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Chinese Premier Li Cheng is attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Moscow and deepening China-Russia cooperation.
What's at stake for regional growth?
Japanese foreign ministry official is in Beijing as the prime minister's erroneous remarks deepen Japan's economic headwinds.
The UN-backed U.S.-Gaza peace plan.
Does it genuinely advance peace or merely serve the interests of external powers?
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Visiting Chinese Premier Li Qiang has promised closer cooperation with Russia on investment, energy and agriculture.
He made the pledge during talks with his Russian counterpart Mikhail Mishustin in Moscow.
Li said China's ready to import more high-quality Russian farm products.
He also expressed the hope that Russian side will provide more conveniences for Chinese enterprises to invest and operate in Russia.
Mishustin noted, bilateral ties are at an unprecedented high and Russia is ready to expand dialogue at all levels.
Li Chen is in Russia to attend a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
To delve into this.
Joining us on the line is Dr Zhang Xin, Deputy Director of the Center for Russian Studies at East China Normal University.
Professor, let's start with a regular meeting of the SCO.
With Belarus now officially joining as the SCO's 10th member, the organization has become the world's most geographically expansive regional cooperation framework.
In your view, what will be its core mission over the next decade?
You're definitely right.
I think the official joining of Belarus SCO now has expanded further to be one of the most geographically expensive regional organizations.
On top of Belarus, there are a couple of other observer states that are waiting to be formally admitted.
So with the expanded framework, with expanded membership, I think the organization needs some further updating in both its internal management, internal rules of management, as well as its core mission or organizational mandate.
To me the original mandate of regional security cooperation, particularly in the post-Soviet context, and its original mandate in security cooperation among Russia, China and Central Asian countries.
These regional mandates are successfully implemented.
So with the expanded framework and the membership, I think the economic collaboration very likely will be the more important, the top priority, as the organizational mandate for the organization.
And building on the extended economic collaboration, SCO is also very likely to intensify its efforts to become the regional mandate, a collaborative framework for the broader developing countries or the global south countries.
Speaking of that, Premier Li Cheng said China is ready to accelerate implementations of the SCO's 10-year development strategy.
How do you see China's strengths in areas like the digital economy and green energy being translated into concrete public goods within the SCO framework?
And how might this offer new development options for member states?
First of all, I think China, without any doubt, is the leading country in those several sectors, just to mention digital economies, green energy,
So to have the capacity in setting up the standard for these new technologies, new economic sphere, and then to build on that to expand collaboration with countries in terms of the necessary technology manufacturing capacity, as well as industry level of rules and regulations.
So China can offer both hardware and software in these specific fields as potential public goods in the SEO framework and sometimes also beyond the SEO framework.
Second, on top of the capacity, I think China also shows its willingness, interest and willingness to do so, to offer these manufacturing capacity ability to set up industry standards as public goods.
China has the interest and willingness to offer those as public goods to SCO countries, but also potentially even beyond that.
The willingness to do so is also important.
Combining both the ability and the interest to offer these public goods very likely will offer both SCO member states, as well as countries outside of the SCO framework, new possibilities for development in a cooperative manner in a set of new industries of key importance for future development.
As you mentioned, the digital economy, green energy, as well as potentially, AI industry and the integration of these new technologies into the traditional agriculture and the traditional manufacturing sector.
So those sectors are of potential, great importance and the potential development.
Professor Wennell, global multilateralism is clearly under pressure right now.
So what are you expecting from this summit in terms of tightening cooperation among SCO members and helping them deal with external risks?
This summit is going to continue to build on the so-called Shanghai spirit, the foundational principle of equal cooperation among member states under the SCO framework.
This summit will continue to build on that and also make efforts to translate these principles into a concrete plan of action.
For example, there's a high possibility.
This meeting is going to assign an action plan for implementation of the SCO multilateral economic and trade collaborative framework.
And then there's also a possibility to further establish a permanent governing board for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's sustainable development agenda.
So those things under the SCO framework offer the possibilities for SCO member states and potentially for other global South countries, mechanisms of concrete collaboration in economic, trade and technology as a way to cushion the possible challenges, the possible negative impact from the external world.
