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This year's World Economic Forum in Davos and Foz against what an official release describes as the most complex geopolitical environment in decades.
As 2026 begins under growing strain, what economic risks lie ahead and what constructive role can China play?
Welcome to Road Today, the panel discussion with me, Ge'Anna, in Beijing.
Just days into 2026, raw power politics made a blunt return.
A president was forcibly seized abroad, the sovereignty of aligned states came under strain and tariffs re-emerged as a weapon.
Weeks later, as a broad economic forum opened under snow-covered mountains of Davos, the erosion of international order was impossible to ignore.
It's against this back job that this year's forum convened under the banner of the spirit of dialogue.
Addressing the forum, Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng reaffirmed the four core principles support for free trade, commitment to multilateralism, win-win cooperation and dialogue based on equality and mutual respect.
As some foreign media have observed, at a moment when the United States is straining the international order, China is positioning itself in Davos as a responsible major economy.
At the same time, China released fresh economic data 5 GDP growth, with the economy surpassing 140 trillion yuan, or about 20 trillion US dollars, for the first time.
So how much weight does China's 5% growth truly carry?
And how does China's development translate into what many now describe as the road opportunity list?
To explore these questions, we're joined by Yan Liang, professor of economics at Willamette University.
Peter Chan, former deputy director at Institute of China Studies at University of Malaya.
Li Lun, assistant professor of economics at Peking University.
What a week, ladies and gentlemen.
This year's Davos Forum is held under the theme of Dialogue.
But many participants say anxiety and fragmentation really dominate the mood.
Professor Yan Liang, from your perspective, have the world lost some of its ability or willingness to reach consensus today?
Well, I think so.
I think the two adjectives that you use to describe this meeting anxiety and also fragmentation are the right words.
Because I think In a way, this kind of fermentation has been ongoing for quite a while.
But this year, especially, I think, acute.
The Canadian Prime Minister Carney described the current world as in rupture, not transition.
And I think that again described quite well the current sort of tension fermentation, confrontation the world is facing with.
Now I think Donald Trump, of course, is the biggest catalyst for this kinds of fermentation and confrontation.
The spotlight was on him for this Davos meeting because he was the one that really agitated Europe pretty much by saying that the United States would acquire Greenland one way or the other, by force or otherwise.
He of course quickly backed out and probably now reached a framework that actually is mostly with NATO.
Not to use force to take over Greenland, but I think there's still a lot of carve-outs in terms of pockets of areas to use as US military base.
Nevertheless, I think the damages have been done.
The kinds of coercion threat by force towards traditional allies that really created a kind of rupture.
But still, I think, even without Donald Trump and all these, both rhetoric and also very coercive actions, I think the world is increasingly fragmented.
When it comes to earlier trade protectionism, various military actions by Donald Trump's administration towards mostly global South countries,
So I think yes, in some ways, the world is increasingly incapable of reaching any sort of a consensus.
And that's why I think it is important for other countries, that the non-US sort of orbit countries, to really think about alternatives and really take actions to create this alternative order, create alternative system.
And I think the stark contrast is, of course, China's vice premier He Lifeng's speech, which I think he emphasizes the importance of multilateralism, China's opening, China's development and how it presents itself as a reliable partner but also an opportunity to the rest of the world.
So I think the contrast cannot be starker.
So in a way we don't have consensus in the world, but we are seeing this alternative system right that we're seeing.
Perhaps out of this chaos a better system can be built.
So I think this is very important that we should not be completely in a way of losing hope that despite all these ruptures chaos, there could be new systems being formed and cultivated.
Professor Li Lun, what's your take?
How do you see the atmosphere dominating the Davos Forum this year?
Yeah, you know, just as the theme said, even though you know the global cooperation is in very bad shape right now, I do agree that having this dialogue is not a luxury in times of uncertainty.
It's an urgent necessity.
So I think right now, especially European countries have waken up to the reality that the geopolitical uncertainty will not just happen, for example, South American countries or Middle Eastern countries, but also for them as well, for Denmark, for NATO allies.
So I think, especially in this increasingly fragmented world, confidence in countries, especially in US, or the big players in the world, has become a very scarce resource.
So this anxiety we have seen in Davos is a reflection of that, because what we're seeing is that the trust between previous allies have become more and more thin.
Basically, the globally accepted rules are being contested and also policies that were taken as granted were becoming more and more unpredictable.
So I think China and US definitely as the two biggest players at the global stage, I think are presenting with different values or different messages.
So, whether we're contributing or providing stability or growth to the world, or are we providing disruption or unilateralism to the world,
So I think this presents a very different set of values and potentially a set of alliances between different countries as well.
