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In the eyes of a German fighter pilot in the skies over the English Channel in 1940, the Battle of Britain was as much a struggle of human endurance as it was of strategy and skill.
In this episode of the History Extra podcast, aviation historian Dr Victoria Taylor joins Emily Briffitt to explore the psychology of the Luftwaffe, revealing the experiences of pilots, grand crews and support personnel as they face the perils of aerial combat and the brutal pressure of Nazi ideology and the relentless intensity demanded of them by those in command.
We're going to be talking all about your new book Eagle Days Life and Death for the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain.
When it comes to the Luftwaffe during the Second World War.
What are some of the most pervasive perceptions?
I think the most prevalent kind is the fact that many people see the Luftwaffe as being that cartoonish antagonist to the RAF, to Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain.
And I think it's because understandably, we have a rather Anglo-centric interpretation of the Battle of Britain and it's so soaked into our psyche.
And as a result, I think it's difficult sometimes to change those perspectives.
And we look at the.
But I think it's mainly that those that have looked at the Luftwaffe, it's often really common to kind of focus on its operational minutia.
So, even down to the different markings on an aircraft or specific elite units and commanders, without looking at the broader picture and ultimately, what the Battle of Britain meant to both the Luftwaffe and Nazi Germany,
But there's also the kind of feeling of nights of the sky and these chivalric duels that are happening.
All of these, you know, vapor trails up above in the blue summer skies.
It's one of those things that I think so often people forget this isn't an honorable joust.
There are certainly moments of chivalry that pepper it.
But at the same time, it's one of those things where this is a horrific fight to the death.
This is a life or death struggle for both sides.
And as a result, you know, you can't pull punches in war.
And in this episode we are going to be totally stripping away these perceptions of the Luftwaffe as the cartoonish antagonist, the chivalric knights against the sort of formidable few of the Royal Air Force during the Battle of Britain in 1940.
We're going to be getting to the real history behind it all.
So first, we really need to set up the context.
By the time we get to the Battle of Britain, how is Germany faring in the war?
I feel that the Germans aren't quite thriving, as much as the general narratives will have you believe.
Yes, of course, they've managed to obtain this, what they call this wonder of 1940.
The fact that they've managed to take so many different territories on the continent.
They've taken Norway and Denmark in Operation Visit U-Bong in the spring of 1940.
There's, of course, France and the Low Countries that have been taken as we get to the mid to late summer of the 1940s.
You kind of have this sense of invincibility in the Luftwaffe.
And all individuals of the time, I think, felt that not just the Luftwaffe and not just the Allies, but even the neutral press were talking about this.
There was a Swiss magazine saying that was speaking in the summer of 1940 about all the different invasions Britain had been subject to in previous years.
And for them to be even speaking about that and the kind of tension in the world.
Are the Germans going to try and launch Operation Sea Lion, the amphibious invasion of Britain?
It's such a strong, pervasive feeling that I think people don't always look at just how tired the Luftwaffe was going from one campaign to the other.
And I mean they'd had a bit of a lull from the Polish campaign in the autumn of 1939 through to the phony war and then to the spring of 1940.
But they are feeling it by the end of the Battle of France.
They've taken quite considerable losses in their bombers, in their BF110.
So their zerstörers, their destroyers,
They've had all of those issues and even just trying to get their men there has been stressful.
They've had from the beginning of the war up until about the summer of 1940.
About 30 of their losses have come from training.
So it's one of those moments where you sort of think well yes, they are triumphant in certain ways.
But in other ways they're starting to feel the strain of losing some of their comrades, even though they've had this monumental military victory.
And things weren't going to get much better.
In the eyes of Germany, what was the goal of the Battle of Britain then?
Excellent question.
So it was very split.
I think a lot of people think that it was just that the Luftwaffe was kind of looking towards seeing if they could make the British completely subdued for sea line.
But the thing is, is that the Germans didn't want to have to do that if they could avoid it.
The fact that the fight over Norway, for instance, had been harder than they'd expected.
The German Navy, the Kriegsmarine, had struggled a lot in that and really had terrible losses, despite the fact they'd taken Norway.
And they'd got used to some degree of flying over water as a result of the campaign over Norway.
But the English Channel was so different.
You know, it is this real formidable fortress of water that they have to fly over.
And they know that their aircraft are going to be incredibly limited trying to bridge that gap.
It's so.
The Messerschmitt Bf 109, which is sort of their backbone of their fighter force, already loses about two thirds of its fuel capacity getting there and back.
So this is really stressful for the Germans.