So this summit is going to further concrete plans of implementation and action for these multilateral countries economic, trade and technology collaboration, both within the SCO and potentially, within application for countries even outside of SCO.
Then, Professor, let's shift the gear to the bilateral ties between China and Russia.
The Russian prime minister says China-Russia relations are at an unprecedented level and both sides are willing to expand a dialogue across all channels.
Then in today's international climate, how should we understand the significance of this?
Under today's geopolitical climate on a global level, I think the China-Russia bilateral collaboration is a of utmost importance for both countries in its anti-hegemonic struggle against the United States and the so-called collective West, on the one hand, but also offer important potential public goods, as you just mentioned.
Public goods for countries in the Eurasia region, but also potentially even beyond that.
This time.
I think the Russian prime minister's statements before the meeting indicate russian government and the russian business community are going to further emphasize economic sovereignty in its relation with china.
It also specifically referred to several specific economics, economic sphere or with some new features and new features.
Those reference to these sectors also indicate China and Russia are going to further develop its collaboration at both the government level and the business level and the social level in these new sectors.
And so that would offer some new potentials for new forms of collaboration between the two countries.
And let me emphasize that, very likely, the bilateral collaboration between China and Russia are also very likely to provide some sort of public goods for countries beyond this bilateral relations.
For example, industry-level regulatory rules related to, for example, digital economy or AI technology, and as well as bilateral rules and mechanisms for bilateral financial payment.
Those collaborative results from China-Russia bilateral collaboration is going to have a direct impact on countries beyond these two countries.
The muting on that.
As you mentioned, China and Russia have again pledged deeper cooperation in investment, energy and agriculture.
And China has said it will increase imports of high-quality Russian agricultural products.
What practical impact will this upgraded cooperation have on the stability of both countries' industrial and supply chains?
This is indeed a very important ongoing process of rearrangement and shifting of production industrial chain, as well as the supply chain and the value chains between the two countries and potentially also with other partners of collaboration.
You mentioned the imports of high-quality agricultural products by China from Russia.
This is one concrete example of the potential rearrangement of supply chain in the agricultural sector, because for a long time Russia's major agricultural exports are to some of the former Soviet country, not directly to China.
So this is a concrete example of a shifting of supply chain in the agricultural sector.
But also, as I mentioned these, agricultural collaboration goes way beyond just import and exports, because this is also an area a lot of the new technology are going to be implemented green agriculture with a potential application application of many new technologies.
So further collaboration between the two countries in this field also are going to bring some new elements, new features into the bilateral relation, with more involvement of new technology and possible rules and the regulatory frameworks related to these new technologies.
So agriculture is just one field, these new technologies that are potentially being integrated, but there are other traditional sectors that are going to be going through a very similar process of integration of new technology.
And then these processes are going to have a direct impact on how supply chains and value chains industrial chains are being re-shifted.
Again, this is not only just bilateral.
There's a process of concern to bilateral collaboration.
For SEO countries Central Asia COXIS, also the Asia-Pacific country.
This reshifting of industrial chain is going to be important for all of them.
And this is an ongoing process.
We will see some, I would say we will see some big changes in five or ten years.
Thanks, Professor, for those valuable insights.
That was Dr Zhang Xin, Deputy Director of the Center for Russian Studies at East China Normal University.
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A Chinese foreign affairs official has called on Japan to retract its remarks on the Taiwan region and stop making trouble on China-related issues.
Director General Liu Jinsong of the Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Department lodged representations in a meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Kanae Masaki, in Beijing.
Liu said the Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takeuchi's comments violate fundamental principles of international law and undermine the post-war international order.
He emphasized that her remarks contradict the one China principle and the four political documents that guide China-Japan relations.
Masaki arrived in Beijing on Monday amid growing economic fallout from Takeuchi's statements which hinted the possibility of Japan's armed intervention in the Taiwan Strait.
On Monday, Japanese stock in sectors closely tied to Chinese tourism, including department stores, transport and retail tumbled, with markets continuing to slide.
