 40 years ago, when Paul's father was in his early fifties, he began to show signs of early onset Alzheimer's disease.
But no one suspected cognitive decline, and his father lost job after job.
He was no longer able to make decisions, and he couldn't handle the slightest amount of pressure.
Since there was no medical explanation given for what he was going through, everyone assumed he was having a crisis of confidence.
And he was told that he needed to pull himself together.
My father, as you can imagine, felt totally humiliated.
After he was diagnosed with Alzheimer's, he was horrified by the news, but I imagine he also felt some sense of relief.
Finally, there was an explanation for his decline.
And in spite of it all, he still wanted to keep working.
And this is where my unsung hero stepped in.
It wasn't a single person but a whole company.
A small firm located in our hometown in Buffalo offered my father a job knowing full well that he was suffering from Alzheimer's disease.
They hired my father to handle small tasks like making copies.
They gave him a paycheck which made him feel needed and valued.
But more than just a job, they gave him respect, dignity, and a sense of purpose at a time when his life was falling apart.
Unfortunately, my father's disease ultimately progressed to the point where he was having problems keeping his balance.
One day at work, he fell off a small step ladder.
He wasn't hurt, but it was clear to everyone that it was no longer safe for him to continue working.
him. The company told my father and my mother in a very compassionate way that it was with deep regret that they'd have to let him go.
On my father's final day on the job, they threw him a party to thank him for his service.
What a beautiful, remarkable gesture that was.
I wish my brothers, my sister, and I could remember the name of this company.
Forty years later, we don't know if they're still in business or what happened to them.
If I could see them today, I would tell them, thank you, from the bottom of my heart.
Your kindness during my father's final chapter will never be forgotten.
of Charlotte, North Carolina.
This segment of My Unsung Hero was brought to you by Discover.
Discover believes everyone deserves to feel special and celebrates those who exhibit the spirit in their communities.
I'm a long -standing card member myself.
Learn more at discover .com credit card. I'm Shankar Vedanthan, see you soon.