They're hoping that they can force a political decision.
But at the same time they know that the more pressure they're putting on the British, the less they're getting that response that they're hoping for, that the war might be over.
So this is why they start moving more towards sea line and trying to make sure that they are sort of building the blueprints for an invasion, if necessary.
So we've got hints of stress and pressure here.
When the Battle of Britain first erupted, what was the attitudes of the individuals actually participating?
On a personal basis,
Some were shocked that it had happened.
They had this real innate sense of confidence and a feeling of finality after the fall of France.
And, you know, they'd seen the British evacuating at Dunkirk.
They'd seen all of the British Expeditionary Forces equipment strewn over the beaches at Dunkirk.
And General de Flieger, Paul Deichmann, for instance, said you know, we were really surprised to have to prepare for this war for England because we thought it was over.
So they were shocked to some degree.
There was also a letter from from a Luftwaffe serviceman, sort of around the time of the fall of France.
That said about how back home in Germany there were some factories which had already started to convert over to peacetime articles.
So in certain circles of Nazi Germany, they felt that, well, that's it.
We don't need to invade Britain.
But there were others who were convinced that that would be the next step, because they can't just float around and if the british don't sue for peace, then they know they've got that sort of thorn in their side.
So there's a general hope that it won't have to go any further.
But there's also, as they start to see, in the british speeches, you know, with winston churchill as the newly installed prime minister, and him basically saying you know, i expect that the battle of britain is about to begin.
It soon starts to spark some panic for the germans.
And what was German national propaganda saying about this?
Yes well, obviously they have an absolute coup after the fall of France and they describe themselves as sort of the undisputed champions of Europe.
They've obviously tried to denigrate the British efforts many times and to be disparaging about their capabilities.
They've attacked even the Spitfire and said, oh well, this is the very best that the British can offer.
And yet our men have managed to shoot some of them down, you know.
So it's interesting because you start to get this break in Nazi propaganda and, in reality, for the aircrews.
And Adolf Gallant, who was a very famous Luftwaffe ace, said that the Nazi propaganda actually annoyed him because it tried to condition both the Luftwaffe and Nazi Germany as having you know.
Oh, you're against an opponent that's ill-prepared.
You know, it's all going to be smoothed out very quickly.
But of course the Germans were soon finding out, in as early as the Channel Battle, the first phase of the Battle of Britain from early July 1940, that this was not going to be a walk in the park.
And Gallant went so far to say that we were not hopeful of victory.
Britain wasn't going to be quite so easily defeated then.
No, there was hesitation amongst the British population at an invasion.
The Germans had been watching all of the different invasion or anti-invasion preparations by the British.
They knew that we changed the signposts around in Britain.
They knew that if the church bells rung, That was going to be the sign for invasion, if any Luftwaffe paratroopers had dropped.
And so they knew the nervousness of the British.
But at the same time they had their own sort of terror really, at the fact that they were needing to do a strategy which put the Luftwaffe front and centre.
This was such an unprecedented campaign in being dominated by the air.
And even though both the German army and the navy were looking into joint exercises and preparing for sea lion and all of these elements, the Luftwaffe felt very much isolated by itself and wasn't always quite so comfortable in its chances.
You've hinted at a few of the stresses upon the Luftwaffe at this time.
The fear of crossing the Channel, the fact that the British were more prepared than what their propaganda may have suggested.
Were there any other threats to them?
There were.
So when looking at the fear of the channel, a lot of it is, of course, physical.
Those that were in single-seater fighters.
Of course, if your one engine packs up, that's it over the English Channel.
You are going nowhere.
And also they have the psychological threat of the fact that if they're forced to bail out over Britain which is of course becomes more common with the Eagle attack from mid-August 1940 when they start attacking RF airfields, radar installations etc.
Then they know they're out the war.
That's it.
Their Battle of Britain, their Second World War is done for.
The British use that to their advantage because they know that they would be bailing out over friendly territory And some of the British pilots even spotted this when some of the German formations would break up easier.
And they didn't necessarily think it was a case of a lack of bravery, but rather that the Germans in some ways had more to lose in those battles.
So it's interesting that they had that kind of threat.
The dangers that come as well from flying over the water is the fact that they kind of lose their bearings.
They need to get to grips with what's known as blind flying, which is learning to fly on instruments.
So it's trying to focus on that rather than what's around you.
And Gontoral, who is a very famous Luftwaffe pilot.
He said about how if you haven't got a few hours of blind flying to your arsenal, then you know you're in deep, deep trouble.