Professor Peter Chan, how do you sense the atmosphere of the Davos Forum this year?
Do you think the road has in some ways lost its ability to reach consensus.
And, from an economic standpoint, what concrete damage does continued US unilateralism and power politics inflict on the global economy?
I'm speaking from the Malaysian, ASEAN and Global South perspective.
In the context of Davos Forum, which is called the World Economic Forum, but it's really a Western-led forum.
Countries like us in the global South has never really found a home in that forum.
And to the extent that there is a consensus, it is very much a Western-led consensus.
And now to the extent that there is a crisis in terms of anxiety and fragmentation and the ability to reach consensus for us in the global South.
We have always had this difficulty in reaching consensus with the West.
But right now, within Davos Forum itself, the fragmentation is within the West itself.
The inability to reach consensus is not so much between the global South and the global North, but it is within the global North itself.
So this is a different set of dynamics that is playing right now.
And when the question was posed for us in the global South, we have been quite familiar with this position of not able to reach consensus with the global North.
We are quite familiar with that struggle.
And now we are seeing that struggle being played out within the Western hemisphere itself, within the Western allies.
So this is a level that is somewhat different from where we have been experiencing.
Coming back to the more immediate question about the concrete risk that the US unilateralism and Greenland and Venezuela are happening on the global economy, again speaking from the global south, in ASEAN and Southeast Asia perspective, we have already experienced significant economic shock.
At the onset of the Trump second administration.
It has already shaken us up, and we have, rightly so, taken corresponding measures.
Now the new round of what's happening in Venezuela and Greenland is shocking up, really the Western hemisphere itself and the Western economy itself.
Again, for us in the global South and Southeast Asia, we are looking at it.
We are sort of telling ourselves, these are familiar things.
We have already gone through this.
But now this is hitting for those in the Western hemisphere and those who are in the Western alliances.
So those are the risks disruption of trades and markets and all those things are very familiar to us.
But it is hitting very home to EU and NATO and the Western hemisphere.
Indeed.
Professor Yan Liang speaking of this, the US has sent a very large delegation to Davos but continues to emphasize an American first approach.
So how do you interpret this behavior of participating in multilateral platforms while simultaneously pursuing unilateral policies?
What does this reveal about the U.S. mindset toward global governance today?
Well, I think Trump And the administration is very clear from the get-go right that they don't believe in such a thing as multilateralism.
They reject it outright.
That is manifested in many different ways.
Right, in terms of, you know, paralyzing WTO that was, you know, predated the Trump's second administration to now, Trump basically has withdrawn the United States from 66 international organizations, including many of the UN.
UN commissions, as well as WHO, and of course, earlier Paris summit.
So I think this is, again, nothing new.
And I agree with Professor Chang.
I think that this rupture becomes a rupture only, you know, in sort of the Western point of view right.
This kinds of fermentation has long been the case as far as the North-South divide is concerned.
So I think in terms of this multilateralism, Trump has never believed in multilateralism.
He believes in power politics, as you just mentioned.
And I think now is, of course, increasingly being recognized by the Western allies.
As I think again, Carney's speech is very revealing that this idea that the so-called rule-based international order has always been the strong preying on the weak.
I think the difference this time is that the Western allies themselves are being treated as the weak, as on the table.
So I think the delegation that you mentioned yes, there are around 300 delegates from the United States.
And the message that Trump has always been conveying to the world is that he wants countries to invest in the United States.
He wants countries to import from the United States because he has this very transactional view that if countries are buying from the United States, that's good for the United States.
If countries are investing their dollars into the United States, then that's good for the United States.
But he's not seeing this as a way of mutual benefits or win-win cooperation.
He's seeing this as a zero-sum game, right?
So this idea that If countries are not investing in the US or not importing from the United States, that is a loss for the United States.
And that needs to be coercively changed.
So, in other words, he has been so famously using tariffs as a weapon to tell countries unless you invest in the United States or unless you strike a trade balance with the United States or you know import more from the United States, you will be tariffed.
So I think the message that, again, at this WEF, it's very similar.
It's exactly the same.
You know modus operandi of the Trump administration that countries should pour their money into the United States.
They need to, you know, import from the United States.
They need to do businesses on the United States terms.
Or else, there will be economic coercion, and there could be military interventions as well.
I mean clearly in the case of Venezuela.
There's no longer excuse about human rights or democracy or liberalism.
It's all about controlling of oil, right?
The oil that shouldn't be somehow belonging to the Venezuelans.
It should belong to the United States.
So...
I think this whole, you know, as you mentioned, it's supposed to be a multi-level platform.