On Tuesday
So for more on this, let's have Dr Wang Xinsong, Associate Professor at Beijing Normal University School of Government.
Thanks for joining us, Professor.
Thank you.
Professor, Japan's top Asia diplomat is visiting Beijing for talks.
So what do you make of this trip?
And do you expect this visit to help stabilize or to ease somehow the current tension caused by Takeuchi's erroneous deeds?
Well, I'm afraid not.
I think what has happened over the past few days as a result of the wrong deeds by Takachi violated Japan's policy of respecting the one China principle and touched the bottom line of China's core interests.
So it is much more than what a director general can take care of.
It does show that the Takachi cabinet would like to unwind the track a little bit and to avoid further political and economic costs.
But apparently it is far from what the Chinese government expected.
But Professor, at AIPAC, Takahashi promised to respect the One China commitments.
But then she met with Taiwan's representatives and even hinted at military action.
Even after China's protests, she still refused to take anything back.
So do you think her provocative remark was a slip of the tongue or something she planned all along?
Well, I've heard such views, and some others argue that it might be due to her inexperience being a new prime minister.
I'm afraid I cannot agree with those views.
I think Takachi had always been vocal and right-leaning on political issues.
And, in fact, she became the LDP leader thanks to her political inclination, which matches the right-leaning political environment currently in Japan.
So her latest comments were a proof, I think, to her supporters that she sticks to the same political views as even after election.
And she also wanted to demonstrate to the US that Japan can be a good follower of the US and could be a regional defender of the US led order.
But I think it is a miscalculation because by stirring up regional instability, I think Japan might put the US at a very awkward position because, at the end of the day, I don't think that the US would be forced to engage in a potential military conflict with China, which is a nuclear power.
Professor, building on that her political calculation inside Japan.
Many criticized her comments are reckless.
That talks only hurts Japan's own interests and security.
What risks does this pose to Japan itself?
Where could such leadership ultimately lead the country?
Well, we've seen some fallouts already on various fronts.
I mean after the Chinese government's reaction regarding advising the Chinese citizens to be cautious or to avoid visiting Japan.
The sectors of tourism and culture have suffered and the stocks have seen a plummeting.
And soon, I think, the real economic costs will emerge, as more Chinese tourists are hesitant to make Japan their travel destination.
But there are political and security costs as well.
The Japanese government keeps on this dangerous track.
For example, if the Japanese government keeps interfering in China's domestic affairs and by moving toward relaxation of nuclear control, I think regional stability is not going to be guaranteed anymore.
And that is the last thing people in the region, including the Japanese citizens, want.
Speaking of the fallout in sectors like tourism and security, etc.
We know trade and economic ties with China have created major employment and economic benefits for Japan.
But Takeuchi's provocative remarks have cooled relations and shaken Japanese markets.
On November 17, stocks in sectors like department stores, transport and retail heavily depend on Chinese tourism, took a hit and markets continued to slide.
On the 18th.
Companies of all sizes are feeling supply chain pressures.
Could this ripple into everyday life in Japan eventually and spark broader social concerns?
Well, it's likely given the strong economic bonding between the two countries.
And the economic costs to be caused by reduced travel can be huge.
And many locals in Japan who work in the service sector rely on tourism for their revenues.
But then it's likely that the tension keeps escalating and the engagement becomes even more damaging if more economic leverages are applied, as we have recently seen from China's responses to the trade war with the US.
By then, I think, the economic damage will be enlarged, which will have very broader impacts on social life and economic life in Japan.
Many pragmatic Japanese business leaders and experts have long warned that political games can harm the development of Japan.
But the prime minister keeps her stance on far-right radicalness.
Could putting politics over the nation's realities widen the gap between countries?
Japanese industry and government, and also weakens Japan's economic policy overall.
Yes, I think Takahashi's political move is a manifestation of Japan's economic problems, which include decreasing global economic competitiveness inflation, slowed wage growth and unemployment for young people, and so on.
All of that explains the right-wing movement which is going on in Japan.