You know real danger because you haven't got the same landmarks to work as your bearings.
And it's so disorientating.
And of course, there is the psychological fear of I might drown in this.
I may go down with my aircraft.
So there's those dangers.
There's also, of course, the fact that they're going over British anti-aircraft crews manned by the British Army and the Territorial Army.
And you know they've got the dangers as well of even if they manage to make it roughly to the other side of the coast, it's not a guarantee that that the German Air Sea Rescue Service can pick them up, because sometimes you had these tense engagements between the British and the Germans about trying to rescue different airmen in the channel and being seen as a threat versus being seen as medical assistance.
So even if you manage to make it back to occupied France, that's still also a danger as well, but you might not even get picked up.
For those who did make it back.
Were these just one-off sorties or were these repetitive, going on and on?
Repetitive.
When there's the very intense stages of the Battle of Britain.
You are looking at about 2000 sorties a day from the Luftwaffe.
So when you look at the Channel Battle, for instance, which is the first sort of five-week phase, that's about 1300 sorties across the entire five weeks.
And so when you look at the 15th of August 1940, for instance, which ends up being Black Thursday, for the Luftwaffe to be hitting about 2000 sorties.
I mean, it gives you an idea of the kind of stress logistics, the hope that the weather's going to hold out.
Obviously, as we know, with Britain, our weather is not always reliable which thankfully, has saved us.
But, you know, it's incredibly stressful.
And one thing I think people don't always realise about the Luftwaffe is sometimes they are operating from makeshift airfields.
They have moved in so quickly into France that they don't necessarily have time to fully settle in and they have to create these runways.
But sometimes there are, within the topography, there's natural quirks.
And I remember reading one story and I think it's in Guntural's autobiography actually about a poor French farmer who was forced to mow his field for the Luftwaffe, much to his anger and dismay, because it was before the harvest.
So he was very annoyed.
And so he'd moaned it.
But the problem is, is that he had done that.
But there was a massive natural hump in the middle of where this new airfield would be.
So Guntural spoke about the fact that you know there was this fear of when you've got an aircraft trying to take off and you're trying to have one that lands, they're not necessarily going to see each other because of this natural mound.
So it is quite hairy for the Luftwaffe.
I think going back to to sort of the idea of our image of the Luftwaffe.
We always see it as being efficient and ruthless, and everything goes to plan, and it's only because of Goering that anything goes wrong and goes awry.
But it's not true.
It's got so many other kind of natural strains of war and unforeseen complications that just aren't optimal for the Luftwaffe.
This is something that becomes known as channel sickness.
What impact did this have on morale?
What extents were people going to personally?
Yes, great question.
So this is described by Ulrich Steinhilfer, who was a BF109 pilot.
And this idea of kanalkrankheit or the channel sickness that you mentioned, is actually this kind of horrific physiological and psychological condition that some of the men go through, which is this strain of flying over the channel.
And the symptoms sound horrific.
It's sort of war neurosis slash depression, but also just kind of all morphed together.
And they lose weight, they'd be throwing up.
As he says, you know, the patient would inhale far many more cigarettes.
I mean, it was just the sense of trying to hang on the survival.
Steinhilfer talks about the very first KCCs of this in his colleague, Henrik Waller.
And you know, he runs out with a pistol into the forest with the intention of killing himself.
Because it's so crazy intense trying to fly over the English Channel.
This is towards the end of late August 1940 where the Luftwaffe is actually starting to get an upswing in how it's doing against the British.
And they're getting more to a one to one ratio around that time.
So they managed to balance out the earlier attacks.
I suppose, of the Eagle attack in mid-August 1940.
But it doesn't always translate.
Just because you're doing better militarily doesn't mean that it's not exacting a great cost to do that.
And that's what we see in this channel sickness.
And I think what's also interesting about that is Steinhilfer says it even extended to the aircraft.
You know, sometimes Their BF109s would feel the strain of flying over the channel, almost as if they were sick.
It was a really odd phenomenon.
But, you know, you'd have an aircraft that initially was faithful to you.
But just that journey of flying over the English Channel was just too much for the aircraft as well as the airmen.
What about those left behind on the ground? they had their own stresses in a different way.
So they had, of course, the concern that they've got to put all of the effort into making sure that the aircraft are armed properly, serviced properly, that they're able to turn them around quickly enough, particularly when the men are having to fly three four, five times a day, depending on how frenetic the phase is of the Battle of Britain.
For them.