It's supposed to, you know, foster a spirit of dialogue as the theme of this WEF is.
But that is definitely not how Trump is seeing, right, the WEFS.
He's seeing at the plate as a stage where he can flex the muscle to showcase his power and to bring some sort of investments and deals for the United States.
Professor Liu, how do you look at this?
As Professor Yan Liang said, the US has been promoting a transactional peace approach to diplomacy and economic relations, which means You can trade anything as long as you play by my rules.
So how do you assess the impact of this thinking on the global economy?
Yes.
So Trump is definitely leading through a bunch of transactions or exerting pressure to its enemies as well as its allies.
But I do think that you know we're seeing the collapse of, you know the so-called, you know US morality.
Even you know previously what a lot of country have realized is that there are a set of double standards.
So basically some of the, you know, moral rhetorics of U.S. doesn't really match their behavior.
But right now, if you look at, for example, the interview on Air Force One between you know Trump and Lindsey Graham and other, you know important figures and you know the reporter, trump is outright, it's very straightforward about.
You know the purpose of this military.
You know action in venezuela is basically we're going to take their oil.
You know lindsey graham or or other you know us senators are are still in the old mindset of of hiding something and saying there's going to be American alive today because of this military action.
But Trump is not hiding anything.
Trump is basically very explicit about the national interest and is basically abandoning the previous moral framing that helped the US in the past build its loyalty and coalition in Europe among its alliances.
I think very importantly, this is why you know some of the international orders are beginning to collapse.
And meanwhile, if you look at China, China too many countries you know a lot of countries used to look at China in hostile or or biased ways.
But right now, as China grow.
So I totally agree with Professor Yan Liang's point and observation that when you're trading with US, there's often a target and a threat.
So you have to meet the trade balance or else there's going to be consequences.
You have to meet some goal or else there's going to be results.
To China, I think it's more like a market operation or free trade.
So if you don't do transactions or work with China, There's not going to be any consequences.
Everything is your own choice.
So I think this freedom of choice and this free from interference from China or threats from China, I think it's making China look like the more predictable and reliable partner.
And it's going to be increasing increasingly so, I think, in the future.
So I think that's how I see this problem going to evolve in the future.
Professor Peter Chan.
Building on that interesting comparison mentioned by Professor Yan Liang and Professor Li Lun, some international media describe the US as acting more like a disruptor or revolutionary, using financial, technological and geopolitical tools to shake the existing order, while portraying China as more of a builder or architect focused on stability and long-term construction.
Do you agree with this framing?
And where do these differences come from, in your opinion?
Yeah, I do agree broadly.
The United States has sort of given up.
They felt that the post-World War II order that they were leading has failed them.
Globalization in particular has not benefited them.
So they have taken on this very revolutionary approach towards you know, some would say breaking down the old order.
What the new order will emerge.
We're not exactly sure, but it clearly is going to be Maga and America first centered.
China, on the other hand, was critical.
So is the Global South critical of the post-World War II order, which was Western land.
But we did not see it as necessarily needing to be completely overhauled.
And we just felt that the United Nations and the other global institutions that were in place needs to be reformed.
It needs to be renovated, I would say, rather than bringing it down.
And for that reason, I think China has taken this much longer term approach as an architect.
In contrast to revolution, China takes this evolutionary approach to us gradually, slowly reforming and renovating the existing global order itself.
I think China, and so is the global South, remain committed to the United Nations.
We still think that given that for the first 50 years or so, it was Western-led.
And we just felt that there will be a moment in history now where the United Nations will be much better represented globally, where both the voices of the global North and the global South are given equal hearing.
So I do agree that China does take a much more sort of long-term view, constructing gradually and reshaping the global order.
We see that happening with the four global initiatives that President Xi has introduced global development security, governance and civilizational.
These are not to replace the United Nations.
These are supposed to complement and eventually strengthen the United Nations.
So I think that's the right approach and that should be the way forward, especially for us in the global south.
Professor Yan Liang about China's architecture role.
What's the real appeal of the stability China advocates?
Besides predictability, policy continuity, is there something deeper?
Well, I do think that there are many other dimensions.
So, first of all, I think China's own development itself is a great contributor to global stability and prosperity right.
We know that China is the second largest economy right now by nominal GDP.
Nominal exchange rate measures.
And it has long been the first, the largest economy based on the PPP measure.
And China has been contributing around 30 to the global growth in the past few years, past five years.
And it's, I think, projected to continue to do so.
And so I think China's development presents a lot of opportunities for the rest of the world when it comes to China's supply chain to be able to provide with the rest of the world very cost-effective and great varieties of industrial input and finished products.