And that tends to attribute the problems to foreigners and to foreign countries or to the liberal politicians.
However, by adopting more aggressive foreign policy, I think Akaichi is creating a more hostile external environment.
And we've talked about the deteriorating economic relations already.
And by the way, China is the most important trading partner for Japan.
Doing so will not solve Japan's economic problems.
It will only make things even worse.
Former Japanese prime ministers have openly criticized Takeuchi.
Does this show internal divisions within Japan over China policy?
And what role can Japan's peace-minded citizens and intellectuals play at this stage?
Yes, there is no doubt that there are different voices within Japan.
And in fact Takeuchi's prime ministership wasn't completely guaranteed even after she was elected president of LDP, because the long-term coalition party Komeito, declined to be part of that coalition anymore because of Takeuchi's political views.
So there is a possibility that the Japanese diet confidence in her leadership is going to be shaken due to her risky moves.
But overall I think the political environment in Japan is going to continue to be right leaning unless the social economic situation sees better opportunities to improve.
We know China's stance on defending national sovereignty is firm and clear.
The more extreme Japan's Taiwan rhetoric becomes, the stronger China's response will be.
Then, looking ahead, does Takaichi have the influence or leadership to repair China-Japan relations and stabilize Japan's economy?
Well, I have doubts about Takaichi, given her long-term political views and the political base which she relied on to continue to grip on power.
Look, she is playing up identity politics.
And if she becomes moderate, she loses her political identity and then political power.
But clearly Takachi underestimated China's determination to defend national integrity and to deal with anyone with all means who challenges China's core interests.
So I suppose the situation will become worse before it becomes better.
Thanks, Professor, for the clarity and valuable insights.
That was Dr. Wang Shenzong, Associate Professor at Beijing Normal University School of Government.
More to come.
One month to go until the launching of special customs operations at the Hainan Free Trade Port.
You are listening to Road Today.
We'll be back after a short break.
You've been listening to Road Today with me, Ge'enna, in Beijing.
The Hainan freight trade port is marking a month to go until independent customs operations begin across the island.
The new system will further open the southern province to international markets.
Regulated access will ensure that goods entering the Chinese mainland from Hainan comply with domestic regulations, with additional duties applied as necessary.
More liberal trade and investment policies within Hainan are creating a highly favorable business environment.
What will be the impact of this operation?
What specific investment opportunity does this offer to foreign investors and international businesses?
With more.
Zhao Yang spoke with Dr Zhou Mi, a senior research fellow with the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation.
So, Dr Zhongmi, what does the launch of island-wide customs closure in Hainan in December mean for consumers and businesses?
And what does it mean for China's broader opening up strategy?
Well, we know that in WTO there are many members and all the members are independent custom territories.
So maybe some of these entities are not a country like Hong Kong and Macau.
And also their independent custom territory means that they are able to provide our different and independent tariff requirements for all the import and export.
So for Hainan, I think this time is trying to build some region, just like the independent custom territory, which is very important and different from the rest of China's areas, think this kind of practice is one of our very important practices because it's really our kind of regulation to have a very different tariff requirement for the import and export and also based on that they will really create a unique place for the consumptions and also for the supply chains interactions.
So this time it's trying to build our very special policy region.
And this region is one of the most advanced or most developed kind of free trade in China for the regional development in China.
So could you explain more details for this special customs operations?
What does it really mean?
And can Hainan become a gateway linking China with Asia Pacific, Southeast Asia and global markets?
Definitely, in my understanding, when we are trying to use these policies, we are trying to give Hainan a very special treatment for the position in the international trade.
So when they are going to establish the relations in the economic, about imports and exports, they are able to connect with the rest of the world with almost 100 tax-free policies.
So the import from the rest of the world into the highland market can be tax-free.
And when they are going to be re-exported to the mainland, the rest of China, they will be putting some additional policy restrictions.
So in this regard it's just like that highland has been well being exposed to the world market without any kind of interference about the additional cost on the tariffs, but they still have to be protected by the customs about the quarantine or other safety considerations.
So based on this kind of policy, I think the high-end market is quite unique in China.