It's an interesting thing because some of them don't like fact that the fighting is happening and there's one chap that doesn't like about how he's having to load up the bombs and things and he feels like a bit of a murderer, you know, but it's also.
It's frustrating for them in a different way.
So if you look at, for instance, some of the Luftwaffe anti-aircraft units that were defending the Reich in the late summer of 1940 where we start to get the kind of tit-for-tat city attacks and after there's some stray bombs dropped around London, Churchill of course green lights a retaliatory blow against Berlin.
And what's stressful for the ground crews is that at least if you're in the aircraft, you've got a little bit more of an influence on your war.
It feels like you've got a bit more autonomy and it feels like you are actively making a difference against the enemy.
But the thing that's stressful for the flat crews and for air signals units and all of these other different units, they don't feel as if they've got as much influence.
And they're so stressed about the fact that they can't really do much about the fact that some of the British bombers are starting hitting at German cities.
And there's a really interesting letter from I believe it's Nair Signalman, who says to his wife, who's located in Berlin, on the 30th of August 1940 he writes about how you know, please don't touch Germany any duds, I'm so worried about you.
If only we could get these dogs.
But you know, all hell breaks loose where you are, but not over here.
So they kind of have their own frustrations as well on the ground.
And I think we so often forget that the Battle of Britain or, more specifically, the Blitz, considering that the Germans put both the Battle of Britain and the Blitz together in the Luftschlacht um England or the Air Battle for England.
We so often see it as one sided.
But when British aircraft are flying over the Reich and German occupied territory, they have the same concerns and stresses.
And so this is a really stressful time for the Luftwaffe and Nazi Germany at large.
There have been several phases that you've mentioned as we're talking about.
And this is something that we should clarify for our listeners as we're talking about it.
So could you tell us about that early period leading up to Eagle Day and what it must have been like for the Luftwaffe, the personnel involved in that initial period?
Yes.
So the Battle of Britain from German dates starts around the 2nd of July 1940.
And this is when Goering orders that Hermann Goering, the commander in chief of the Luftwaffe, orders for Channel C traffic to be attacked more thoroughly.
So the Channel battle is the early phase of the Battle of Britain and stretches from mostly through July 1940 and into early August.
And this saw Allied shipping and convoys come under more intensive attack by the Luftwaffe.
There's this idea of we'll try and see if we can force a bit of a blockade, if we can put political pressure on the British.
But if we do have to go into an invasion, then this will at least help us to start laying the groundwork for that.
But because the British show no signs of they don't have any sort of response to Hitler's so-called peace speech towards the end of July 1940, they know that they need to start looking into different options and that it is a real possibility that they might have to take the island by force, as they have so many other countries.
So that's why they start to move into the Eagle attack which is launched on Eagle Day, on the 13th of August.
And this is the swap to RAF infrastructure, critical defence, British aircraft industry, all of those different elements trying to paralyse the RAF on the ground, because they need well, air superiority but preferably air supremacy to carry out sea line.
Because if they've got RAF fighters opposing them, if they've got bombers from Bomber Command and if they've got Coastal Command aircraft that are able to strike at the invasion barges, they are not going to get very far.
So it's trying to pave the way for that.
They're still hoping in the back of their minds that it's going to be more of a political decision and that the British will be intimidated enough into suing for peace.
And that's the kind of logic that ends up, well, I say logic, some say it's illogical, but that's what is the reason for Goering swapping to the Blitz later on and hitting British cities instead of airfields.
But that's what they go for.
And they start to go more for radar, although Goering ends up getting very sort of impatient and he says not one's been put out of action and that ends up being a huge black mark against the Luftwaffe's strategy.
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But of course, the British radar, that was really influential.
I'm sure it must have affected the German psyche?
Yes.
Well, that's brilliant Emily, because so many people say to me with radar about how it's all about the British view.
It's all about having that early warning system, being able to galvanise your forces to scramble all the aircraft you need, and in the right direction.
But it was such a huge impact on the Luftwaffe's morale.
It was the sense of Firstly, the unknown, because it took them a while to figure out that radar was a thing in Britain.
Now, people often say that the Germans didn't really value radar.
And that's not true.
They had already been very successful in the radar they had created.
They had created Freya, which was an early warning system.
They created Wurzburg, which was more of a kind of tracking system when an aircraft had come in.
And it was a way to sort of keep it interlinked with the anti-aircraft guns to make sure that you were able to lock onto your target.
But the problem is is that the frequency, the calibration of them was so sensitive that when they were kind of scoping around Britain in the interwar period and trying to find something that would rival their own radar, they were looking at completely the wrong thing.