And then, of course, because China is growing and it is really a large consumer market and that also provides, I think, a lot of opportunities for other countries to export to China.
So I think that is also made clear by Vice Premier He Lifeng's speech that China is not only a world's factory, but it is also a market that it also wants to consume and import from the rest of the world.
So I think that it's important to emphasize that China's own development is an opportunity.
And second, I think, in addition to China's sort of unilateral opening right when it comes to investment opportunities, increasingly open up the service sector right after the full opening of the manufacturing sector to foreign direct investors.
Now China is opening a lot more service industries, service sector for foreign investments, and also just closed the customs for the Hainan, the largest free trade port.
So I think, a lot of these kinds of measures that allow again the rest of the world to participate into the Chinese market and enjoy the opportunities that China provides.
Not to mention, you know, all these visa-free policies and so on and so forth.
And then last one I think I would like to emphasize again is you know China is offering development finance to the rest of the world, that we know that through BRI and many other outward investments and finance, China has been really helping the global sales countries to get their finance right.
I think again depends on how you measure it, but pretty much since 2000 China has provided through both public development banks but also various commercial banks and so on.
China has provided the rest of the world with over 1 trillion to develop the finance.
So I think this is really important for the global south and the rest of the world right to be able to get that resources to grow.
And, of course, China is now also developing its technological capacity and it's able to lead in many critical technological areas.
And so I think that China is willing to share the kinds of technologies, not only by, for example, opening factories abroad and training the local workers, but also by providing a lot of technological demonstration zones and other exchanges opportunities.
So I think, through all this, it's clear that China is a stabilizer, but also an enabler for the rest of the world.
So I think that it's important, as I mentioned earlier, that when this so-called rule-based global order is being destroyed and again, I think this so-called order has never been working for the global South countries
But I think all the more with the increasing uncertainty, risks and volatility.
I think what China has been doing and what China has been advocating is are really important as a stabilizer for the global economy.
Thanks, ladies and gentlemen, for your in-depth perspectives.
Let's have a short break.
Coming back.
We'll continue our discussion on global economic uncertainty and China's role in a fragmented world.
This is Road Today.
Stay with us.
Welcome back.
You're listening to Road Today, the panel discussion with me, Ge'anna.
Let's continue our discussion.
Ladies and gentlemen, let's delve a bit deeper into China's economic growth and its role.
This week, China released its 2025 GDP growth figure of 5, while Vice Premier He Lifeng attended Davos and delivered a keynote speech.
Professor Li Lun, how do you think China's presence at Davos So soon after the GDP data release is perceived by governments, multinational companies and central bank governors?
Yes.
So I think for the group of people you mentioned, what they care about is investment opportunity, because under these policy uncertainty, most certainly investments are going to be delayed because tariffs are going to hit when geopolitical tensions are going to become more severe.
So firms are definitely going to postpone some of the investments and for some firms to think about their supply chain or reroute their supply chain to make it more efficient.
So for China, what the world has observed is that China is, first of all, maintaining a steady growth of 5.
And second, I think, with more predictability and basically providing a policy-backed a stabilizing both the fiscal policy and monetary policy.
And not to mention our value added for high tech manufacturing is increasing by 9%.
So these all give the signal to global investors, as well as central bankers, that China is doubling down in investment and upgrading our domestic manufacturing network.
So it can also serve as a very positive diplomatic signal, right?
So, instead of creating disruption or creating these geopolitical tensions to hit the goal, China is basically trying to keep the entire system working, whether it's domestic, in terms of manufacturing, consumption you know, providing the necessary service healthcare, childcare to our citizens or in terms of international system WTO principles, trade networks, trade flows and global foreign direct investments.
So basically China is overall telling the world we can still deliver.
We are still the reliable partner.
To work with us, we can still deliver the growth and prosperity that you need.
So under these, if you basically do business With certain partners, there are definitely going to be some unpredictable outcomes.
But if you work with us, then we are going to provide you with.
China is both a big factory and a big market.
So, whether you're working from a demand side or supply side, you are probably going to get what you want if you collaborate more with China.
Professor Peter Chang.
Given that many countries expressed a strong interest in China's development opportunities and deeper cooperation at Davos this year, What does this tell us about global expectations of China in 2026?
Well you know, in the Western media, it's like a new awakening for them that they suddenly found out that China is a reliable and stable partner to cooperate in the context of what's happening with America.
But for us in Southeast Asia and the global South, we have known China as a reliable, stable partner for decades.
This is not a new awakening for us at all.