And also we will also do something as the taxes reform and some of the integration or change of the categories of the taxes.
And that will bring a lot of more spaces for the companies to do businesses in Hainan market and have a better integration at the end to other Asia-Pacific regions and also the rest of the world.
And how will lower tax and zero tariff policies reshape the business investment decision in Hainan?
So if they come here to invest some part of branches in Hainan, they can benefit by free flow of the import of the raw materials, intermediate or equipment from the rest of the world.
And the way they are going to export to the world market, they can also benefit from that.
So Hainan is one part of China and they benefited from very strong abilities of the labor forces, the technology and supply chains.
So they can just have a better integration of the market advantages of the world market and also the advantages of Chinese manufacturing and science and technology.
That will give the companies very strong abilities to compete with other competitors in the world.
And the negative list for foreign investment in Hainan will be the shortest nationwide.
So tell us more about it.
How might this influence the cross-border partnerships and local economy?
And which sectors will foreign investment be focusing on?
Well, negative list management is a kind of a way for us to fulfill our commitment to keep our market open, opener and opener.
So you know, any restrictions and also the differential requirement for the foreign investors compared with the domestic one are put in that list.
The shortest negative list means that there are at least restrictions on the foreign investment in China.
So when the company is trying to invest in China, they have to find out what are the proper destination.
I mean, the local provinces, they want to investor too.
The shortage of negativities really provide the companies so many more choices when they come here to invest in China.
So Hainan is an island and it has its own purpose about attracting the FDI.
Maybe it's not only trying to welcome all the manufacturers.
It is going to focus on some of the services, the high technology and also something to do with advanced manufacturing.
So when the companies really want to have more opportunities, they can choose to try whether they can get more, you know, better treatment and more fairer environment in investing in Hainan.
And can Hainan become a major trade transshipment hub for Southeast Asia and beyond?
I think that it will take part of that because, you know, the consumption is a main reasons why we are going to connect with the ASEAN countries or other countries in the Eastern Pacific regions.
Hainan is a little bit not that big compared with Guangdong as a conception total amount.
But Hainan can become a very important hub, as you mentioned, for the transit.
So they can come here to do some import and then to have even some procedures to have a better development in the value and also to integrate with different imports intermediates.
So this is kind of a very easy way for them to have less cost of tariffs and have a better efficiency to feed for the market.
But they still have to have more connections on the information from the consumption market, including Guangdong and also the rest of China.
And will preferential personal income tax successfully attract global talents, especially in high-tech and digital sectors?
Yeah, it's very competitive for the people who are going to have the income in Hainan.
They will have much less personal income taxes coming compared with the rest of china.
So if they are able to generate more income i mean based on their contribution to the economy they will definitely have much lower taxes.
We know that when the companies, or even the individuals, are making decisions, that the tariffs or taxes is one of the main concerns for them to consider about the possibilities.
So i think this uh, you know policies are very attractive for those people who are going to investing in Hainan and also have a pretty high income from this island.
So finally, Dr Jomi, what specific investment opportunities does Hainan Free Trade Port offer to foreign investors and international businesses?
Well, I would say that it provides a very big room for the development and exploring in different regions, like the, you know electronics, like some of this medical care and also some of other logistic based transactions.
It's definitely will not guarantee that all the competitors will benefit from these opportunities, so it's providing a better room and the better room should be, you know, adopted by the related stakeholders.
They can try to define their own way, the own pathway for the development.
So, based on these policies, they can have a better and more predicted future, while they can even ask for some other treatment.
So the Hainan free trade accord is not just a static one.
We are going to improve that according to the situation.
And I will say that is also one of our purposes to improve the position of Hainan and also trying to have better experiences that can be used for China's, you know, further opening up and also benefit the world.
That was Dr Joe Mi, a senior researcher, fellow with the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation.
This is World Today.
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The UN Security Council has approved a US-drafted resolution backing President Donald Trump's Gaza peace plan.
The resolution allows member states to participate in the Trump-led Board of Peace, which will oversee Gaza's reconstruction and economic recovery.