You know, Chain Home and Chain Home Low, which are the main parts of radar for the British in this period, didn't operate on the same frequency.
So they just assumed that Britain didn't have it.
And they don't realise until later, into the Battle of Britain, that actually yes, there is a dedicated system that is picking up on their aircraft.
And it's very disorientating for them before then, because you know, I think Hans-Eckhardt, Bobb and Gunther Rahl talk about the fact that you know we just seem to get caught out of nowhere.
You know we'd be flying over Britain.
And then, you know, we think we've been stealthy.
We think we've come in and got the element of surprise.
And then suddenly they just cannot fathom why Fighter Command has managed to ambush them.
So not only was that terrifying for them when they didn't know about radar, But once they did discover that, what was picking them up later into the battle?
That's another fear, because you're not only trying to get over the channel, but you know that you could come up as a blip on their radar at any time.
And so that's another psychological disadvantage.
I think so many people talk about radar as an equaliser and it's not.
It's a huge advantage.
You can only imagine what it must have been like, them flying over, all these natural threats.
And now you've added this we know where you are side of it as well.
Yes, i love the way you described that we know where you are like.
Oh yes, it must have been goosebumps for them to go back to talk a little bit about the operation eagle attack.
How successful was this plan?
It was successful at certain points.
It doesn't open very well for the luftwaffe.
The issue on eagle day itself, on the 13th of august 1940, is that there is miscommunication which ends up being very, very costly.
What happens is that over a certain part of the Luftwaffe's airfields in France it opens with a really big, thick fog.
And of course, poor weather on top of trying to go across the English Channel is terrible.
It's every pilot's nightmare.
So they have that issue, but they also have the problem that the crystals in the radios within the bombers have not been updated to match those in the fighters.
And as a result, they basically they cannot communicate to each other what is happening.
So when Goering tries to call off the attack because it's had to be postponed on and off in the days coming up to it because of the weather, he delays it again because of the weather report.
But it doesn't get through to all the German bombers.
So there's some setting off from sort of around Arras.
That are heading in as I sort of describe in Eagle Days, it's like heading into a lion's den without a whip.
You know they haven't got a fighter escort because the fighter escorts have been waggling their wings at them, trying to get them to stop.
And Fink talks about this very famous Luftwaffe bomber pilot.
He talks about the fact that, you know, he sees his German fighter escorts kind of wheeling around in front of him.
And he just thinks it's a weird kind of, oh, yeah, you know, you're ready to go kind of thing.
Whereas they're saying the absolute opposite.
They're like, do not go.
And so it ends up being really, really hairy for the Luftwaffe in the morning of Eagle Day.
And eventually they do go on to launch quite a few sorties by the afternoon.
They have a bit of success against some of the the British airfields, but it's not the hammer blow.
You know, they really want to subdue the British as quickly as possible.
Goering's hoping he can subdue the British within two to four weeks.
And this is just not how it's meant to be going for the Germans.
So the 13th of August, 1940 is very underwhelming for them.
As I sort of alluded to earlier, also with Schwarzer Donnerstag, or Black Thursday, on the 15th of August.
Two days later, They have been trying to put a conference together to understand what the hell happened on Eagle Day.
And it's even worse for them.
So the 15th of August also goes terribly.
We then get the 18th of August 1940, which is known as the hardest day.
And that's when both the RAF and the Luftwaffe have the highest combined losses on that day.
So that's also admittedly, a terrible day for both sides, but it really has started to get into this aerial war of attrition.
And it's only really as we get towards the end of August 1940 and the RAF is getting really run ragged that the Luftwaffe starts to kind of slightly reverse its fortunes that, you know, the fighter command was never subdued to the point that some people claim that it was pretty much at the brink of defeat.
It wasn't, but you know as, as one of its officers said, you know it was pretty groggy and the radar sites were pretty groggy.
It wasn't all knocked out as the germans often believed, but it was feeling in the effects.
And of course, when we get to late august 1940, we are talking about the blitz, we're talking about attacks and retaliation.
We start to see the bombing of civilians.
It's a bit of a gear shift and this is something i think we've spoken about before in another episode that we did and everything you wanted their episode on the battle of britain that the germans encompass the blitz as part of the battle of britain in their timeline.
So this being a real step up from attacks on shipping and other combatants.
Do we get a sense of how german pilots, but also auxiliaries, felt about this?
We do.
So it's interesting because depending on their branch, they tend to look at it different ways.
So Hans Eckerhardt, Bob, the fighter pilot, thinks it's an accident.