So, as we watch what's happening unfolding in Davos, we're just saying that the West is probably about five or a decade behind us in terms of our own understanding and engagement and perception with China.
For us, we have had very strong integrated economic relationship in ASEAN and China itself.
So to us moving forward, China's economic robust growth and figures and things like that are a positive sign for us, especially in the context of these global uncertainties where America imposed unilaterally tariffs on each and every one of us.
We have to respond and protect our national interests, and we have to hedge and realign.
In the midst of this, in general, overall in ASEAN and Southeast Asia, we have found China as stable and as a very reliable partner.
And we want to trade with a partner that really truly affirms the principle of win-win rather than a zero-sum approach.
I think in general for us, speaking from the global south perspective, looking at 2026, in general a positive outlook.
Professor Yan Liang, as Professor Chong said, the West is awakening to the fact that China is a stabilizing partner, a reality many global south countries recognized a long time ago.
Given that trend, are global expectations of China aligned with how China see its own role in the world economy going forward?
Well, I definitely think so.
I think I'm quite heartened to hear that colleagues from Southeast Asia simply seem to share the same sort of common perception and understanding that China has been a reliable partner for decades.
Now, that's not to say that there are no frictions, there are no disagreements.
But I think what difference that China's approach is that these trade differences or any sort of disagreements can be ironed out through dialogues, conversations and negotiations right rather than unilateral actions.
One of the concerns, of course, for many, not just Southeast Asian economies but also many of the global South economies, is that whether or not China will be able to continue to import more, whether or not, you know, China will welcome the kinds of production right in other parts of the world instead of, in a way, sort of monopolizing all the production and somehow leave other global size countries behind as far as industrialization is concerned.
And there are two important factors here, right?
One is that, as I mentioned earlier, I do believe that China's approach is about mutual respect, is about equality, is about win-win cooperation.
China never thinks that economics is a zero-sum game.
In fact, I think China believes that economics is about positive sum game.
So, in other words, we could together grow the pie bigger instead of always just trying to divide the pie, giving the existing size.
So if you get more, then I'll get less.
So I think, at least from an intention point of view, I do see, I don't see China is being trying to take advantage of other countries.
So I think China is an enabler, especially, you know, for many of the Southeast Asian economies.
I see that now more and more Chinese companies are going abroad.
You know BYD, CATL and many others are opening factories in Thailand, in Malaysia, in many other in Vietnam.
So I think these are important to sort of as a win-win cooperation, right, as an opportunity.
And China is doing the same thing, I think, with many African countries, to first help them to build infrastructure and also help to develop these industrial special economic zones.
I think that China is intentionally trying to kind of share the opportunities of industrialization right with the global South countries.
Now, of course, some countries are doing better job than others.
But I think it also takes many of these host countries some economic policies right and their own investments to really generate fruitful outcomes with a corporation such as China.
So that's one thing I wanted to emphasize.
And the second thing that I want to also emphasize is that it is written in China's five-year plan.
And it's not just the most recent one.
It's not only the 16th year. five-year plan.
But it has been for quite a while, at least decades, that China wants to boost its domestic consumption, domestic demand right, so to speak.
So I think it is the policy intention for China to increase its consumption domestically and therefore provide more imports opportunities for the rest of the world.
Now the difficulty, of course, is that we know that as China's income grows and as consumption level increases, a lot of consumption tilts toward services.
Because the service consumption in China now is still only about 50 percent of the total consumption and that there's a lot of room to grow.
And we also see that, for example, service consumption last year grew at the rate of 55 percent, compared to the retail sales growth, which is at 37.
So I think we're likely to see a lot more growth in consumption, but it is in service.
And of course, service is not as conducive to trade as merchandises, right?
You can easily buy and sell products, maybe not as easily to deliver services across borders.
So I think this is sort of a difficulty.
But that said, we also know that service trade is growing at three times the rate of merchandise trade.
So I think that also means there is tremendous opportunity.
As China continues to grow, as it continues to open its economy, as it continues to support its consumption growth, we're likely to see more demand from China for the rest of the world.
Professor Li Lun.
Building on what Professor Yan Liang mentioned domestically, How did consumption, investment and exports each contribute to China's 2025 growth?
And which sectors or industries stood out as new drivers?
Well, it's dangerous to do predictions because you know economists have a very bad reputation doing predictions.
But I do think broadly.
I definitely agree with Professor Yan that simply relying on product consumption is not enough.
So we definitely need to shift towards more service consumption.
So both because it's a more value added sector.
And also besides, you know consuming the product when you were, for example, if you go to a restaurant, you not only consume the meat and vegetables that's being used in cooking the dish, there's also, you know, jobs created because there are cooks, and also you know restaurant owners and so on and so forth.