It also authorizes an international stabilization force tasked with ensuring the demilitarization of the territory.
For the first time, the resolution references a potential Palestinian state.
Russia and China abstained from the voting, saying the resolution does not give the UN a clear role in Gaza's future.
Meanwhile, Hamas has rejected the plan, arguing it does not address the political and humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people.
For more on this, let's bring in Dr Zhang Chuchu, Deputy Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University.
Thanks for joining us, Professor Zhang.
Thanks for having me.
The resolution sets up a US-led international stabilization force, but it doesn't clarify who is in charge, the rules of engagement or how long you will operate right.
Could this be seen as a blank check?
What risks might it create for potential misuse down the line?
Well, I think it indeed leaves the common structure, rules of engagement and duration undefined in detail, as you said, and that relies on a so-called board of peace to oversee implementation.
So it is still likely that this ambiguity could arguably amount to a blank check for the United States-led force, as it grants broad authority without built-in safeguards or timelines, potentially allowing mission creep.
So far, I think there are still many uncertainties.
For example, who are the troops and how can they, you know, guarantee their safety?
And actually many stakeholders still fear entanglement in a volatile conflict.
And also there are other risks, including escalation, if the force engages in offensive operations beyond the stabilization.
Also, there are risks of prolonged deployment turning into de facto occupation or misuse for geopolitical leverage.
So I think what is going to happen next remains to be seen.
Then Professor, Hamas has rejected the plan, saying it doesn't meet the political and humanitarian needs of Palestinians.
Do you think their concerns are justified?
Well, right now, the biggest issue here is that the resolution is still very vague and ambiguous, and it has not discussed much about core Palestinian political rights, such as the self-determination without foreign imposition.
On a lot of core issues like these, it remains undefined.
And right now, what makes things very worrisome is that, as Hamas has expressed its rejection of this resolution in the next step, it's very hard to say what it is going to do next.
And it is very likely that it will refuse to disarm itself.
So this risks perpetuating violence.
And it means that, you know, total and complete ceasefire still faces a lot of challenges.
And also it can complicate ceasefire monitoring and civilian protection.
Speaking of ambiguity, for the first time, the resolution mentions a potential Palestinian state, but it doesn't define borders, sovereignty or the path to statehood.
Is this a real breakthrough in your opinion, or just a diplomatic language without substance?
I think right now the resolution avoids specifics on borders, sovereignty or a conflict path, such as timelines or negotiations under international law.
And also Netanyahu has made it very clear in recent days that he rejected the establishment of the Palestinian statehood.
In general, I see the resolution as more of a diplomatic gesture lacking real substance, as it does not commit to enforceable steps and could serve as symbolic cover for the security-focused elements.
While it might represent some breakthrough in acknowledging statehood potential post-CIS fire, its ambiguity risks rendering it ineffective.
That might be very similar to the past agreements that hasn't advanced peace.
Right now, as it has not defined how it is going to deal with the post-war Gaza.
Who is going to be the governor?
I think there still are a lot of challenges.
As you suggested.
Some voices in Netanyahu's government want long-term control over Gaza's security, but reports say the US wants this resolution to lead the post-conflict order and prevent the Gaza war from dragging on.
Does this show a fundamental split between Washington and Jerusalem on Gaza's final status?
Right, there are a lot of divergences and actually it's not something new.
Actually, the United States aims to use it to shape a post-conflict order and it hopes to prevent indefinite war and to keep you know, pouring money and resources into it and, in contrast, voices in Netanyahu's government, including the prime minister himself and also a lot of far-right politicians.
They seek long-term Israeli security control over Gaza and have reiterated opposition to the Palestinian statehood.
So I think this slip reflects broader United States-Israeli disagreement, where the United States administration has periodically pushed for two-state frameworks, while Israel prioritizes military dominance.
So I think this also potentially undermines the plan's implementation.
However, we also have to note that the United States' continued military support for Israel suggests that they still have lots of common interests in the Middle East.
And I think the disagreements will not fundamentally affect the alliance.
Professor, let's talk about China's stance on this.