I mean, obviously we've got to be careful of post-war mythology and wanting to present themselves as admirable and all of those different aspects of being honorable.
But he... thinks surely it's an accident.
And he says about how the Jagdflieger or the fighter pilots would never stand for something like that.
You know, the attacking of British civilians.
It's interesting that I believe it's Baumbach who talks about the fact that he's a bomber pilot.
And he tries to describe the Blitz portion of the Luftschlacht am England as being industrial.
So he writes about how it's all industrial.
And we started off with more of the kind of you know military side in the first half of the Battle of Britain.
And now we've gone the industrial side.
And that's really sort of whitewashing, the fact that no, the killing of civilians is a highly intended I mean I wouldn't even say side effect.
It's an intention of the Blitz.
So you do get some kind of split attitudes.
There's one Luftwaffe crewman who says, around the same time as the Blitz has just broken out, on the 7th of September 1940, that we'll soften up the English, which is what he puts in his letter.
And he talks about the fact that you know we're ramping up this effort and that he's tired around the clock because he's having to work so hard.
But at the same time, he sees it as the inevitable change in the air war.
It doesn't last that way very long.
I think they assume that the Blitz is perhaps going to be maybe a few days and the British will capitulate and it will all be fine.
But it's interesting that Peter Stahl, who was a Junkers 88 pilot, he said about the fact that his commanding officer had to sort of explain to them, justify to them, why they'd gone into the Blitz.
And he said this was so rare for any member of the Wehrmacht, of the German armed forces, to have to justify to us why we were doing this.
I believe it was his Stoffelkapitän, his squadron captain.
So they noticed that difference in some of their early raids on London, the fact that they're having to have this sold to them as an idea, and they're being told by his commander, Stoffelkapitän.
He's saying about how you know, oh well, the Reichsmarschall believes that it just needs a few blows and that's it.
So this is kind of how the Luftwaffe gets breadcrumbed into the Blitz and why they keep going against this target.
But really, the morale is already starting to drop.
And there's even in the Luftwaffe, going into the main months of the Blitz, going into September October, the suicide rates of the Luftwaffe actually skyrocket.
And it's hard to know from the Luftwaffe psychology reports which branches and arms are affected.
It could be the ground personnel.
It could be the flyers.
It could be a mix.
But it's evident that it's incredibly stressful.
And Luftwaffe psychologists do say after the war that it got so bad that they needed the Luftwaffe surgeon general to issue a bulletin to prevent suicide as they go into 1941, because it's just so intense.
So it's an incredibly stressful situation for them.
The Blitz, of course, you start to get less of the German fighters as escorts.
But of course the German bombers are still going into this and haven't had a break since the beginning of the year.
So it's an incredibly damaging time for their morale.
And, of course, with every dimming hour of the autumn of 1940, an invasion seems less and less likely.
That's astonishing.
When it comes to the Blitz, obviously this gear shift is attributed to Goring.
And it seems that that decision by him to deviate to attacking civilians rather than the RAF air bases is considered the downfall of the Battle of Britain.
It's the thing that lost it for them.
Would you say that it's actually also this mentality, this damaging to the psyche of the Luftwaffe itself, that contributes?
I think it's a mixture of things.
I mean Goering's role in it absolutely has to be acknowledged in terms of the fact that that momentum of the late Eagle attack is frittered.
I think Goering switching to British cities perhaps wasn't quite as illogical as people would normally argue, simply because he was under a lot of pressure on the home front whenever he toured any bombed out cities.
Well, specifically Berlin.
There were reports of women and children that were kind of described as babbling and hysterical after the first raids against Berlin.
And he'd been so public about.
You know, no bomber's ever going to reach the Ruhr.
He's never going to reach Berlin.
Of course it does.
So he's in very uncomfortable situations.
I mean, Göring is a total narcissist with no kind of empathy.
And he's just uncomfortable at the fact that he's not being beloved, you know.
So it's a sense of, even though it is for his own ego, the fact that he wants to secure this victory over Britain as soon as possible, and that's partially why he prematurely moves to attacking London.
We've got to remember that the Nazi home front did have a war that it needed to win and it needed to save face and keep the faith of the nation.
So it's partly Goering, it's partly the inconsistencies of the battle as well and the discrepancies in Luftwaffe intelligence and numbers.
There's a lot of arguments over how much a fighter command is actually still existing.
Kesselring thinks that it must be very much brought down to a lower level.
Sperle thinks that it's actually, you know, the British are far better than they think.
And his assessment is more accurate.