So for other type of service, whether it's we're talking about online or whether we're talking about physical services.
So these are going to definitely be the pillar of the future.
And I think in terms of for a domestic perspective, I think Chinese government is a lot of.
The focus is on how to improve the welfare of Chinese citizens.
And I think we're taking a pretty different approach than a lot of different countries.
So I think our focus, as we have seen, is that to increase the disposable income of rural households, of poor or people in poverty.
And basically by lifting them out of poverty, we basically create a more demand for these people.
And also, on the other hand, by sending, for example, the trading policy and consumption coupons, we are further lowering the prices of some of the durable goods.
For example, for households that couldn't afford a vacuum cleaner or a big screen TV.
They can now afford it.
So this basically just gives the manufacturing sector more incentive to keep innovating, to keep investing, because you now have a larger and expanding consumer base when it comes to what previously thought as prestige or expensive goods.
But now they can enter more and more households.
So this basically incentivize investments in these manufacturing sectors.
And not to mention we have a, you know, very large investment in R&D.
So that means, you know, we can see, for example, AI devices, or you know AI glasses or these new product varieties very quickly.
So consumers not only buy existing products at a higher quantity or volume, they can also, you know, have the possibility of buying new products.
And these new products can further be exported to other countries, because you know you can't, for example.
It's a story like EV, right.
So if some other country you want to buy EV, there's a very high chance that the EV is from China by volume.
So I think when you met other product varieties, when you increase the market share and dominance in these other products, other new high-tech products, and that could increase our competitive edge on the export market as well.
So I think we do have a very close circle between consumption, investment and export, and that's all supported by government policy.
And also, I think it's all written in the 15th five-year plan.
I am very optimistic about this whole economic cycle working the way that it's designed to be.
Ladies and gentlemen, let's shift gears to a development this week.
According to the New York Times, in the latest Latin global university rankings based on academic output and impact, Zhejiang University ranked first worldwide, with seven Chinese universities in the global top 10, while several leading US universities fell in the rankings.
Professor Yan Liang, are we witnessing a breakthrough in China's so-called hard academic and innovation capacity?
What does this mean for China's economic and national strength over the next five years?
I think so.
I think this is a significant development in China.
When it comes to now, the quality of China's development in academics, in science and technology seem to be highly elevated.
And I think China has been always excelling in terms of science and development when it comes to producing large amounts of, for example, STEM graduates.
I think the number that is often cited is that China is producing four times as many STEM graduates as the United States per year.
And of course, now China's RD spending is reaching 27 of GDP, which is more than the OECD average.
Now, as you mentioned earlier, in terms of the university ranking, China is also top of the list.
So I think this shows that these are not individual single developments.
They all sort of point to the same direction, which is China is increasingly becoming much more in terms of innovation.
When it comes to technological development capability, China is really growing by leaps and bounds.
And when it comes to the implications, I think it's very clear that China's past growth model is based on intensive investments a lot of resources to put in that growth machine.
But I think China has made a pivot, I would say as early as 2017, when this idea of high quality development is really officially sort of launched.
And in the past couple of years, what we have heard a lot is China is now trying to develop the so-called high-quality productive forces in order to propel the kind of high-quality development.
And so what that means is that, on the one hand, China is going to continue to push through technological innovations and technological developments to cultivate some of the sort of cutting-edge technologies and the newly emerged sectors.
And, on the other hand, I think that China is really determined to adopt these technologies, to widely adopt these high tech and to transform the traditional industries right, such as manufacturing, to put it more in sort of concrete terms.
So the idea is, for example, China is now developing AI and using AI.
It is going to produce a lot of AI embodied products, such as humanoid robots.
And, with these humanoid robots, they will be deployed in advanced manufacturing and also in some of the service sectors, such as healthcare, to create a lot more breakthroughs in terms of drug developments and so on.
So you can see how this is an entire sort of an ecosystem that goes from technology development to technological deployment to really trying to promote the productivity growth not just in those high-tech sectors but really in a broader economy.
I think that is really the significance of all these technology development that you mentioned.
It's not just about R&D spending.
It's not just about trying to produce more STEM graduates.
It's not just about one sort of deep seat model.
It is not about one highly ranked universities, but it is a really holistic strategy that develop technologies on the one hand, but really deploy and diffuse the technologies on the other.
Combine it with you know which markets.
And also with the complete supply chain, industrial value chain, to really create the productivity growth and to create a lot of values that I think again benefits not just the Chinese economy but, I think, for many of other countries in the world as well.