China and Russia both abstain from the UN vote.
How do you rate China's position here?
I think this position can be viewed as very much consistent with China's broader diplomatic approach in general.
Above all, China historically supports Palestinian self-determination rights and also it has historically advocated for the two-state solution.
Also, China advocates resolving the problem at its roots.
Otherwise, even if there is a ceasefire, history has already showed us there are cycles of violence.
Meanwhile, China also considers that the resolution so far is still vague on many key issues.
So right now, I think China's stance is very clear.
The finalization of all these very specific details requires further discussion and further negotiation and coordination, as well as the joint efforts of the international community.
Professor, one last question.
Actually, earlier you touched upon a little bit on this issue.
Looking at the bigger picture, the plan is mostly driven by external powers.
Does it open even a small window for peace, or is it just hitting pause before the next, more complicated round of conflict?
Well, indeed, the plan is mainly driven by external powers.
So far, it does open a very narrow window for ceasefire, potentially paves the way for reconstruction and governance transitions if key actors cooperate.
However, its vagueness on some critical issues, together with a lot of other challenges, including Hamas's rejection, you know, the disagreements between United States and Israel, and also reliance on the foreign force, all risks.
And so all put a lot of risks in this issue.
And right now, it means that maybe there is going to be a more complex future round.
And I think it's successful implementation hinges on detailed follow through, which still seems very uncertain given the plan's ambitious but detailed scan today is true.
Thanks, Professor, for your insightful analysis.
That was Dr Zhang Chuchu, Deputy Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University.
This is World Today.
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Australians are growing increasingly uneasy about U.S. influence.
A new survey from the University of Technology Sydney shows 54 of respondents worry Washington is meddling in Australia's domestic affairs a jump of nearly 20 points since 2021.
Meanwhile, 72% say the U.S. is likely to use coercive trade measures against other countries.
And more Australians now believe the US, not China, would pressure Australia to take sides in the Sino-US rivalry.
So for more on this, our colleague Xue Wen spoke with Dr Digby Ren, External Relations Advisor to the Royal Academy of Cambodia.
Dr Ren.
First of all, the latest poll shows that 54 of Australians are concerned about US interference in their domestic affairs, a surge of nearly 20 percentage points from 2021.
What do you think is the core driving force behind this dramatic change in just a few years?
I think there's two answers to this question.
The first one is clearly the policies of the US under the Trump administration and the activities of Donald Trump himself are punishing Australia, or it's perceived as punishment with tariffs, where Australia is a net deficit in trade with the US.
And it has always been that way.
So very unusual for Australia to be punished in this way.
And the second thing is that the Australian government the new Australian government, so Albanese has basically split their policies.
So while the US has kind of consolidated national security and trade and tariff policy all into one.
Australia is kind of, so they're running two tracks, basically an economic track in which China is the most important partner.
And so a lot of effort has been made to do that.
And also where Southeast Asia and East Asia are important.
So that has a reflection on China as well for commerce and trade.
And so most Australians understand that that's important.
And so they see the US is making that difficult.
So I think that's the two main reasons.
At the same time, the polls suggest that Australians increasingly believe the United States uses coercive trade tactics to punish other countries, with the number rising from 36 percent last year to 72 percent this year.
So do you think Australians' concerns are part of this broader skepticism about the US global leadership?
I think there is a general skepticism that's rising about US leadership.
I think that is a real concern for many Australians.
And I mean, across the board, Australians, elites, middle class, working class.
I think right across the board, that's a real concern.
But at the same time.
I think that most Australians still believe that there is such a thing as U.S. global leadership and that the U.S. alliance, cultural, social, economic, is so tightly bound up in Australian media, culture, entertainment, finance, brands, Coca-Cola, you name it, Facebook, all that stuff.
So it means that Australians are still very much hooked on the idea of the US as still a global leader, still number one.
But they see that that space is changing, and this is a reflection of that.
Doctor, is this shift in Australia's public opinion driven more by short-term policy disagreements like what you have just mentioned the trade dispute, or will this antitrust on US last?
Yeah, I think it's a trend.