But the issue with the Luftwaffe is it doesn't really have a proper general staff.
It's more based on divide and conquer, and this is in the Reiche ministry as well, and it's sort of built around Goering's ego and personality cult.
So it's even those that have got a better idea and have got their head screwed on properly.
They're getting buried by people who have political favor, and so it's partly that it's the inconsistency in strategy, the fact they're swapping to so many different targets at different times so they can't fully consolidate any one area, and But I think it's also the fact that the Germans can never quite get on the same page of if sea line is happening or not.
I mean, they're still going back and forth going into the spring of 1941.
There's still orders in the Luftwaffe about.
You know, we need to pursue looking into sea line again and we must do this with the utmost speed and all of these elements.
And later on the Germans tried to claim that this is to hide for the preparations of Operation Barbarossa, invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.
But I think looking at the kind of inside reports and what they share with the army, it doesn't fully die as a concept for them.
And that's why they stay and they waste 600 extra bombers during the Blitz, because I think they just cannot quite make their mind up.
And ultimately, it is that incongruence that ends up committing them to this great defeat.
There are a few dates that we've covered here.
One of the other ones we need to talk about is the Battle of Britain Day in mid-September 1940.
Why was this so devastating for the Germans?
It was devastating because it seemed as if their lowered contact rate with the British as they go into late August 1940.
It seemed as if they had started to gain air superiority.
So I believe it's Bob that says about how you know, at some points they were flying pretty much all the way up to London towards the end of August 1940 and not really getting challenged too much because of course they've not yet changed their direction all the way to bombing London specifically.
And it seemed to confirm to them, when they didn't come across many fighters from Fighter Command, that surely the British must be more subdued and in a worse state than was actually the reality of.
So when we get to the 15th of September 1940, to Battle of Britain Day, the RAF has managed to have enough of a respite.
It's not huge, but it's enough.
The futters come off from their throats long enough to get that kind of huge gasp of air in and to keep going.
And it's very tragic for them to see what's happening in the Blitz.
They hate the fact that suddenly, you know all the fires have cropped up and civilians are being killed, and all of these different aspects.
But it allows them to regroup.
And they're able to launch a stinging counterattack on the 15th of September 1940 to throw up this big wing style formation and to completely overwhelm the Germans.
So it's interesting because in some ways it's indicating that this is the norm almost for fighter command.
It's not.
I mean, the big wing came with a lot of different problems.
It was incredibly stressful to coordinate it and to get so many aircraft flying in the air at once.
The Germans don't know that.
They're just going on the assumption that we've subdued the RAF.
We're laying the way for sea line if we do still want it to take place in the middle of September.
And so that is the time where psychologically, they're expecting to be moving towards that integrated Wehrmacht strategy.
But then they get this horrific attack.
They lose over 50 aircraft.
And Otto Bechtle, who was a bomber pilot.
He talks about it being a drunken party and weeping for comrades and singing that the Tommy has given us a hiding.
You know, it's a really pivotal moment.
And it's also such a testimony to just how much of a fight the fighter commander had given them throughout the Battle of Britain.
We've spoken somewhat about the German phases of this campaign.
How do those compare to those in Britain?
Yes, very important to go by the British phases as well, to make sure that we're understanding how it looked for both sides.
So for the British, the Battle of Britain starts from the 10th of July 1940.
And this is the date that's selected by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, as the Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command.
That's the beginning of the Channel Battle for the British.
Their dates around the Eagle attack are around the same as those for the Germans.
But for the British they see the Battle of Britain continuing on until about the 31st of October 1940, where they get the last daylight raid of the Battle of Britain.
So for the British it's a little bit more straightforward in terms of you have Channel Battle, Eagle Attack moving into the Blitz and then you get towards the end of the autumn of 1940, going into the 31st of October 1940.
For the Germans, they tend to have a few more phases scattered in.
So therefore, when trying to understand the German perspective, it's important to keep the British dates in mind, but also look at the fact that for them, there is this accumulation of exhaustion in the Luftwaffe, because this is a 10-month campaign, not just a four-month campaign as the British tend to put it.
Towards the end of 1940.
We've spoken about how there have been significant losses in the Luftwaffe have not just been badly affected in terms of its quantity of aircraft, but also the quality of the crews as well.
Things seem to look quite desperate.
How did the recruitment of the so-called totally unacceptable contribute to this?
Yes, so the decline in the quality of the air crews comes from the fact that They've been losing so many of their experienced veterans?
Some of these men have had an average of five years experience as we get into the Battle of Britain.