Professor Li Lun, how do you view this ranking?
Is this driven more by sustained national investment in education and science or by closer integration between universities and technology companies?
For example, Zhejiang is located around huge tech giants like Alibaba in Hangzhou, which is China's Silicon Valley.
What's your take on that?
Yeah, so I don't think it's a single example of Zhejiang University.
I just counted the latent global ranking of the top 20 universities using the latent measures.
Of those 20, if I'm correct, 14 of those are Chinese universities.
So we're seeing a total upgrading of Chinese universities in terms of its publication.
So I have to mention that these latent measures, they don't measure the level of teaching.
So they're basically all built on the output of publication, the citation, the impact factor, the level of collaboration of researchers.
That's built from the web of science data.
So it's Basically you can think of it as a non-perfect measure of innovation, because publishing a paper doesn't directly mean you innovated something.
But still I think it's a very meaningful signal that China has attracted a lot of global talent to participate in China's research system.
And I think a very exciting feature about China's academia and research system is that the scale and speed are extraordinary, because once you, for example, participate in a research project, especially for STEM majors or especially AI, advanced manufacturing materials or energy related it's very likely that your research breakthrough can be enter these and basically to commercialize in a couple of years or in a single year.
We have seen, for example, commercialized aerospace in low attitude economy evolve in just a matter of a year or two.
So basically, this is what's so exciting about China's whole ecosystem of RD, of China's universities.
I do think, you know, it's going to have some spill over for consumers as well.
Just as I mentioned, because you know, when we have more innovation, when we have high, better technology, it's going to create better products, more interesting or more innovative products for consumer to use.
And we're going to see more different kind of services.
For example, if humanoid robot are being commercialized.
Right now we can see, you know, in some museums, in some hotels as well, but it's not widely adapted.
But imagine a world where human robot not only enters the factory line but also enters households.
Then we are going to unlock the huge potential area for development because elderly care, childcare maybe you know you can use the robot to walk your dog, and so on and so forth.
That's only one product.
So you can also expect, for example, new materials being used in ships or using cars, and so on and so forth.
So I do think this is a very positive signal the Leiden ranking that the global researchers begin to see that the Chinese colleagues at Chinese universities are producing these high quality research results.
And it's definitely going to have some deeper consequences beyond only university and academia.
Professor Peter Chang from this realm academic output and impact.
How do you assess the trajectory of China's high-tech sector over the next five years?
Can I just put this, approach this from the Global South and ASEAN perspective?
China's remarkable scholastic achievement, scientific breakthrough is really, truly amazing.
We are seeing this happening almost in any arena, especially with the AI revolution.
But for us here in Southeast Asia, there is this concern that we want China to build our bullet train, but we do not want to be mere passengers.
We want to be drivers as well.
So this is in the context of technological transfer.
And we hope that China will be able to.
As China advances ahead, far ahead, the rest of the world.
We do not want to be left behind.
So we hope that, through universities like Zhejiang and others, There is an opportunity in which countries like us in Malaysia and Southeast Asia will be able to tap into your expertise.
There is, I understand, a push right now for China's universities to go global, to go out to establish a partnership and branch campuses and things like that.
In Malaysia, we have Xiamen University establish a full campus here already.
These are critical steps towards sharing knowledge and technological transfer.
But, you know, it's easier said than done.
It takes a lot of commitment.
It takes a long-term investment for both sides to want to do that.
I think for us in Global South and Southeast Asia, as we look at the amazing transformation within China, we want to be part of that as well.
But that will require a lot of commitment on both sides.
We are obviously very excited about the robotics, the humanoids and the AI.
For the longest time, investment from abroad come to Malaysia and Southeast Asia.
When you build factories, you create jobs.
But there is really this concern that the next revolution, when manufacturing does come to Malaysia, there will not be any jobs to be created.
This is also a potential challenge that we face.
Our human resources, our human capital will be left behind.
We may not be able to fully engage in the next industrial revolution 4.0.
And here, I think, again, in the context of technological transfer, China could really help.
But these are challenges ahead.
As much as we are excited about the promises and the potentials that AI and robotics will bring and we could see beyond the horizon there are challenges lying ahead.
And we've got to address that.
One of those challenges are how to integrate our relatively young demographic in Southeast Asia.
A lot of our younger demographic populations will find difficulty in integrating themselves into this AI-driven economy.
And I think on that score, I think China and ASEAN and other schools should really come together and address that as well.
Professor Yan Liang, how do you see these expectations of developing countries Regarding China's advances in technology?
How can China's development opportunities translate into growth for them as well?
What's China's stance on this?