It's definitely a trend, as the US faces more and more difficulties everywhere, and the Trump administration seems to swing from one argument to another argument to one policy, to another policy.
This kind of volatility is not going to help Australian public opinion think positively about the US, and it's not going to help anybody think positively about the US.
It is eroding their leadership.
How far it will go is very hard to say, but I suppose that it will hit a sort of a bottom.
You know, I don't think it's ever going to be 100 percent against the US or anything like that.
So but I do think that there's going to be more realization as the government changes its policy.
The Australian government changes its policy about the alliance structure and having more autonomy within the alliance structure and seeking wider economic arrangements with the region.
And I mean the region.
I'm saying the Asia-Pacific region specifically, although they're also trying to do that with Europe and other countries, India for example.
But yeah, I think that's a trend and it will continue to be like this as long as the US keeps up its volatility in terms of policy.
Let's talk about Australia's relations with China.
So the report indicates that the two-thirds of Australian respondents believe China poses a security risk, which is the lowest level since the survey began in 2021, dropping from 72 in 2021 to 64 in 2025.
What factors do you think have contributed to this gradual decline in Australian public's perspective of China as a security risk?
Well, everybody can see that China is very stable.
And so, in terms of its policies and its diplomatic efforts, China is not volatile in the same way that the Americans are.
And so because of that, it's seen as a stabilizing force.
I believe many Australians now see it as very stable.
But of course you know it came off the high with Morrison back in 2015 16 in the Trump first term.
And the prime minister of Australia was Scott Morrison.
And he was a real hawk.
And he instigated lots of policies, especially with state media and other things, to really form Australian opinion about China.
And so and then COVID happened.
And it's the Albanese government, and with its landslide election win just recently, that has managed to steer the course back, you know public opinion, back to the centre, or more towards the centre.
And this is of course all with the threat or the shadow, if you like, of declining standards of living.
And so, you know, Australians, like all voters, vote basically with their pocketbook.
It's all about democracy.
The economy is stupid.
And so they see that the Albanese government is trying to balance that.
And so this, I think, has enabled this decline in Australia's perception of China as a security risk.
Although there are still, I think, doubts in many areas.
And it's exacerbated by still, I think control by American media in Australia is still very negative towards China.
And that's probably one of the driving forces.
Although it's a decline, I mean, you know, the perception of risk is dropping.
It's still something that is being turned over in the scandal sheets, the tabloids in the American-run media in Australia.
And one last question, Dr. Ren.
The poll suggests that more Australians believe the US will force them to take sides in a Sino-US rivalry.
And with the rising concerns over US influence, as we discussed just now, can Australia truly maintain a neutral position in China-US relations?
Or is a more independent foreign policy unrealistic?
The policy is being split into sort of.
There's a definite security defense policy which is very much aligned with the alliance and operating within the alliance.
But the government is operating now with a certain amount of what they call what the prime minister said was strategic autonomy.
And that's been echoed by South Korea as well.
So that's an interesting point.
Most Australians do feel that they're being forced into a situation where they have to pick sides.
And I think no Australian really wants to do that.
Many have already picked a side.
But I think many don't want to be forced into that.
They're very worried about sovereignty, especially with the new defence arrangements.
You know, bombers and nuclear submarines and so forth.
That worries a lot of people.
And I don't think Australia can ever be considered neutral.
I don't think that would be correct. description of Australia's situation.
It's definitely allied with the US, but what it's trying to do is turn its trade into a more neutral zone and disconnect it from the security, from Australia's security relationship.
That is a long-term goal for the Albanese government.
So, all of that said, I think that as long as the government in the US, as long as the Trump administration remains in power and they continue with their volatility and their policies, both economic and security, Australia will see a continued reversal about this, not wanting to be forced into anti-China or, you know, China threats being amplified.
I think most Australians are on the downside of that.
They don't really want it.
And they'd like to see the Albanese government and I think the landslide reflects that take this more subtle, more nuanced approach to China and to security.
That was Dr. Digby Run.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today with Mika Anna.
Thank you so much for listening.