And, as a result, when you're losing those kind of commanders, you really end up losing this grounding for the new airmen.
The men that are coming through are either losing their leadership because some of the more prominent commanders are being moved into staff positions.
But also because you've got this loss of operational experience, they really have to drop their recruitment standards and their training standards.
This is getting quite stressful.
They've got to try and do everything in at least amount of time as possible.
And even though they'd already had very high standards in the interwar period and were able to kind of slowly prime the men for the air war, they have to really cut corners on these aspects.
And you know, of course there's a rise in crashes because of the, the fact that they're operating in the dark during the blitz.
There's the fact that because the training is not quite as efficient, there's actually a shortage of men that can fly the Junkers 88 bomber.
And this is easily their most advanced bomber kind of going into 1941.
So there's a lot of shortfalls in the Luftwaffe.
They do feel the losses of their airmen, not just from the perspective of their valued comrades, but also the fact that they're losing that key operational experience that they need to try and subdue the British.
Can you tell us more about how these losses affected the Luftwaffe in other theatres of war?
Yes.
So the issues with the losses was the fact that they, again, couldn't really build up any reserves.
They hadn't really been built like that.
They'd had losses in several other areas in terms of reconnaissance.
Crews, of course, have been affected and they'd already been trying to patch up the kind of losses that they'd had previously in the war.
So they'd had a sense of trying to balance things out, but the main problem really was bombers.
Bombers were the main issue, and as we get to December 1941, as we get the United States of America entering the war, They've dropped down to about between sort of 25 to 30 percent of their operational strength, of their authorized operational strength.
So they really cannot field as many bombers as they would like.
They initially have the success of Barbarossa, but towards the end of 1941 they're getting bogged down in the Soviet Union.
They're feeling the effects of the fact that it took so much longer to complete the Balkans campaign.
So the Luftwaffe is really starting to get pulled from post.
It needs to commit more aircraft to the Mediterranean and, of course, later into North Africa.
So it's just this absolute accumulation of responsibilities on it that are just the Battle of Britain and the Blitz really sets this precedent of being a chronically overstrained air force, which it remains for the rest of the war, even if it is formidable.
It seems utterly unfathomable.
As a final question to you by nuancing the picture and maybe putting aside that popular misconception of this seemingly unfathomable the chivalric knight, the cartoon villain, how does this reshape the way that we think about the Battle of Britain in your mind?
I think sort of revisiting the Luftwaffe changes the dimensions of the Battle of Britain in several ways.
I think, firstly, it's more of a transnational campaign.
I think people so often see the Battle of Britain in the context of its sun-soaked tussles over Kent of Spitfires and BF109s, and that's it.
And of course, that's such an evocative part of the Battle of Britain.
You know it's such a strong part of the British psyche.
Understandably, because you're seeing all these vapor trails in the skies and you know you're hoping that your champion is going to come out of this alive.
But I think the thing is is that we need to look at the fact that this is two nations vying for their freedom, desires for control in Europe.
And of course, their views of peace are vastly different.
But that's still what they're fighting for in different ways.
The Luftwaffe, of course, in a way that's far more destructive to humankind.
But at the end of the day, they don't want to be losing men either.
So I think in British studies we've looked so much more at the few, but then we've gone further back from the few and it's then become the few of the fleet air arm.
And then it's been oh, let's look at bomber command, coastal command, Let's look at all the aircraft designers of the WAFs, all of the different mechanism that's behind what was traditionally considered the few.
And we've not always done the same thing for the Germans.
You know, they have their own few in a different way.
Of course, their definition is not the same, but they've been celebrated everywhere.
In Germany for so long they've got the same sort of newsreels that are showing the men in the air and they're recruiting the Luftwaffe airmen of the future.
There's young schoolboys that are tracing what's happening in the Battle of Britain and the Blitz on their maps in their history lessons.
It's such a huge aspect of Germany's war in 1940 and 1941.
That's what all thoughts were on.
Letters were on, newspapers, propaganda were on.
And I think it's important to see just how much of a spanner in the works the Battle of Britain was.
I think so many people talk about Stalingrad and they talk about the U-boat war and these other different aspects that were very important to the outcome of the war.
But I think, even if the Battle of Britain wasn't decisive, it was a British defensive victory but it wasn't decisive.
It was still pivotal.
And it is partly why the Second World War unfolded as it did.
And that in itself is important to consider.
That was Dr Victoria Taylor speaking to Emily Briffitt.
Victoria is an aviation historian and the author of Eagle Days Life and Death for the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain.