I think this is really a great question.
I think from China's own development experience learning by doing and welcoming foreign investors to create not only just the competitive environment but also transfer technology that has been really important for China's own growth.
I do believe that China has been talking about this shared prosperity.
And I also think that, with a lot of Chinese companies now are going abroad, they are going to create jobs and share technologies.
Now I think we could debate about whether or not it is in China's intention and interest right to transfer those I would say you know cutting edge or really sort of leading technologies.
Or China is probably not going to sort of share all the technologies in masters.
Right.
But really create some sort of a tier system similar to the old paradigm of flying geese.
But I think in terms of technology transfer, I do see this is what China has been doing.
And I think this has been a trend.
Well, just look at China's outward direct investment.
I think we just got a new report that showed in 2021.
China's overseas direct investment, or ODI, has reached 174 billion, which is a 7 growth from a year earlier.
And that puts China as the top three foreign direct investors for nine years in a row.
And so China's outward investment has created over 2 million jobs on average every year.
In other words, I think as China's companies going abroad, and I think in the past a lot of these are.
They were enterprises, right.
A lot have to do with infrastructure construction or certain types of technologies, utilities and so on.
Now I think more and more we're seeing private enterprises like Huawei BYD CATL, and they are going abroad.
And so I think inevitably, when they go abroad they will create some jobs and they will bring certain technologies with them and they will train the local workers to perform productive work.
That's why I think it's very likely it is also in China's own interest as you exhaust the domestic kind of resources or workers, as we know that China's population growth has been declining.
And so eventually there will be some sort of labor force shortage.
On the one hand, China is deploying a lot of robots to compensate for that.
But then I think at the same time it would make sense for a lot of production to go in a third market to serve the third market.
So I do see this as being a trend for China to continue to open factories abroad, create jobs there and share technologies with various local governments.
That said, I also agree with Professor Chang it takes two to tango, so it also takes local governments.
They would need to implement advisable policies to attract Chinese investments.
They would need to build their own infrastructure and invest in their own people, so then they will be able to enhance their technological absorptive capacity.
But I am optimistic that this kind of shared opportunities, women cooperation are going to be unfolding in the near future.
Now, last but not the least, I also agree, it is a common challenge.
It's not just Southeast Asian economies or any other economies, I think is a common challenge for all countries when it comes to AI development, robotics and how it may replace jobs.
You know, we of course hear a lot of very scary sort of predictions coming from Elon Musk or others that in the next three to seven years we're going to see jobs disappearing.
So I think it is a common challenge and how to cope with these kinds of challenges is definitely pays, not only just individual country and their government's efforts but, I think, some cooperative and collaborative kind of measures, because otherwise it would be a race to the bottom.
Professor Li Lun, how do you see other countries' expectations for China's development in 2026 or in the next five years period, whether in technology, green growth or other areas, be it from developing nations in the global south or increasingly attentive Western countries, as Professor Chong earlier pointed out?
Yeah, I think Professor Chong pointed out a very important point.
So what I want to say to this is that Chinese companies not only offer these final products, they also offer the so-called intermediate products that you can use for the production of other products.
So I think the story I want to share is in the case of Turkey.
We have seen that in 2025, Turkey have increased their registered EV for 100.
If you look at the breakdown of these EVs, actually a Turkish domestic brand called TOG is the most popular EV brand, not a Chinese brand.
But if you look at, for example, the manufacturing, the components of this car, a lot of the components are actually from Chinese suppliers.
What I want to say is that the expansion, for example, of our EV or technology doesn't mean that Chinese brand going to dominate the market of every country.
Just the opposite, because the external competition, but also because of providing a reliable and predictable supply chain.
If, for example, in the case of Turkey, when they want to build a domestic car brand, they can easily find the suppliers, the components that's being used to assemble the car they want for their domestic markets.
So I think similarly for ASEAN countries and other European countries as well.
I think the most important thing is to find the trade partner, not only in terms of final goods, but also for intermediate goods, for supply chain and also in terms of innovation.
I think transfer or spillover of knowledge is one thing, but coming up with your own brand or based on features of domestic market, having the own innovation but being supported by the strong manufacturing capacity of Chinese supply chain.
I think that's a more realistic and also a quite feasible objective.
Thanks, Professor.
And thanks to all of our panelists for those valuable insights.
Yan Liang, professor of economics at Willamette University.
Peter Chan, former deputy director at the Institute of China Studies at University of Malaya.
And Li Lun, assistant professor of economics at Peking University.
That's all the time for this edition of World Today.
I'm Gui Anna.
Thank you so much for listening.
Bye for now.
